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Abstract 
This dissertation reshapes our understanding of the earliest years of American psychology by 
documenting the discipline’s methodological plurality from its very inception. In tracing the use 
of questionnaires over the first half century of the discipline’s existence as a science, I argue that 
a natural historical orientation, wherein collection, analysis, and categorization are central to the 
scientific enterprise, has been a persistent facet of the field. Manifested in a recurrent interest in 
collecting information on mental life, this natural historical perspective facilitated a moral 
economy of data, wherein the discipline’s affect-laden norms and values sanctified the objects 
and practices of mass data collection. This in turn lent itself to the adoption of statistical analyses 
as a central component of psychological science. Although, at first glance, falling outside of the 
bounds of the mechanically objective practices that characterized the new psychology’s 
laboratory endeavours, with their use of standardized instrumentation, projects with this 
orientation adhered to this form of objectivity in their own way. Seeking precise accounts of 
mental life, including information on its physical correlates, these enterprises engaged the public 
in collection practices in the field. Taking up subjects with widespread interest outside of purely 
scientific spheres – including child study, psychical matters, and dreaming – questionnaire 
projects had broad appeal. Undertakings with less popular allure deliberately and necessarily 
confined themselves to more restricted university populations. Issues of social relevance 
remained mainstays of this kind of research, but by the 1920s the public’s relation to 
questionnaire research shifted so that they were no longer active participants in collecting 
activities. Instead, questionnaires were circulated in more restricted circumstances and their 
findings served as the basis for broad claims about the state of the public’s mind. To do so 
effectively, I argue, practices of collecting with questionnaires shifted from thick to thin 
 iii 
description; no longer were rich descriptive accounts of mental life the aim of these endeavours. 
Rather, increasingly restricted ranges of information were accumulated, a process that 
culminated in the development of numerical Likert scales and the use of more sophisticated 
statistical analyses. Scales of this kind continue to dominate questionnaire research today. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Questionnaires are ubiquitous. Regular components of contemporary psychological 
research, they have also moved beyond scientific spheres to feature regularly in our everyday 
lives. Whether used to assess perfectionism or attitudes toward political candidates, these 
instruments now pervade the many domains of our existence. How is it that the questionnaire is 
now our preferred means of gathering information on any and everything? When and why did 
psychology adopt this mode of inquiry? What shape did early research with the method take? 
And what are the intricacies of practice that attended the use of this method? 
This project tracks the use of questionnaires within American psychology over the first half 
century of the discipline’s existence as a science. In tracing the questionnaire’s early trajectory, I 
argue that a natural historical orientation, wherein collection, analysis, and categorization are 
central to the scientific enterprise, has been a persistent facet of the field from the very 
beginning. Manifested in a recurrent interest in collecting information on mental life, this natural 
historical perspective facilitated a moral economy of data, wherein the discipline’s unspoken 
affect-laden norms and values sanctified the objects and practices of mass data collection. This in 
turn lent itself to the adoption of statistical analyses as a central component of psychological 
science. Although, at first glance, falling outside of the bounds of the mechanically objective 
practices that characterized the new psychology’s laboratory endeavours, with their use of 
standardized instrumentation, projects with this orientation adhered to this form of objectivity in 
their own way. Seeking precise accounts of mental life, including information on its physical 
correlates, these enterprises engaged the public in collection practices in the field. Taking up 
subjects with widespread interest outside of purely scientific spheres – including child study, 
psychical matters, and dreaming – questionnaire projects had broad appeal. Undertakings with 
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less popular allure deliberately and necessarily confined themselves to more restricted university 
populations. Issues of social relevance remained mainstays of this kind of research, but by the 
1920s the public’s relation to questionnaire research shifted so that they were no longer active 
participants in collecting activities. Instead, questionnaires were circulated in more restricted 
circumstances and their findings served as the basis for broad claims about the state of the 
public’s mind. To do so effectively, I argue, practices of collecting with questionnaires shifted 
from thick to thin description; no longer were rich descriptive accounts of mental life the aim of 
these endeavours. Rather, increasingly restricted ranges of information were accumulated, a 
process that culminated in the development of numerical Likert scales and the use of more 
sophisticated statistical analyses.1  
In documenting the collecting practices of early American psychologists, this study 
provides a counterpoint to the extensive historiography of the psychological laboratory and its 
role in legitimating the new psychology as a science (e.g., Capshew, 1992; Coon, 1993; Kroker, 
2003; Morawski, 1988b). The rhetoric of experimentation and the locating of psychology as a 
laboratory-based science were crucial for the establishment of the field, and have been amply 
documented in disciplinary histories. The new psychology coalesced around the ability to render 
mental functions observable, notably innovations that allowed for the measurement of the speed 
of various mental processes (Benschop & Draaisma, 2000). Together with psychophysical 
investigations that directly linked physical stimuli with the psychological experience of such, 
                                                
1 This project is self-consciously not a history of each and every questionnaire-based 
research project in first decades of American scientific psychology. Hundreds of questionnaires 
were constructed, distributed, and compiled during the time period covered in this project. A 
complete accounting of each of these projects is not simply infeasible, but would not, in and of 
itself, prove particularly informative. Consequently, I address only a fraction of these 
questionnaire-based investigations and focus instead on the range of subjects inquired into, as 
well as the nuances of practice associated with these kinds of instruments. 
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psychology emerged as a science rooted in laboratory practice. Despite this self-conscious 
positioning of their work within the laboratory, psychologists retained interest in mental 
functions that could not easily be investigated via reaction time experiments or psychophysical 
studies. Although methodologically suspect to some, questionnaires provided a means of 
studying these otherwise unobservable mental states beyond the confines of the single, anecdotal 
case.2  
Spanning the final days of Gilded Age America, continuing through the reform oriented 
Progressive Era, and ending in the socially turbulent times of post-World War I America, this 
account of questionnaire research shows how the discipline regularly sought to study topics of 
widespread interest. Although the laboratory is often emphasized as the defining feature of the 
discipline’s establishment this was by no means the only site of scientific practice. Taking place 
in the field, broadly conceived, questionnaire research was especially well-equipped to address 
culturally popular issues of the day. Much of the questionnaire-based research I engage with is 
situated in the final decades of the nineteenth century, during the rise of the Progressive era. In 
part, the shape of scientific psychology at this time is a reflection of this period’s overarching 
concern with social reform and widespread faith in science as the means of achieving a better 
world.3 This is seen most clearly in psychology’s involvement in educational matters from the 
very beginning of the discipline. The field billed itself as the key to scientifically reforming 
educational practices in a way that would produce social benefit (e.g., Cattell, 1890). In doing so, 
it ensured the discipline a place in the national conversation and established the roots of the later 
applied psychology that took shape in the early twentieth century. Even in those instances where 
                                                
2 For an illuminating discussion of the role of the case in the psy-disciplines, especially 
the psychoanalytic case history, see Forrester (1996). 
3 On this era in American history see Hofstadter (1955), Lears (1981, 2009), and Wiebe 
(1967). 
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direct intervention in prominent social issues was not the aim, as was the case with child study, 
those adopting the questionnaire method nonetheless engaged with subjects of popular interest 
and their attendant publics. The co-opting of cultural practices for scientific investigation is not 
unique to the American context, as Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau (2013) documents a similar 
process in France with respect to the adoption of automatic writing as an object of psychological 
study.4 Psychology consumed the cultural practices surrounding it, making clear the porous 
boundary between cultural and scientific practices more generally. 
To date, relatively little has been written on the history of the questionnaire within 
psychology, especially in its very early forms.5 Even for those individuals whose work has been 
amply documented – G. Stanley Hall, William James, Joseph Jastrow, and Mary Whiton Calkins 
– very little attention has been paid to the specifics of their questionnaire research.6 This kind of 
psychological research was oriented around practices of collection. Addressing this gap in the 
historical record, this dissertation investigates the myriad of ways in which collecting figured 
into the practice of psychology at the end of the nineteenth and into the early twentieth centuries. 
This history of collecting practices within psychology takes the questionnaire as a prominent 
collecting technology employed by the discipline during this period. Using questionnaires 
involved enlisting into the data collection enterprise a wide swath of individuals, most notably 
those who fell outside the privileged realm of the educated and elite. These individuals were 
charged with accumulating data via questionnaires crafted, publicized, and printed by other, 
nominally expert individuals. The success of these kinds of investigations was predicated upon 
                                                
4 Bacopoulos-Viau (2013) also addresses the subsequent adoption of automatic writing 
into another cultural milieu, that of literary expression. 
5 The most notable exceptions to this are Bordogna (2005, pp. 107–8), Danziger (1990, p. 
75), Gault (1907), and Young (2012a, 2012b). 
6 Among the most relevant sources on each are Bordogna (2008), Scarborough and 
Furumoto (1987), Pettit (2013b), and Ross (1972). 
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the labour of the former group. Yet, within this endeavour there remained a clear delineation of 
responsibility between the often socially diverse body of lay individuals involved in data 
collection and the experts charged with interpreting the mass of facts they accumulated.7 An 
expansion of our understanding of who the participants in early psychological research 
endeavours were, the positions they occupied, and the practices of their involvement is a central 
aim of this project. 
Collecting information was, of course, only the first step. Following the amassing of a bulk 
of data on mental life was the challenge of sorting, classifying, and analyzing this material. This 
process, unlike collection activities, was largely confined to trained experts. Constructing a 
synthetic whole from what were initially masses of descriptive accounts was a difficulty not fully 
surmounted for decades. This depended in large measure on changes in the construction of 
questionnaires, as well as the development of tabulating technologies that could process large 
masses of newly numerical data. Underlying the adoption of the questionnaire method was the, 
not always clearly articulated, conviction that large amounts of data were scientifically valuable. 
Masses of information held an inherent appeal for many. Investigators employing questionnaires 
during the first decades of American psychology faced an incompatibility between the nature of 
the data they were collecting and their aspirations for its use. Accumulating rich, thick 
descriptions of personal mental experiences, they endeavoured not to understand this material at 
the level of the individual, but rather in terms of the mass. This aspiration left many 
overwhelmed in the face of reams of descriptive responses and ambivalent about the method’s 
value to the discipline. Only with developments in the construction of questionnaires that 
allowed for the collection of directly numerical data was this difficulty surmounted. 
                                                
7 A historical account of the category of the “expert” is provided in Gooday (2008). 
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Danziger (1985) has termed this orientation toward studying populations the Clark model 
in recognition of the preponderance of this kind of research at Clark University in the 1890s. In 
many respects this is misleading as these kinds of endeavours date earlier and involve a larger 
contingent of the psychological community than heretofore recognized. Missing too from this 
discussion is any recognition of the role of intermediary figures in the data collection process. 
Danziger’s aim of explicating the relationship between subject and experimenter, while 
sufficiently constitutive of much psychological research, obscures the contributions of other 
kinds of individuals including the educators so much a part of the Clark model of research. At 
the same time, there are unremarked upon continuities between the Clark model and the 
laboratory-based Leipzig model, particularly in terms of emphasis on training and expertise as a 
necessary part of the scientific process, as well as the continued assignation of responses to 
specific individuals in at least some of the reports of questionnaire research. The restriction of 
“statistics” in his analysis to techniques for manipulating numerical data also obscures the 
discipline’s long preoccupation with statistical studies, in the broader sense of inquiries which 
accumulated large quantities of information of whatever form. The division of psychological 
practice according to Danziger’s tripartite scheme of Leipzig, Paris (or clinical), and Clark 
models, while valuable in terms of explicating the social dynamics of the research situation, if 
adopted uncritically, obscures both other forms of difference as well as commonalities across 
these forms of practice. This is especially apparent in this inquiry into early questionnaire 
research.  
The Nature of Questionnaires 
By the 1880s questionnaires were a well-known method of investigating psychological 
matters, referred to variously as circulars, blanks, schedules, syllabi, and questionnaries, in 
 7 
addition to the now familiar term questionnaires.8 Even given longstanding popular awareness of 
this mode of inquiry, questionnaires remain surprisingly difficult instruments to define. They are 
at once incredibly simple and decidedly complex. We know, almost intuitively, what a 
questionnaire is, but describing their characteristic features can be challenging. At base 
questionnaires are both material objects and a set of rules for collecting information (see 
Gundlach, 2007). As instruments they comprise no more than a list of questions, which is 
reproduced and circulated with the aim of amassing information.9 Depending on the 
circumstance, the set of questions might be printed individually or, for expediency in 
distribution, reprinted within the pages of popular and scientific periodicals. However 
disseminated, placing questionnaires in the hands of a multitude of individuals is central to the 
effort to have large numbers of individuals respond to a set of questions and provide this 
information to an investigator. Only once this process of distribution, circulation, and return is 
completed is the questionnaire fully constituted. 
As items used to produce scientific data, questionnaires fall within the larger category of 
scientific instruments (Gundlach, 2007; Sturm & Ash, 2005). Although not laboratory apparatus 
of the type often associated with the early years of psychology as a distinct discipline, 
questionnaires are nonetheless psychological instruments. As such questionnaires facilitate the 
adoption of specific scientific and social practices. From the earliest iterations of these 
instruments within psychology, the practices attendant to their use influenced their very form. 
Placed in the hands of inexpert individuals, the specificity of questions and the degree of detail 
provided in instructions to those collecting data were critical. At the same time, alterations to the 
                                                
8 The latter term, questionnary, is unique in its use by Edward Titchener and clearly 
aligned by him with the work undertaken by Galton and Hall (see Titchener, 1901, pp. 387–8).  
9 The more general role of lists in science has also been addressed (Delbourgo, 2012; 
Delbourgo & Müller-Wille, 2012; Müller-Wille & Charmantier, 2012). 
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composition of questionnaires allowed them to be recalibrated for various ends by investigators 
possessing different interests and agendas. As printed lists of questions questionnaires also 
operate as a kind of “paper tool” (Kaiser, 2005; Klein, 2003), facilitating not only the description 
of pre-existing knowledge about the world, but creating objects and order where none existed 
before.10 In some respects, it was only in the 1930s that questionnaires were fully realized as 
paper tools. The emergence of Likert scaling provided a systematic means of ordering and 
representing aspects of mental life often lacking in earlier efforts with these kinds of instruments. 
The form of psychological questionnaire we are most familiar with today – where 
agreement or disagreement with particular statements is indicated via selection from a numerical 
scale – marks the very end of my story. Decades before the development of scales of this type, 
questionnaires were well-worn instruments in psychology. Occasionally involving the collection 
of information along discrete dimensions, including items to be completed with simple yes or no 
responses, early questionnaires more often consisted of open-ended questions to which 
individuals were free to respond with as little or as much descriptive detail as they desired. 
Depending on the investigation, descriptions could be procured directly from the individual 
whose experience was being reported, from observations made by others of the individuals, or 
from accounts gleaned from hearsay or read about in books. The aim, often, was simply to amass 
as many accounts of experience as possible. It was only decades into the twentieth century that 
the shape of questionnaires changed. No longer were descriptive accounts the mainstay of these 
instruments. Instead, the construction of questionnaires was radically altered so that only a 
restricted range of answers was permissible. 
                                                
10 Extensive discussion of research tools in scientific practice is provided in Clarke and 
Fujimura (1992). 
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In their earliest iterations questionnaires served, in some respects, as means of collecting 
multitudes of case studies all at once. As Forrester (1996) notes in his discussion of 
psychoanalytic case histories, cases are often divorced from the individual, circulating as 
disembodied dossiers of information. To some degree, responses to questionnaires operated in 
the same manner. These instruments produced extensive descriptive accounts of personal 
experience and information in responses was rarely associated with an identifiable individual. 
Even in instances where some characteristics of the respondent were attached to their data, 
readers would be hard pressed to identify a subject from these pieces. This is, in part, a reflection 
of perhaps the most glaring distinction between case studies proper and information collected via 
questionnaire. The former are far more interested in producing, as far as possible, a full account 
of an individual’s given circumstances, while the latter often attended only to a small subset of 
this personal experience. Generally targeted toward the collection of information on specific 
topics, questionnaires necessarily reduced individuals to pieces in order to construct a larger 
whole. Only in doing so could an account of aggregate functioning with respect to a particular 
topic be produced. 
The practice of collecting information on various aspects of human experience via lists of 
questions, circulated among those with access to these experiences, was not a development 
unique to psychology. Decades before psychology began to take shape as a discipline, this mode 
of data collection was well established among European anthropologists who printed queries 
intended to serve as ethnographic instructions to collectors (Sera-Shriar, 2014; Urry, 1993). In 
this field questionnaires were effective means of gathering information regarding peoples in far-
flung locales. In the earliest years of the new psychology, the boundary between psychology and 
anthropology was itself porous. This is most evident in undertakings like the Torres Strait 
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expedition, which was as much a psychological as anthropological inquiry (Herle & Rouse, 
1998; Martin, 2013), as well as in the positioning of the psychology exhibit at the 1893 World’s 
Columbian Exposition within the Department of Ethnology (Shore, 2001). Ultimately, 
psychologists were less interested in putting these tools to work in amassing information on 
foreign peoples, but they nonetheless found questionnaires beneficial in the accumulation of 
masses of data on psychological life. In adopting the method, previous anthropological uses of 
questionnaires were invoked as evidence of the practice’s legitimacy, especially the use of lay 
individuals as data collectors.11 Similarly invoked was work in this vein by Charles Darwin. 
More important still, was Francis Galton’s use of this method, as well as studies undertaken by 
German pedagogical societies, both of which served as direct models for some of the earliest 
questionnaire-based inquiries in American psychology (see Chapters 1 & 3). As these lines of 
influence suggest, psychological questionnaires were by no means unique to the American 
context and investigators within the United States were well aware of similar undertakings 
occurring elsewhere.12 This project is restricted to work with psychological questionnaires within 
a singular national context, leaving the use of psychological questionnaires in other locales for 
future researchers. 
As collecting technologies, questionnaires have much in common with surveys and polls. 
There exists a rich literature on the history of both social surveys and opinion polling (Bales, 
1996; Bulmer, Bales, & Sklar, 1991; Converse, 1987; Greenwald & Anderson, 1996; Groves, 
2011; Igo, 2007; Katz & Sugrue, 1998; D. J. Robinson, 1999; Yeo, 2003), but little has thus far 
been written on the history of the questionnaire. Though similar, questionnaires are distinct from 
                                                
11 See, for instance, Hall (1895a, p. 36, 1924, p. 392). 
12 In addition to British and German investigations, questionnaires were employed in 
psychological research in France. Discussion of Galton’s questionnaire-based inquiries can be 
found in Burbridge (1994, 2001). 
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these other approaches in part because of the function to which each are put. Questionnaires are 
employed with the aim of amassing facts that science might then interpret. In contrast, social 
surveys and opinion polls, while also used to collect large amounts of data, are more the domain 
of those with, respectively, reformist and commercial or political interests. Surveys, in particular, 
often target specific populations, seeking to reveal details unique to their social existence.13 
Psychological questionnaires, in contrast, are often distributed to any and all who might provide 
responses with the goal of amassing information on the human condition on a broad scale. While 
both may employ a list of questions to gather data, their aims are decidedly different. Even still, 
the line between methods can be hard to locate. Consider historian Robert Brain’s (2001) work 
on Max Weber’s early twentieth century investigation of workers’ lives. Brain switches easily 
between the use of the term questionnaire and that of survey to describe Weber’s investigation, 
which he argues was informed not just by efforts to extend the measurement practices of the 
laboratory to mass investigation, but also an understanding of social measurement drawn not 
from the natural, but from the historical sciences. A distinctly sociological project, Weber’s 
questionnaires are put to a very different use than those of psychologists. Even within more 
psychological realms, the term questionnaire has at times been employed rather loosely, such as 
in the Edison Questionnaire, a series of questions devised by Thomas Edison and administered to 
job applicants in the 1920s. Despite its title, this instrument falls more within the category of 
mental tests, as its intent was individual evaluation rather than mass description (Dennis, 1984). 
Styles of Scientific Thinking 
The adoption of the questionnaire in psychological investigations by a multitude of 
individuals is clear evidence of the methodological plurality of the new psychology as it emerged 
                                                
13 Along similar lines, undercover investigations of into the lives and conditions of 
particular social groups were also undertaken (see Pittenger, 2012). 
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in the United States.14 In addressing the nature of early questionnaire-based research, this project 
draws from the literature on styles of scientific thinking. Alistair Crombie (1994), Ian Hacking 
(1982, 2002), and John Pickstone (2001) have each articulated a similar series of recurrent styles 
of reasoning in science. The questionnaire method, with its aim of collecting, classifying, and 
analyzing masses of information, operated within what has been identified as a natural historical 
or taxonomic style of scientific reasoning, in contrast to the experimental style that characterized 
those psychologists whose work involved experimentation within laboratory spaces.15 Historian 
Katherine Pandora (1997) has detailed the role of this kind of perspective within the field from 
the 1930s, particularly in the work of psychologists Gordon Allport, Gardner Murphy, and Lois 
Barclay Murphy. Extending this characterization, I document the presence of a natural historical 
orientation within the discipline from its very inception. Those employing questionnaires did not 
reject the idea of psychology as a science, nor did they reject the importance of laboratory spaces 
or the role of specialized training. Instead, they drew on a different brand of scientific 
epistemology for authority, explicitly aligning their work with natural history. Promoting a 
broader understanding of the scientific basis of the field, one that included the accumulation of 
information from diverse, non-specialist sources, they adopted multiple styles of scientific 
reasoning and a more accommodating understanding of objectivity.  
Experimentation and work with questionnaires involved different styles of scientific 
reasoning, but at the level of discourse no definite distinction between the two forms of practice 
was made. The recognition that experimental investigations may reveal causal relations, while 
                                                
14 Further discussion of the breadth of the new psychology’s methods can be found in 
Pettit (2008). 
15 In many respects, this characterization is in line with Danziger’s (1990) distinction 
between Galtonian and Wundtian traditions in psychology. A now classic account of 
experimentation as a form of knowledge production can be found in Shapin and Schaffer (1985). 
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commonplace today, is missing in late-nineteenth century debate over the use of questionnaires 
in psychological research.16 As a means by which psychological data might be generated 
questionnaires, like the category of mental tests, were often understood as experiments (see 
Winston & Blais, 1996). This reflects the fact that for psychologists at the time the experiment 
was an incredibly broad category, encompassing nearly any undertaking that produced data on 
mental life. Even still, there was a clear difference between the experimental work conducted in 
psychological laboratories and that undertaken with questionnaires. The kind of knowledge 
obtainable through each mode of inquiry was unmistakably different. Laboratory-based 
experimental studies in the Wundtian tradition, pursued knowledge of the generalized normal, 
white, adult, male mind (Danziger, 1990). In contrast, questionnaires offered an avenue by which 
to document and dissect information on a wider range of human mentality. Although this project 
documents the role of the questionnaire within the new psychology, the history of this particular 
psychological instrument is not told in isolation. Within the methodologically diverse territory of 
the new psychology, investigators were not necessarily committed to a singular mode of inquiry. 
Instead, the same investigator at times adopted different methods, and in some instances 
employed multiple methods within a single research project. Similarly, some subjects of inquiry 
were subject to multiple investigations by different psychologists, each adopting different kinds 
of investigatory practices. Just what these various practices afforded researchers is explored in 
the context of a variety of questionnaire-based projects.  
                                                
16 The breadth of the meaning of the term experiment in early psychology, and the 1930s 
standardization of the term to refer to investigations involving independent and dependent 
variables capable of revealing causal relations, is discussed in Winston (1990; 1996). Throughout 
this project, I engage the term experiment as a means of juxtaposing questionnaire inquiries with 
contemporaneous endeavours that were explicitly non-questionnaire-based and that often took 
place within laboratory spaces. Although cognizant of the potential anachronism of employing 
this narrow definition of experiment in a period where this was not yet the established meaning, 
the expository simplicity of doing so has, ultimately, prevailed in the face of this concern. 
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Still more distinguishing features between these two modes of inquiry, as articulated at the 
time, were the places and people involved in each. Those associated with questionnaire-based 
research were seen as questionable sources of scientific knowledge. Research with 
questionnaires largely shunned the laboratory in favour of the accumulation of information in the 
field.17 The standardization of laboratory spaces and their associated instrumentation allowed 
laboratories to serve as “truth-spots,” what Thomas Gieryn (2002) has characterized as spaces in 
which scientific claims that transcend the bounds of place may be generated. It was the 
laboratory as site of psychological practice that was crucial to the discipline’s assertion of its 
status as a science (Capshew, 1992; Morawski, 1988b).18 For naturalistic collection projects 
employing questionnaires, place was crucial in a very different sense. Data were to be collected 
not in the sanctified spaces of laboratories, but in the unregulated environment of the field. The 
legitimacy of data, in this case, was predicated upon the very naturalness of settings in which 
information was amassed, as it was only in these spaces that unadulterated mental life could be 
found.  
Not only was the field, by definition, unstandardized, so too were collectors and the 
instruments of collection employed therein. Much of the early questionnaire research in 
psychology relied on the assistance of untrained individuals in data collection efforts. Their 
participation was, for many, antithetical to the discipline’s efforts to claim dominion over the 
territory of the mind. Questionnaires themselves were piecemeal productions, largely 
unstandardized across investigations, unlike the instrumentation of the laboratory which was 
                                                
17 On the relation between laboratory and field in biology see Kohler (2002). On the role 
of fieldwork in science, particularly its role in anthropological investigations, see Kuklick 
(2011), Kuklick and Kohler (1996), and Sera-Shriar (2014). 
18 The ideal of the laboratory was by no means unique to psychology. For discussion of 
the laboratory’s role in American sociology see Owens (2014). 
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specially calibrated in an attempt to ensure precise measurements (Benschop & Draaisma, 2000; 
Coon, 1993; Kroker, 2003). The flexibility of the questionnaire method, in terms of who, where, 
and what might be used to collect data, was appealing to many as it allowed for the study of a 
diverse array of psychological topics. At the same time, the lack of standardization of space, 
instrument, and user was problematic. Employing untrained individuals in scientific practice, 
even if only in highly circumscribed roles, was seen by some as a threat to the professional 
standing of trained psychologists, putting in jeopardy the entire enterprise of scientific 
psychology. Seeking scientific and social standing, these psychologists were unsympathetic, if 
not outright dismissive of, the use of questionnaires to generate psychological knowledge.  
In venturing out of the laboratory and including the public in the research process, 
questionnaire projects violated standards of objectivity central to the discipline’s scientific 
identity. These kinds of investigations did not conform to the mechanical objectivity central to 
laboratory-based research. This kind of objectivity involved the production of scientific 
knowledge by machine-like means, something that could involve mechanical devices either 
literally or metaphorically (Daston & Galison, 2010; T. M. Porter, 1995). Psychologists pursued 
this kind of objectivity through the use of standardized instrumentation in laboratory spaces, but 
also through specialized training that in effect transformed individual psychologists into 
mechanical operators of the mind (Coon, 1993; C. D. Green, 2010; Kroker, 2003). The inclusion 
of untrained members of the public in the research process, and as sources of information about 
the mind, undermined psychologists’ own claims to expertise, ones largely grounded on 
specialized training in the field.19 By involving untrained, and therefore what some 
                                                
19 Much like Green (2010), I do not see the emphasis on training in early American 
psychology as an adherence to Daston and Galison’s (2010) epistemic virtue of trained 
judgment. Within this scheme expertise is to include specific individual aptitudes such as skilled 
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contemporaries considered as untrustworthy, individuals in the research process, the resultant 
knowledge was suspect. The social nature of knowledge production in science is predicated on 
trust, which for psychologists was rooted in training.20 Mechanical objectivity and expertise were 
not completely absent from questionnaire-based research, but their presence was far more 
circumscribed than in other forms of psychological practice at the time. 
Collecting Practices and Data Gathering 
This study of the questionnaire in early American psychology builds upon a growing 
literature on collections and collecting practices (e.g., Crane, 2000; Fabian, 2010; Findlen, 1994; 
Kohler, 2006, 2007, 2008; Strasser, 2012a). As historian of science Robert Kohler (2007) 
observes, 
…collecting is not a simple act of gathering but an unusually complex social and cultural 
practice. At the core of each collecting science are procedures for finding, selecting, 
extracting, recording, and transporting objects from field to storage vault. No less 
necessary are strategies of designing and assembling collections to serve some definite 
scientific purpose; methods of ordering and classifying objects for ready retrieval or 
public display; and the arts of preserving and curating that make collections of fragile 
objects permanent. All scientists are finders (in one way or another); only collecting 
scientists are also keepers. (p. 432) 
As Kohler recognizes, collecting is a part of most, if not all, sciences but there are some sciences 
and some scientists for whom collecting is a much more central concern. Within the new 
                                                                                                                                                       
observation and interpretation. In contrast, psychology’s emphasis on training is more closely 
aligned with mechanical objectivity, wherein psychologists are themselves to be specially 
calibrated and machine-like in their observational activities, rather than act as interpreters of 
intermediary representations of their subject matter. 
20 The social nature of scientific knowledge production, and the key role of trust in this 
process, is discussed in Shapin (1994). 
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scientific psychology it was those who adopted the questionnaire as a methodology who made 
collecting most central to their science. Recourse to standardized measurement and laboratory 
spaces as validating was impossible in these undertakings and it was, instead, the collection of 
masses of information that lent these endeavours authority.  
In his call for other historians of science to pay greater attention to the collecting sciences 
and their attendant practices, Kohler enumerates a number of characteristics he sees as unifying 
these sciences. For Kohler (2007), (1) “collecting is place specific” (p. 445). It involves a (2) 
“social diversity of…practitioners” (p. 445) who take on (3) “composite professional roles” (p. 
446). These sciences have also (4) “retained distinct vestiges of the vernacular cultures from 
which they sprang” (p. 446) and are (5) “ambivalent about their dependence on objects and 
collecting” (p. 447). Collecting sciences also (6) face the challenge of keeping collections and 
the emphasis on collection results in a (7) “split professional identity” (p. 448). Finally, the (8) 
“dependence on found objects engenders a distinctive moral economy of data” (p. 449). 
Kohler’s criteria for identifying and describing the collecting sciences provide a starting 
point for my discussion of collecting within early American psychology. That said, these criteria 
are not absolute, especially in the case of psychology, a science for which the objects it seeks to 
collect are necessarily ephemeral. The fact that psychology collects accounts of phenomena, 
rather than phenomena themselves, suggests that its practices of collection may have more in 
common with data gathering than with collecting proper (e.g., Sepkoski, 2013; Strasser, 2012a). 
For Kohler (2007) “reportorial data ‘gathering’” (p. 431), of the kind undertaken by 
anthropologists and ethnologists, is not strictly speaking collection as “it is this ‘thing-y’ 
particularity of found objects that demarcates the collecting sciences as a natural group. It shapes 
the distinctive practices of these sciences, distinguishing them from the data gathering that is 
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common to all empirical science” (Kohler, 2007, p. 432). Mental events are not material, or 
“thing-y,” in the way identified by Kohler as typical of the collecting sciences. Rather, 
psychology’s collected objects are in fact proxies for the original, intangible phenomena that are 
the real object of interest. It is accounts of mental events, and the behavioural manifestations 
thereof, that are collected rather than the events themselves. In the collection of this kind of 
immaterial material the questionnaire served as an invaluable tool.21 
Kohler’s understanding of data gathering as apart from collecting has not gone uncontested 
as a recent piece by historian Bruno Strasser (2012a) on role of collecting in the life sciences 
makes clear. Unlike Kohler, Strasser (2012a) is interested in data collection, rather than the 
collection of material objects, and is “…focused on a specific cognitive and material practice 
centred on the constitution and use of collections…” (p. 305). In doing so, Strasser argues that 
rather than experimentation overtaking natural history in the biological sciences, the two 
practices have converged.22 For the purposes of this project the collecting undertaken by early 
American psychologists is situated somewhere between the kind of collecting of material objects 
discussed by Kohler and that of the collection of data discussed by Strasser. Psychologists may 
have collected data, but they did so only because their object of investigation was itself 
immaterial and therefore inaccessible. Psychological experimentation in laboratory spaces itself 
involved a particular set of practices, but it is the collecting practices that characterized 
questionnaire research that are most glaringly absent from the historical record. Places like the 
psychological laboratory may well have served as “truth-spots” that legitimized the knowledge 
produced therein, but methodologies and their associated practices also offered a means by 
                                                
21 Paper proxies were also collected in biological sciences, such as in Georges Cuvier’s 
“paper museum” of specimens see Rudwick (2000). 
22 For more on the historical relation between collecting and data practices in biological 
and life science research see Strasser (2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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which truth might be produced. It is some of the extra-laboratory practices of this period, and 
their relation to other efforts at scientific knowledge production, that this project documents.23  
Despite not meeting Kohler’s criteria of materiality, many of the characteristics of the 
collecting sciences are also typical of the collecting done by early American psychologists. As a 
result, a number of these points guide my discussion of early questionnaire research. In 
establishing psychology as a science the laboratory played a key role, as it allowed psychologists 
to situate themselves within a place that bore the imprimatur of science. (1) With respect to 
collecting via the questionnaire method, place was also important; it was not in the laboratory, 
but in the field that accounts of mental events were to be amassed. It was often in schools and 
homes that the questionnaire was put to use. (2) As a consequence of the objects of 
psychological interest existing outside the confines of the psychology laboratory, psychologists 
relied on a “social diversity of…practitioners” (Kohler, 2007, p. 445) in order to assemble their 
collections, largely by enlisting the public, particularly parents and educators, in their research 
projects. These individuals possessed unique forms of “residential” (Kohler, 2006) or 
“experiential” (Vetter, 2011) knowledge derived from the experiences of their daily lives. This 
kind of knowledge was a crucial component of questionnaire research projects, as it was 
information that was otherwise inaccessible to psychologists, whose own knowledge bases were 
more decidedly “cosmopolitan” in nature, in that they were “more global and theoretical” 
(Kohler, 2006, p. 157) in orientation. These involvements of lay individuals reveal the 
importance of social relationships and networks of collectors for the success of questionnaire 
projects. (3) A diverse pool of participants also encouraged the construction of  “composite 
professional roles” (Kohler, 2007, p. 446) in which some of those out in the field collecting were 
                                                
23 On practices in the human sciences see Isaac (2012). 
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psychologists and some of those who began as collectors struggled to become psychologists in 
their own right. (4) With respect especially to those who sought to study children’s minds, 
psychology as practiced with the questionnaire method retained a tendency to venerate the child. 
(5) The difficulties of collecting ideal specimens, that is full, detailed accounts of mental 
phenomena, also led to an ambivalence about the value of collecting for many of those who 
adopted the questionnaire method and others in the field. (6) When completed questionnaires 
were returned en masse psychologists also faced the challenge of what to do with such abundant 
returns. (7) For those psychologists who adopted the questionnaire as part of their research on the 
child, the involvement in the child study movement resulted in a “split professional identity” 
(Kohler, 2007, p. 448) in terms of their status as both psychologists and as educational experts, 
for whom expertise was predicated on their scientific knowledge of the child. (8) Kohler’s 
(2007) final point, that the “dependence on found objects engenders a distinctive moral economy 
of data” (p. 449) is also true of the early adopters of the questionnaire method within psychology. 
These psychologists clearly privileged data, particularly in abundance, but were at times not 
entirely sure how to articulate what data on this scale afforded the discipline.  
In attending to the practices of collection at the centre of questionnaire-based research, 
Danziger’s now canonical analysis of the ways in which psychological knowledge was 
constructed in the first decades of the field’s existence is complicated. This project does not 
challenge his characterization of the psychology’s development, but rather offers a more nuanced 
account of just how the “triumph of the aggregate” (see Danziger, 1990, pp. 68–87) he identifies 
came about. It is the locations in which the mass assemblage of data occurred, the diverse 
participants in this research process, and the struggles of investigators to make sense of 
accumulated information that are the centre of my analysis. Danziger, despite his focus on the 
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role of the subjects in psychological research, pays little attention to exactly who the subjects of 
questionnaire research were, or to the practices of data collection. Specifics of subject and 
investigator in questionnaire research are absent. Instead it is asserted that these participants were 
children, and therefore problematic sources of psychological data. As this project documents, 
this is an oversimplification. Although child study questionnaires were among those most 
abundantly circulated, this mode of inquiry was used to investigate a variety of topics with 
participants who ranged from children, to college students, and to the adult public more 
generally. At the same time, involvement in questionnaire-based research extended beyond 
simply the psychologists initiating research projects and those whose information was recorded 
on questionnaires. Crucial to many of these enterprises was the participation of non-expert 
collectors as intermediaries between psychologists and respondents.  
Work with questionnaires was both a consequence of and a contribution to a moral 
economy of data. Moral economies, as outlined by Lorraine Daston (1995), are the affect-laden 
norms and values that sanctify certain objects and practices.24 Facilitating the emergence of this 
moral economy within psychology was the broader rise of quantification and measurement in the 
nineteenth century and its influence on the social sciences.25 The use of quantification and 
measurement practices was part of, and spurred on by, changing conceptions of causality, 
certainty, determinism, and objectivity. These kinds of changes in the very understanding of how 
the world might come to be known established quantification and measurement as valid means of 
knowing the world, but were also themselves brought into being, at least in part, as a result of the 
                                                
24 For a very different understanding of “moral economy” see Thompson (1971). 
25 There is an extensive historiography on the ascent of quantification and measurement 
in society, as well as the import of such for the development of the social sciences (Anderson, 
1988; Bannister, 1987; J. Brown, 1991; Cohen, 1982; J. Cole, 2000; Desrosières, 1998; 
Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Hacking, 1990; T. L. Haskell, 1977; Poovey, 1998; T. M. Porter, 1986, 
1995; Ross, 1991; Rusnock, 2002). 
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rise of a quantified worldview. As part of efforts to manage citizenry, nations collected 
increasing amounts of data from as early as the seventeenth century, but into the nineteenth 
century developments such as an ever-increasing population, in ever more urban environments, 
roused government efforts to keep track of the populace as never before. To do so, they resorted 
to a heavily quantified system of state-gathered numbers to track various features of this society 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1989; Hacking, 1990; T. M. Porter, 1986), including the institution of national 
censuses (Anderson, 1988; Curtis, 2001; Levitan, 2011). Efforts to manage an increasingly 
unwieldy society created an “avalanche of printed numbers” (Hacking, 1990, p. 2) in European 
states in the early nineteenth century. In this system, the populace was not only quantified, but 
also classified, with data gathered on various kinds of social deviancy including suicide, murder, 
and disease, among others. These seemingly innocuous practices of counting citizens and their 
attendant behaviours were followed by more sophisticated quantification technologies, and more 
importantly the application of these technologies to a wide range of fields of inquiry, one of 
which was psychology. 
The prevalence of questionnaire-based research in American psychology at the end of 
nineteenth century was part of a larger move toward quantification within the discipline. These 
projects were self-consciously fashioned as “statistical” in nature as a function of their aim of 
amassing and analyzing large quantities of information.26 That said, the data collected by early 
adopters of questionnaires were largely descriptive, rather than numerical. For those adopting a 
naturalistic style of scientific thinking, the accumulation and use of masses of data was central to 
the scientific standing of their work. As Danziger (1990) notes, for these individuals “there was a 
belief that mass data, gathered by these means, constituted a valid basis for psychological 
                                                
26 Discussion of the statistical nature of early social survey work can be found in Bulmer 
(1991). 
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knowledge” (p. 75). Within the emergent moral economy of data psychologists could not only 
collect information via experimentation, but also through widespread questioning conducted 
outside of laboratory spaces by non-experts.  
Without recourse to standardization and training, questionnaire research relied for its 
scientific authority on the mass accumulation of data. Inherent in this practice was the belief that 
large quantities of information, whatever their form, held scientific value. To be sure, the 
collection of masses of information was not unique to questionnaire research.27 Experimental 
projects undertaken psychological laboratories could also result in large quantities of 
information, but in questionnaire-based projects masses of material served as the central marker 
of authoritative knowledge as this mode of inquiry could neither rely on the legitimacy afforded 
by laboratory spaces, nor on directly numerical results such as those produced in reaction time 
studies. Seeking to align their descriptive inquiries with the physiological and perceptual 
interests of those in the laboratory, if only speculatively, physical states associated with mental 
phenomena and sensory and perceptual experiences themselves were recurrently asked after. In 
some instances, questionnaires contained items that asked individuals to engage in specific forms 
of self-experimentation. Similarly, efforts were made to transform masses of descriptive 
information into numerical values. Data of easily quantifiable form, however, remained elusive 
in many projects. 
Eschewing a singular truth-spot in favour of diverse, multiplicious data questionnaires 
were able to do what the experimental methods of the day could not. Mass data collection efforts 
held the possibility of documenting difference. Variation was antithetical to the initial aims 
laboratory psychology, especially the standard Wundtian paradigm. Nonetheless, it soon 
                                                
27 It would not be until several decades into the twentieth century that statistical sampling 
techniques were established as an alternative means of obtaining credible data (Converse, 1987). 
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surfaced as an abiding interest among psychologists influenced by Darwinian notions of 
evolution, fostering the emergence of an American system of functionalist psychology (C. D. 
Green, 2009; O’Donnell, 1985; R. J. Richards, 1987). In contrast to the homogeneity aimed for 
in the psychological laboratory, questionnaires explicitly sought out diversity through the 
accumulation of large quantities of material on mental life from the masses. Only in this form of 
scientific practice could the rich variation inherent in the human populace, as well as similarities 
across groups, be fully revealed. These kinds of undertakings – which aimed to reveal 
differences on the basis of sex/gender, nationality/race, and age – were part of a growing 
discourse on difference within both science and broader society (Bederman, 1995; Noon, 2005a; 
Russett, 1989; Shields, 1975). An increasingly diverse American populace, and the increasing 
visibility of these differences within urban centres, also served to increase the import of 
describing variety in its many forms. Doing so, spoke to social concerns surrounding 
pervasiveness of groups deemed deficient and fears of degeneracy more generally (Pick, 1993). 
The use of psychological instruments such as the questionnaire was part of a broader trend 
toward understanding the aggregate by collecting mass information on the shape of the social 
world.28 Common to early research projects using questionnaires were efforts to de-limit the 
“normal” functioning of the mind by documenting the full range of human experience. Over the 
course of five decades of questionnaire use, the relation of work with this method to 
understandings of normality shifted considerably. As Ian Hacking (1990) notes, 
the normal stands indifferently for what is typical, the unenthusiastic objective average, but 
it also stands for what has been, good health, and for what shall be, our chosen destiny. 
                                                
28 Twentieth century efforts to produce an aggregate understanding of the social world, 
through the application of social surveys and opinion polls, are ably discussed by Igo (2007). 
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That is why the benign and sterile-sounding word ‘normal’ has become one of the most 
powerful ideological tools of the twentieth century. (p. 169) 
Similarly, Peter Hegarty (2013) has recently called attention to the necessity of attending to the 
division between the visions of “normal” inherent in Adolphe Quetelet’s vision of the aggregate 
and that in Francis Galton’s conception of the ideal when discussing psychology’s construction 
of normal.29 This division is most notable when comparing Hall’s work on children with latter 
scaled attitude questionnaires. Hall’s undertakings were very clearly in the tradition of Galton, as 
he amassed information on child life in an effort to produce an idealized vision of normal 
childhood. Other investigations, especially with twentieth century developments in the scaling of 
questionnaire items, pursue information on normality in line with Quetelet’s notion of the 
aggregate. Statistical averages across large groups of individuals spoke not to an ideal state, but 
rather to the current mental state of the aggregate public.  
The reliance in many questionnaire projects on public assistance with data collection meant 
subjects of investigation were often of popular interest. Inquiries into child life, psychical 
phenomena, and dreaming all relied on the participation of a public that was itself already 
captivated with the topic at hand. Securing the cooperation of large numbers of individuals in 
scientific projects was predicated on such interest, and in cases where less broadly engaging 
subjects were investigated, respondents were necessarily obtained from more circumscribed 
populations. Studies of mental imagery and mental association, for instance, relied not on the 
public at large, but rather on members of college communities, particularly students. Easily 
accessible populations of students would continue to form the basis of questionnaire research in 
later years. Questionnaires in the 1920s and 30s were also geared toward topics with broad social 
                                                
29 On the notion of the “normal” in psychology see Carson (2003). 
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relevance, but explored these through the assessment of attitudes toward various issues. The 
cooperation of a diverse public was no longer a necessary component of this work, as the 
circulation of questionnaires was largely limited to university populations. Questionnaires were 
now wielded not by untrained members of the general public, but by psychologists. Rather than 
amassing information from any and everywhere, data were gathered from students. The public 
was no longer engaged in scientific practice, but was instead the target of work with 
questionnaires as investigations resulted in pronouncements regarding the aggregate public’s 
position on social issues. 
From Thick to Thin Description 
Efforts to construct a meaningful whole from collected descriptive accounts were never 
fully successful. Statistical aggregation of assembled information was simply impossible despite 
stated aspirations to produce something akin to a composite portrait (see Hall, 1883a, p. 252, 
1893b, 1924). This difficulty engendered a particular ambivalence about the method among its 
early adopters. Those employing questionnaires in the final decades of the nineteenth century 
were drawn in by the seductiveness of masses of data, convinced that within a mass of material 
was bound to be a bounty of knowledge. Yet, without a means of synthesizing large quantities of 
descriptive information this knowledge remained ever elusive. It was only with the advent of 
techniques that allowed for the collection of information in a more directly numerical form that 
this circumstance changed. Description was abandoned in favour of numerical values that 
permitted collation and manipulation in ways impossible with diffuse descriptive accounts. 
Numbers were simply more amenable to reductive techniques. No longer was experience open-
ended. Rather than being free to depict experience in any way they so chose, individuals were 
instead restricted to a predetermined range of possibilities with corresponding numerical values. 
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Only in this way was the whole of a body of data able to be treated in unison, allowing for 
distinct conclusions on the state of the aggregate.  
This transition from masses of descriptive data to the collection of numerical proxies of 
mental experience illustrates a shift from thick to thin description within the field.30 As historian 
Theodore Porter (2012) notes, the benefit of thin description is that it “offers outsiders the 
opportunity to act and to choose, relying on knowledge without deep understanding. For insiders 
it signifies self-denying objectivity: forfeiting, if only in principle, the right to interpret” (p. 222). 
Thin accounts offer straightforward bases for decision making in a way impossible with nuanced 
thick description that lacks a singular, conclusive result. In the context of attitude research this 
kind of thin description of the aggregate’s state of mind on issues had, at the very least, the 
potential for definite social action. Providing simple, concrete findings on social matters allowed 
for the dissemination of results outside of scientific spheres, but necessarily reduced the 
complexity of social life. Often of numerical form, information like this served as immutable 
mobiles (Latour, 1986) capable to circulating broadly in government and corporate contexts. At 
the same time, work in this vein operates with a guise of objectivity that early investigators in the 
thick description tradition were hard pressed to claim. As the shift from thick to thin description 
in questionnaire research demonstrates, neither characteristic is intrinsic to a field (T. M. Porter, 
2012). And it is not that thin description wholly replaced thick, as there are still those who seek 
detailed, nuanced accounts of personal experience. 
                                                
30 My use of “thick description,” and its counterpart “thin description,” as a way of 
thinking about changes in questionnaire research draws from the use of the term by historian of 
science Theodore Porter (2009, 2012). As Porter (2012) acknowledges, the term was previously 
employed by philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1949, 1968) and then anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
(1973), whose respective uses of the term were necessarily somewhat different, but who both 
highlighted the importance of meaning for understanding. 
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 The thick description of early questionnaire research produced an abundance of 
paperwork. Little of this, however, remains. Even among those with particularly rich archival 
collections, such as William James, documents pertaining to questionnaires are scarce. Outside 
of limited correspondence relating to data collection and the difficulties of interpreting 
information, the bulk of the papers generated in questionnaire-based projects are lost to the 
historical record. In a few instances, archives house copies of the blank forms that were 
circulated to collect data.31 Glaringly absent are the replies submitted by the public to 
psychologists in response to questionnaires, as well as records of the more personal interactions 
of the public with the research process.32 As a result, accounting for the experiences of the public 
in their engagement with psychology is difficult. Evidence of these encounters is always 
fragmentary, never fully capturing the subjectivities of participants. At the same time, as 
historian of the human sciences Michael Pettit argues “archival silence and presence are in 
themselves suggestive evidence that can illuminate the social history of expertise” (Pettit, in 
press).33 That kept and that disposed of are marked signs of, respectively, what is valued and 
                                                
31 For instance, the collection of Topical Syllabi housed in the Clark University Archives 
(Topical Syllabi, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
32 Only two completed questionnaires were located in archival collections over the course 
of this project. One is William James’s answer to James Pratt’s 1904 questionnaire on religion 
(William James. [Answers to J. B. Pratt's questionnaire on religion]. Printed sheet with autograph 
annotations; [n.p., 1904 ]. William James Papers, 1803-1941, b MS Am 1092.9 (4474), 
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA). The other is the 1930 response of 
Rensis Likert’s father’s to his son’s “A Survey of Opinions” (April 26, 1930, Box 21, Folder 
1930, Rensis Likert Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI). 
Neither is an example of the kind of answers the public at large generated in response to 
questionnaires. 
33 In a similar vein, Pettit (2013b) has also recently proposed that Hacking’s notion of 
looping effects be used as a methodology, in an effort to document the feedback process inherent 
in the public’s engagement with psychology. He argues “historians should become more 
attentive to how the public’s interactions with these sciences generated what might be called 
“therapeutic archives” of self-talk created in conversation with experts. The twentieth century 
saw the proliferation of such archives, whether recordings of psychoanalytic sessions, responses 
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what is not. The lack of remaining material from questionnaire projects, which necessarily 
generated masses of paperwork, is itself telling. Individual accounts were not themselves 
esteemed. It was only the collected whole that might reveal scientific truth. Value was located at 
the level of interpretation, after which raw data was simply superfluous. In the end individual 
reports were no more than ephemera, easily disposed of, either by researchers themselves or by 
subsequent individuals faced with a profusion of what were often undoubtedly seen as redundant 
documents. That much of the correspondence with the individuals charged with undertaking the 
labour of data collection is also absent, speaks to the relationship between investigator and 
collector. Those engaged in the work of collecting were often no more than a means to an end, a 
route to data on a scale that was otherwise impossible to achieve. As a consequence of these 
factors we are left with a distinct lack of information on both collectors and respondents, and 
their particular engagements with the research process. This makes difficult, if not impossible, a 
precise accounting of the questionnaire as a device of the public, defined by Marres and Lezaun 
(2011) as the “forms and modes of participation that are irreducibly material, and that recognizes 
that the political value of objects, devices and settings is itself established during the emergence 
of an idiosyncratic public” (p. 491; see also Marres, 2007). The questionnaire undoubted helped 
shape conceptions of the public, but exactly how the public engaged with these instruments and 
how they understood that engagement remains unclear. Similarly, the extent to which 
questionnaires operated as “technologies of elicitation,” or instruments “designed to generate lay 
views on the issues at hand, and feed those opinions into the policy process” (Lezaun & Soneryd, 
                                                                                                                                                       
to psychological tests, or inquiries made to celebrity scientists. These are not strictly medical 
records; they derive instead from a broader (psycho)therapeutic culture oriented around the 
cultivation and examination of an autonomous, deeply feeling self” (Pettit, 2013b, p. 1056). 
Unfortunately, these kinds of materials are largely lacking in the context of early questionnaire 
research. 
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2007, p. 279) is difficult to discern. What is clear, however, is that early questionnaire research 
was predicated on a distributed form of scientific practice among members of the public. These 
kinds of engagements undoubtedly shaped this public, and helped craft its very existence, in 
particular ways (Igo, 2007; Kelty, 2005; Latour, 2004). 
A number of historical works have sought to address the role of participants in social 
scientific research. Most recently Frans Lundgren (2013) has discussed public involvement in 
Galton’s anthropometric work, though largely sidestepping the public’s experience of this work 
in favour of documenting Galton’s concerted effort to create particular kinds of selves via this 
participation. In contrast, Sarah Igo’s (2007) exploration of the contested construction of a mass 
public in relation to social scientific surveys and opinion polling offers a far richer account of the 
public’s experiences of their interactions with experts.34 Sociologist Mike Savage (2010) has 
provided a unique insider’s perspective on the encounters between subjects and researchers 
documenting changing social class identities in Britain during the mid-twentieth century, 
drawing heavily from the rich accounts provided by participants. In her recent history of autism, 
Chloe Silverman (2012) attends to the work of non-experts, highlighting how the caregiving and 
research efforts of parents have proved crucial to scientific developments in the field. Like these 
projects, this account of the history of questionnaire research attempts to capture, to the extent 
possible, the contributions of lay individuals to early psychological research practices. These 
subjectivities are difficult to grasp given the paucity of the historical record, yet deserve to be 
attended to as important aspects of psychology’s history. In the chapters that follow I attempt to 
reveal the role of the public to early psychological research by reading the traces that remain of 
                                                
34 The employment of lay individuals in statistical studies in New Deal America has also 
been documented (Didier, 2011). 
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their contributions in published accounts and fragmentary archival records, while also seeking to 
glean something of the subjectivities of those engaging in this work. 
Chapters 1 and 2 trace the influence of Francis Galton on the American context. Incipient 
biologist Henry Fairfield Osborn’s questionnaire-based psychological work, some of the earliest 
in the nation, was directly modeled on Galton’s research. Inquiring into the subject of mental 
imagery via questionnaire provided emerging eugenicist Osborn, much like Galton, with the 
opportunity to document various forms of group differences in mental capacities. Although 
Galton’s influence on American psychology is often associated with the mental testing work of 
James McKeen Cattell (Sokal, 1987a), Osborn’s work offers an alternative entry point. 
Subsequent work on mental associations, discussed in Chapter 2, also built on earlier inquiries 
undertaken by Galton. Investigations of number habits and mental associations were part of 
attempts to counter reports of psychical phenomena by documenting how common mental 
proclivities could account for the kinds of coincidences that were often interpreted as 
supernaturally meaningful. At the same time, questionnaire research on mental association 
reveals that just as questionnaires were able to depict differences between groups they were also 
uniquely capable of documenting similarities across groups. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I turn to some of the most abundant questionnaire-based research in 
early American psychology, that conducted on child-life. Central to this kind of research was G. 
Stanley Hall who, together with his students and associates, produced a plethora of 
questionnaires from the 1880s through the 1910s. Chapter 3 discusses Hall’s data collection 
efforts in terms of the involvement of a network of female educators in this work. Although 
psychologists like Hall purposefully restricted their role in questionnaire research to certain 
forms of practice, for these educators involvement in scientific child study was a means of 
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obtaining a form of authority over child-life and educational practices. I then turn in Chapter 4 to 
debate among psychologists over the scientific value of questionnaire-based child-study work 
given its reliance on untrained data collectors. Unable to appeal to the quality of the material 
amassed as a marker of this work’s authority, quantity served as a convenient stand in. At the 
same time, seeking to root his research in dominant scientific ideals, Hall sought to frame his 
questionnaire-based research as mechanically objective, both literally and metaphorically, while 
also highlighting the role expertise at the point of interpretation. Seeking to produce a composite 
portrait of child-life, Hall struggled to synthesize his masses of descriptive material and to 
invoke the growing authority of numbers in his project. 
Next to research on child-life inquiries into psychical phenomena were some of the most 
abundant questionnaire-based projects in early psychology. In Chapter 5 I discuss efforts on the 
part of the American Society for Psychical Research to collect large quantities of information on 
psychical phenomena through appeals for public assistance. William James, in particular, 
undertook projects in this vein, including an inquiry into consciousness of lost limbs and a much 
larger census of hallucinations. The labour associated with the latter project, in particular, was 
enormous as it accumulated large quantities of information. Just as in child study, data from the 
untrained public, however extensive, was suspect and required careful consideration by trained 
experts able to evaluate the validity of responses rooted in personal experience. Chapter 6 takes 
up efforts to interpret the data amassed in the census of hallucinations and the larger debates over 
the reality of psychical phenomena in which this work was embedded. Central to this discussion 
was the invocation of various probabilities as forms of evidence. Disagreement over the reality 
of psychical phenomena, and the value of particular forms of evidence, reveal the differing 
scientific styles and methodological commitments of early American psychologists. At the same 
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time, the non-psychical explanations offered for purportedly psychical phenomena positioned 
information gained from untrained members of the public, the central component of 
questionnaire research, as inherently untrustworthy. 
Chapter 7 takes up the various investigations of dreams and unconscious mental life 
undertaken by American psychologists in the 1880s through to the early twentieth century. Like 
child study and psychical phenomena, these subjects were of popular interest. Appropriating 
popular cultural practices of dream interpretation and the keeping of dream books, the discipline 
sought to document the full range of the mind’s ability, as part of a continuing effort to naturalize 
mental proclivities often characterized as psychical. Involving a variety of methodological 
approaches, many of them statistically oriented, work on dreams reveals the messiness of 
methodological distinctions during this time. 
In the final chapter I move ahead in time to the 1920s and 30s to discuss changing 
approaches to the construction of questionnaires. Following developments in mental testing, 
particularly as a result of large-scale intelligence testing during World War One, the very form of 
questionnaires became increasingly standardized. At the same time, the public’s relationship to 
questionnaire research changed. Instead of involving the public in the research process, 
questionnaires served as a means of speaking about the state of the public’s mind. In the context 
of socially oriented research on attitudes, the work of first Louis Thurstone and then Rensis 
Likert was central to the redesign of questionnaires along increasingly numerical lines. This, I 
argue, constituted a move from thick to thin description, a shift that irrevocably altered 
questionnaire research in psychology. 
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Chapter 1 
Verifying Variation: Collecting Accounts of Mental Imagery35 
One of the earliest questionnaire-based investigations in the United States was 
undertaken at the College of New Jersey (later Princeton University) in 1880. In June of this 
year, a young American biologist wrote to British polymath Francis Galton (1822-1911) 
requesting a copy of the mental imagery questionnaire he was circulating. The biologist, Henry 
Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935), sought to distribute Galton’s questionnaire in the United States 
and hoped, in so doing, to make a “small contribution to Psychological service.”36 The 
psychological research Osborn conducted was initially structured around the research objectives 
outlined by Galton, but he soon adapted Galton’s questionnaire research methodology in order to 
pursue his own burgeoning psychological interests.37 Better known in history of science 
scholarship for his biological work in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century American 
vertebrate palaeontology, for his administrative leadership during a twenty year long tenure as 
president of the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) in New York City, and for his 
prominent role in American eugenics (Clark, 2008; Kevles, 1986; Rainger, 1991; Regal, 2002) 
Osborn was also an early American psychologist, albeit a temporary one.  
For Osborn, psychological research “was taken up … in the leisure hours not occupied by 
other professional work” (1884c, p. 440) and, by his own admission, pursued only “as far as my 
                                                
35 This chapter, in slightly different form, has previously appeared in print (Young, 
2012b). 
36 H. F. Osborn to Galton, June 14, 1880, Galton, F. (1612-1926). Francis Galton Papers, 
152/6B, University College London Special Collections, London, England. 
37 Osborn, H. F. (1882). Questions on the visualising faculties. Henry Fairfield Osborn 
Papers, MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 5. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New 
York City, NY. 
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other work will permit.”38 Notwithstanding this subsidiary position in his professional life, this 
questionnaire research provides an early link between the only just emerging American 
discipline and British psychological practices, particularly those of Galton.39 The project sought 
to amass information on individual experiences of mental imagery or visualization; that is, visual 
representation experienced in the absence of direct external stimulation, be it the memory of 
previous sensory experience or a constructed internal representation of some not previously 
experienced image.40 For the purposes of his project, information on mental imagery was 
obtained by having individuals self-report, in an open-ended fashion, on their past and present 
visualizing experiences. And questionnaires were the means of collecting this data. As would be 
the case with subsequent investigations using the method, questionnaires provided Osborn with a 
means of collecting information on various forms of difference. Once located in his specific set 
of respondents, differences were generalized as applying to wider populations, including groups 
never directly investigated.  
                                                
38 H. F. Osborn to Galton, August, 19, 1880. Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
39 Given the nascent state of scientific psychology in the United States at the time Osborn 
undertook his research, and his lack of further work in the field, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
the project attracted little attention at the time (see Chapter 7). 
40 Images, taken to be fundamental components of consciousness, would later figure 
prominently in introspection’s decline within American psychology. The so-called imageless 
thought controversy, catalyzed by disparate findings from German psychological laboratories 
(see Kusch, 1995, 1999), comprised disputes over the possibility of thought occurring in the 
absence of imagery (Danziger, 1980, 1990; Thomas, 1989). The inability of the introspective 
method to yield consistent results was evidence of the failure of attempts to standardize 
introspection so as to bring the method in line with the period’s techno-scientific ideals (Coon, 
1993; Kroker, 2003). Within American psychology, the early twentieth century debate over the 
veracity of imageless thought led to disillusionment with idea of mental imagery as a guiding 
psychological concept, and with the study of consciousness more generally. This, in part, led 
John B. Watson to propose the abandonment of consciousness, including imagery of the type 
investigated by Galton and Osborn, as an object of psychological study in favour of a system of 
psychology he termed behaviorism (see Watson, 1913a, 1913b; Wozniak, 1993). 
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In this chapter I argue that Osborn’s work offers an alternative avenue for the Galtonian 
influence on American psychology. This orientation has largely been attributed to the mental 
testing work of James McKeen Cattell begun in the late 1880s (Danziger, 1990; Sokal, 1987a). 
Osborn’s research took place years earlier and was directly Galtonian in character, bringing with 
it an interest in individual and group differences. This enterprise foreshadows the later obsession 
with mental ability that would overtake the discipline in the twentieth century. At the same time, 
it served to further questionnaire-based research within the new field of scientific psychology 
with later undertakings building upon this mental imagery work, but recasting it in terms of the 
more culturally popular phenomena of dreaming (see Chapter 7). 
Henry Fairfield Osborn (1857-1935) and Psychology at Princeton 
From birth onward, Henry Fairfield Osborn lived a life of privilege as a member of New 
York City’s social and financial elite. The son of a railroad magnate and the grandson of a 
successful New York City merchant, Osborn was also the nephew of prominent American 
financier J. Pierport Morgan (1837-1913), the founder of the hugely successful J. P. Morgan 
financial institution. The Osborn family’s wealth allowed Osborn to attend New York City’s best 
preparatory schools before his departure from the city in 1873 to attend the College of New 
Jersey (Rainger, 1991; Sloan, 1980). At Princeton, Osborn’s interest in science was fostered 
through contact with Presbyterian minister, Scottish Realist philosopher, and College president 
James McCosh (1811-1894),41 as well as geology professor Arnold Guyot (1807-1884), both of 
whom instilled in Osborn the conviction that science and religion are valid means of knowing the 
world, and thus are complimentary endeavours (Maier, 2005). The professed acceptance of the 
                                                
41 McCosh’s relationship to the “new” psychology has been explored by Rodkey (2011). 
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theory of evolution by some at the College, including McCosh, furthered Osborn’s own interest 
in the biological sciences.42  
Under McCosh, the College was also a bastion of discussion on, though not research in, 
the new physiological psychology emerging in Germany. Charged with teaching mental and 
moral philosophy at the College, McCosh incorporated findings from German physiological 
psychology into his courses in the early 1870s and later in the decade Wilhelm Wundt’s 
Grundzüge der Physiologischen Psychologie made its way into his teaching (G. Richards, 1995, 
2004).43 The presence of both the doctrine of evolution and discourse on the new physiological 
psychology at the College influenced Osborn, ultimately shaping not only his professional 
development, but also his personal views. Within the institutional context of the College of New 
Jersey, where the College president himself endorsed evolutionary views, including for a period 
Darwin’s doctrine of natural selection (Livingstone, 1987; Moore, 1979; Wertenbaker, 1946), 
variation was a viable subject of inquiry, one that Osborn took up in his questionnaire research.44 
His longstanding interest in the nature of human variation, which first manifested in his mental 
imagery research, would eventually lead him to endorse social intervention in human breeding 
practices. In the early twentieth century, as a prominent American eugenicist, he helped found 
the eugenic-minded Galton Society with fellow eugenicists Madison Grant (1865-1937) and 
Charles Davenport (1866-1944) and served as president of the second International Congress of 
                                                
42 The acceptance of the theory of evolution by McCosh and others at the College was 
subject to criticism from some members of the Princeton community. One of McCosh’s foremost 
critics was Charles Hodge, Principal of Princeton’s Theological Seminary, who equated 
Darwinism with atheism (Hoeveler, 1981; Marsden, 1994). 
43 McCosh’s interest in the new psychology was at least partially a consequence of its 
emphasis on sense perception, which fit well with his Realist philosophy (Maier, 2005). 
44 McCosh’s acceptance of Darwinian evolution was tempered by his view that evolution 
by natural selection operated on variations that only appear to be random, but are in fact of God’s 
design (Marsden, 1994). 
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Eugenics (Clark, 2001; Kevles, 1986; Osborn, 1932; Regal, 2002). Not only did Osborn adopt 
Galton’s mental imagery questionnaire, he also eventually adopted the eugenic ideas that Galton 
championed.  
Osborn graduated from the College of New Jersey with an undergraduate and later a 
graduate degree, as part of the first cohort of American students specifically trained in the 
emerging discipline of biology, and in 1880 accepted an appointment as the College’s first 
professor of biology (Hoeveler, 1981; Maier, 2005; Rainger, 1991; Wertenbaker, 1946). Within 
his role as Professor of Biology Osborn almost immediately exhibited an interest in the new 
physiological psychology. In 1881 he, along with two of his colleagues, historian William Sloane 
(1850-1928) and vertebrate palaeontologist William Berryman Scott (1858-1947), established a 
“Wundt Club” at the College. The club aimed to keep abreast of new physiological psychology 
findings, particularly those emerging from Wundt’s newly institutionalized physiological 
psychology laboratory at the University of Leipzig. At weekly meetings the club’s members, 
including McCosh and various students of the institution, one of whom was future 
developmental psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934), discussed new scientific 
developments and partook of related anatomical and physiological demonstrations. Spurred on 
by the success of the club, McCosh instituted a new course specifically on physiological 
psychology (Hoeveler, 1981; Maier, 2005; Rainger, 1991; Wetmore, 1991). The course was 
taught through the combined efforts of McCosh, Osborn, and Scott from 1883 until 1886, at 
which time Osborn and Scott were joined by Baldwin, who seemingly took on McCosh’s portion 
of the course.45 
                                                
45 Osborn, H. F. (1886). Physiological psychology. Henry Fairfield Osborn Papers, 
MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 7. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New York City, 
NY. 
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The Questionnaire Method at Princeton 
Research into mental imagery began at the same time that physiological psychology was 
gaining a stronger foothold at the College. In line with his, by this time longstanding, interest in 
the developing field, McCosh published on the results of the mental imagery investigations 
Osborn undertook (McCosh, 1886; McCosh & Osborn, 1884),46 but was not himself involved in 
carrying out the research. McCosh’s interest in the project arose nearly a year after Osborn first 
contacted Galton about the possibility of distributing his questionnaire in the United States when 
Osborn presented on the project before the College of New Jersey’s Philosophical Club.47 
Despite McCosh’s support of scientific psychology, for him psychology would always be “the 
science of the soul” (McCosh, 1886, p. 1), rather than a modern science of the mind.48 In his 
view, science was to proceed by the Baconian inductive method (Maier, 2005) and, within this 
scientific orientation, psychology was to “gather in (induco) facts, but always with a view of 
discovering an order among them and arranging them” (McCosh, 1886, p. 1; see also Rodkey, 
2011).49 McCosh never actively engaged in the kind of empirical research that characterized the 
new psychology, but was supportive of Osborn’s questionnaire-based mental imagery research, 
                                                
46 Although both McCosh and Osborn authored this article, the article itself is comprised 
of three distinct sections (I, II, & III), each indicated as authored solely by either McCosh or 
Osborn. McCosh’s contribution to the article is a discussion of “the general laws and 
characteristics of our mental imagery” (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 58), and it is only in the 
section of the article authored by Osborn that the questionnaire research on mental imagery 
conducted at Princeton is discussed. At places in this paper, quotations from the McCosh and 
Osborn article will be prefaced with attributions of the quoted material to either McCosh or 
Osborn, in accordance with the section of the article from which the quotation originates. 
47 H. F. Osborn to Galton, April 9, 1881, Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
48 This definition of psychology appeared in McCosh’s textbook Psychology: The 
Cognitive Powers, which received a scathing review from G. Stanley Hall (1887b) who 
concluded that, “from a scientific standpoint… little that is good can be said of the book” (p. 
147). 
49 McCosh’s endorsement of Francis Bacon’s inductive method of scientific inquiry was 
common amongst Protestant theologians (Maier, 2005). 
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with its use of introspection conducted en masse to gather facts on mental life. For him, this 
work was acceptable as it “proceeds on the method which Bacon held in view” (McCosh & 
Osborn, 1884, p. 71). At this time he also spoke favourably of recent questionnaire-based 
psychological research undertaken by Hall (1883b), which appeared in the pages of the 
Princeton Review, insisting that it similarly conformed to the Baconian method (McCosh & 
Osborn, 1884, p. 72).50 
Osborn recognized that the questionnaire research he was engaged in was an effort at 
introspective psychology and he was moved to argue that, “introspective research is becoming 
somewhat overshadowed, in the present day, by the brilliant progress of the experimental school, 
yet it deserves to be put upon a continually sounder and wider basis” (Osborn, 1884c, p. 449). 
This defence of a type of introspection more aligned with the British philosophical tradition, 
wherein introspection involved consciousness scrutinizing consciousness, was not a denial of the 
value of the emerging German experimental introspection, but rather an attempt to elevate the 
scientific status of non-experimental introspection.51 Osborn’s adoption of a more 
philosophically-oriented form of introspection – one in keeping with McCosh’s views – was 
tempered by his explicit attempts to link descriptive accounts of mental imagery with 
corresponding physiological states. This attempt is consistent with the entrenched scientific aims 
of the new psychology that was only just coalescing at this time. That his psychological research 
adopted a decidedly naturalistic orientation is in line with his status as a biologist, one who 
would soon establish a successful career in vertebrate palaeontology collecting and analyzing 
                                                
50 Hall (1883b) himself referenced Galton’s visualizing work in his questionnaire 
research. Further, some of Hall’s first published success on the educational front came in the 
pages of the Princeton Review (Hall, 1882a, 1882b).  
51 For more on the differences between the British and German introspective traditions 
see Danziger (1980, 1990). 
 41 
fossil specimens. Osborn’s work on mental imagery illustrates the apparent ease by which 
qualitative, introspective research could become, at least superficially, physiologically grounded. 
Constructing Questionnaires and Categorizing Responses 
Osborn’s decision to undertake research into mental imagery was partly a consequence of 
his psychological interests and partly the result of an apparently chance encounter with Francis 
Galton the previous year. In 1879 Osborn travelled to Britain where he studied embryology with 
Maitland Balfour at Cambridge University and comparative anatomy with Thomas Henry 
Huxley in London (Rainger, 1991; Regal, 2002). While in London, he was introduced to Galton 
at a Royal Society dinner.52 Upon his return to the United States, Osborn happened upon a 
published account of Galton’s mental imagery research, wherein Galton himself solicited the 
accumulation of information on mental imagery by others (Galton, 1880b, 1880c, 1883). These 
encounters, first with Galton himself and soon after with Galton’s mental imagery research, 
prompted Osborn to contact Galton about obtaining a copy of his mental imagery questionnaire 
so that he might distribute it to individuals in the United States. Regarding the possibility of this 
research, Osborn wrote to Galton, 
If you think it worth your while I will undertake to obtain a number of sets of answers 
from the most intelligent men and women I know personally or by reputation. They may 
be interesting in comparison and conjunction with those of your English correspondents. 
If you have not completed your inferences from the answers already obtained I shall 
                                                
52 H. F. Osborn to Galton, June 14, 1880, Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
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enjoy very much undertaking this small contribution to Psychological service and 
forwarding the results to you.53  
Osborn’s initial intent in undertaking this research was merely to gather information on mental 
imagery for Galton. His letter to Galton two months later makes his research agenda explicit: “I 
appreciate your suggestions regarding the collection of answers to your ‘questions’ and will 
endeavor to obtain answers … in the spirit which you desire.”54 In its initial conception, the 
research was to fulfill Galton’s aims and not Osborn’s own, though this soon changed as Osborn 
developed his own mental imagery related research interests. 
At the time Osborn contacted him about his mental imagery questionnaire, Galton 
himself had only recently begun research into the subject. The project began at some point in 
1879 or 1880, when Galton casually questioned his acquaintances about their powers of mental 
imagery.55 A more formal questionnaire investigating individual habits of visualization soon 
followed (Galton, 1880c).56 As he described it, he set about studying “…the degree and manner 
                                                
53 H. F. Osborn to Galton, June 14, 1880. Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
54 H. F. Osborn to Galton, August 19, 1880. Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
55 In his initial informal investigation of imaging ability many of those Galton questioned 
were his scientist friends (Galton, 1883). This attempt to ascertain the imaging abilities of 
scientists is understandable given changing views on the role of imagination in science during 
this period. As Lorraine Daston (1998) has outlined, it was only in the mid-nineteenth century 
that a type of scientific objectivity arose that sought to relegate subjectivity and its companion, 
the imagination, to the artistic, rather than the scientific realm. In keeping with these efforts to 
banish the imagination from science, Galton’s mental imagery research found that most scientists 
had no familiarity with the notion of mental imagery (Galton, 1883). While mental imagery is 
not synonymous with imagination, it is an aspect thereof, and Galton’s investigations of the 
imaging ability of men of science fits within the discourse on the contested role of the 
imagination in science that Daston has documented. For more on the history of scientific 
objectivity see Daston’s collaboration with Peter Galison (Daston & Galison, 2010). 
56 The questionnaire was a method Galton employed in a number of other prominent 
investigations in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These research endeavours include 
investigations into the qualities of English men of science and the characteristics of twins 
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in which different persons possess the power of seeing images in their mind’s eye” by 
“collecting a large and growing store of materials, partly of verbal answers made by friends to 
my inquiries, but principally by means of written replies to a printed list of questions that I am 
distributing” (Galton, 1880c, p. 252). Requests for information from individuals were geared 
toward the collection of  
well-marked and properly-authenticated instances of persons who are able to recall, or 
represent to their imagination, with great vividness, either sights, sounds, smells, or 
tastes, and to obtain information that may throw light on the peculiarities of the 
representative faculty in different families and races. (Galton, 1880c, p. 256) 
The latter aim would prove central in the interpretation of findings from both his and Osborn’s 
imagery research. 
The questionnaire Galton developed to assess mental imagery was entitled, Questions on 
Visualising and Other Allied Faculties. The second version of the questionnaire, itself based 
upon an informal first questionnaire (Galton, 1883), instructed respondents as follows: 
Before addressing yourself to any of the Questions on the opposite page, think of some 
definite object – suppose it is your breakfast-table as you sat down to it this morning – 
and consider carefully the picture that rises before your mind’s eye. 
1. Illumination. – Is the image dim or fairly clear? Is its brightness comparable to that of 
the actual scene? 
2. Definition. – Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same time, or is the place of 
sharpest definition at any one moment more contracted than it is in a real scene? 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Fancher, 1983a, 1983b; Galton, 1874, 1883; Godin, 2007). For a contemporary critique of 
Galton’s statistical study of mental imagery see Bain (1880). 
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3. Colouring. – Are the colours of the china, of the toast, breadcrust, mustard, meat, 
parsley, or whatever may have been on the table, quite distinct and natural?57 (Galton, 
1880b, pp. 301–2, 1883, p. 378)  
As this segment of the questionnaire indicates, all of the items on Galton’s mental imagery 
questionnaire were open ended; the respondent was merely asked to elaborate on various aspects 
of their mental imagery skills. Galton then ranked the responses he received according to the 
precision of an individual’s mental imagery, with higher ranks indicative of greater ability. For 
the questions reproduced above, top ranked responses included, “Brilliant, distinct, never 
blotchy” and “Quite comparable to the real object. I feel as though I was dazzled, e.g. when 
recalling the sun to my mental vision” (Galton, 1883, p. 89). Individuals characterized as 
moderately capable of mental imagery offered responses such as, “Fairly clear, not quite 
comparable to that of the actual scene. Some objects are more sharply defined than others, the 
more familiar objects coming more distinctly in my mind” and “Fairly clear as a general image; 
details rather misty” (Galton, 1883, p. 90), while those with low ability provided responses such 
as, “Dim and not comparable in brightness to the real scene. Badly defined with blotches of light; 
very incomplete” (Galton, 1883, p. 91). In total, Galton’s mental imagery questionnaire consisted 
of fourteen items. The remaining eleven questions asked about a variety of other aspects of 
visualization including characteristics such as the “distance of images,” “persons,” “scenery,” 
“comparison with reality,” and “numerals and dates” (Galton, 1883, pp. 378–9), as well as other 
sensory experiences.  
                                                
57 A variation of this question was used as part of the battery of physical and mental tests 
administered to the students of Columbia College by James McKeen Cattell in the mid-1890s 
(see Cattell & Farrand, 1896). 
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Undertaking research via questions posed to masses of untrained individuals was a 
valuable means of investigating mental life, so far as Galton was concerned. It was his 
contention that 
although philosophers may have written to show the impossibility of our discovering 
what goes on in the minds of others, I maintain an opposite opinion. I do not see why the 
report of a person upon his own mind should not be as intelligible and trustworthy as that 
of a traveller upon a new country, whose landscapes and inhabitants are of a different 
type to any which we ourselves have seen. It appears to me that inquiries into the mental 
constitution of other people is a most fertile field for exploration, especially as there is so 
much in the facts adduced here, as well as elsewhere, to show that original differences in 
mental constitution are permanent, being little modified by the accidents of education, 
and that they are strongly hereditary. (Galton, 1880c, p. 256) 
Much like Osborn, Galton considered mass introspection via questionnaire as a profitable means 
of understanding the mind’s terrain. Especially valuable, given the ability of questionnaires to 
collect information from a multitude of individuals with relative ease, was the promise the 
method held of revealing the great diversity of mental life. Crucially, it was this kind of variation 
that was central to the evolutionary scheme introduced by his cousin, Darwin, decades earlier 
(Darwin, 1859; see R. J. Richards, 1987). 
 Although Osborn initially used Galton’s Questions on the Visualising and Other Allied 
Faculties as his means of assessing visualization ability, he soon found this questionnaire 
inadequate for the investigation of the aspects of visualization he found most interesting. In 
1882, Osborn solicited information on the visualizing faculties for a second time, this time using 
a heavily modified version of Galton’s questionnaire, one he termed simply Questions on the 
 46 
Visualising Faculties.58 On this modified Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire,59 Osborn 
offered an explanation of the research he was undertaking: 
In the Spring of last year I sent to Francis Galton, the English psychologist, a collection 
of answers to his Questions upon the Visualising and Allied Faculties … In 
acknowledgement he wrote me that they would prove of considerable value to him … the 
friendly tone of Mr. Galton’s letter[s] have encouraged me to continue the subject this 
year. 
The following series are taken in part from Mr. Galton, and were partly suggested 
by the replies to the last year series.60  
Rather than solicit further responses to Galton’s mental imagery questionnaire, Osborn opted to 
pursue his own line of research, one informed by his previous use of Galton’s questionnaire, but 
not determined by the content of such. The questionnaire originally implemented to measure 
mental imagery was modified so that, of thirteen questions that comprise the questionnaire, the 
first four were taken without modification from Galton and of the remaining nine only three bore 
any resemblance to the original items on Galton’s mental imagery questionnaire.61 Thus, in his 
second endeavour into psychological research, Osborn significantly altered Galton’s mental 
imagery questionnaire so that he might investigate the aspects of mental imagery he took to be of 
                                                
58 Osborn, H. F. (1882). Questions on the visualising faculties. Henry Fairfield Osborn 
Papers, MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 5. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New 
York City, NY. 
59 The phrase “Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire” has been adopted to distinguish 
Osborn’s questionnaire from Galton’s early versions. 
60 Osborn, H. F. (1882). Questions on the visualising faculties. Henry Fairfield Osborn 
Papers, MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 5. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New 
York City, NY. See also McCosh and Osborn (1884, p. 58). 
61 Osborn, H. F. (1882). Questions on the visualising faculties. Henry Fairfield Osborn 
Papers, MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 5. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New 
York City, NY. See also McCosh and Osborn (1884, p. 60). 
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interest, in particular: the physical correlates of memory formation and later retrieval, the 
phenomenon whereby novel events strike individuals as familiar, and the relationship between 
aging and visualization. 
 Among the new items Osborn included on the 1882 mental imagery questionnaire are a 
number of questions that inquire as to the physical states that accompany memory formation and 
subsequent visualization. Question 10 on the modified Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire 
reads:  
(a.) Are the most vivid mental images that you can now bring up associated with any 
definite physical state at the time you formed them, such as active exercise on horseback 
or in running, or such as comparative repose in reading or study? (b.) Do you seem to be 
able to call up mental images easier at one time of day than another, or in an active rather 
than a quiet state of body? (c.) If you have ever experienced any impairment of vision 
how has this affected your visualising power at the time or subsequently?62  
This series of questions was Osborn’s attempt to ascertain the physical states that most often 
accompany memory formation and subsequent retrieval. What is described as a fairly typical, if 
above average, response to this question reads, “Mental images, so far as I have been able to 
observe, come most in a passive state of body, and are not associated with any particular 
exercise” (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 61). Question 11 on this revised questionnaire, “What 
was the state of mind in which the most vivid mental images you can now recall, were formed? 
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In what states of mind can you recall mental images most readily?”63 elicited responses similar to 
that of Question 10: “When I am engaged in any kind of mental labor my visions do not come. 
When I am in a comparatively pensive state with no particular mental object in view, I am most 
apt to have images” (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 61). By inquiring into the physical correlates 
of memory formation in questions like these Osborn was able to link qualitative inquiries into 
mental imagery with particular physical states. Such a connection, between descriptions of 
memory formation and retrieval and their associated physical states, allowed Osborn to frame his 
qualitative research in physiological terms and to more decisively link his biological and 
psychological interests.  
In published accounts of his mental imagery research, Osborn discusses the specific 
physiological states thought to accompany initial memory formation and later mental imagery. 
He asserts that, “physiologically speaking, the memory of an event is a revival, a repetition of the 
original brain changes accompanying that event” (Osborn, 1884a, p. 480), and further that,  
…in order to renew the visual signal, that is to recall our friend’s face, the disturbance at 
the terminal station must be repeated. Our imagery then, in so far as it depends upon 
physical causes, consists of a literal revival of the former disturbance in the brain. 
(Osborn, 1884c, p. 441)  
Ascribing a connection between the purely descriptive data generated by his questionnaire 
research and possible physiological accompaniments of mental imagery, provided Osborn with a 
means of grounding, if only speculatively, his mental imagery findings in the biological science 
in which he had been trained.  
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In addition to investigating the physiological states associated with mental imagery, the 
revised version of the Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire contains an item that Osborn 
characterized as “particularly interesting.”64 In March 1882, Osborn informed Galton that he had 
“distributed a second series of questions, with several added to your original list & have been 
receiving some very full and interesting answers. Testimony upon the last question brings out 
interesting points.”65 Osborn identifies the phenomenon he sought information on in the final 
item of the Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire as having previously been discussed by 
others under the terms “false,” “unconscious,” and “illusory” memory (Osborn, 1884a, p. 478), 
as well as “double perception,” “double presentation,” and “double thinking” (Osborn, 1884b, p. 
274), and describes this phenomenon as,  
a curious psychical or psycho-pathological experience which is alluded to by many 
writers upon psychology, and is not infrequently met with in general literature. It is that 
vague sentiment of familiarity we sometimes have upon entering a new experience, best 
expressed in the words, ‘I have seen or known all this before.’66 (Osborn, 1884b, p. 274)  
Elsewhere, Osborn asserts that his attention was drawn to this phenomenon,  
by a Southern gentleman; he had experienced them only in connection with scenery, and 
attributed them to the supposed uneven action of the nerves supplying the eyes, one side 
of the brain thus receiving the image before the other, and causing the second image to 
appear as a familiar repetition of the first, in this way giving rise to a deception. (1884a, 
pp. 479–80)  
                                                
64 Osborn, H. F. (1882). Questions on the visualising faculties. Henry Fairfield Osborn 
Papers, MSS.O835, Box 82, Folder 5. American Museum of Natural History Archives, New 
York City, NY. 
65 H. F. Osborn to Galton, March 22, 1882. Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
66 This phenomenon might today be identified by the term déjà vu. 
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This Southern gentleman’s ascription of a physiological cause to his experience of familiarity 
when encountering new scenes is in line with Osborn’s previously discussed research objective: 
the uncovering of the physiological states associated with mental imagery. Seeking to discern the 
physiological cause of visualization, Osborn distributed a new questionnaire, one written to 
specifically to ascertain not only the physiological accompaniments of visual memory formation 
and retrieval, but also the physiological cause of this “interesting” phenomenon.   
The modified Princeton Mental Imagery Questionnaire sought to investigate this 
phenomenon through the addition of a new question. The item that sought information on the 
nature of the experience whereby a newly encountered scene or event strikes us as familiar, 
reads: 
Have you come suddenly upon an entirely new scene and while certain of its novelty felt 
inwardly that you had seen it before – with a conviction that you were revisiting a dimly 
familiar locality? Mention if you can an instance or two in which this has occurred. Has 
any satisfactory explanation of this experience ever suggested itself to you?67  
Preoccupied with providing an account of this phenomenon, Osborn (1884b) later reprinted the 
question in an issue of Science, requesting that the journal’s readers forward onto him 
information on these kinds of experiences. In reprinting this item, he also expanded its content, 
adding the following questions:  
How frequent is the experience in your case? Was it more frequent in childhood than at 
present? How soon do you usually become conscious of the deception? Does it occur 
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more frequently in connection with some kinds of experience than with others? (Osborn, 
1884b, p. 274) 
The phenomenon Osborn was seeking information on was familiar to those completing 
his questionnaire. As one individual asserted,  
I have experienced this feeling quite frequently. Sometimes I dream what seems at the 
time to be familiar, and yet different from anything dreamt before. The only explanation 
at all satisfactory was that I had seen some thing similar in a painting or drawing. 
(Osborn, 1884a, p. 479) 
While the Southern gentleman who initially inspired Osborn’s research interpreted his 
experience of the phenomenon in terms of an underlying physiological process, this respondent 
interpreted the phenomenon as the result of simple frailty of memory. A further possible 
explanation of this phenomenon explored by Osborn was that this sense of familiarity arises as 
the result of “the scenes or conversations of early life – memories so distant that they cannot be 
brought into consciousness, yet sufficient to arouse this sense of early experience” (Osborn, 
1884a, p. 481).68  
 Along these lines one of the items Osborn added to his modified imagery questionnaire 
sought to ascertain the relationship between childhood, aging, and mental imagery ability. 
Headed “Childhood and age” this item asked: 
Have your powers of visualising varied much in your recollection? At what age were the 
earliest mental images formed which you can still recall. [sic] State if you can what is the 
                                                
68 “Double memory-consciousness” was later invoked by Josiah Royce (see 1888, pp. 
247–8) as an alternate, non-psychical explanation for telepathic phenomena (see also Chapter 4). 
 52 
character of those images, do they seem as bright as those formed in later years. [sic] 
What events of your home life in childhood do you recall most readily or vividly?69  
In this question Osborn sought to discover the developmental trajectory of mental imagery 
ability, as well as the types of memories from childhood most likely to be recalled in later life. In 
responding to this item, one individual asserted, 
My visualising power I feel is not so good as it was a few years ago. I do not remember 
when I did not have mental images. I recall very vividly my sister falling into the water 
and how she looked when she was rescued, tho I was not over four or five years old at the 
time. (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 61) 
As Hall would in subsequent years (see Chapters 3 & 4), Osborn used the questionnaire method 
as a means of obtaining information on childhood. On the basis of this research, he came to 
conclude that, “the images formed in childhood are with most persons clearer, brighter, and more 
numerous than those of later years” (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 66). Osborn’s interest in the 
relationship of aging to mental imagery ability was part of his more general interest in variation 
in mental imagery ability. The investigation of the developmental aspect of the visualizing 
faculty is representative of one aim of mental imagery research: to discern not only individual 
differences in mental imagery, but also group differences in this faculty. 
Interpreting Mental Imagery and Determining Difference 
The specifics of Osborn’s questionnaire-based psychological research provide evidence 
both of his long standing interest in human variation and his pervasive concern with the quality 
of the American populace. Although Galton and Osborn differed in the particular aspects of 
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mental imagery they each found interesting, and thus the aspects of mental imagery they sought 
information on in their questionnaire research, their rationales for conducting research into 
mental imagery were markedly similar. Both were certain that individual differences in mental 
imagery would be detected and sought to collect and categorize their data in such a way as to 
detect group-based differences in mental imagery as well. As Osborn asserted at the end of his 
mental imagery research, “… no one could have foreseen the extent of individual variation 
which this investigation has disclosed” (McCosh & Osborn, 1884, p. 62).70 Similarly, Galton’s 
aim in undertaking mental imagery research was, “to define the different degrees of vividness 
with which different persons have the faculty of recalling familiar scenes under the form of 
mental pictures, and the peculiarities of the mental visions of different persons” (Galton, 1880b, 
p. 301). In doing so, he hoped to delineate the boundaries of normal mental imagery. Osborn’s 
interest in mental imagery stemmed from similar concerns. In his view,  
Our mental images seldom attain the full force of reality; when they do, they are not far 
removed from hallucinations. The more one studies this faculty the more credit one gives 
to the subjective truth of visions. This transition is an easy one from a vivid image which 
we know to be an image, to an image which we believe to be real. (Osborn, 1884c, p. 
447; see also 1884a, p. 485)  
A shared concern with individual differences in mental imagery ability, and more particularly 
with defining the extent to which imagery is normal, rather than pathological, was central to the 
mental imagery questionnaire research undertaken by both Osborn and Galton.  
Establishing norms of mental imagery also extended to an investigation of race and sex 
differences in ability. Galton hoped that his research would, “elicit facts that shall define the 
                                                
70 For discussion of group-based differences in mental imagery ability see Osborn 
(1884c). 
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natural varieties of mental disposition in the two sexes and in different races, and afford 
trustworthy data as to the relative frequency with which different faculties are inherited in 
different degrees” (1880b, p. 301). He recognized the potential existence of both individual and 
group differences in the ability to form mental pictures, and expected to find both types of 
differences in his mental imagery research. In his view  
the peculiarities of visualisation, such as the tendency to see Number-forms, and the still 
rarer tendency to associate colour with sound, is strongly hereditary, and I should infer, 
what facts seem to confirm, that the tendency to be a seer of visions is equally so. Under 
these circumstances we should expect that it would be unequally developed in different 
races, and that a large natural gift of the visionary faculty might become characteristic not 
only of certain families, as among the second-sight seers of Scotland, but of certain races, 
as that of the Gipsies [sic]. (Galton, 1881a, p. 739, 1881b, pp. 653–4)71 
Osborn similarly sought to ascertain sex and race differences in mental imagery. In the fall of 
1880, he informed Galton that,  
Acting upon the suggestion offered in your letter I have relied chiefly upon educational 
institutions, and accordingly have sent copies to Vassar (female) Princeton, & Columbia 
and more recently to Hampton College Va. You may know the latter institution by having 
heard of its singers who have been all over Europe. It is for colored students and of late 
they have added a department for Indians. Replies from the latter College may therefore 
prove interesting.72 
                                                
71 On number forms and coloured hearing see Chapter 2. 
72 H. F. Osborn to Galton, November 7, 1880. Francis Galton Papers, 152/6B, University 
College London Special Collections, London, England. 
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As Osborn indicates, Galton’s questionnaire was to be completed not only by Princeton’s male 
students, but also by female students at Vassar College and by “coloured” students at Hampton 
College in Virginia.73 In the context of the objectives of the mental imagery research, responses 
from these groups were vital as they were to provide the needed material out of which to discern 
sex and race differences in mental imagery ability. While later investigations into topics with 
pervasive cultural engagement could call upon the public for assistance, Osborn’s inquiry into 
the less popular subject of mental imagery was restricted to those at educational institutions who 
might be personally induced to provide responses for the project.  
 As this attempt to obtain responses to his mental imagery questionnaire illustrates, data 
collection with questionnaires was largely an opportunistic process. Within Osborn’s own 
institutional milieu, data could be amassed through direct personal appeals for information, such 
as his request that those in attendance at his presentation before the College of New Jersey’s 
Philosophical Club complete the circular.74 Collecting information from those in one’s 
immediate environment was relatively straightforward. Successful data gathering beyond this 
realm required more effort and necessitated securing the assistance of sometimes-distant 
individuals, something that often required leveraging existing personal relationships. In the case 
of efforts to obtain responses outside of the Princeton context acquaintances were called upon to 
collect data in their given locale, but such cooperation was not guaranteed. For instance, 
responses from female students at Vassar College were obtained through the assistance of the 
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institution’s president Samuel Caldwell,75 but other efforts to obtain data were unsuccessful. As 
Osborn noted 
to my considerable disappointment I got no answers from Hampton Sidney [sic] College. 
Nor from friends in the South (Louisiana) who expected to do something for you among 
the colored people so my returns are all from Americans & mostly from students.76 
In addition to a lack of responses from Hampton Sydney College, and the South more generally, 
information also failed to come in from Columbia College.77 Appeals to friends for research 
assistance were by no means assured of success. Osborn also sought to obtain responses by 
enlisting Hall’s aid in distributing the circular to students at Harvard Medical School (McCosh & 
Osborn, 1884, p. 58), though whether Hall in fact solicited responses and forwarded the data on 
to Osborn is unknown. It is also unclear to what extent this contact influenced Hall’s (1883b) 
decision shortly thereafter to undertake his own questionnaire-based research (see Chapters 3 & 
4).78  
 From the responses to his mental imagery questionnaire Galton drew several conclusions. 
Firstly, he observed that both children and women possess a strong visualizing faculty, and 
further that women are more prone to detailed imagery than men (Galton, 1883). In his view, 
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“the mental difference between the two sexes seems wider in the vividness of their mental 
imagery and the power of introspecting it, than in respect to any other combination of mental 
faculties” (Galton, 1880c, p. 252). From this result he concluded that a well-developed 
visualizing faculty is an impediment to intellectual achievement, as “an over-ready perception of 
sharp mental pictures is antagonistic to the acquirement of habits of highly-generalised and 
abstract thought” (Galton, 1883, p. 88). Those individuals who were both successful 
intellectually and in possession of a well-developed visualizing faculty, had in fact to suppress 
this faculty in order to achieve intellectual greatness (Galton, 1880c, 1883). He concluded, “there 
is no doubt that abstract thought is best carried on without the aid of this concrete imagery, and 
that a natural tendency to indulge in it is liable to be repressed by vigorous brain-workers” 
(Galton, 1881c, p. 85). Finally, he determined that peculiarities of mental imagery are hereditary. 
It was this conclusion that led Galton to further conclude that differences in mental imagery 
between races must exist, as he reasoned that, “since families differ so much in respect to this 
gift, we may suppose that races would also differ, and there can be no doubt that such is the 
case” (Galton, 1883, p. 100).  
Osborn unreservedly endorsed the conclusions Galton reached from the mental imagery 
research, asserting that this research brought to the fore “…the obscure influences of heredity 
and environment, or nature and nurture, upon our ordinary mental operations” (McCosh & 
Osborn, 1884, p. 58). He further voiced his conviction that, as Galton argued, women, children, 
and savages possess superior mental imagery skills: 
This faculty of visualization is inherited: talent or deficiency in forming images is found 
to run in families. As regards sex and age, among women it is more keen and better 
developed than among men; many adults have lost the power of imagery and will tell you 
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they have never possessed it, but this is contradicted by the fact that among children 
imagery is almost universal. Savages, as far as our knowledge goes at present, are 
remarkably endowed with this faculty. (Osborn, 1884c, p. 444) 
As is typical of late-nineteenth century discourse on difference, Galton and Osborn both 
characterized the mental capacities of women, children, and savage races as equally inferior (see 
Bederman, 1995; Noon, 2005b; Russett, 1989; Shields, 1975, 1982), although in this case 
inferiority was equated with the possession of a well-developed visualizing faculty, rather than 
with poor mental imagery ability.  
The characterization of women, children, and savages as possessing a distinct range of 
mental imagery ability is reflected in the particulars of Osborn’s questionnaire research. The 
discernment of sex, race, and age-based differences in mental imagery are all ingrained 
assumptions of his project. Not only did he deliberately set out to gain responses from both 
female and “colored” students, but developmental differences in mental imagery were also 
explicitly asked after. Although not always successful at obtaining information from these 
groups, questionnaires were nonetheless valuable instruments in efforts to obtain information 
from diverse bodies of individuals. In the context of Osborn’s later eugenic commitments, his 
early interest in group differences in mental capacity is telling. Even in the early 1880s, more 
than two decades before his eugenic views became public, Osborn was explicitly concerned with 
detecting difference in society. This aim is evident in his assertion, within a discussion of his 
mental imagery research, as to “how much would be gained if we could trace the influences of 
heredity, of race, of cultivation or neglect, – results such as can be obtained only by pushing out 
inquiry among large numbers of persons” (Osborn, 1884c, p. 450). In adopting Galton’s 
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questionnaire-based research, Osborn was able to investigate enmasse just those facets of society 
that concerned him most. 
Interested in documenting the relation of children’s mentality to that of savages, Osborn 
set out to undertake a further psychological investigation. In June 1882, having completed his 
work on mental imagery, Osborn wrote Galton a final letter proposing a new research project: 
At the close of the May term here I am more at leisure for two or three months and 
propose to start a circular paper which may interest you. The idea is to obtain the child’s 
development in art by collection of a large number of drawings of figures made by 
children. What I have already done in a tentative way has proved interesting by 
comparison with the drawings of our American savages.79  
Like in his mental imagery project, Osborn sought to investigate the child’s mind, this time even 
more explicitly with the aim of equating the child’s mentality with the savage’s. This, again, was 
very much in line with Galton’s (1883) understanding of the mental life of primitive peoples, 
whose drawings he considered evidence in favour of their superior imaging abilities. Whether 
Osborn’s project ever came to fruition is unknown.  
Although both Galton and Osborn concluded that particular characteristics of mental 
imagery are hereditary, the more general ability to mentally represent was thought to be 
educable. One of Galton’s reasons for undertaking research on mental imagery was in fact his 
conviction that a study of the visualizing faculty would be of benefit to educational practices, as 
“a serious study of the best method of developing the faculty of visualizing is one of the many 
pressing desiderata in the new science of education” (Galton, 1880a, p. 324). As a result of his 
questionnaire research on mental imagery, Galton concluded that, “there is abundant evidence 
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that the visualising faculty admits of being developed by education” (Galton, 1883, p. 105, see 
also 1880a, p. 322). Similarly, Osborn held that, 
This faculty deserves far more attention from educators than it has yet received. 
Visualization is inseparable from the entire mental activity of children, yet we have 
barely begun to take advantage of this fact or to recognize the invaluable aid it may 
render in enabling children to bring and retain clearly before the mind’s eye such objects 
as geographical maps, columns of figures in mental arithmetic, or pages of music. As a 
matter of fact, children are constantly taking visual notes in this way; but the faculty 
might be brought to a much higher degree of usefulness by special practice. (Osborn, 
1884c, pp. 448–9)  
Despite concluding that a well-developed visualizing faculty served as a hindrance to intellectual 
achievement, Galton and Osborn encouraged the development of certain features of this faculty 
through education, interpreting imagery skills as advantageous in various technical and artistic 
endeavours.80 Galton, in fact, concluded that, “the highest minds are probably those in which it 
[i.e., the power of mental imagery] is not lost, but subordinated, and is ready to use on suitable 
occasions” (1883, p. 88). Emphasis on the pedagogical value of their questionnaire-based 
projects aligns well with Hall’s soon-to-be initiated program of child study research and also 
foreshadows Osborn’s later commitment to public science education through his role as AMNH 
president (Osborn, 1911, 1912; Pauly, 1991; Rainger, 1991), as well as his more general interest 
in the quality of American education (Osborn, 1892, 1903, 1906, 1910, 1925, 1927). For Osborn, 
an ardent neo-Lamarckian, quality education was a eugenic initiative, as it offered a means of 
ensuring prolonged social betterment.  
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of the imagination to the artistic, rather than scientific, realm. 
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Conclusion 
 By every indication Osborn completed circulating the Princeton Mental Imagery 
Questionnaires in the spring of 1882. Although he would continue to publish on mental imagery 
and the results of his questionnaire research for two more years his research in this area had 
come to an end. By the mid-1880s his research turned increasingly to biological topics, and by 
the early 1890s, he had left psychological research behind for a career in vertebrate 
palaeontology. In 1891 he ended his tenure at Princeton and relocated to New York City. 
Although he was initially offered the position of Professor of Psychology at Columbia College, 
Osborn turned the position down, as he was no longer working in the field. He subsequently 
accepted joint appointments to the Biology Department of Columbia College and the vertebrate 
palaeontology department of the AMNH, while the position of Professor of Psychology was 
filled by Cattell.81 Come the twentieth century, Osborn was one of the most influential vertebrate 
palaeontologists in the country, with an influence that extended beyond the scientific realm 
(Rainger, 1991). From his politically prominent position as president of the AMNH, over a 
twenty-year tenure, he became one of the most noted eugenicists in the United States, a 
development hinted at by the interest in human variation evident in the questionnaire research 
undertaken decades earlier. 
Osborn conducted some of the earliest questionnaire-based psychological research in the 
United States, but his tenure as a psychologist was short-lived. That being said, he never lost 
interest in the nature of mental life and related issues. In the 1890s he, as well as Baldwin 
(another former student of McCosh) and British comparative psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan 
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(1852-1936), each seemingly independently, developed an evolutionary theory in which 
consciousness plays a guiding role (Baldwin, 1896a, 1896b, 1896e; Osborn, 1896, 1897; see 
Young, 2009, 2013). Nonetheless, for Osborn the study of mental imagery appears to have been 
his only foray into psychological research. 
 Osborn did not pursue the subject further, but the study of mental imagery did not go idle. 
Nearly a decade after Osborn collected his initial data, Professor of Philosophy Andrew 
Campbell Armstrong Jr. (1894), of Wesleyan University, took up the project again.82 In 1890 he 
obtained 43 responses Osborn had collected using Galton’s original questionnaire and added to 
these a further 151 responses from Wesleyan students. The latter were collected from students in 
his elementary psychology over the course of four successive years, from 1890 through 1893, 
while only 37 of the former were used in Armstrong’s combined analysis as the remaining six 
were from non-students. By and large Armstrong’s results matched those previously recorded by 
Osborn and Galton, but he also took this work one step further. As he reported in 1894, “within 
the group of Wesleyan students an attempt was made to compare the power of visualization with 
the standard of scholarship as tested by college grades” (Armstrong, Jr., 1894, p. 505). Here, 
efforts to track mental ability were extended into the practical realm of college performance in 
much the same manner as Cattell’s soon-to-be discredited method (Sokal, 1987a). Armstrong 
(1894) deemed the data “inadequate” (p. 505) for definitive conclusions, but nonetheless 
observed the apparent trend for those with lower imaging ability to be those with the highest 
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class standings. Similarly, the small number of responses received from women pointed toward a 
more pronounced imaging faculty than was the case with men.83  
 It remains unclear to what extent Osborn’s early questionnaire-based inquiry inspired the 
later body of work with the methodology but, irrespective of its direct influence on later projects, 
it introduced this mode of inquiry to the American context. In doing so, it set the stage for much 
of the work to come with the method. While the Galtonian orientation within American 
psychology has traditionally been traced to Cattell’s mental testing work, Osborn’s endeavours 
provide an earlier and alternate source of this influence on the field. Subsequent investigations 
undertaken by not only Armstrong and Hall, but also Jastrow and Francis Speir Jr. (see Chapter 
7), are all linked to this early work in some respect. As in Osborn’s investigations, questionnaire-
based inquiries more generally were pre-occupied with collecting information on various forms 
of difference. The ability to document variance in mental ability writ large came increasingly to 
dominate the discipline. Armstrong’s explicit attempt, in the immediate wake of Osborn’s work, 
to orient the results of early mental imagery projects toward this aim was only the beginning of a 
much larger trend that would only fully take shape in the twentieth century. 
  
                                                
83 Titchener’s widely adopted manual for teaching psychology, Experimental Psychology, 
published in 1901, included examples of what he termed the “Questionary Method” (1901, p. 
387). In the context of a series of experiments on “Ideational Type and Association of Ideas” 
Titchener (1901) presented the questionnaire method as the “most complete and satisfactory 
upon the visual side” (p. 391) and suggested its use to investigate imagery following Galton’s 
earlier example. This form of inquiry was subsequently taken up by investigators at Vassar 
College, who explicitly adopted the methodology outlined in Titchener’s volume (Bell & 
Muckenhoupt, 1906; French, 1902).  
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Chapter 2 
Enumerating Mental Associations 
In the 1880s and 1890s a number of psychologists turned their attention to mental 
associations of various forms, subjects Galton (1883) discussed alongside his mental imagery 
studies. Unlike earlier investigations of mental imagery, however, work on mental associations 
often demonstrated the vast similarities in the minds of men and women, rather than pronounced 
differences between groups. The questionnaire’s ability to reveal similarities across groups, I 
argue in this chapter, was as much a part of the method’s appeal as its ability to discern 
differences. Emerging eugenicists like Galton and Osborn might focus on uncovering the latter, 
but this was by no means the sole power of the questionnaire. Just as laboratory-based studies of 
limited numbers of subjects – the prototypical scheme of the new psychology in the Wundtian 
tradition  – could not reveal difference, neither could such studies make clear similarities in 
mental life of assumed disparate groups. In the context of studies of mental association data 
conveniently fell into discrete categories, as questionnaires sought to document the presence or 
absence of particularly kinds of associations, particularly those related to numbers, colours, and 
letters. This kind of material, unlike the more descriptive data that dominated other kinds of 
questionnaire endeavours (see Chapter 4), held the distinct advantage of being relatively easy to 
synthesize into a coherent whole. The regular invocation of particular kinds of mental 
associations as alternative explanations for psychical phenomena imbued these kinds of 
investigations with further import. Documenting the ubiquity of mental associations rendered 
these mental proclivities particularly viable natural, rather than supernatural, causes of the 
coincidences so often deemed meaningful.
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Central to the conversation over possible alternative explanations of telepathy in the latter 
years of the nineteenth century was the invocation of one particular kind of mental association: 
number habits (see Chapters 5 & 6). That individuals might form strong associations with certain 
numbers rather than others, that there might be a general preference among individuals for some 
numbers, and that these associations might inform the results of research into telepathy was 
acknowledged by all in the foregoing debate. For at least some, this state of affairs provided a 
plausible alternative explanation for the apparent occurrence of telepathy, one appealed to 
alongside other non-psychical explanations. What remained to be explained was the exact nature 
of mental associations, number habits included. Efforts to do just this were taken up by 
investigators, who surveyed the minds of large numbers of individuals. This provided a means of 
documenting not only the peculiarities of mental associations, but of rendering their occurrence a 
normal part of mental life. Much like the work on dreams and unconscious cerebration I describe 
in Chapter 7, research into mental associations provided a means of accounting for psychical 
phenomena in terms of the mind’s as yet undocumented proclivities.  
 Even if number habits were not explanations for the entirety of findings in psychical 
research, these kinds of mental habits offered compelling counterpoints to often-persuasive 
personal experiences with coincidences. Coincidences that could be interpreted as meaningful 
served to support belief in the reality of psychical phenomena. In offering an account of how 
apparently supernaturally significant coincidences were products of the mind’s natural 
tendencies along certain lines, the weight of personal experience as evidence in favour of 
psychical matters was challenged. Questionnaires, by gathering information from numerous 
individuals, offered a succinct means of providing a scientific counterpoint to the authority of 
personal experience. In documenting the pervasiveness of the mind’s propensity to form 
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associations of various kinds, unique patterns of association were rendered a normal part of 
mental life. The number habits investigated by psychical researchers were tendencies to respond 
in certain ways, but number forms were decidedly visual. Thus, much of the research on mental 
associations may also be understood as a variation on basic perceptual and sensory research, 
which was the hallmark of early laboratory psychology. This research also allowed for 
discussion of individual variation impossible in paradigmatic experimental work, which was 
confined to adult, male, white minds (Danziger, 1985, 1990).  
 The mental imagery studies undertaken by both Galton and Osborn involved inquiries 
into what were termed “visualised numerals” (Galton, 1881d, 1883), also referred to as number 
forms (see Chapter 1). These forms were unique spatial depictions of numbers characterized by 
Galton (1880c) as “usually fantastical and sometimes very elaborate” (p. 253) and were “by no 
means the same in different persons, but assumes the most grotesque variety of shapes” (Galton, 
1881e, p. 87). More specifically, for those who possess number forms  
whenever a number is thought of, it appears in the same place on a visual diagram which 
is invariably called up, viewed by the mental eye, often definitely located, and which 
usually consists of an irregular composition of lines on which the figures appear either 
written or printed. (Phillips, 1897a, p. 506) 
Though mental imagery and number forms were Galton’s (1883) main interest within the field of 
mental associations he also made mention of colour associations with letters. This work, along 
with studies by a number of other European investigators, were touchstones for much of the 
work on mental associations taken up by American investigators.84 
                                                
 84 In addition to Galton, work by Théodore Flournoy (Calkins, 1895a; Phillips, 1897a), 
Alfred Binet (Calkins, 1892, 1893a), and Henry Beaunis was referenced in the context of 
American inquiries (Calkins, 1892, 1893a). 
 67 
 Investigations of mental habits by American psychologists were of two kinds. On the one 
hand were investigators, including George Thomas White Patrick, Mary Whiton Calkins, and 
Daniel Edward Phillips, who sought to document the nature, variety, and commonness of mental 
associations through the circulation of questionnaires. This included number forms, but also 
alphabet forms and coloured hearing. On the other hand were efforts to enumerate individuals’ 
number preferences. This work, most notably that of Jastrow with respect to the results of the 
1880 census, used great stores of data to demonstrate number habits. Both were statistical 
undertakings, but each was of a slightly different orientation. While Jastrow emphasized group 
differences in his collected data, Patrick, Calkins, and Phillips all downplayed difference in order 
to frame mental associations as normal features of mental life common across groups. In each 
instance, the investigation of entities with a limited range possible values (numbers, colours, 
letters, etc.) ensured that analysis and interpretation of collected data was relatively manageable, 
at least along certain lines.  
Joseph Jastrow and Census Statistics 
 In the mid-1880s Jastrow (1885b), at the time a fellow in psychology at Johns Hopkins 
University, turned his attention to what he characterized as “some peculiarities” of the most 
recent United States census (see Pettit, 2013b). The census, undertaken in 1880 under the 
direction of statistician Frances Amasa Walker, surveyed a national population of just over 50 
million individuals in an effort to document, and thus manage, a changing American populace. 
Expanded census work undertaken in the late nineteenth century, led by statisticians like Walker, 
took on a broader social role beyond political apportionment as “business associations, 
reformers, and the new university men” (Anderson, 1988, p. 85) pushed for the collection of data 
in line with their interests. This involved the growth of social statistics to document changing 
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social life, including both economic changes as well as the collection of vital statistics on 
“defective, dependent, and delinquent classes” (Anderson, 1988, p. 85). Outside of official 
census undertakings, the social survey simultaneously became a popular means of documenting 
the particularities of American life in various locales (Bulmer et al., 1991; Katz & Sugrue, 1998).  
 According to Jastrow’s analysis, the individuals accounted for in the 1880 census 
demonstrated a marked preference for certain kinds of numbers when declaring their age on the 
census. The general goal of his analysis was to “shed light on the characteristics of the natural 
bias in favor of round numbers” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 464).85 In the context of contemporaneous 
psychical research where chance coincidences were imbued with significance, documenting this 
kind of particularity of mental life served to counteract superstition. Charles Minot’s earlier 
reference to mental habits as explanations for otherwise inexplicable correspondences between 
individuals was received favourably by Jastrow who saw the “neglect of the natural community 
and similarity of men’s thoughts” (Jastrow, 1889, p. 81 fn.) as a problem in need of addressing. 
In the case of especially close companions, who are familiar with each other’s thought-habits and 
thus able to predict their association of ideas, this was even more clearly the case (Jastrow, 
1895). If anything, Jastrow, thought “knowing, as we do, how closely alike are our modern 
education and interests, the wonder is, rather, that these coincidences are not more frequent and 
startling” (Jastrow, 1887, p. 115). 
 In the case of the census, the American public showed evidence of pervasive number 
habits in particular directions. Individuals were disposed to report their age in round numbers, 
especially multiples of ten (20, 50, etc.), rather than the odd numbered ages immediately 
                                                
85 He went on to suggest a more practical ambition for his project: “a means of suggesting 
modifications in the method of questioning which would obviate these misrepresentations” 
(Jastrow, 1885b, p. 464).  
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preceding these values (19, 49, etc.). To examine the strength of this tendency, Jastrow (1885b) 
began by “subtract[ing] the number of persons recorded as 9 years old from the number recorded 
as 10, and express[ing] this excess in percentage of the number at 9 years” (p. 461) and doing the 
same with every age ending in 9 and its immediately following round number. Averaging the 
resulting 9 percentages produced what he termed the “10 exaggeration” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 461), 
with each individual percentage serving as the 10 exaggeration for its multiple of 10 (i.e., the 10 
exaggeration at 20, the 10 exaggeration at 50, etc.).86 The overall 10 exaggeration for the entire 
population of the United States was calculated to be 71.25%, though it ranged from a low of 
9.5% at 10 years of age to a high of 126% at 60 years of age. 
 The 10 exaggeration served as the basis for Jastrow’s discussion of race and gender based 
differences in numerical preferences.87 According to his calculations, this tendency was 
particularly strong among the foreign born, females, and “colored” people which, for the 
purposes of his calculations, included Chinese, Japanese, and “civilized Indians” (Jastrow, 
1885b, p. 462 fn.). To concretize what was otherwise a rather abstract discussion of the 
propensity for some groups to display – or over-display – a penchant for certain numbers Jastrow 
produced two line graphs of the 10 exaggeration for the population as a whole and each of his 
groups. In the first of these figures each group was further divided by gender (see Figure 1). Of 
the stark presentation of the data in his Fig. 1, Jastrow contended “the enormous exaggeration of 
the colored people is the first striking, appalling fact” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 462). With an average 
10 exaggeration of 432% the group’s tendency to prefer round numbers was more than 6 times 
                                                
86 Jastrow (1885b), at least for the purposes of this analysis, assumed that individuals 
were predisposed to round up to the nearest multiple of 10. The possibility that individuals might 
round down in the same fashion was not addressed.  
87 Jastrow’s attention to difference was by no means confined to this analysis. For instant, 
he contended that the propensity to hypnotization was dependent “upon the nationality, class, 
temperament, and so on, of the individuals observed” (Jastrow, 1889, p. 78, see also 1891c). 
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that of the population as a whole. A similarly patterned “5 exaggeration” was also noted, and 
represented in Jastrow’s Fig. 1 with cross-marks on each of the 10 exaggeration lines.  
 
Figure 1. The 10 exaggeration for various groups. Reproduced from Jastrow (1885b, p. 462). 
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 Jastrow singled out a number of factors to explain some of the specific peculiarities of 
number preferences. The greater prevalence of the 10 exaggeration in the foreign born and 
“colored” people was, in part, attributable to illiteracy as he had worked out that “a set of lines 
representing the illiteracy for the several races and sexes would closely resemble fig. 1” (Jastrow, 
1885b, p. 462 fn.).88 Illiteracy might correspond with number exaggeration, but it was not a 
complete explanation for the phenomena. Jastrow (1885b) noted, “the negro is the being upon 
whom all the various causes tending to produce this peculiar falsity of returns are the most 
active” (p. 462). The group next most susceptible to these causes was the foreign born. Though 
relatively high rates of 10 exaggeration in foreign born individuals might be explained in large 
part by illiteracy, as in “colored” individuals, the “doubtless misunderstandings between the 
foreigner and the census official, owing to a meagre acquaintance with the language, enter as an 
additional disturbing influence” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 462). No such additional factor was offered 
to account for the even higher rates of number preference in the “colored” group. For this group 
illiteracy served less an explanation for their pronounced 10 exaggeration than as yet a further 
indicator of the group’s more general, and assumed innate, inferiority. 
 Both race and place were positioned as especially pernicious influences. Separating the 
census data by state, Jastrow noted a tendency for native white males of southern states to show 
more pronounced 10 exaggerations on account of what he pointedly remarked to be “too close 
intimacy with the ‘round-number loving’ negro” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 463).89 Such an influence 
                                                
88 Jastrow did not offer an explicit rationale for why illiteracy would produce a 
pronounced ten exaggeration. Perhaps he held the illiterate to be less aware of their exact age and 
thus more likely to select a multiple of ten when reporting their age, or the illiterate to be 
children of other illiterate individuals who were unable to accurately record birth date 
information for their children. 
89 Jastrow (1885b) did not explicitly consider what role education, or the lack thereof, and 
particularly rates of illiteracy might have played in producing these results. 
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was, in his view, “dangerous to statistical accuracy” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 463). The corrupting 
influence of “colored” individuals was responsible for elevating the 10 exaggeration of native 
white males beyond the more “normal” levels displayed by, for instance, those in the New 
England states. Gender was similarly determinative, even within groups already singled out for 
their deficiency. The large number exaggeration exhibited by elderly “colored” women, nearly 
twice that of their male counterparts, was attributed to “colored” women being “far more 
forgetful of their ages than old men” (Jastrow, 1885b, p. 463).  
 One form of number exaggeration was, however, exclusively the domain of native white 
males. Though this group was the one least disposed to the 10 exaggeration that was at the centre 
of Jastrow’s analysis they did demonstrate a clear preference for one number: 21. This 
exaggeration was difficult to gauge with any degree of precision because its closest lower 
counterpart, 20, was itself part of the 10 exaggeration. Similarly, 19 proved inadequate for 
comparative purposes as it was presumed underreported given the exaggeration of 20. 
Nonetheless, Jastrow noted that there were more males at 21 than 19, and more so than was the 
case with females. The exaggerated number of males at 21 was explained purely on the basis of 
the social utility of the age for a white male, but not a white female, or “colored” male for that 
matter: “21 being the voting-age, and 1880 the year of a hot presidential campaign” (Jastrow, 
1885b, p. 464). 
 Amassing a larger body of information on the American public than that assemble for the 
1880 census was simply inconceivable. Unlike others who created questionnaires to gather 
information on specific aspects of mental life, Jastrow capitalized on this existing data set. An 
easily accessible mass of data, the census allowed him to avoid the perils of large-scale data 
collection and its attendant labour. At the same time, in order to ascertain anything of value 
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regarding mental habits, Jastrow had to extrapolate from data collected for another purpose 
entirely. This was both advantageous and limiting. On the one hand, the data allowed him to 
make grand claims regarding the regularity of certain tendencies of the mind. On the other, the 
project very decidedly lacked the introspective element so common in large-scale data collection 
with questionnaires. Using a mass of already collected data, assembled for another purpose, 
meant that individual experiences with the mental habit he identified was decidedly absent from 
the analysis. What remained, however, were the kinds of “curves and averages of surprising 
regularity” (Jastrow, 1895, p. 573) that Jastrow privileged.90 This kind of effacing of the personal 
element was not limited to undertakings where the inclusion of such was impossible. More 
generally, Jastrow (1900) held the “tendency, to insist that the laws of science shall be precisely 
and in detail applicable to individual experiences possessing a personal interest for us, has 
wrought much havoc” (p. 84, see also Jastrow, 1895, p. 573) including the perpetuation of belief 
in psychical matters. The solution, in his view, was “to insist upon the statistical nature of the 
inquiry” (Jastrow, 1900, p. 84). The census and smaller scale questionnaire inquiries were one 
means of countering personal experience with statistical data. 
                                                
90 Jastrow’s analysis of census data was one of many such undertakings with the findings 
from the 1880 endeavor, largely as a consequence of Walker’s successful organizational and data 
collection efforts (see Anderson, 1988). One other such instance was Alexander Graham Bell’s 
interrogation of the enumeration of individuals classified as blind, deaf-mute, idiotic, and insane 
in the United States and his observation that there had been a relative increase in the number of 
these individuals in the populace over time (“Census of the defective classes,” 1889). Further 
discussion of the oddities of the census’s age statistics, in relation to race and place, was 
undertaken by Albert Williams, Jr. (1889) several years later. Williams (1889) was drawn to the 
subject by an encounter with a numerically based “so-called mind reading trick,” in the context 
of which he observed “the number 7, though so common among the Semitic races, is a rare one 
with Aryans. We have for favorite numbers 5s, 10’s, and strangely enough, 3’s” (p. 11008). It 
was this work, rather than Jastrow’s, that Phillips (1897b) cited in his work on number 
preference (see also Sanford, 1903). 
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As Jastrow (1887) recognized in the context of psychical research, “the human mind is 
not calculated to act like a die-box or a raffling-wheel” (p. 116).91 Having pairs of individuals 
guess numbers and comparing their matches with calculations of the probability of chance 
coincidences was consequently a failed research approach. Census statistics only served to 
further reinforce this view. In subsequent decades other psychologists continued this line of 
research. Both Fletcher Dresslar (1899) and Edmund Sanford (1903) undertook projects on 
number preferences in guessing, in each case collecting a large body of statistics of the guesses 
made by numerous of individuals within the context of a public guessing contest.92 Efforts to 
explain number preferences in these investigations resorted to appeals to longstanding 
superstition, such as Dresslar’s (1899) contention that  
as lower peoples developed the need of numbers and the power to use them, certain of 
these numbers came to be surrounded with a superstitious importance and endued with 
certain qualities which led at once to numerical preferences more or less dominant in all 
their thinking connected with numbers. (p. 784) 
Superstition could be used to explain why individuals chose certain numbers, and in the case of 
psychical phenomena were included as explanatory factors for the correspondence between 
individual’s guesses. While continuing to reference the kind of superstitious thinking invoked by 
                                                
91 And more so, “to have numbers chosen is a different thing from having them drawn. In 
fact, it is possible to suggest a certain kind of number-preference by the framing of the question” 
(Jastrow, 1887, p. 116). 
92 In Dresslar’s (1899) case material was secured from a Los Angeles clothing company 
that ran a contest with a one hundred dollar gold prize for those who could guess the correct 
number of seeds in a very large uncut squash. More than seven thousand individuals offered 
guesses as part of the contest. Sanford’s (1903) data was amassed as part of a guessing context, 
ostensibly held by a Worcester photographic supplies dealer, which offered as a prize a valuable 
camera. Individuals guessed the number of beans held within a five-pint jar displayed in the shop 
window. Nearly three thousand guesses from more than seven hundred individuals were 
recorded. 
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Jastrow within his assessments of psychical belief, later researchers also recognized the import of 
contextual factors. Sanford (1903) in particular noted that number habits “are not fixed and 
constant, as seems generally to have been assumed, but vary characteristically with variations in 
the conditions under which the guessing is carried out” (p. 401).93 Rather than assuming number 
habits to be fixed characteristics of individuals or groups situational factors were appealed to as 
necessary features of any observed tendency of individuals to choose certain numbers over 
others. 
Collecting Mental Association 
 Efforts to collect accounts of mental associations were more involved than Jastrow’s 
census work. Psychologists seeking to elucidate the nature of a variety of mental associations 
opted to employ the questionnaire method as a way of amassing their own data. Central to many 
of these investigations, as in Galton’s earlier inquiries, were the enumeration of number forms, 
but efforts in this direction did not stop with simple numerical associations. Rather, inquiries into 
number forms often rapidly expanded to include efforts to describe a wide variety of mental 
associations, including various synaesthesias. From the late-1880s through the mid-1890s three 
projects were undertaken along these lines. 
Trained predominantly as a philosopher Patrick, like a number of others during this 
period, expressed an interest in the emerging new psychology. In the 1880s, following three 
years of graduate study at Yale University, he moved to Johns Hopkins where he studied 
philosophy and psychology with Hall.94 Although he was more interested in the former than the 
                                                
93 Notably Sanford (1903) found no difference in the guesses of men and boys in 
comparison to those of women and girls. 
94 Patrick (1895a) was also active in the child study movement. See also “National 
Association for the Study of Children: Preliminary Announcement;” “Organization and Plan of 
 76 
latter field, Patrick minored in psychology and economics. At Hopkins, he was part of a 
generation of students – including John Dewey, Cattell, Jastrow, William Burnham, James 
Hyslop, Henry Donaldson, and Sanford – who went on to make significant contributions to a 
number of fields including, psychology, philosophy, neurology, and education. In 1887, prior to 
completing his doctoral studies, Patrick was called back to his alma mater, the University of 
Iowa, to take up the position of Professor of Mental and Moral Science and Didactics. A year 
later, upon hearing Hall was leaving Hopkins for the newly founded Clark University, Patrick 
temporarily returned to Baltimore to complete his examination for doctor of philosophy. Shortly 
thereafter, in 1890, he established a laboratory of psychology at the University of Iowa.95 In the 
1890s, like many American students of the time, he travelled to Germany for further instruction. 
There he visited Oswald Külpe and Wilhelm Wundt, and briefly worked in the latter’s laboratory 
(Cantor, 1991; Patrick, 1932). Ultimately, more philosophically than psychologically inclined, 
Patrick was nonetheless active in the field especially prior to psychologist Carl Seashore’s 1897 
arrival at the University of Iowa (Patrick & Gilbert, 1896, 1897).  
Although at least nominally credentialed in laboratory psychology, through his studies 
with Hall and his time in Germany, Patrick’s psychological investigations were not confined to 
this space. In the late 1880s, having not yet established a laboratory at his institution, he 
developed an interest in number forms and opted to investigate the phenomena via questionnaire. 
As he described, “the general character of number form [sic] is such that a person having one can 
not think of the related numbers without seeing them in a definite visual picture” (Patrick, 1893, 
p. 507). To document the existence and character of these forms, Patrick set out to gather 
                                                                                                                                                       
Work of the National Association for the Study of Children,” B1-8-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
95 This was only the 10th such laboratory to open in North America (Garvey, 1929). 
 77 
information on these forms of thinking from numerous individuals. Over the course of four 
years, several dozen examples of number forms were collected, explicitly following the line of 
work set out by Galton earlier (see Patrick, 1893).  
Over the course of his investigation Patrick altered the form of his questionnaire. As a 
result, the body of data collected was not all from the same set of questions. Earlier in his studies 
questioning was brief and pointed: “When you think of the numbers from 1 to 100, do you 
mentally see them in any form, or outline? If so, can you draw a representation of it?” (Patrick, 
1893, p. 505). As would be the case with both Phillips (1897a) and Calkins (1892), later 
questioning was expanded to include queries on a variety of mental associations. This included 
not only questions on numerical associations, but also ones on alphabet forms and alphanumeric 
colour associations: 
1. When you think of the numbers from 1 to 100, do you see them in any particular form? 
If so, will you write or draw it on paper? 
2. When you think of the alphabet from a to z, do you see the letters in any particular 
form? 
3. Have you any associations of color with the numbers or letters? (Patrick, 1893, p. 510) 
Both sets of questions were asked of college age individuals, largely those between 18 and 25 
years of age, both male and female. This included 75 individuals who responded to the first 
iteration of the questionnaire and a further 29 to the second extended version. Of these, 30 and 8 
individuals, respectively, were female. 
Toward the end of Patrick’s work on number forms Mary Whiton Calkins began her own 
systematic inquiry into the matter. At Wellesley College, Calkins and her students undertook 
extensive questionnaire-based inquiries into number forms and other mental associations, far 
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beyond those of other early American investigators. These investigations were part of Calkins’s 
longstanding interest in the more general nature of association (Calkins, 1893b, 1896a, 1896b, 
1898; Münsterberg et al., 1894). Trained initially in Classics and Philosophy at Smith College 
and hired in 1887 to teach Greek at Wellesley, she was first approached in 1888 about the 
possibility of teaching a course on the new psychology at the College. The position was briefly 
postponed, but in 1890 Calkins was made instructor in psychology at the school, under the 
condition that she obtain a year of training in the field. After exploring several options, including 
travelling abroad to study in Germany, as well as opportunities for study with John Dewey at the 
University of Michigan and George Trumball Ladd at Yale, Calkins endeavored to arrange for 
graduate training at the geographically nearer Harvard University. In addition to its proximity, 
Harvard had the advantage of possessing what neither the University of Michigan nor Yale 
University did: a laboratory of psychology (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).  
 Thanks to lobbying from her father and Wellesley’s president, Calkins managed to secure 
from the Harvard administration the right to attend courses in psychology in 1890. As a woman, 
however, she was never formally admitted as a student. At Harvard, Calkins studied with both 
William James and Josiah Royce, though this work was largely philosophical rather than 
experimental, despite the presence of a psychology laboratory at the institution. To supplement 
these studies, she arranged to work with Sanford in Clark’s psychology laboratory (see Chapter 
7). As at Harvard these studies were informal, as Clark similarly did not permit female students 
to officially enroll at the University (see Chapter 3). With Hugo Münsterberg’s arrival at Harvard 
in 1892, to take over operation of the university’s psychology laboratory, Calkins returned to the 
institution for several years of further training in experimental psychology (Calkins, 1930; 
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Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987).96  
 Throughout her studies in psychology at both Harvard and Clark, Calkins continued to 
teach at Wellesley. There, in 1891, she established the first psychology laboratory at a women’s 
college in the United States. Shortly thereafter research with questionnaires was incorporated 
into her course on experimental psychology through the study of mental forms and associations. 
For Calkins, there was no necessary distinction between experimental laboratory investigations 
and those undertaken via questioning with circulars. Both served as central components of her 
teaching and therefore Wellesley students were introduced to psychology as a science that could 
be practiced through a variety of investigatory methods.97 Calkins established a formal 
laboratory of psychology, and students were instructed in the use of the instruments within it, but 
there was also room for studies that did not necessitate the use of this kind of formal scientific 
space.98 Work with questionnaires was one such mode of study.99 
 In the fall of 1892, following a period of training in laboratory psychology and her 
establishment of a laboratory at Wellesley, Calkins (1892) initiated a new psychology course at 
the school: “Psychology, including Experimental Psychology” (p. 260). As part of this offering, 
                                                
96 This work culminated in her completion of all the necessary requirements for a 
doctoral degree in psychology. Although a successful unsanctioned doctoral examination was 
held, with James, Royce, Münsterberg, and other Harvard faculty members, Calkins never 
received an official doctoral degree from the university (Scarborough & Furumoto, 1987). 
97 Other undertakings on association from the Wellesley laboratory also included work 
explicitly following Galton’s example (see Calkins, 1898). 
98 For descriptions of other non-laboratory bound research projects see Calkins (1892). 
 99 Earlier in the decade Calkins was also involved in questionnaire research, as a 
participant rather than an investigator, as part of James’s American census of hallucinations (see 
Chapter 5). Her questionnaire-based psychological research does not seem to extend beyond the 
1890s, though she did continue to assist with data collection for others’ studies into the twentieth 
century (see Thayer, 1905) and in 1910 undertook a questionnaire-based investigation of the 
state of psychology education in institutions that lacked laboratories (Calkins, 1910) as part of a 
larger inquiry on the part of the American Psychological Association’s Committee on the 
Teaching of Psychology (C. E. Seashore, Angell, Calkins, Sanford, & Whipple, 1910). 
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students completed a number of experimental investigations in the new psychology laboratory, 
largely based on those outlined by Sanford (1891a, 1891b, 1892) in his “Laboratory Course in 
Psychology,” as well as other experimental work, including studies of attention and space-
consciousness, among others (see Calkins, 1892). These kinds of experimental investigations 
were not the only research conducted in the course. Also undertaken was the “collection of 
statistics about colored hearing and number-forms” (Calkins, 1892, p. 269);100 that is, an inquiry 
into forms of synaesthesia, focusing particularly on the association of certain sounds with a given 
colour and the association of numbers with particular spatial arrangements (see also Calkins, 
1893a). This inquiry into mental associations began in the spring of 1892 and continued into the 
fall of that year with wider reaching annual circular studies conducted at the College in later 
years (Calkins, 1893a, 1895a). As in other inquiries, Calkins’s questionnaires were easily 
alterable instruments and subsequently circulated versions were regularly reconfigured in light of 
knowledge gained from previous undertakings (see Calkins, 1895a).101 
                                                
100 Both of these subjects were later investigated at Vassar College in the first decade of 
the twentieth century (Rose, 1909). Experiments on single individuals with such associations 
were also conducted during this period (e.g., Dresslar, 1903). For an overview of some of the 
early psychological research on synaesthesia see Campen (1999). 
101 Also undertaken during this period were educationally oriented studies by Calkins and 
her students on what was termed “mathematical consciousness” (Calkins, 1894). This included a 
further questionnaire-based inquiry that compared those who liked mathematics and those who 
did not, men and women, and those who preferred algebra to those who preferred geometry on a 
number of separate points. As part of this inquiry 30 male students at Harvard and 87 female 
students at Wellesley, in addition to specifying their positions regarding the previously listed 
points, responded to the following questions: “Do you find it easier to remember (a) words? or 
(b) how things look, sound or feel?” (Calkins, 1894, p. 272), “Do you remember easily or with 
difficulty?” (Calkins, 1894, p. 273), “Can you carry a long calculation in the mind?” (Calkins, 
1894, p. 274), “Do you naturally classify or group (e.g., notice the likenesses and differences of 
two declensions or of two botanical families)?,” “Do you reason out or remember a 
demonstration?” (Calkins, 1894, p. 276), and “Do you readily supply intervening steps in a 
demonstration?” (Calkins, 1894, p. 278). As part of this investigation a small body of material 
was also collected on the sense-type of numerals (visual, articulatory, auditory, or graphical) in 
children. Included in this research report was a related study comparing the degree of 
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 Much like James McKeen Cattell’s soon-to-be initiated efforts at submitting all incoming 
students to Columbia College and the Columbia School of Mines to his series of largely 
anthropometric mental tests, a practice that began in 1894 and continued into the twentieth 
century (Sokal, 1987a), Calkins attempted something similar with her circulars. Following the 
initial investigations of 1892, the questionnaires were systematically distributed to all freshmen 
students at the College for two years beginning in 1893 (Calkins, 1895a, see 1930).102 Unlike 
Cattell’s attempt to construct tests that revealed something about the subject’s overall mental 
ability, the aim of the Wellesley studies was decidedly less ambitious. Questionnaire-based 
investigations of mental associations were not intended to serve as tests revelatory of larger 
mental functioning, but were simply framed as studies of particular psychological phenomena. 
This limited field of inquiry – as well as the project’s relatively short duration – may well have 
spared Calkins the kind of downfall that Cattell’s project met with when his student Clark 
Wissler, trained in statistical methods by anthropologist Franz Boas, revealed that the Columbia 
mental tests did not correlate to any significant degree with academic achievement (Sokal, 
1987a). 
 Shortly after the conclusion of Calkins’s research project, Phillips undertook a further 
questionnaire-based investigation into numerical associations. At the time a student at Clark 
                                                                                                                                                       
imagination in children who did and did not like arithmetic according to their varying degrees of 
arithmetical ability (Calkins, 1894). For this investigation children’s  
imaginative power was tested by the request to make up a little story about the sunflower 
and the rose; and by the following questions:  
If you were a king or a queen, what would you do?  
Like what does the wind seem to you to sound?  
If the wind were a person, like what would it look? (Calkins, 1894, p. 280)  
 102 Calkins (1895a), in the fall of 1895, expressed her intent to continue the project several 
years longer, though it is does not appear that this in fact transpired. In her autobiographical 
reflections only annual investigations along these lines for 1893 and 1894 are mentioned (see 
Calkins, 1930, p. 35) and no further research reports were published. 
 82 
University, Phillips was later appointed Professor of Psychology and Education at the University 
of Denver (see Phillips, 1913). Initially, he sought information on numerical associations as part 
of a broader circular inquiry into “Numbers and Mathematics” initiated in April 1896.103 This 
undertaking was largely oriented toward pedagogical considerations, particularly improvements 
that might be made to the teaching of numbers and mathematics as a function of insight into 
children’s acquisition of this kind of knowledge (Phillips, 1897b).104 Under a section in the 
circular headed “Psychological and Anthropological” several questions were directed to 
numerical associations (see Phillips, 1897b).105 Most interesting to Phillips’s (1897b) mind was 
an item that inquired into experiences with number forms, 
(f) Cases of number forms, e.g., the first 12 numbers being habitually associated with a 
dial or clock face, the first ten on a line, straight or curved, systems of dots, colors, etc. 
Do odd seem to you different from even numbers? Draw any number forms. How do you 
                                                
 103 “Numbers and Mathematics,” April 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. In 1899 at Clark E. B. Bryan, with Hall’s assistance, 
undertook related studies into “Mathematics in Common Schools” (Feb. 8, 1899, B1-7-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA) and “Mathematics in the Early 
Years” (Feb. 15, 1899, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA). Phillips was not involved with this work, but did later undertake another questionnaire-
based inquiry. This 1898 study of “The Teaching Instinct” served as his doctoral dissertation 
(Phillips, 1898a, 1898b). A later circular investigation of “The Elective System in American 
Education” was also conducted (Phillips, 1901).  
104 Phillips’s (1897b) understanding of the development of the number sense, particularly 
his description of the separate development of ideas of number in terms of series and ratio, was 
disputed by John Dewey (Dewey, 1897a; see also Phillips, 1897c). 
 105 “Numbers and Mathematics,” April 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. Most of the returns Phillips received to his circular 
addressed only questions under the head “Psychological and Anthropological.” Although he 
received more than 800 responses almost 200 of these “were found of little value in any way” 
(Phillips, 1897b, p. 248) and were excluded from his discussion. Williams (see Chapter 3) was 
once again one of the main data collectors for this investigation (see Phillips, 1897b, p. 278). 
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arrange days of the week or month, the musical scale? (p. 240)106 
For Phillips (1897a), more intense interest in the nature number forms “was first aroused by 
some strange and complicated answers” (p. 508) to this question. Since “this section did not 
cover the points of greatest interest” he set out to construct a more complete questionnaire on the 
subject (Phillips, 1897a, p. 508). 
 To do so Phillips personally questioned more than 300 normal school students on the 
subject. With the knowledge gleaned from these interactions, he assembled a new set of 
questions. Although the project began as an inquiry into number forms, over its course it 
expanded to document a host of other mental forms including specific iterations of number forms 
such as “month-forms” and “week-forms,” as well as “alphabet-forms” and forms associated 
with the Lord’s Prayer and songs (Phillips, 1897a, p. 509). Regarding mental forms more 
generally he inquired: 
1. At what age did it appear? 2. How did it originate? 3. Is it useful, or troublesome? 4. 
Do you see the figures on a line? 5. How large does it appear to be? 6. Where is it 
located? 7. Are you left-handed? 8. Do you know of any forms in your family? 9. State 
any peculiarities about your form or its use. 10. Do you like mathematics? 11. Give 
name, age, and sex. (Phillips, 1897a, p. 508)107 
Using this set of questions, Phillips accumulated responses from more than two thousand 
individuals, including 969 men and 1040 women.  
 
                                                
106 “Numbers and Mathematics,” April 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
107 This syllabi is not included – as a circular distinct from the “Numbers and 
Mathematics” syllabi – among those in the Clark Archives, nor is it listed in Hall’s (1924) 
accounting of the syllabi issued at Clark during his tenure. 
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Surveying Students and Student Surveyors 
 Central to the accumulation of information on mental associations was the involvement 
of students in the research process. Patrick (1893) collected what he imprecisely identified as 
between 35 and 40 examples of number forms over the course of four years, which he noted 
“were collected from or by my students” (Patrick, 1932, p. 415). Left unclear was whether the 
same students served as both subject and investigator. If indeed the case, this kind of role 
exchange was well within the parameters of practice of the new psychology. What Danziger 
(1985) has identified as the Leipzig model, the form of practice most closely associated with 
laboratory investigations of the period, is characterized in large part by regular role exchanges 
between experimenter and subject. In the context of those teaching the new psychology, 
questionnaires provided a technically simple research scheme with which non-specialist students 
could engage.  
 A reliance on students, as both investigators and subjects, was also an integral feature of 
Calkins’s work on mental associations, though her subjects also extended to members of the 
larger university community. In her case, the decision to undertake questionnaire-based research 
was informed by her understanding of the psychology course as “a general one” that needed to 
be “adapted to students without especial scientific training or without particular interest in 
experimental work” (Calkins, 1892, p. 260). Calkins’s initial inquiry into mental associations 
involved questionning 543 people, most of whom (526) were members of the Wellesley College 
community. As she and her students discovered, 98 of these individuals experienced either or 
both coloured hearing and number-forms. Of these, 32 experienced only coloured hearing, 78 
experienced only number-forms, and 14 experienced both coloured hearing and some kind of 
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number-form (Calkins, 1892, p. 269).108 As a class assignment, this data was collected by 
students “aided by a simple set of questions” (Calkins, 1892, p. 269). Whether subjects were 
required to respond to these questions by themselves filling out answers on paper, or students 
verbally questioned individuals and recorded their responses, is unclear. Whatever the procedure 
for amassing information on mental associations, this procedure revolved around a set of 
questions that guided data collection, a procedure that Calkins later explicitly identified as 
questionnaire-based (Calkins, 1930, p. 35). Once again students, at least in some instances, 
served as both data collectors and offered self-observations of their own mental associations for 
the project (see Calkins, 1893a). Unlike the Wundtian Leipzig model that underpinned much 
laboratory psychology, questionnaire research did not necessitate that participants be trained in 
the new psychology. Relying instead on a Galtonian model of psychological science, this work 
engaged a variety of individuals as participants with an eye toward accumulating information on 
populations (Danziger, 1985, 1990). Even still, the role exchange of subject and experimenter 
characteristics of Leipzig model extended to practice in this realm as, at least in some instances, 
students served both as data collectors and as sources of information themselves.  
 The students and educators involved in Phillips’s work were of a more diverse makeup 
than in previous inquiries. Phillips was himself a graduate student at Clark during the tenure of 
his project and the data he gathered was largely from student populations of various kinds, as 
was often the case in questionnaire investigations undertaken at the institution (see Chapters 3 & 
4). Of the more than two thousand responses collected with his second circular, over three 
hundred were from normal school students and nearly one thousand from Worcester school 
                                                
108 Only a paragraph later, Calkins (1892) specifies that 33 individuals experienced 
coloured hearing. This accounting of those with mental associations does not align with her more 
general claim that 98 individuals experienced one or both kinds of associations. 
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children between 10 and 16 years of age. Outside of these groups, a further 360 responses were 
received through the general circulation of his syllabus and 343 miscellaneous responses were 
obtained through personal questionning undertaken by Phillips. Of the latter group 92 were 
teachers and a further 41 were from the Clark University community. As in Calkins’s work, both 
students and educators comprised the bulk of research subjects.109 Additionally, the responses 
collected from normal school students, as in his initial inquiry on the subject (Phillips, 1897b, p. 
278) and the questionnaire-based research conducted at Clark more generally, were almost 
certainly the result of the assistance of normal school instructors in data collection. Across these 
endeavors students, and the broader body of individuals associated with educational institutions, 
were key to the accumulation of masses of data. 
Difficulties with Data Collection 
 Across these endeavours data collection was fraught with difficulties. Simply asking 
questions of individuals, while at face value an imminently straightforward undertaking, was in 
reality a much more challenging process. Even communicating exactly what was being asked 
after was problematic. Phillips (1897a) noted of his efforts to survey individuals that “those who 
have no form have no idea of what you are speaking of, and are often slow to comprehend any 
explanation, appear surprised or treat indifferently what you say” (p. 510). In much the same 
way, many of the individuals Patrick questioned at first reported they had no experience with the 
kind of mental associations asked after. Despite this initial denial, in his work at least, further 
questioning often revealed that these associations did exist. As he observed, 
it would seem that a person having even a complicated number form might live and die 
                                                
109 Phillips also solicited at least some responses to his questionnaire by approaching 
individuals in public spaces. He at one point remarks “six men in a shop were asked if any of 
them has a number-form” (Phillips, 1897a, p. 510) and then went on to reproduce the number 
form of one of these men (Phillips, 1897a, p. 513). 
 87 
without knowing it, or at least without once fixing his attention upon it or speaking of it 
to his nearest friends, although such a one might use his form in daily computation. It 
seems to him quite natural to see the numbers in that way, and the thought may never 
enter his mind that others should see them differently. (Patrick, 1893, pp. 505–6)  
Oftentimes number forms were such an ingrained part of thought processes for individuals that 
they were not immediately aware of them as a distinct feature of their mental life. The necessity 
of undertaking additional prodding to get individuals to accurately characterize their mental 
functioning makes clear that questionnaires were not discrete objects bound to the printed page. 
Rather, printed lists of questions served as prompts to data collection that sometimes needed to 
be supplemented by further inquiries on the part of the researcher. In this investigative scenario 
questionnaires extended beyond the written word on the page to encompass more informal verbal 
inquiries, the traces of which remain largely elusive.  
 Other investigators similarly recognized the need for more personal questionning. 
Though Phillips (1897a) did not observe the same necessity of pushing past initial claims of 
unfamiliarity, he nonetheless “personally interrogated” (p. 508) a subset of his respondents. 
These kind of personal inquiries were one means of obtaining further responses to questionnaires 
from individuals who might otherwise be reluctant to take the time to write out responses to a 
printed circular of questions. In the case of data collected from school children, in person 
questionning served as a means of clarifying what was asked after. As Phillips (1897a) describes, 
the process of collecting data from children involved providing “a short explanation” of mental 
forms to a classroom of children and then requesting that they “draw whatever form, or forms, 
they had” (p. 509). Those who produced forms were then questioned privately in more detail. 
Recognizing that collecting information from children on their mental life was problematic, 
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Phillips (1897a) argued that the data, while certainly not error free, “cannot be far wrong” since a 
similar proportion of adults reported mental forms and nearly all traced their forms to the earliest 
days of childhood (p. 510). 
 Efforts to ensure the existence of mental associations relied on multiple tactics. In the 
case of mental forms, both Phillips (1897a) and Calkins (1892) turned to individual’s drawings 
of their forms as confirmation of their existence. Drawings were sufficient to authenticate mental 
forms, but non-visual associations necessitated other forms of verification. In the case of 
research undertaken at Wellesley, reports of coloured hearing were substantiated by re-
questionning individuals two months after their initial responses were recorded (Calkins, 1892). 
Of the body of collected data Calkins (1893a) contended, 
the figures given … have been carefully verified, and every effort has been made to 
interpret accurately through personal interviews, or through correspondence the exact 
meaning of the subjects. Hundreds of letters have been written and scores of interviews 
have been held. (p. 439 fn.) 
The reality of individual experiences of mental associations was also communicated through the 
inclusion of detailed case descriptions in research reports (see Calkins, 1893a). Narratives of 
these kinds were persuasive evidence in favour of the authenticity of personal experience, even if 
only a fraction of the collected cases were presented in this manner. This was similarly the 
approach taken in much of the questionnaire research conducted at Clark (see Chapter 4). 
Additionally, much like James’s attempts to verify accounts of hallucinatory experiences (see 
Chapter 5), Calkins and her students expended considerable time and energy in their endeavour 
attempting to confirm claims of mental associations.  
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In questionning and re-questioning individuals it also became evident that mental 
associations were not transient states but were rather extremely stable across the lifetime. Calkins 
(1895a) saw her work as providing a “virtual demonstration of the stability of the experience” (p. 
91). Of nearly 200 individuals questioned for a second time about their experience of photisms 
(i.e., synaesthesia) and mental forms, between several months and a year later, all but one were 
found to still possess the same association (Calkins, 1895a, 1930). This finding corroborated 
Patrick’s (1893) earlier contention that individuals questioned years apart would “draw from his 
mental picture of it a copy differing in no essential respect from the original copy” (p. 507). 
Similarly, Phillips (1897a) re-questioned some of the 332 normal school students a year after his 
initial collection of information and “found no change of any note” (p. 509) in the mental forms 
reported by these individuals.  
 Unsurprisingly the content of questionnaires was crucial in amassing data deemed 
valuable by investigators. Consequently, Patrick, Calkins, and Phillips each altered their circulars 
over the course of their data collection efforts. In Calkins’s case her 1894 circular, “Questions on 
Synaesthesia” was explicitly altered as a results of challenges observed in previous years’ 
inquiries.110 Some items from earlier iterations of the circular were removed because of what was 
described as difficulties obtaining accurate responses to certain questions or near unanimous 
responses from those sampled (Calkins, 1895a, p. see p. 90–1). The final iteration of her 
questionnaire began with a set of four preliminary questions:  
I. Do you think of particular colors in connection with letters of the alphabet, or 
numerals, or proper names, or musical sounds, or in any other unusual connection? 
II. Do you think of numerals, or names of months, days or years or of any series of 
                                                
110 The questionnaire is reprinted in full in Calkins (1895a, pp. 101–7). 
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words, as arranged in particular shapes, like circles, squares, zig-zags, or very long lines? 
III. Do single numerals, letters, musical notes, etc., make you think of different shapes? 
IV.  a. Do you especially like or dislike any numerals, letters, etc.? 
 b. Do numerals, letters, etc., seem to you to be like people? (Calkins, 1895a, p. 
102) 
For each question individuals, on the basis of personal experience, were instructed: “Answer by 
“Yes,” “Yes?”, or “No.” Do not fail to answer “Yes?” not “No,” if in any doubt” (Calkins, 
1895a, p. 102). An answer of “Yes?” was to be given by anyone who was at all unsure about 
whether they possessed such associations. While Patrick sought to overcome the foreignness of 
mental associations for many individuals through additional questioning, Calkins chose to 
surmount this difficulty by providing individuals with a concrete alternative response that was 
neither “Yes” nor “No.” On the basis of these initial responses, those who answered “Yes” or 
“Yes?” to any of the items were asked to complete more detailed questions on the subject. Like 
James’s earlier census of hallucinations (see Chapter 5), this questionning began with a simple 
accounting of the prevalence of the phenomena before moving on to more detailed inquiries. 
Limiting responses to a predefined set of possible answers ensured that at least this subset of the 
data could be collated with ease. 
 The more specific questions on associative phenomena were divided into three topic 
areas – pseudo-chromesthesia,111 forms, and personification – and filled multiple pages.112 The 
questions were prefaced with the instruction: “Many of these questions may be answered by 
                                                
 111 This term was earlier defined by Clark fellow William Krohn (1892) as a “class of 
phenomena in which colors are called up in the mind of the subject when certain letters or words 
are spoken, or seen in print or writing” (p. 20). 
112 In reprinting the questionnaire as part of a 1895 journal article these questions spanned 
7 printed pages (Calkins, 1895a, pp. 101–7). The length of the printed version that was 
distributed for data collection is unclear. 
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“Yes” or “No,” but fuller replies are preferable. It is hoped that all questions will be answered, 
but the less important ones are starred” (Calkins, 1895a, p. 102). This instruction was a response 
to the difficulties with data collection encountered in previous years. Although more than 500 
people were included in the initial 1892 investigation into mental associations, an 1893 effort to 
sample all incoming students at the College was unsuccessful. This failure was due to a common 
difficulty in these kinds of projects: many individuals sampled simply did not respond or did so 
carelessly. As Calkins (1895a) described, “every member of the freshman class was questioned, 
but the preliminary inquiry was by circular, and the traditional objection to answering statistical 
inquiries may be responsible for many careless, negative replies” (p. 91). To address this issue, 
the project of sampling the next year’s freshman class was more involved. This included 
addressing the class directly wherein “the purpose of the investigation was explained, and the 
preliminary questions were answered before the students left the room” (Calkins, 1895a, p. 91). 
This was followed by the more detailed set of questions, which were provided “either by circular 
or by personal interview” (Calkins, 1895a, pp. 91 & 93, see also 1930, p. 35). The decision to 
simplify the questionnaire by indicating, via the presence of an asterisk, which of its many 
questions were less important and therefore might be skipped in the interest of time, was a 
further means of addressing students’ reluctance to devote their time to the project. Those in a 
rush, it seems, might still provide profitable responses by focusing their attention on the asterisk-
less questions Calkins deemed most valuable. Even when lengthy descriptive responses were 
provided to questions, the field of inquiry was confined to particular forms of mental 
associations. By focusing on these clearly defined categories of types of experience, the 
organization of messy, descriptive data on the particularities of colour, number, and alphabet 
associations could be streamline to some degree. 
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 The challenges of data collection extended beyond attempts to survey Wellesley students. 
Calkins reports – separate from her other figures – the case of anomalous data collected by Lillie 
Williams of the New Jersey State Normal School in Trenton. Although Williams questioned 250 
students at the school, she found only a small fraction of pupils experienced either coloured 
hearing (5 cases) or number forms (6 cases). This was in direct contrast to Calkins’s (1895a) 
finding that  
of every ten persons five at least have some peculiar, fixed form of mental imagery, and 
that of these five two are likely to have photisms and four to possess some mental form, 
while three must admit some other kind of apparently erratic association. (p. 93) 
To explain this discrepancy, Calkins (1895a) noted that many individuals who possessed some 
degree of associative tendencies did not report so, presumably responding “No” rather than 
“Yes?” to preliminary questionning, and that nearly half of the subjects “answered the questions 
hastily in time taken from other work” (p. 93).  
 Like Patrick before her, Calkins cautioned that individuals were often unaware of the 
operation of mental associations until further prodding. In Calkins’s case, this observation 
became a way of reconciling disparate findings between data collectors in different locales. 
Doing so was an exercise in diplomacy, especially in the case of findings produced by 
particularly active collectors. Williams, one of the most productive collectors of questionnaire 
data (Carnicom, Faye, & Baker, 2011; Hall, 1924), could not simply be written off with a few 
choice words regarding the poor quality of the gathered data, or left out of the discussion 
entirely, but had to be appeased with reference to her skill. Just as Hall regularly praised 
Williams’s contributions to his child study investigations (see Chapter 3), Calkins (1895a) noted 
“this report of a careful observer is certainly worthy of consideration” (p. 93). While Phillips 
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(1897a), for instances, could simply express his thanks to the “authorities of the Worcester 
schools, to Supt. Carroll and the teachers of Worcester” (p. 527) for their cooperation with his 
scheme of work, such platitudes were insufficient in the case of active data collectors. 
Irrespective of whether Calkins was correct to dismiss Williams’s findings as the result of 
substandard questionning and excise them from her larger body of data, her careful framing of 
the work of another investigator provides a glimpse into the personal dynamics on which data 
collection rested.   
The Roots of Mental Associations 
 As in other questionnaire-based research endeavours efforts were made to connect mental 
associations with physiological states, if only superficially. Calkins (1893a), understood an 
observed “hereditary tendency of colored-hearing and of forms” as indicative of “cerebral 
changes” (p. 452 ) that accompanied the phenomena. Multiple family members who possessed 
mental associations were evidence of a hereditary element for Calkins, but not Phillips (1897a) 
who contended 
I find no more signs of, nor reasons to look for, heredity here than in any highly 
developed power of imagination, memory, art, music, etc., all of which are much 
questioned since Weismann’s theory of heredity has become prominent. Two in the same 
family may have like forms by mere coincidence. (p. 520)113 
Patrick avoided discussion of heredity, but explicitly dismissed attempts by others to link mental 
associations with particular cerebral centres. Responding to William Krohn’s (1892) earlier 
assertion that “pseudo chromesthesic phenomena arise from some sort of cerebral work which is 
the outcome of the close relation of the cortical centers, which are connected by numerous 
                                                
113 Phillips’s exact interpretation of Weismann’s work in this context is left unspecified. 
 94 
associational fibers, notably the visual and auditory centers” (p. 38), he instead noted that most 
colour associations, and all number forms, could be better accounted for with reference to the 
usefulness of a given association (Patrick, 1893).  
 Calkins also speculated that the prevalence of mental associations was the result of their 
utility in childhood. Despite a lack of children investigated with regard to their mental 
associations, retrospective accounts revealed that almost all these associations dated back to 
childhood (Calkins, 1893a).114  Patrick (1893), meanwhile, speculated number forms were “the 
attempt or necessities of children to give a concrete form to the abstract” as numbers “are bald 
abstractions that the poor child must manage in some way” (p. 513). Calkins (1893a) similarly 
concluded that, “visualization of numerals or of word-series may be an important aid to memory, 
especially in a child’s first struggle with numbers. Accidental associations of this sort may then 
be perpetuated because of their helpfulness” (p. 450; see also Patrick, 1893, p. 514). Other 
mental associations, such as coloured-hearing and name-associations, were also posited as the 
outgrowth of useful childhood associations. Most, however, could not be confidently traced to 
any particular childhood experience. For instance, of twenty respondents only one affirmative 
response was received to the question “Can you compare your form with any pattern of wall-
paper or carpet, with any crack in the plastering or with any other line which you might have 
seen when learning the numbers in childhood?” (Calkins, 1892, pp. 270–1).115 
                                                
 114 In his discussion of number forms, Galton (1880c) had previously noted “young 
people see forms more commonly than adults, but that their forms are less developed and 
sure…where they are vivid and serviceable they are much used, and insensibly grow in 
vividness, in definition, and in automatic character. Otherwise they decay from disuse and 
become forgotten” (p. 495). 
 115 On his first syllabus Phillips (1897b) similarly asked after “Cases of “eye geometry,” 
or automatic puzzling over patterns of carpet, wall paper, bricks on sidewalks, strong fondness 
for tracing the forms of decorative ornamentation, spontaneous drawing of such patterns or 
development of them in the use of kindergarten material” (p. 240). See also, “Numbers and 
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 Both Calkins’s and Patrick’s speculation about the childhood roots of mental associations 
took place without any direct investigation of children’s experiences with the phenomena. 
Calkins (1895a) noted on her circular “canvasses of men’s colleges, or college classes, of 
associations of people in middle life, of schools of children and young people, and of the 
accidentally blind and deaf, would yield especially valuable results” (p. 102). Nonetheless, she 
did not pursue information from these populations herself. The lack of research with these 
groups was not a consequence of inaccessible research populations. In other instances, Calkins’s 
students studied infants and young children directly (see Calkins, 1892, 1894) and secured data 
from male students at Harvard (Calkins, 1894). Some Wellesley students even sought out 
specialized populations for study, including one student who investigated imagination in the 
blind through the study of children at the Perkins Institute (see Calkins, 1892). Questionnaire-
based research with children, however, was problematic. In the context of other research, Calkins 
and her students directly addressed the difficulties of asking children for information on their 
mental life and in that instance opted “to avoid asking them questions requiring an introspection 
which would have been artificial and difficult” (Calkins, 1894, p. 280). Although other 
populations were at least nominally available for research purposes, Calkins confined her work 
on mental associations itself to the more readily accessible population of Wellesley College 
women who to her mind, unlike children, were capable of unproblematic introspection. 
 As a consequence of the largely female community from which her subjects were drawn, 
discussion of gender differences in mental associations was completely absent from Calkins’s 
work. This was not the case in other Wellesley projects, notably those into mathematical 
consciousness, which directly investigated gender differences and found “no important 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mathematics,” April 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. 
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distinctions” (Calkins, 1894, p. 279) between men and women.116 Patrick (1893), following 
Galton, observed that number forms were “perhaps a little more common among women than 
men” (p. 506), while Phillips (1897a) observed little in the way of difference between the 
genders in the presence of mental forms. The lack of these differences was in direct contrast to 
Galton’s (1883) earlier contention that mental forms were twice as numerous in women as in 
men and other contemporaneous discussion of pseudo-chromesthesic phenomena which 
contended “the larger number of the subjects are women” (Krohn, 1892, p. 36).117 While 
questionnaire-based inquiries allowed for evidence to be collected with respect to gender 
differences in mental life this did not, of course, necessitate the discovery of such differences. In 
the case of investigations into mental associations gender differences, where addressed at all, 
were largely absent. 
Like so much questionnaire-based research that into mental associations appealed to the 
pedagogical value of this characteristics of the mind. More generally, Calkins (1894) and her 
students contended “no serious psychological study can be undertaken which does not lead to 
pedagogical conclusions” (p. 269). Tracing, for instance, the close connection between “the 
number, time, and space concepts” provided number with “a wider application” (Phillips, 1897b, 
p. 277; see also Calkins, 1897). Along these lines Adelia Hornbrook, a teacher at Evansville, 
Indiana’s Classical School, promoted the view that number forms might be employed with great 
benefit in educational enterprises. Inspired by Galton’s work on the subject and Hall’s child 
                                                
116 A similar absence of gender differences was found in the related inquiry into the 
relationship between imagination and arithmetical ability, as well as fondness for arithmetic. 
Here it was concluded “imagination is the basis of every psychic process and, in some form or 
another, of all intellectual ability; that not only the artistic, but the scholarly or the practical child 
is imaginative, each in his different way” (Calkins, 1894, p. 283).   
117 Krohn (1892) went on to say that women “as a class can hardly be called 
introspective; at least they are less so than men – but they are more observant” (p. 36). 
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study endeavours (see Chapters 3 & 4), she attempted “to promote directly the growth of number 
forms in the minds of children” (Hornbrook, 1893, p. 473) through a variety of formal numerical 
schemes. Calkins (1895a) spoke approvingly of this approach: 
the use of charts and of diagrams is in itself a suggestion of mental forms, for calendars 
and primer pages lie at the basis of many month, week and alphabet forms. To make 
these suggestions more definite, and, in particular, to impress the child’s memory, as 
Miss Hornbrook does, with some simple number-form, seems a reasonable, pedagogical 
application of these forms. Such aid to the visual imagination might not aid the 
essentially “ear-minded” children, but it could do no harm unless unduly pressed. (p. 100) 
Although supportive of these kinds of efforts, this applied work was not something Calkins, or 
other investigators of mental associations, pursued.118  
A Common Phenomenon 
 In surveying large bodies of individuals, mental associations were increasingly classified 
as common features of the normal mind. After questioning individuals closely about their mental 
life, and pushing past their initial claims of unfamiliarity with the subject, Patrick was prepared 
to revise Galton’s previous estimate of the prevalence of number forms. Rather than one in thirty 
adult males, and one in fifteen adult females, possessing number forms Patrick (1893) was 
“inclined to believe that one out of six adults would be a more accurate proportion” (p. 506), 
                                                
118 Galton (1880d) similarly contended “I believe the forms to have been mnemonic 
diagrams, invented by the children when they were learning to count verbally, the sounds of the 
successive numerals being associated with the successive points of the forms….On this 
supposition we possess in these numerical forms a representation of the route along which the 
attention naturally travels in the mental field of view of the child. It is entirely the child’s own 
way of working, and therefore true to his nature; and being natural, it persists through life and 
offers itself in the adult for our examination” (p. 495). 
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with little by way of gender differences.119 In his view it was the failure of many individuals to 
immediately recognize the subject being inquired after that rendered previous estimates of the 
prevalence of number forms far too low. Mental associations were similarly pervasive in the 
populations sampled by Calkins and Phillips. Phillips, however, accounted for the discrepancy 
between Galton’s figures and those of American investigators by noting number forms may be of 
numbers in general or for specific types of numbers (e.g., days of the week, months of the year, 
etc.). Galton considered only the former in his estimation of prevalence, while both Patrick and 
Calkins included the latter in their estimates (see Phillips, 1897a).  
  Not only were mental associations like number forms a regular feature of the normal 
mind, more emotionally tinged associations were as well. Calkins (1892) found that a number of 
respondents reported strong emotional associations and  
a sort of dramatization of numbers or of colors. Thus one subject writes, “1, 2, 4, 7 and 8 
are reliable quiet, well-disposed, but not brilliant numbers; 3 is a sharp shrewd, noisy and 
disagreeable number always making as much trouble as possible. For 13 I always had a 
great antipathy. It had all the disagreeable qualities of 3 added to a pertness and 
aggressiveness which made it repugnant to all the other numbers, with which it seemed 
never to associate. I never wanted to be thirteen years old.” (p. 270) 
This kind of personification of numerals was also noted by Patrick (1893), who referenced two 
cases of women who possessed strong associations of numbers with particular types of 
individuals, such as “6 = a young man, plain, matter-of-fact person, slow, good; will never 
amount to more than the average” (p. 509). On his first circular Phillips (1897b) similarly 
inquired “Do the figure forms have any moral or personal character, as: 8 looks happy, 7 cross, 4 
                                                
119 Patrick (1895b) later outlined in great detail his views on the psychology of women. 
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solid, etc.?” and “Describe any rare case of pupils who associate number processes with personal 
acts or dispositions, as e.g., four is peaceable, and dwells tranquilly with eight, but with seven it 
feels and acts out enmity, etc.” (p. 240).120 Though these kinds of inquiries were absent from his 
later questionnaire, he nonetheless saw number forms as directly related to other mental 
association “including Pseudo-Chromesthesia, dramatization of numbers (that is, the giving to 
certain numbers the characteristics of certain persons, animals, or objects)” etc. (Phillips, 1897a, 
p. 526). More generally Calkins (1895a) found that a number of individuals, particularly those 
experiencing coloured-hearing, reported that their given mental association was pleasurable.  
The Possibilities of Statistical Analysis 
 The end result of these questionnaire-based investigations was to render mental 
associations, broadly conceived, a normal part of the mind. Rather than position mental 
associations as psychical phenomena, researchers like Calkins, Patrick, and Phillips positioned 
these tendencies as regular characteristics of normal minds. This was in direct contrast to other 
contemporaneous investigations, including the census of hallucinations, which sought to amass 
information on abnormal mental life as a means of substantiating the reality of psychical 
phenomena (see Chapter 5). These kinds of associations – of number forms, alphabet forms, 
coloured-hearing, and more – were positioned as recurrent features of mental life across 
individuals, whether male or female, young or old. As Calkins (1897) noted of Phillips’s work, 
“it tends to lure the number-form from the terra more or less incognita of the abnormal, into the 
familiar domain of the normal psychic life” (p. 682). Mental associations might well be 
                                                
120 “Numbers and Mathematics,” April 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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idiosyncratic, but they were by no means abnormal.121 Nor were they a means of making 
distinctions between groups of various kinds. 
 Statistical undertakings held the possibility of revealing pervasive differences, but such 
differences – and more importantly – their meaning was not self evident. These kinds of studies 
allowed individuals like Jastrow to argue for demonstrable differences between men and women 
but they also allowed others, most notably Calkins and her students at Wellesley, to argue just 
the opposite. Shortly after the completion of her circular studies of mental associations, Calkins 
and her student Cordelia Nevers engaged Jastrow in a debate over the conclusions of his study of 
the community of ideas of men and women (Jastrow, 1891a, 1891b, 1894a). Having asked his 
students “to write out at their leisure one hundred words as rapidly as possible” (Jastrow, 1891b, 
p. 559) Jastrow found that female students produce a less variable set of words than male 
students and that their words tended to refer to concrete rather than abstract ideas. While these 
findings were themselves up for debate (see Calkins, 1896c; Nevers & Calkins, 1895),122 the idea 
that these kinds of findings were evidence of innate differences in the minds of men and women 
was the much more contentious issue. 
 For Jastrow (1891b) work on the community of ideas of men and women was an 
opportunity to obtain “material capable of yielding in objective form the results of unconscious 
and natural mental processes” (p. 559). It was these “natural mental processes,” he argued, that 
showed evidence of distinct differences between men and women. Though the minds of men and 
women were different, Jastrow did not contend that these differences appeared regularly in each 
                                                
121 Personal accounts of mental associations were provided by a number of individuals 
during this period, including one on the personification of numerals offered by Margaret Whiting 
(1892), and another on the colours of letters from David Starr Jordan (1891). 
122 Additional research on the subject was undertaken nearly a decade later by 
Manchester (1905). 
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and every individual. Rather, what the statistical method offered was “the data for new and 
suggestive generalizations” (Jastrow, 1894a, p. 152) including ones regarding pervasive 
differences in the sexes at large. Speaking of “the much-discussed question of the differences in 
brain characteristics of men and women” he offered that “the acknowledged inability of an 
expert anatomist to determine whether a particular brain belonged to a man or a woman” 
(Jastrow, 1895, p. 573) was not conclusive evidence of the absence of brain differences. The 
difference between men and women’s brains was not to be detected at the individual, but at the 
statistical level: 
Give the anatomist a goodly number of fairly selected brains and tell him that all the 
women’s brains are in one group and all the men’s brains in another, and he will tell you 
which group is masculine, which feminine; and this more than offsets his failure in the 
former test. It establishes a statistical regularity. (Jastrow, 1895, p. 573)  
It was only in the context of statistical undertakings, like those into the community of ideas, that 
regular and inescapable differences could be detected. 
 Attempts by others to explain the differences between men and women with reference to 
differences in experience failed to sway Jastrow (1896). Nevers and Calkins (1895) argued that 
generalizations from Jastrow’s findings were impossible as they were based upon “the 
comparison of men and women of entirely different training” (p. 366-7). While, Calkins (1896c) 
contended, “a statistical study may truly, if sufficiently extended, establish characteristic 
differences in the interests of men and women” attempts to distinguish fundamental differences 
between male and female minds, with respect to the community of ideas, is “futile and 
impossible, because of our entire inability to eliminate the effect of environment” (p. 430). 
Wading into the debate, Amy Tanner (1896) pointed out that it was impossible to attribute the 
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differences in men and women’s thought to either inherent mental differences or to differences in 
life experiences as the origins of these differences were in no way addressed in the studies.123 
Elsewhere, addressing the difficulties of ascertaining whether less variation in the mentality of 
inferior races was the result of innate differences, Jastrow (1898) noted  
differences of life and training are so prominent … that adequate and comparable 
standards of estimation are not easy to find. Yet, as man in a measure fashions his own 
environment, that environment itself becomes a significant index of his variability. (p. 
307) 
It seems that even differences in the environment were, for Jastrow, ultimately traceable to the 
inherent limitations of certain groups. 
His statistical studies allowed Jastrow the opportunity to document what he presented as 
innate differences in variability of the mental lives of minds of men and women.124 At the same 
time, he also proposed that the community of ideas in the public at large was becoming 
increasingly similar. In an effort to account for purportedly psychical phenomena, notably 
coincidences ascribed to telepathy, he argued that “mental community” in thought was pervasive 
and only becoming more so. In his view, “with the marvellously increased facilities for the 
dissemination and transportation of thought, the range of such mental community is 
correspondingly extended” (Jastrow, 1895, p. 572). The result of modern life, with its expanded 
circulation of knowledge, was that people’s points of view, education, literature, and thoughts 
more generally were becoming more and more similar producing a “common life” (Jastrow, 
1895, p. 572). This growth in “common life” provided an alternative explanation for 
                                                
123 On Tanner’s contribution to the community of ideas debate see Pettit (2008). 
124 On the variability hypothesis, which proposed that men and women were differently 
variable in their characteristics, see Shields (1975, 1982). 
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coincidences otherwise marked as telepathic. Even still, women’s mental community necessarily 
remained that much more similar than the combined community of men and women. And in the 
context of psychical research, this similarity was that much more dangerous. A less variable 
community of ideas meant that women were that much more prone to the kinds of coincidences 
used to substantiate psychical phenomena, making them – depending on your point of view – 
ideal or problematic subjects of psychical research.125 
Conclusion 
 Detailing the pervasiveness of mental habits provided another means of countering 
psychical explanations of coincidences. That the mind was predisposed to certain lines of 
thought, and did not operate as a “die-box” (Jastrow, 1887, p. 116), was well documented by 
psychologists in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Unlike the messy descriptive data 
that dominated other questionnaire-based inquiries, studies of mental habits were able to deal, at 
least in part, with clearly demarcated values. With the scope of information limited in this way, 
investigators were better positioned to analyze and draw conclusions from a bulk of material. 
While Jastrow described mental habits as a function of innate differences between groups, a 
series of questionnaire-based inquiries into mental associations gathered evidence in support of 
the normality of these mental predilections. Of course, as in other circular investigations, 
gathering information on mental life was a complicated process in many respects as it 
necessitated extended questionning and the careful navigation of personal relationships. The end 
result of these labours was an understanding, counter Jastrow, of this facet of men and women’s 
minds as functionally identical. Questionnaires, though capable of describing variation, were also 
able to reveal similarities rather than differences.   
                                                
125 Discussion of the role of women in spiritualism can be found in Basham (1992), 
Lehman (2009), and Owen (1989). 
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Chapter 3 
Interrogating the Mind of the Child:  
Child Study, Collecting, and Female Educators 
Science has broken into the field … Its method is not that of the spider, that spins out of 
its own inwardness, but that of the ant and the bee, many individuals working together, 
and each content to toil long if he may bring at last a tiny stone, solid and well hewn, to 
the great but unfinished temple of science. (Hall, 1890, p. 18) 
 
 The new psychology, as it took shape in the United States, was almost immediately 
concerned with issues of social relevance. On this front child life and associated educational 
practices were some of the first targets of the developing discipline. Throughout the final 
decades of the nineteenth century a number of psychologists capitalized on widespread interest 
in child study and undertook research on child development, while also framing the larger 
growing body of psychological knowledge as educationally significant.126 This work 
acknowledged that children’s minds were especially elusive, particularly by way of the 
laboratory-based experimentation that characterized much of the rhetoric, if not always the 
reality, of the new scientific psychology. Unable to interrogate the child’s mind in the same 
manner as the standardized adult, white, male mind (see Danziger, 1985, 1990), psychologists 
instead undertook extensive case studies and questionnaire-based projects.127 In doing so, 
                                                
126 On the history of child study in relation to psychology see especially Brooks-Gunn 
and Johnson (2006), Davidson and Benjamin, Jr. (1987), Ross (1972 esp. ch. 15), Shuttleworth 
(2010), Smuts (2006), and Zenderland (1998).  
127 Among those who reported case studies of children are Baldwin (1895a), Darwin 
(1872, 1877), Preyer (1888), Shinn (1900), and Sully (1895). On baby biographies in Imperial 
Germany see Brian (2011), and on the English context see Shuttleworth (2010). Milicent Shinn’s 
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research was conducted in venues outside of the idealized space of the psychology laboratory. 
Adopting a natural historical scientific orientation, these projects enlisted the assistance of 
psychological laypersons – especially female educationalists of various stripes – in extensive 
data collection endeavours. With masses of data in hand psychologists then struggled to find 
meaning in the mayhem.  
In this chapter I trace the involvement of psychologists and educators in a multitude of 
questionnaire-based projects on children’s mental life in the final years of the nineteenth century, 
before turning in the next chapter to the larger discussion over the appropriate methodology, and 
scientific soundness, of this kind of work. The literature on the history of psychological 
investigations of children includes little sustained discussion of the methods used in these 
inquiries or the contributions of non-psychologists to this work, elements that are at the core of 
my discussion.128 Central to psychologically oriented child study research during the Progressive 
Era were Granville Stanley Hall and his associates at Clark University.129 Although Hall began 
his questionnaire-based research in the 1880s, it was not until the mid-1890s that this work took 
the shape of a definite research program in which scores of Clark graduate students undertook 
their own questionnaire-based projects.130 In employing questionnaires Hall put into practice his 
                                                                                                                                                       
American attempts to create a network of female observers of infant and toddler life is discussed 
in von Oertzen (2013).  
128 Among the works that address this history are Brooks-Gunn and Johnson (2006), 
Grant (1992), Green (1995), Herman (2003), Noon (2001, 2005b), Ross (1972), Shuttleworth 
(2010), Smuts (2006), White (1990), Wozniak (1995), and Zenderland (1998). 
129 Although now more than four decades old, Ross’s (1972) biography of Hall remains 
the most complete account of his life and work. For somewhat more intimate accounts of his life 
and work see his autobiography (Hall, 1924), as well as a biography by his former student, 
Lorine Livingston Pruette (1926). On his scientific persona see Bordogna (2005). 
130 Although questionnaires continued to be produced at Clark until 1915, I focus here on 
the earliest years of this project, which were in many respects the most productive period of 
work. It was in this first decade or so that the project engaged most with the larger field of 
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conviction that “the modern psychologist is also to some extent a naturalist” (Hall, 1901, p. 138). 
As naturalist, the psychologist sought to collect information on all of the aspects of mental life 
available to them and for Hall the questionnaire was the instrument of doing so. Those adopting 
this naturalistic approach engaged in psychological research in the field, notably in homes and 
schools, instead than enacting science within the sanctified space of the laboratory. In doing so, 
the form of knowledge amassed in these endeavours was of a naturalistic, rather than 
experimental, character. 
The process of collecting masses of information on various features of child-life for 
psychological research was difficult. In order to do so efficiently, non-specialists were engaged 
in data collection efforts. Within the context of the nation’s popular child study movement, it 
was most often parents and educators who were enlisted to aid with these projects, as these 
individuals had unique access to child-life. This access constituted a kind of “residential” 
(Kohler, 2006) or “experiential” (Vetter, 2011) knowledge, one rooted in the common 
experiences of lay individuals in various contexts (Vetter, 2011, p. 132), in contrast to the 
“cosmopolitan” knowledge of psychologists which was decidedly “more global and theoretical” 
(Kohler, 2006, p. 157). The experiential knowledge of parents and educators was central to the 
success of psychologists’ efforts to research child-life via questionnaire and constituted an early 
form of citizen science (e.g., Lezaun & Soneryd, 2007; Marres, 2007; Marres & Lezaun, 2011). 
As in other data collection efforts during this period, women were some of the primary labourers 
in these child-study endeavours. Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People of London, one 
of the earliest social surveys, employed female researchers (see Bales, 1996), Jane Addams’s 
Hull House engaged Chicago-based women in social survey work (see Deegan, 1988), and Igo 
                                                                                                                                                       
psychological practice. For an overview of the work in child study across the United States until 
the mid-1890s, including an extensive accounting of the syllabi circulated, see Wiltse (1895). 
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(2007) has identified women as central to survey-based twentieth century data collection 
efforts.131 More particularly psychological in nature were the efforts by soon-to-be psychologist 
Milicent Shinn, beginning in the 1890s, to establish a network of mothers as scientific observers 
and recorders of infant and toddler-life under the auspices of the Association of Collegiate 
Alumnae (von Oertzen, 2013).  
In this chapter I argue that female educators comprised a valuable network of collectors 
for questionnaire-based psychological research on children during the final decades of the 
nineteenth century, and that their male psychologist counterparts carefully confined this work to 
particular realms. This kind of engagement of lay individuals in psychological work was 
characteristic of much early questionnaire research, which was predicated for its success on a 
more distributed form of scientific practice than that typical of the Leipzig model of laboratory 
psychology (Danziger, 1985, 1990). For educators seeking some form of professional status, 
participation in this kind of work offered a much-needed avenue to authority over childhood and 
educational practices.132 Their work was characterized as valuable, but decidedly not scientific in 
and of itself. The very clear delineation of responsibility in questionnaire-based projects ensured 
that scientific authority remained in the hands of psychologists like Hall and those training with 
him at Clark. Once information was collected, it was this latter group that endeavoured to make 
sense of the mounds of reports before them. Doing so in any systematic or comprehensive way 
was a challenge, one never fully overcome, as will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                
131 For further discussion of many early social survey projects, and the involvement of 
women in such, see Bulmer, Bales and Sklar (1991). 
132 On women’s roles in education see Apple (1985) and Feinstein (2001). 
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G. Stanley Hall and Child Study 
Hall’s involvement in questionnaire research was not a fleeting endeavour, but a very 
nearly all-encompassing pursuit. Often remembered today as one of the first scientific 
psychologists, instrumental in the establishment of laboratory psychology in the United States, 
Hall in fact conducted little experimental research (Hall & Jastrow, 1886; Hall & Motora, 1887). 
Outside of his administrative and organizational work – founding the American Psychological 
Association, establishing and editing multiple periodicals, and serving as president of Clark 
University (Ross, 1972) – it was questionnaire research that occupied much of his time. Between 
1894 and 1906 Hall and his extended network of students and associates distributed 147 distinct 
questionnaires, or “topical syllabi,” on a plethora of topics, including “the early sense of self,” 
“moral education,” and “training of teachers” to name but a few.133 Most often oriented to 
aspects of child life, the number of syllabi issued at Clark rose to more than 200 by the time the 
research program came to an end in 1915 (Hall, 1924).134 As early on in this endeavor as 1896, 
Hall asserted that in response to copies of questionnaires that had been distributed to various 
individuals, “at least a hundred thousand returns” (Hall, 1897b, p. 184) had been received, with 
sixty thousand returns received in 1895-1896 alone (Ross, 1972).135 Even if an overstatement it 
is clear, nevertheless, that huge quantities of questionnaires were distributed, completed, and 
returned by a number of individuals during this period. Measured in terms of sheer data amassed, 
Hall’s questionnaire-based project was a momentous success. 
                                                
133 Topical Syllabi, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. 
134 Hall lists 194 questionnaires in his autobiography, but a number of other circulars that 
do not appear on this list are included among those in the Clark Archives bringing the total to 
just over 200 topical syllabi issued by Hall and his associates (Topical Syllabi, B1-7-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
135 The total number of responses to the questionnaires distributed between 1894 and 
1915 is unknown as none of this material has survived. 
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 Hall was born in western Massachusetts in 1844. After studying at Williams College and 
New York City’s Union Theological Seminary, he spent several years in Germany studying 
philosophy before returning to the United States and working for a time as a teacher. Resuming 
his academic pursuits, he studied psychology with William James at Harvard University in the 
1870s. These studies led him to obtain, in 1878, the one of the first doctorates in psychology 
conferred within the United States. A subsequent period in Germany studying physiology also 
included a period of work in Wilhelm Wundt’s laboratory, making him the first of many 
American students to study with this key figure of the new scientific psychology. Returning to 
the United States in 1880, Hall faced an unfavorable hiring environment and only gained regular 
employment two years later, when he obtained a temporary academic position as a term lecturer 
in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. In 1884 he became professor of 
psychology and pedagogy at the institution. Four years later he left Hopkins for the presidency of 
Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, where he spent the remainder of his career.136  
 Upon his return to the United States from Germany in 1880, Hall became involved in the 
American child study movement.137 Through a series of popular public lectures on pedagogy, 
organized and funded by Harvard, Hall engaged with educators and secured a leading role in the 
burgeoning field. Those with an interest in education, many of whom were Boston 
schoolteachers, gathered Saturday mornings in the winter of 1881 to hear Hall speak on various 
pedagogical topics (“The board of overseers,” 1881). The popularity of these lectures led to the 
organization of similar lectures for two subsequent years (Ross, 1972; “The past year at 
Harvard,” 1883). Following his move to Baltimore he continued to lecture publicly on pedagogy 
                                                
136 On Hall’s life and work see Ross (1972). 
137 Ross (1972) attributes the formation of a British Child Study association to a visit to 
an American child study meeting by James Sully and three female teachers. On child study in 
Britain see Shuttleworth (2010). 
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on behalf of Johns Hopkins University (“Work at Johns Hopkins,” 1884). Trading on the 
scientific authority of his psychological training, Hall fashioned himself as an educational expert, 
capable of guiding the course of the nation’s child study movement. Massachusetts, having 
already witnessed the innovation of Francis Parker’s Quincy system of education in the 1870s, 
was a particularly fertile ground for such an undertaking (Ross, 1972). More generally, the final 
decades of the nineteenth century were a period of substantial educational reform across the 
United States, with the spread of compulsory schooling and the rise of professional training for 
educators.138 These developments, and Hall’s involvement in child study more particularly, were 
part of the Progressive Era’s growing interest in scientifically grounded reform, as well as the 
increasing rationalization of motherhood (R. D. Apple, 2006; Grant, 1992).139 Within rapidly 
expanding educational circles Hall quickly gained prominence. 
The Contents of Children’s Minds 
 Hall’s questionnaire-based psychological research first began during his time as Harvard 
Lecturer on Pedagogy. In the fall of 1882, he undertook an investigation into the nature of the 
child modeled on previous research conducted in German schools by the Pedagogical Society of 
Berlin in previous decades.140 Hall’s project investigated just what children knew upon their 
initial entrance to the city’s schools (Hall, 1883b; see Ross, 1972).141 Deciding that many of the 
                                                
138 On history of education in the United States see Cremin (1961). On the history of the 
American normal school see Ogren (2005). 
139 On this era in American history see Hofstadter (1955), Lears (1981, 2009), and Wiebe 
(1967) 
140 Near the time of Hall’s undertaking Galton (1880c) too commented on the potential 
benefits of undertaking questionnaire-based research within school settings: “An excellent way 
of obtaining average returns to psychological questions would be by the help of schoolmasters…. 
both boys and masters would enjoy the satisfactory feeling of having accomplished a substantial 
piece” (p. 252). 
141 Hall later misattributes the study as beginning in the fall of 1880 (see Hall, 1893c, p. 
13). 
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questions posed to children in the Berlin investigation were unsuitable for American children he 
spent “many preliminary half-days of questioning small groups of children and receiving 
suggestions from many sources” (Hall, 1883b, p. 250). These questions, Hall noted, “should lie 
within the range of what children are commonly supposed or at least desired…to know” (Hall, 
1883b, p. 250). To assess this, on the basis of his preliminary investigations, Hall developed and 
printed a list of one hundred and thirty-four questions. In some instances, these questions were 
accompanied by physical objects, such as four colour questions in which children were instructed 
to pick out the colour named by the examiner from the materials comprising the Holmgren wool 
test for colour blindness (Hall, 1883b). More often than not, however, children were simply 
questioned verbally regarding their knowledge of the world. 
As would often be the case with Hall’s later questionnaire-based psychological research, 
it was educators who were assigned the task of collecting data (Hall, 1883b, 1893c). To gain 
access to large numbers of students, Hall secured the co-operation of the superintendent of 
Boston schools and in order to question students at newly created kindergartens, he also secured 
the support of local kindergarten advocate Mrs. Quincy Shaw and superintendent Miss L. B. 
Pingree (Hall, 1883b). The questionning of students was primarily the work “four of the best 
trained and experienced kindergarten teachers” (Hall, 1883b, p. 251), all female: Sarah E. Wiltse, 
Miss L. H. Symonds, Miss E. M. Parker, and Miss C. Scandlin (see Hall, 1883b, p. 272).142 An 
additional sixty Boston teachers were involved in collecting data, though some collected 
                                                
142 Wiltse later collected material for Hall’s topical syllabi endeavours at Clark (Ellis & 
Hall, 1896; Hall, 1898) and prior to his syllabi based inquiry into dolls she aided with a 
preliminary survey of children (see Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 129). Hall also wrote the introduction 
to Wiltse’s monograph The Place of the Story in Early Education, and Other Essays (1892). In 
this volume she recounts some of her experiences collecting data for Hall’s inquiry into the 
contents of children’s minds. Wiltse (1895, 1896) also wrote two overviews of American child 
study endeavours for Hall’s Pedagogical Seminary. 
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responses from no more than three students. The questionnaire employed to collect data for the 
project was a printed document, but was not presented to the students in this form (Hall, 1883b). 
Rather, teachers used the document as a guide to oral questionning of 
three children at a time in the dressing-room of the school by themselves alone, so as not 
to interrupt the school-work. No constraint was used, and, as several hours were 
necessary to finish each set, changes and rests were often needful, while by frequent 
correspondence and by meetings with the writer to discuss details and compare results 
uniformity of method was sought. (Hall, 1883b, p. 251) 
Even still, the information accumulated was far from perfect. Hall acknowledged that “many 
returns,” especially from those other than the four main questioners were “incomplete, careless, 
or show internal contradictions” (Hall, 1883b, p. 252).143 From the outset of his questionnaire 
inquiries he was well aware of the difficulties associated with the method, especially the 
propensity for error in collected information (Hall, 1883b).  
Topical Syllabi for Child Study 
 Despite an initial foray into questionnaire research in the 1880s, Hall’s work with the 
method only took full form more than a decade later. This was an era in which mass data 
collection was prevalent, most notably social survey work. These undertakings, like 
contemporaneous undercover investigations by individuals of various stripes (see Pettit, 2008; 
Pittenger, 1997, 2012), sought to document the experiences of different kinds of people in the 
United States, particularly the disenfranchised (see Bulmer et al., 1991; Katz & Sugrue, 1998). 
Unlike these more explicitly reform oriented projects, Hall self-consciously sought to position 
his questionnaire-based research as scientific undertakings. Doing so allowed him to claim 
                                                
143 Toward the end of this work Hall privately printed a thirteen page pamphlet “The 
Study of Children” to guide child study efforts (see Hall, 1924, p. 381; Ross, 1972). 
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dominion over child life and pedagogical practices not as a reformer, but as a scientist. While his 
insights might spur reform, they were to be rooted in science above all else.144 
In the early 1890s, now President of Clark University in Worcester, Hall faced a series of 
difficulties at the institution both with faculty members and the institution’s benefactor (see 
Ross, 1972).145 Hoping to gain popular support for the graduate education only university among 
the local community he turned again to educational issues. Higher education in pedagogy had 
been a focus of the institution from its founding (Clark University, 1889), but this work now 
became more inclusive of the broader educational community. In 1891 Hall established a new 
journal The Pedagogical Seminary and the following year instituted a summer school for 
educators, while also expanding and reprinting his earlier inquiry into the contents of children’s 
minds (Hall, 1893c). And in the fall of 1894 he initiated a new program of questionnaire-based 
research, much of it devoted to the study of psychological aspects of child life and educational 
matters more broadly. 
 Prior to initiating his series of syllabi at Clark, Hall spearheaded a more ambitious 
undertaking, begun at the International Congress of Education. Held in Chicago in conjunction 
with the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition, the Congress included two separate meetings on 
the subject of psychology and education. One, on the subject of “Rational Psychology in 
Education,” was organized by James McCosh and included papers by McCosh, Josiah Royce, 
and Edward Titchener, among others (Ross, 1972; “The education congresses,” 1893). Hall 
organized an alternative meeting on “Experimental Psychology in Education,” which dedicated 
                                                
144 Notably, prior to her time at Clark, first as a fellow and later on the research staff of 
the Children’s Institute, psychologist Amy Tanner conducted an undercover ethnography of the 
waitressing profession (see Pettit, 2008). 
145 On the history of Clark University, including Hall’s tenure as President, see Koelsch 
(1987). Disappointingly, this volume lacks references to source material. 
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all its time to discussion of child study, and fashioned itself as more progressive than what was 
increasingly seen as the out of date rational psychology dominate in McCosh’s group (Hall, 
1893a, 1893d; see Ross, 1972).146 At the congress plans were made for a National Association 
for the Study of Children, which aimed 
to bring together the scattered teachers, parents and others who are trying to make a 
scientific study of children, that they may mutually assist one another with suggestions, 
syllabi and outlines, and that materials bearing on particular subjects of investigation may 
find their way into the hands of those especially interested in working them up.147 
One of the main tasks of the association was to be the collection of both physical and mental 
measurements of large numbers of children.148 As President of the short-lived Association Hall 
was ultimately unable to unite the diverse body of individuals interested in child study, regularly 
alienating those outside his immediate circle of supporters (see Ross, 1972).149 
                                                
146 On the relation between psychology and the educational congress at the World’s 
Columbian Exposition see Shore (2001). 
147 “National Association for the Study of Children: Preliminary Announcement,” B1-8-
1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. No national association 
for this purpose was ever successfully formed outside of the child study department of the 
National Educational Association (see Ross, 1972). 
148 “Organization and Plan of Work of the National Association for the Study of 
Children”; “National Association for the Study of Children, Registration Card”, B1-8-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. These include tests of physical 
growth as well as motor tests, tests of strength, rapidity, and exactness, among others. 
149 Among the initial members of the association were William L. Bryan, who served as 
Treasurer until his resignation (see “Organization and Plan of Work of the National Association 
for the Study of Children,” B1-8-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA), as well as ten vice-presidents: “Miss Lillie Williams, Trenton Normal School, 
Trenton, NJ; Miss Millicent Shinn, Niles, Cal.; Earl Barnes, Prof. Education, Leland Stanford, Jr. 
University, Palo Alto, Cal.; Supt. Nathan G. Schaffer, Lancaster, Penn.; Prof. J. M. Bailey, of 
South Carolina; Prof. E. H. Russell, Mass. State Normal School, Worcester, Mass.; Prof. G. T. 
W. Patrick, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa; Prof. M. V. O’Shea, Mankato, Normal School, 
Mankato, Minn.; Prof. E. R. Shaw, School of Pedagogy, Washington Square, NY; Mr. Louis 
Block, 723 Washington Boulevard, Chicago, Ill.” (“National Association for the Study of 
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 In the wake of the failure to institute a coordinated data collection effort through a 
national association, Hall began his Clark based program of questionnaire research. The decision 
to issue topical syllabi, rather than a broad request for any and all information on child life was a 
considered choice. Of his experience with the latter approach he noted, “I never got one single 
usable answer, although I circulated something like fifteen hundred copies” (Hall, 1897b, p. 
182).150 Far more productive to his mind were syllabi dedicated to “a narrow special topic” (Hall, 
1897b, p. 182, see also 1897a). In reality the Clark syllabi, though limited to particular subjects, 
were far from narrow as they asked data collectors to provide information on nearly every 
conceivable facet of the topic at hand.  
The aim of Hall’s topical syllabi project, especially in early years, was to describe the 
child writ large. Rather than depict individual children, he sought to produce a composite portrait 
of the normal child (see Hall, 1883b, p. 252, 1893c). Notably, not all children were equally 
worthy of contributing to this understanding of the idealized aggregate child. To distinguish 
among different types of children all questionnaires issued at Clark contained requests for 
information regarding certain characteristics. Those collecting information were instructed to 
provide the nationality, sex, and age for the child at the centre of each report.151 Occasionally 
                                                                                                                                                       
Children: Preliminary Announcement,” B1-8-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University 
Archives, Worcester, MA). 
150 What exactly rendered the responses worthless is unclear. Gault (1907) notes that “a 
comprehensive syllabus for child study” was issued by Hall in 1887, but abandoned because it 
“was found too cumbersome for practical use” (p. 378). Presumably, masses of unfocused 
information were even more difficult to manage than the targeted efforts of topical syllabi (see 
Chapter 4). 
151 See, for example, “Anger,” Oct. 1894; “Crying and Laughing,” Dec. 12, 1894; 
“Dolls,” Nov. 1894; “Early Forms of Vocal Expression,” Jan. 1895; “Folk-Lore Among 
Children,” Jan. 1894 [sic]; “The Early Sense of Self,” Jan. 1895; B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. Also, Ellis and Hall (1896, p. 130) and Hall (1899, 
p. 529). Hall, in his 1924 autobiography, identifies “race” rather than nationality as the 
characteristic required alongside age and sex for each observation (see Hall, 1924, pp. 389–90), 
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other characteristics were also asked after, such as family life, temperament,152 and “any other 
significant circumstance.”153 The recurrent accumulation of information regarding various 
category memberships presumed the existence of difference along these lines, with the 
underlying assumption that certain groups were necessarily deficient. As a result one could speak 
in generalities about various “other” classes of children alongside the constructed sketch of 
normal childhood. 
Syllabi Beyond Clark 
At the time of Hall’s unsuccessful attempt to form a national association for child study, 
another similarly motivated society was organized. The Illinois Society for Child Study, headed 
by Colonel Francis Parker of the state’s Cook County Normal School, emerged in the wake of 
the educational congresses at the World’s Fair and strove “honestly and earnestly to investigate 
the nature and growth of the child, and the best conditions for his growth and education” (Parker, 
1895c, p. 9). In its initial organization the society privileged the participation of psychologists, 
noting in its constitution that the executive committee was to include, first and foremost, “experts 
in rational, experimental and physiological psychology” (“Constitution of the Illinois Society for 
Child-Study,” 1895, p. 10). Among the early members of the executive committee were 
neurologist Henry Donaldson, formerly of Clark and now at the University of Chicago, 
psychiatrist Adolph Meyer, of the Illinois Eastern Hospital in Kankakee, Illinois, and William 
Bryan, a graduate of Clark University now at Indiana University in Bloomington (“Officers for 
                                                                                                                                                       
as the latter term often signified both categories in much of his earlier work. 
152 “Anger,” Oct. 1894, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. Also, Hall (1899, p. 529). 
153 “Early Forms of Vocal Expression,” Jan. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA.  
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1895,” 1895).154 The inclusion of what in psychology were seen to be the increasingly outdated 
rational psychologists, a group Hall sought to exclude from his own efforts, secured a sound and 
wide-ranging base of support for the organization. Kindergarteners, Herbartians, as well as 
psychologists of all stripes participated in the society. Hall too joined the organization (see Ross, 
1972). 
The first two volumes of the society’s Transactions of the Illinois Society for Child-Study 
regularly featured items from those engaged with the new psychology.155 Notably, several 
psychologists contributed pieces to a series of twenty-one child study syllabi reproduced as part 
of the second issue of the publication, which was billed as a handbook for members. These 
syllabi were not all psychological questionnaires of child-life, evidence of the wide scope of the 
term syllabi within child study circles at the time. In addition to outlining in one syllabus a series 
of measurements that might be made on school children (Scripture, 1895b), psychologist Edward 
Scripture recounted in another the results of previous research into the mental and physical 
development of New Haven school children (1895a).156 This work, undertaken by his student J. 
Allen Gilbert (1894), was itself an experimental investigation  – including tests of 
discrimination, memory, and rapidity – rather than a descriptive data collection project guided by 
syllabus.157 Gilbert (1895) also contributed a separate syllabus on how to calculate averages of 
                                                
154 Although initially a member of Hall’s proposed National Association for Child Study, 
Bryan shortly resigned from his position as the organization’s Treasurer (see “Organization and 
Plan of Work of the National Association for the Study of Children,” B1-8-1, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
155 These include Bryan (1894), Dewey (1897b), Hall (1897b), Jastrow (1897b), and 
Tracy (1897a, 1897b). Additionally, Tracy, Hall, Baldwin, Dewey, Scripture, Jastrow, 
Donaldson, and Bryan all contributed answers to a printed discussion on the question of applying 
the results of child study to education (“Results of child-study applied to education,” 1895). 
156 For Scripture’s views on education, see also Scripture (1892).  
  157 Another syllabus outlined experiments on colour sensitiveness in children (Kinnaman, 
1895).  
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the measurements made in some child study inquiries. Others filled their syllabi with discussion 
of child study, rather than providing instructions for collecting data in the field (e.g., T. L. 
Bolton, 1895a, 1895b; Eckoff, 1895).   
Even still, data collection was a central aim of the issue’s syllabi. In introducing the 
series, it was explicitly noted that the real labour of child study lay not in the hands of scientific 
men as  
it is after all to a much more numerous class that we must look for the perfect mountain 
of facts that we need. We must set everybody at work on this business of collecting and 
recording. We must accept every contribution and look no gift horse in the mouth. Then 
have a number of psychologists upon whom to unload our data for classification and 
digestion. (E. H. Russell as quoted in “Syllabi of child-study,” 1895, p. 18) 
Only after the hard work of collecting facts was completed could psychologists produce 
scientific insight into child-life. This rendered the contributions of lay individuals a crucial 
component of the larger project of understanding children and pedagogical practices through the 
lens of science. 
Most syllabi took a form similar to those issued at Clark, listing at length questions to 
guide data collection on a specific topic. This is perhaps unsurprising considering syllabi were 
contributed by a number of individuals with connections to Hall. Meyer (1895), formerly of the 
local Worcester Lunatic Hospital, requested information on mental abnormalities in children. 
Former Clark student F. B. Dresslar (1895), now of the State Normal School in Los Angeles, 
California, sought information on habit degeneration, while Bryan (W. L. Bryan & Griffith, 
1895) requested details on imitation. Current Clark Fellow, Herman Lukens (1895) contributed 
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an inquiry on child language.158 George Thomas White Patrick (1895a) of the University of 
Iowa, a former student of Hall’s at Johns Hopkins (see Chapter 2), with great brevity asked that 
instructors rate children’s intellectual proficiency and measure their height and weight so that the 
relation between physical development and mental proficiency might be ascertained.159 Hall 
(1895c) also contributed his recent syllabus “Fears in Childhood and Youth,” the eighth issued at 
Clark, while the following issue of the society’s Transactions reproduced the previous seven 
syllabi (Hall, 1895d).160 
Also appearing within this collection of syllabi was a request for information from 
psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1895b). An inquiry into the social sense, particularly 
chumming and antipathy in children,161 the set of questions was also printed in the pages of 
Science that spring (Baldwin, 1895c). At the close of his questionnaire Baldwin reassured those 
collecting information for him that names and other personal details would remain “strictly 
confidential” (1895b, p. 20, 1895c, p. 237), while directing individuals to 
                                                
158 Although similar, in some respects, to a syllabus on “Early Forms of Vocal 
Expression” issued by Hall in 1895 (“Early Forms of Vocal Expression,” Jan. 1895, B1-7-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA), Lukens circular was its own 
entity. It is not listed by Hall in his autobiography (1924) as among those issued at Clark, nor is a 
copy among those in the Clark Archives. Lukens, with Hall, later issued a further syllabus on 
reading and writing (“The Beginnings of Reading and Writing,” Oct. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
159 Another syllabus inquired broadly into the mental and physical characteristics of both 
children and parents (Van Liew, 1895), while W. O. Krohn (1895) provide a scheme for 
collecting anthropometrical data. 
160 Topical Syllabi, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. Later volumes included work from Hall’s former student Frederick Tracy 
(1897a), including an account of a circular inquiry into left-handedness (1897b). 
 161 Baldwin’s (1895b) syllabus, and no other, included a note regarding the use of the 
document: “In accordance with an agreement made with the author of this syllabus the results are 
to be sent him for interpretation as far as the workers are willing. He is at liberty to use these 
results wherever he desires, and this same schedule for securing data from other sources” (p. 19 
fn.). The project was clearly positioned as his own and not that of the society. 
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cover as many of these enquiries as possible; yet observations of some of them only 
should still be sent in. All observations should be carefully arranged under the headings 
of the schedule, i.e., by the numbers, letters, etc., in order to secure correct classification. 
(1895b, p. 20, 1895c, p. 237) 
Those amassing information might aid the laborious process organizing data by adopting certain 
collecting practices. Following the scheme of classification outlined in the syllabus, rather than 
expounding at length on the topic without regard for the arrangement of the questions at hand, 
held the potential of streamlining Baldwin’s later work of sorting and analyzing responses.162 
This did not come to pass. Instead “the returns which it brought were filled with apologies for 
not having carried out the conditions!—and the results have little value when tested by the 
plainest rules of scientific control” (Baldwin, 1898, p. 219). These difficulties left Baldwin 
(1898) convinced “the syllabus method is bad through and through” (p. 219). 
Data Collection 
 Before data could be ordered and interpreted it had to be collected. Although the public at 
large was invited to provide responses to the topical syllabi issued at Clark, it was largely women 
who engaged in data collection. In some instances parents, particularly mothers’ clubs,163 took up 
this work, but more often it was normal school instructors and their largely female students who 
engaged in the large scale collection of information on child-life.164 As justification for this 
                                                
  162 Other syllabi appearing in the issue include Bailey (1895), Brown (1895), O’Shea 
(1895), and Parker (1895a, 1895b). 
163 On the involvement of mother’s clubs in collection projects see von Oertzen (2013). 
164 Details regarding who was collecting data with syllabi can be some syllabi themselves  
(“Anger,” Oct. 1894; “Fears in Childhood and Youth,” Feb. 1895; “Dolls,” Nov. 1894, B1-7-1, 
G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA); as well as in Ellis and Hall 
(1896) and Hall (1897a, 1898, 1899). See also discussion of data collection in Hall’s 
correspondence with Herman Lukens (H. T. Lukens to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 14, 1896; Jan. 12, 
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approach, Hall contended “anybody who happens to be on the ground can collect facts, just as 
anybody can pick up a fossil” (1896a, p. 344). All that was necessary was that syllabi “call for 
phenomena so marked that the non-expert parent or teacher can make reliable returns” (Hall, 
1897a, p. 148). They like “the untrained observers” long employed in “the official and 
voluminous questionnaires worked by four European anthropological societies, by students of 
meteorological phenomena, migratory instincts of birds, fishes, etc.” (Hall, 1897a, p. 148, see 
also 1900) were ideally situated to collect information on child-life, as children were a regular 
presence in their lives.165  
Though anyone with appropriate access to children could complete the Clark 
questionnaires, women were seen as particularly skilled collectors of information on children. 
Hall noted that over the course of his program of research “most of the best data were furnished 
by women” (1924, p. 390). With the increasing presence of women in education, he pled 
“especially for the co-operation of women in child study” something he thought “calculated to 
bring out the full power of womanhood” (Hall, 1896a, p. 344). In Hall’s view, the inherently 
loving nature of women, provided they could balance their sentimentality with an appropriately 
scientific mindset, predisposed them to be good observers of children and thus producers of 
quality data on child-life. Like the more recent involvement of parents in autism research (see 
Silverman, 2012), women’s involvement in these endeavours was a form affective labour 
encouraged in large part because of their unique access to a population of interest. In order to get 
his syllabi into the hands of those interested in child study, and thus those most likely to engage 
                                                                                                                                                       
1897, B1-2-7, Box 9, Folder 6, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA). 
165 Elsewhere Hall (1895a) justified his data collection practices by noting, “nearly all 
anthropological matter is gathered in response to questionnaires addressed to missionaries and 
chance residents and travelers” (p. 36). 
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in data collection, Hall reproduced some of his syllabi in popular child study periodicals.166 With 
Hall and the Clark program of research well known within educational circles, many individuals 
interested in collecting data also directly requested copies of the topical syllabi (see Ellis & Hall, 
1896; Hall, 1899).167 Sending out syllabi to all those who might provide responses was also 
attempted for a time, though the cost associated with doing so, especially considering many 
individuals did not respond, soon led to the discontinuation of this practice.168 Over the course of 
the initiative responses were received from across the globe, including England, Germany, 
Australia, South Africa, India, China, Japan, and Canada (see Hall, 1924), but the bulk of 
material was collected by American educators. Information was predominately amassed in the 
North Eastern United States, especially in educationally fertile Massachusetts. That said, material 
was also regularly collected in Midwestern and Central states, especially as Hall’s formal pupils 
took up positions at regional schools, as well as in California where child study had a foothold in 
the education department at Stanford University for much of the 1890s (see Ellis & Hall, 1896; 
Hall, 1897a, 1898, 1899; Ross, 1972).  
On one level, the participation of mothers and educators in questionnaire research was 
seen as a contribution to the scientific understanding of childhood.169 Yet, it was also recognized 
that much of the information amassed by these individuals was of little or no scientific value, 
                                                
166 The first eight syllabi produced at Clark were reproduced as part of the transactions of 
Illinois Society for Child-Study (Hall, 1895c, 1895d). 
167 Further aiding in this work was the increasing presence, from the mid-1890s on, of 
former Clark students in departments of psychology within normal schools, as well as joint 
psychology and pedagogy positions across the nation. Among the most prominent psychologists 
to hold, for a time, these kinds of positions were Lewis Terman and Henry Goddard (see Ross, 
1972). 
168 “Fears in Childhood and Youth,” Feb. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. Also, Hall (1897a, p. 149). 
169 Along similar lines, women were also important survey takers in the twentieth century 
work of Gallup (see Igo, 2007). 
 123 
given their lack of scientific training, and in certain instances, their failure to adopt an 
appropriately scientific mindset (see Goddard, 1900; Hall, 1924; T. L. Smith, 1903). Exactly 
what about certain reports, beyond an overly sentimental tone, led them to be dismissed by Hall 
and others as of little scientific value is unclear, although in his earliest questionnaire work he 
found some reports worthless because they were “incomplete, careless, or show internal 
contradictions” (Hall, 1883b, p. 252). 
Irrespective of the scientific import of their work, the involvement of mothers and 
educators in child study research was framed as a valuable. This work was promoted as a means 
of bettering educational and child rearing practices, as Hall contended that both systematic 
attention to children itself and subsequent scientific findings would benefit parents and 
educators. In inducing individuals to participate in child study Hall emphasized the practical 
value of this work, which “opened the eyes of parents and teachers to the nature and needs of 
childhood in an almost revolutionary way” (1924, pp. 391–92).170 In the case of educators, Hall’s 
student Henry Goddard observed that child study questionnaires “could be used by the rural 
teacher with great benefit to herself and her school, if not to science” (1900, p. 128). Further, he 
asserted that  
A result can be obtained which is of the utmost value, the instant you have induced that 
teacher to think of her individual pupils more than she has been accustomed to think. She 
will be a better teacher, brighter, more interested and more sympathetic…Gradually the 
                                                
170 Upon later reflection Hall (1924) noted, “Not a few of the records of intelligent 
mothers which have come to us, whether they followed one or more of the many schedules 
which…were so abundantly supplied to them or simply noted points they deemed in any way 
significant, may have real scientific value, although most of these are important only for the 
parties concerned” (p. 395-6).  
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most old fashioned teacher will modify her practice as new ideas which she has 
discovered come to her. (Goddard, 1900, p. 128)  
Employing child study questionnaires might not always generate scientifically sound 
information, but the very act of recording child life could inform the investigator’s behaviour in 
appreciable ways. The very act of observing children promised to better educators by inculcating 
in them a more modern approach to education.  
The bulk of data collection employing questionnaires fell to normal school instructors 
and their students. Both educators and their pupils were predominantly female and tasked with 
much of the labour associated with this kind of research. Given the need of amassing significant 
numbers of responses to circulars, these projects inevitably involved large numbers of 
individuals. The delegation of responsibility in these undertakings proceeded down a hierarchy 
of scientific authority. At its head was Hall, followed in short order by his graduate student 
researchers, through to numerous normal school instructors, and finally to their students who 
were often assigned the task of collecting information with topical syllabi as part of their studies. 
Within the hierarchy interpretation of accumulated data was only to be undertaken “by those 
whose scientific training has been wide enough to judge the material and make use of whatever 
in it has true psychological significance and connection” (T. L. Smith, 1903, p. 407). 
Beyond Hall’s endeavours there was widespread interest within child study in collecting 
information, as well as attendant efforts to organize gathered material. Even when not directly 
involved, his influence was felt in these kinds of undertakings. Here I detail the data collection 
work engaged in at the normal school in Worcester, so as to situate the questionnaire-based 
research conducted at Clark within the wider field of child study. I then turn to the involvement 
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of two normal school teachers in data collection with Clark’s topical syllabi.171 This discussion 
illustrates how engagement with Hall’s program of research offered, a sometimes frustrated, 
route to greater professional prospects. To be sure, the potential benefit to teachers’ professional 
status offered by work in child study was not limited to these two individuals. Rather, association 
with these kinds of endeavours provided educators at large with a – not always successful – 
means of professionalizing. Participation in projects like Hall’s allowed educators to claim an 
authoritative scientific knowledge of children, something Hall recognized and explicitly 
emphasized in his attempts to draw educators into the fold (e.g., Hall, 1903). At the same time, in 
other contexts, Hall regularly dismissed educators’ skills in order to elevate to his and other 
psychologists’ expertise. 
The Worcester Method 
 Shortly after Hall completed his initial questionnaire-based inquiry in Boston, Principal 
E. Harlow Russell instituted his own program of research at the Massachusetts State Normal 
School at Worcester. The project, Russell expressly acknowledged, was inspired by Hall’s 
efforts “to induce parents and others having the care of children to record their sayings and 
doings with a view of increasing the data on which mental science rests” (Massachusetts State 
Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, pp. 21–2), as well as his observation 
that this might be undertaken as part of the training in psychology received by normal school 
students. Russell eagerly adopted Hall’s suggestions and put the largely female students at 
Worcester State Normal School to work collecting information on child life with a series of 
annual circulars headed simply “Study of Children” (Massachusetts State Normal School at 
                                                
171 Both were singled out as particularly valuable contributors to the Clark program of 
questionnaire research by its later appointed leader (T. L. Smith, 1903). 
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Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 22).172 Over the course of the project’s operation Hall 
provided “helpful and stimulating criticisms and encouragements” (Russell, 1892, p. 343). 
 Collecting information was not a compulsory component of the school’s curriculum, but 
Russell nonetheless found students eagerly took up the work. To begin with he explained 
the nature of the work to the students very carefully, giving special prominence to the 
necessity of having the records genuine beyond all possibility of question, of having them 
consist of a simple statement of what the child does or says without comment on the part 
of the writer, of making them without the knowledge of the child at the time or at any 
other time, and of noting the usual, rather than the unusual, conduct or remarks of the 
children observed. (Massachusetts State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and 
circular, 1888, p. 22) 
These observations of the “conduct of children in all circumstances, – at home, at school, in the 
street, at work, at play, in conversation with one another and with adults” (Massachusetts State 
Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 24) were to be recorded on a 
provided form as soon after being made as possible.  
 In order to streamline the often-messy process of data collection and categorization, 
Russell devised what Hall characterized as a “new and simpler method” (1893d, p. 430). The 
Worcester method consisted of a series of coloured blanks which were employed “for 
convenience in classification” (Massachusetts State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and 
                                                
172 Data collection began at the Worcester State Normal School in 1884 or 1885 (see 
Massachusetts State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 21; Russell, 
1892). On the collection of data on children undertaken at the school see Bolton and Haskell 
(1898), Frear (1897), Haskell (1894, 1896), and Russell (1892, 1893). For contemporaneous 
popular discussion of this work see the New York Times (“The study of children,” 1895). 
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circular, 1888, p. 22). Depending on the type of material being collected, records were made on 
forms of different colours:  
white paper is used for such observations as students make themselves; red for well 
attested ones reported by others; yellow for reminiscences of their own childhood; green 
for mention of whatever they read on the subject; and chocolate for observations that 
extend continuously over a period of time. (Massachusetts State Normal School at 
Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 22) 
Several years later blue blanks were added to record observations of “exceptional or defective 
children” (Massachusetts State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1891, p. 
20). Outside of colour blanks were identical with space included for recording both the name and 
age of the observer and the child observed, as well at the nationality and sex of the child (see 
Massachusetts State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 22).173  
 The material collected with the Worcester method was deliberately broad. Worcester 
students set out to gather information on the breadth of children’s experiences, in contrast to the 
circulars that would soon be issued by Hall and his students at Clark. The latter were more 
limited in scope, in the sense of inquiring into a particular subject matter related to child life. 
This openness of subject matter in the Worcester undertaking was deliberate. Russell observed 
that “a determinate course and method, such as would suggest themselves to a scientific man as 
most likely to lead to the results desired, would often take our youthful and comparatively 
untrained students quite beyond their depth,” as they were “by no means competent to do 
exhaustive or “quantitative” work in experimental psychology” (Russell, 1892, p. 344). Lacking 
                                                
173 Also to be listed were the date, the address of the observer, and the “length of time 
between making the observation and recording it” (Massachusetts State Normal School at 
Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 22). 
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appropriate training imprecision was the best recourse. It was hoped that the gathered mass of 
material would prove of some value to child study, but this aim was very decidedly secondary. 
The immediate benefit of the undertaking was in the education of normal school students, as 
through this work they both developed “the qualities most sought in a teacher” (Massachusetts 
State Normal School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 23) and gained some 
preparation in the objective scientific mindset necessary for further studies in mental science. 
Thus, Hall commented on the practice’s “good effects on the powers of observation, tact, 
psychologic knowledge and interest of those who make them” (1888, p. xxiv), while 
acknowledging that the evidentiary value of the material was as yet undetermined. 
 The explicit absence of scientific analysis as object of the Worcester work meant that it 
was the process of collection that was of central import. As instructor Ellen Haskell explained,  
the records amassed are an incidental product remaining after the original and main 
purpose has been served. Whether they are the ashes of a furnace or a deposit containing 
precious metal, which will repay the labor of analysis and extraction, is for the promoters 
of science to determine. (E. M. Haskell, 1894, p. 30) 
The handing off of scientific authority over the material to better trained individuals is especially 
apparent in the most comprehensive publication to arise from the undertaking, Haskell’s edited 
volume Child Observations (1896). The publication consisted simply of hundreds of pages of 
chronologically ordered excerpts of observations of imitation in children presented without 
analysis or commentary.174 The 1208 accounts, each accompanied by the observed child’s name 
and age, represented a fraction of the total body of material accumulated since the project’s 
                                                
174 The volume was based on 500 records of imitative acts and included extensive 
excerpts from these records (E. M. Haskell, 1894, 1896). 
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inception.175 The data, leftover from the valuable training process of having normal school 
students observe children, was simply made available to those with an interest in the matter, 
whether pedagogical, psychological, or otherwise. It was up to the scientifically-minded to make 
sense of the mass. 
Haskell’s volume exemplified the orientation of the project more generally. Prior to 
recording observations of children, normal school students were instructed  
to regard their undertaking as of the nature of an exploring expedition among the 
phenomena of child-life, and themselves as nothing more than faithful collectors of 
specimens which as the raw material of science may be worked up by experts later. 
(Russell, 1892, p. 345) 
The understanding of students’ role as that of collector, and decidedly not that of scientific 
synthesizer, was emphasized all the more with the 1893 addition of a quote from Charles Darwin 
to the top of the blanks used to collect information: “I worked on the true Baconian principles, 
and without any theory collected facts on a wholesale scale…” (Massachusetts State Normal 
School at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1893, p. 24).  
Assigned the very specific role of data collector, students at the Worcester Normal 
School excelled in their effort in terms of the sheer quantity of material amassed. In the 1880s 
roughly two thousand records were accumulated each year (Massachusetts State Normal School 
at Worcester catalogue and circular, 1888, p. 24), with this rate increasing to more than three 
thousand per year in the 1890s (Russell, 1892). Alongside the general accumulation of 
observations, in the 1890s students at the school were also put to work collecting data for the 
Clark syllabi (e.g., Hall, 1899) and, in at least some instances, information was culled directly 
                                                
175 Russell estimated that no more than a twentieth of the collected material was 
represented in the volume (see Russell, 1896, p. vii). 
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from the larger body of previously collected observations held at the school (see Hall, 1897a, p. 
149). By the time of Russell’s retirement the body of material had swell to more than 60,000 
questionnaires. With Russell’s departure the documents were transferred to Hall (see Hall, 1924, 
p. 380) but he, like Russell, made no effort to produce any synthetic account of child-life from 
the material once it was in his possession. The very volume of collected material was 
undoubtedly overwhelming.  
Female Educators and the Professional Possibilities of Child Study 
Among the normal school educators attracted to the child study movement, and Hall’s 
questionnaire method of collecting data, was Margaret Keiver Smith (1846-1934).176 Born in 
Amherst, Nova Scotia, Smith earned a diploma from the State Normal School in Oswego, New 
York in 1883. She then spent some time studying philosophy, including two years at Cornell 
University as well as a period abroad in Germany, where she studied the work of philosopher 
and educationalist Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) in Jena. She returned to Oswego as an 
instructor in 1887 and remained at the school until the mid-1890s. Like many other women of 
the period who worked within the nation’s burgeoning normal school system, Smith was 
interested in incorporating the scientific study of children into her teaching. Beginning in the 
mid-1880s she also endeavoured to obtain professional training in the new scientific 
psychology.177  
                                                
176 For basic biographical information on Smith see Cattell (1932) and Ogilvie and 
Harvey (2000); the latter erroneously lists her full name as Kiever Smith. For more on Smith see 
Creese (1998) and Singer (2003); note, however, that the birth and death dates provided in the 
former are incorrect. Smith’s published works include a translation of Herbart (1891), as well as 
Graff and Smith (1886) and Smith (1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d, 1894a, 1894b, 1895, 1900, 
1901, 1902, 1903, 1907a, 1907b, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c). 
177 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Mar. 10, 1890, B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA. 
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Smith’s contact with Hall began in the 1880s and proved both frustrating and not nearly 
as professionally advantageous as first hoped. Her initial letters expressed her interest in the new 
psychology in relation to education and her intention of pursuing advanced study in the field.178 
Five years later, in 1890, she was no further along in her pursuit. Learning of the new graduate 
level university Hall was heading she asked “whether it is only for men…[or] would it be 
possible for a woman to take the course of studies there upon the same conditions as the men 
take theirs?”179 As she informed Hall, 
I begin to feel like making a speciality [sic] of philosophy and of applying it to 
psychology and pedagogy. If it were possible to take a course at Clark University where I 
might perhaps work for a degree, I think I should be tempted to do it….I have a pretty 
clearly defined system of pedagogy in my mind ready for elaboration, but while teaching 
I do not know that I shall ever be able to work it out. My aim would be to fit myself for 
work in history of education, pedagogy, psychology, and history of philosophy.180 
Having been occupied with teaching responsibilities at Oswego for the past several years, she 
was eager to again pursue additional training. Although Hall was at least nominally supportive of 
Smith’s interest in further education, he dashed her hopes of studying at Clark. Noting that 
women were not eligible for admission to the university and that special permission would have 
to be made, he informed her that such permission would not be forthcoming anytime in the near 
                                                
178 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Mar. 10, 1890, B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA. 
179 M. K. Smith to G. Stanely Hall, Mar. 10, 1890, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
180 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Mar. 10, 1890, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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future.181 The institution’s policy against co-education was in part an attempt to appease the 
University’s benefactor, Jonas Clark, who opposed the general admittance of women to the new 
institution and especially the use of his funds for this purpose. Hall also opposed the coeducation 
of women, based on his recapitulationist beliefs regarding the nature of women and the 
consequences of education on reproduction. That said, from the university’s establishment there 
was discussion of creating a separate department for women, housed within its own building, if 
outside funds for this purpose could be secured. Six years after Keiver’s inquiry, the institution 
began to allow exceptional women, as judged by Hall, to take special courses at Clark (see Diehl, 
1986).182  
 Unable to pursue a degree at Clark, Smith nonetheless continued her correspondence with 
Hall. In the early 1890s, Hall had yet to resume his questionnaire-based research of children, and 
Smith’s inquiries focused more on how she might assist with the data collection recently initiated 
at the school by anthropologist Franz Boas. At the end of the 1890 school year, Boas made 
physical measurements of some local Worcester area school children (see Boas, 1897).183 A 
more ambitious series of measurements was proposed in January 1891 and approved by the 
                                                
181 G. Stanley Hall to M. K. Smith, Mar. 11, 1890, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. No 
woman earned a degree from Clark until 1907 (Diehl, 1986). On the important role of female 
members of Clark University during Hall’s tenure see Diehl (1991). 
182 Notably, in the 1890s some female psychologists undertook informal study in Clark’s 
psychological laboratory, under the direction of Edmund Sanford (Calkins, 1893b; Miles, 1895). 
It was only in 1909 that women were formally permitted to obtain graduate degrees from the 
university. Even still, the education of women at the institution was officially limited to the 
Educational Department and women were excluded from pursuing degrees within other 
departments at the university. Despite this, Hall made exceptions on an individual basis. This 
change in policy was made for strategic political reasons, including the university’s desire for a 
tax exemption, as well as in an effort to secure favourable public opinion. Detailed discussion of 
the co-education policies at Clark, and Hall’s views on such, can be found in Diehl (1986). 
183 On Boas’s work during his time at Clark University see Cole (1999). For Boas’s views 
on the growth of children see Boas (1892a, 1892b, 1912) and for his views on anthropometry see 
Boas (1893, 1894).  
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school board that spring, with measurements beginning in earnest in April of that year.184 The 
project was controversial, attracting vocal opposition from local politicians as well as 
Worcester’s sensationalist newspaper, which depicted Boas as a stranger to the community who 
was undertaking a project with no scientific value (see D. Cole, 1999).185 Even still, Boas and 
four assistants, including perhaps his most prolific data collector Gerald West (1891, 1892, 1893, 
1896), continued with the project.186 Hall, wishing to avoid controversy, especially in the face of 
the disapproval voiced by the university’s benefactor Jonas Clark, discouraged the endeavour in 
its early days. With the continuing support of the local school board, he eventually changed his 
                                                
184 The project also received the support of Principal E. H. Russell of the local State 
Normal School (D. Cole, 1999). Copies of various versions of the forms used to record 
information as part of Boas’s anthropometric undertakings can be found in the Clark University 
Archives (B1-2-4, Box 6, Folder 10, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA). In addition to requesting a variety of physical measurements (e.g., height of 
ear, length of head, etc.), information was also requested regarding: age, sex, place of 
observation, name, nationality, place of birth, nationality of father, nationality of mother, 
occupation, color of eye, color of hair, as well as color of skin (very dark, dark brown-red, dark 
yellow-brown, red, yellow, yellowish white, white) for covered parts of body, uncovered parts of 
body, and palms of hands. 
185 The university’s failure to connect with the local community in its earliest years is 
well documented by Ross (1972). 
186 This kind of work was not confined to Worcester. As part of the Third Annual Report 
of the President is was reported: “In November, 1890, Dr. G. M. West, a graduate of Columbia 
College, was appointed fellow in Anthropology, and devoted himself to the consideration of its 
physical side, taking a large part in the anthropometric investigation begun in Worcester schools, 
and afterward extended to other cities. During the summer of 1891 Dr. West was engaged in 
anthropological measurements of the Indian tribes of Quebec and the Maritime Provinces of 
Canada” (“Third Annual Report of the President,” 1893, p. 122, B1-5-3, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). At the same time is was also noted that Alexander 
Chamberlain, a student in anthropology and assistant with Boas’s work: “in April-May, 
superintended the extensive measurements of school children carried on in the public schools of 
the city of Toronto, Canada, with the approval of the authorities and cooperation of the teachers, 
under the auspices of the sub-Department of Physical Anthropology of Chicago” (“Third Annual 
Report of the President,” 1893, p. 122-23, B1-5-3, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University 
Archives, Worcester, MA). 
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position, but Boas soon left the university.187 Prior to his departure, Boas was placed in charge of 
the Physical Anthropology department of the World’s Columbian Exposition, to be held in 
Chicago in 1893.188 For the exhibit, beginning in 1891, he collected extensive physical 
measurements of individuals, particularly various “Indian” groups across North American with 
“the ultimate object of the inquiry … to show the distribution of various types over the American 
continent.”189 The project employed nearly seventy field workers and ultimately produced more 
than 17,000 data sheets (see Boas, 1899; D. Cole, 1999).190  
It was to Boas’s project that Smith initially offered her assistance, erroneously assuming 
it to be Hall’s undertaking.191 Noting that she had already planned to undertake a set of physical 
measurements of children, she requested details regarding just what measurements were being 
made of Worcester school children.192 At the same time she forwarded on to Hall her “first 
                                                
187 Although Boas left at the same time as the mass exodus of Clark faculty to the newly 
created University of Chicago, he was not part of the group hired on there (see D. Cole, 1999).  
188 See “Second Annual Report of the President,” 1891, p. 50, B1-5-3, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
189 “Second Annual Report of the President,” 1891, p. 50, B1-5-3, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
190 See also “Second Annual Report of the President,” 1891, p. 45-50, B1-5-3, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
191 Smith later further followed in Boas’s footsteps, undertaking tests on Indian students 
at the Indian School in Carlisle (see M.K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Nov. 13, 1902, B1-6-11, [no 
box or folder number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA). 
192 Smith initially intended to measure “the height of the child, breadth of shoulder, bust 
measure, waist measure, length of limbs, a measurement of the arm at the shoulder, a 
measurement of the head which I might call the hat measurement as well as a measurement of 
the breadth of the forehead just about the eyebrows. Also, height of forehead” (M. K. Smith to G. 
Stanley Hall, Oct. 6, 1891, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). For an overview of physical 
measurement projects in the United States during this period, including those of children, see 
(Park, 2006). A number of works detail anthropometric studies more generally, many of which 
included psycho-physical tests of some kind (Bagley, 1901; Boas, 1895; Burk, 1898; Carman, 
1899; Galton & Hitchcock, 1889; J. B. Gilbert, 1977; Hartwell, 1893; Hitchcock & Seelye, 1888; 
MacDonald, 1899; W. T. Porter, 1893, 1894; R., 1899; Ripley, 1896). 
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schedule of the work upon the child,” which her students employed as a guide to their weekly 
“observations of special children.”193 The information collected with the schedule was used to 
direct the course of class discussion of pedagogical matters related to children and was not 
necessarily intended to serve a larger scientific purpose per se. Provided by Hall with schedules 
for recording the physical measurements of children, she expressed her willingness to collect 
data herself and to put her students to work doing the same. The latter endeavour, however, she 
noted “must be merely tentative” at least for the first several weeks “as many of my students are 
not yet sufficiently practiced to make observations upon which one could rely.”194 Though she 
was sufficiently trained to collect scientifically valuable information, her students were not yet 
competent enough to do the same. 
Smith was enthusiastic regarding the educational value of observational work as guided 
by printed schedules, such as those provided to her by Hall.195 Although occupied to some 
degree with this work, her ambition to receive further training in psychology did not abate. At 
the end of 1893 she told Hall of her continuing desire to obtain an education in the field, 
informing him that she was “ready for more advanced work than can be done in the Normal 
Schools.”196 Beyond this she observed “with a degree I believe that I should have the assurance 
to apply for university work.”197 Three years later, seeking more challenging work and broader 
                                                
193 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 6, 1891, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
194 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 9, 1891, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
195 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Nov. 23, 1891; M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, 
Mar. 1892, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
196 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 26, 1893, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA.   
197 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 26, 1893, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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professional opportunities, she left Oswego for Europe. She audited courses at the University of 
Göttingen for a time, but unable, as a woman, to audit classes in pedagogy or participate in 
seminars in subjects more broadly, she soon moved on to the University of Zurich (see Creese, 
1998; Singer, 2003). There she completed a doctorate in psychology, in 1900, with a well-
received study of rhythm (M. K. Smith, 1900). That fall she returned to the United States, 
conducting further experiments on rhythm in the Clark laboratory through the winter under 
Sanford’s direction (see M. K. Smith, 1907a).  
Despite her earlier hopes, she found her professional prospects little improved with a 
doctorate in hand. She again applied for positions at normal schools, and was shortly appointed 
Professor and Director of Psychology and Geography at the State Normal School in New Paltz, 
New York, but she insisted “it is not my intention to do Normal School work longer than I can 
help. I desire a position where I can work in Experimental psychology.”198 Even relegated to a 
normal school she continued to pursue experimental work, undertaking tests of reaction time and 
skin sensitivity of children for a period.199  
Aspirations aside, Smith was never able to secure an academic position devoted to 
experimental psychology. Instead, she returned to her role as data collector throughout the first 
decade of the twentieth century, amassing information on numerous subjects.200 Of an inquiry 
                                                
198 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Sept. 14, 1900, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
199 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Jan. 29, 1903, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. Smith 
likened these tests to those undertaken by Chicago Public Schools’ Department of Child Study 
and Pedagogic Investigation (see Chicago Public Schools, 1898, Chicago Public Schools, 1899, 
Chicago Public Schools, 1900, Chicago Public Schools, 1902). 
200 Smith also collected data for Jewell (1905; see Chapter 7). Correspondence related to 
Smith’s data collection efforts for Hall include (M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 11, 1901; 
M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Nov. 13, 1902; M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Jan. 12, 1903; 
M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Jan. 29, 1903; M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Feb. 17, 1907, 
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into the education of women she rather diplomatically informed Hall, who was firmly convinced 
of the dangers of education for women (see Diehl, 1986): “whether you are right in your ideas 
about women, I am not as sure, but shall tell you just what I think when I answer your 
questions.”201 As for other female psychologists during this period (see Pettit, 2008), remaining 
on friendly terms with Hall, who was her best connection within scientific psychology, was 
crucial to her continuing efforts to obtain employment directly in the field. She was very soon 
unhappy with her position at the New Paltz normal school, noting “I am doing the work of two 
teachers here for less than one teacher’s pay and the school is not prospering.”202 With little 
prospect of employment in psychology she applied for positions at other normal schools.203 
Hearing of a new women’s college, Sweet Briar College, being established near Lynchburg, 
Virginia she took the opportunity to write to Hall of her interest in chairing the institution’s 
department of psychology, regarding which she informed him “I know that I can do it, if I can 
get the opportunity.”204 Leveraging her usefulness as a regular collector in his questionnaire 
endeavours, she ended her request for a reference with the offer: “If I can make any other return, 
                                                                                                                                                       
B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
201 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 11, 1901, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. See 
“Education of Women,” Dec. 9, 1901, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University 
Archives, Worcester, MA. For more on this project see, A. L. Brown to G. Stanley Hall, May 22, 
1899, May 23, 1899; B1-6-2, Box 35, Folder 22, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University 
Archives, Worcester, MA. 
202 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 26, 1903, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
203 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 26, 1903, B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA. 
204 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Aug. 4, 1906, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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I shall be happy to do so.”205 Hall provided Smith with a largely positive, though brief, letter of 
recommendation, in which he opted to emphasize her teaching ability, rather than her 
psychological training and research.206 The position was not to be. Instead of continued work in 
experimental psychology, Smith turned to theoretical discussions of psychological and 
pedagogical aspects of language,207 and later to the study and treatment of a “backward” pupil,208 
before leaving normal school work in 1909 to undertake the private education of a family for 
nearly a decade.209   
 A recurrent data collector herself, Smith was also quite likely the one to introduce Hall to 
his most prolific accumulator of questionnaire responses. In the spring of 1892, in advance of 
                                                
205 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Aug. 4, 1906, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
206 Hall wrote: “I am requested to write you my impression of Dr. Margaret K. Smith’s 
fitness for a chair in your institution. I consider her one of the ablest women and one of the best 
teachers I have ever known, and although she is no longer young, seems to be in the zenith of her 
strength and enthusiasm. She took for yours [sic – four years] off some time ago to take a Ph. D. 
in Europe, has studied since one year here, has never failed, I think in anything she has 
undertaken. Of her incisiveness of mind her article on English, which is the best thing that has 
appeared for years in my judgment, is a sample. She is a thoroughly pleasant person to work with 
and commands the respect and enthusiasm of her class” (G. Stanley Hall to President J. Carhardt, 
Dec. 28, 1906, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
207 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 12, 1903; M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, 
Oct. 19, 1903; M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 30, 1903; B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA. See also Smith (1903). 
208 See M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Dec. 10, 1907, B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA. Although Smith offered her account of the training of a backward boy for Hall’s 
Pedagogical Seminary, it instead appeared in three-parts in Lightner Witmer’s recently 
established Psychological Clinic (M. K. Smith, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c).  
209 Smith’s final correspondence with Hall was a request that he provide a reference letter 
on her behalf to the National Research Council. The reference was part of her application to 
work with disabled and otherwise incapacitated soldiers returning from service who were under 
the care of the Division of Special Hospitals and Physical Reconstruction of the Surgeon 
General’s Office (M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Mar. 3, 1918, B1-6-11, [no box or folder 
number], folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, 
MA). 
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Clark University’s first summer school on psychology and pedagogy, Smith provided Hall with a 
list of possible participants. Included here was the recently appointed “Teacher of Psychology” 
of the State Normal School in Trenton, New Jersey: Lillie (Leslie) A. Williams.210 Along with 
Smith and some sixty-six others, Williams attended the summer school (see Clark University, 
1893).211 This was also the year she founded a psychology laboratory at her institution (Garvey, 
1929) and promoted the value of both teaching and practicing the new psychology in normal 
schools within the pages of Hall’s Pedagogical Seminary (Williams, 1892). She also soon 
established herself as one of the “most valued contributors” (Hall, 1924, p. 389) to Hall’s 
program of questionnaire-based research. Although she published only a single study of her own 
in the field, on children’s interest in words (Williams, 1902), Williams contributed material to 
numerous topical syllabi based projects initiated at Clark, in some instances supplying as many 
as a third of the returns (e.g., Lindley & Partridge, 1897). 
 To Williams’s mind the topical syllabi issued by Hall and his students at Clark allowed 
for the accumulation of “rich masses of facts” (Williams, 1896, p. 423).212 This body of material 
held the promise of producing “a science of the genesis of the mind” (Williams, 1896, p. 423) 
which might enrich educational practice.213 Even prior to her collection efforts for Hall, Williams 
(1896) had engaged her students in child study through observational work along the lines of that 
                                                
210 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, April 6, 1892B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
Williams was an instructor at the school from 1871 until the 1915-1916 academic year and 
served as Instructor of Psychology from 1891 on (Bauerle, 2003; Breland, 2010; Carnicom, 
Faye, & Baker, 2011; Chaffin & Gruenfeld, 1997). 
211 On the summer school see Ross (1972). 
212 See also “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
213 See also “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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instituted by Russell at the Worcester Normal School.214 Put into contact with Hall, she soon 
shifted her students’ efforts to the more specific collection of data for the many topical syllabi 
produced at Clark. These syllabi began to appear in the fall of 1894 and Williams, and by 
extension her students, were soon at work accumulating information on various subjects 
including anger (see Hall, 1899, p. 539), fears (see Hall, 1897a, p. 150), and the early sense of 
self (see Hall, 1898, p. 395 fn.).  
 As a dedicated collector of material on child life, Williams set out to ensure that 
information amassed using syllabi were of sufficient quality to be of scientific value. To this end, 
she composed a document to guide the work of data collectors: “How to Collect Data for Studies 
in Genetic Psychology” (1896). In addition to appearing within the pages of Hall’s The 
Pedagogical Seminary, Williams’s guide was printed and circulated alongside the Clark topical 
syllabi.215 The document outlined what Hall considered “the most effective of all methods for 
collecting valuable returns to questionnaires” (Hall, 1897a, p. 150) one “calculated to eliminate 
very many at least of the possible defects and errors” (Hall, 1897a, p. 239, see also 1924, pp. 
389–90) . Use of the guide offered a means by which to, at least, strive toward the 
standardization of data collection efforts.216 Within the document Williams at once detailed her 
method of using topical syllabi to collect information and the instrument’s larger role in the 
normal school classroom. As she described, she first dictated the syllabus, question by question, 
to her students and asked them to recall their own childhood experiences and share them with 
one another. Following this discussion, students wrote out reminiscences of their own childhood 
                                                
214 See also “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
215 “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
216 On efforts at standardization in early American psychology see Coon (1993) and 
Kroker (2003). 
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experiences and then set out to observe children and record their observations with the syllabus, 
in each instance recording the age, sex, and nationality for the children observed (Williams, 
1896; see also Hall, 1924, pp. 389–90).217 Following this scheme, however, did not guarantee 
success when it came to collecting information on specific kinds of experiences, as she noted 
“the impossibility, in many cases, of getting at children at the right time and under circumstances 
otherwise favorable, proved a serious obstacle to success” (Williams, 1896, p. 422).218 Simply 
because one set out to observe a particular kind of experience in children did not mean, of 
course, that it would be there to be found. In these instances another option was to respond to 
syllabi questions with information gleaned from hearsay, as well as incidents read about in books 
(see Hall, 1924, p. 380).219 Only on some syllabi were respondents directly instructed to indicate 
“whether each record is from memory observation, literature or report” and little was made of 
these kinds of distinctions in published reports.220 
 Numerous normal school educators employed Hall’s syllabi, together with Williams’ 
guide to collecting information, and at one point Hall had at his disposal as many as fifty regular 
data collectors (Hall, 1924). As he later recalled, the “syllabi were often made the theme of 
instruction and we were not infrequently called on to furnish copies by the score for class 
purposes” (Hall, 1924, p. 389). Like Smith, Williams was appropriately and, given their status 
differential, necessarily deferential toward Hall. Discussing the difficulties of teaching the new 
psychology in normal schools, she noted 
                                                
217 See also “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
218 See also “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
219 See also “The Early Sense of Self,” Jan. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. On Williams’s work as data collector see Smith (1903). 
220 “The Early Sense of Self,” Jan. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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how to secure apperception is ever the chief problem. We know that we must lead them 
to introspect, but we do not always know how to give beginners the sort of explicit 
direction which they need. Here Dr. Hall’s carefully prepared syllabi come to our aid. 
(Williams, 1896, p. 422)221 
For normal schools seeking to incorporate the new psychology into their teaching, often in the 
absence of a designated and equipped laboratory space, Hall’s syllabi offered a straightforward 
means of inculcating a psychological disposition in students.  
In addition to praising the quality of Hall’s research instruments, and their benefit to the 
teaching of scientific psychology, Williams was sure to position the work of data collectors like 
herself as crucial to the efforts of scientific researchers. Pupils were to be reminded that “every 
natural science must begin with the accumulation of facts” and 
that the material can be obtained only through the coöperation of very many different 
observers, each contributing his mite to swell the whole, and that in this work each one of 
them may bear apart. I touch upon the honor of being co-laborers even in ever so small a 
way with the eminent scientist who is directing the research. (Williams, 1896, p. 419)222 
Amassing of information for Hall and other researchers was a worthy endeavour, but one 
necessarily subordinate to the more important scientific work engaged in by trained others. Like 
Smith who considered her students to be insufficiently trained to produce much of value, at least 
in their initial forays into this kind of research,223 Williams was explicitly concerned with the 
status differential between trained and untrained, as well as how to best go about training 
                                                
221 “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
222 “How to Collect Data for Studies in Genetic Psychology,” B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. See also Hall (1924, pp. 389–90). 
223 M. K. Smith to G. Stanley Hall, Oct. 9, 1891, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], 
folder id: B1 D44-35, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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students. Those like Hall who possessed expertise as a function of their scientific training were 
positioned as superior to normal school students who just were in the midst of receiving some 
modicum of training in the field. As intermediaries to this collection process, Smith and 
Williams each sought to claim some level of authority through their association with Hall, the 
ultimate expert in the field.  
In her guide Williams carefully cultivated the data collector’s role as invaluable in an 
effort to attract educators and their students to this work, and positioned the activity as a boon to 
professionalization. At the same time, she also made clear that collecting was ultimately a 
negligible contribution to the larger scientific undertaking. This latter qualification ensured that 
scientific authority remained in the hands of Hall and his researchers and was not dispersed 
among the laity. In terms of her own role, Williams at once positioned herself as mere data 
collector, and as something more. The founding of a psychology laboratory at her institution 
allotted her a certain amount of scientific standing, but more important was her role vis a vis the 
practices of collecting.224 By authoring the text on how data collection for Hall’s questionnaire 
projects was to be undertaken, she skillfully fashioned herself as the authority on this matter, in 
effect commanding control over a new and esteemed form of expertise. She, as much as any 
scientific researcher, was the arbitrator of what constituted good data. 
Conclusion 
 For Hall and his supporters questionnaires provided a relatively straightforward means of 
amassing information on child-life. Even still, collecting data in this way was difficult. To 
successfully do so, untrained collectors – largely female normal school students – were engaged 
in accumulating material in the field. This was in direct contrast to the intensive training 
                                                
224 Hall (1894) noted of laboratories of experimental psychology “a few even of the 
normal schools have lately found out to their great benefit” (p. 713). 
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emphasized in laboratory psychology, most famously that emphasized in Wundt’s Leipzig 
laboratory (Danziger, 1985, 1990). The participation of laypersons was vital to questionnaire 
research, but was framed as decidedly unscientific, in and of itself. Within the status hierarchy on 
which questionnaire projects rested, it was Hall and his students who retained the apex of 
scientific authority. Some, like Smith and Williams, attempted to negotiate greater status for 
themselves, with varying degrees of success.  
The natural historical orientation central to these projects may have required the diffusion 
of responsibility to numerous individuals, but it did not guarantee equal standing for all forms of 
work. Much like the difficulties encountered by Jane Addams and her female compatriots at Hull 
House in relation to sociology at the University of Chicago (see Deegan, 1988), the labour of 
female educators in psychological investigations has largely gone unrecognized. Whether strictly 
scientific by Hall’s estimates or not, the work of predominately female educators and their 
largely female students was a crucial component of the naturalistic form of science practiced in 
questionnaire endeavours. Employing women to collect information on children in the field, 
particularly homes and schools, offered a way a means of practicing scientific psychology 
beyond the walls of the laboratory. Doing so, necessarily, produced a very different form of 
knowledge. The difficulties that attended data of this kind are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
Child Study, Objectivity, and Scientific Styles 
The extension of psychological work to untrained members of the public, while 
convenient, provoked debate among those within the discipline with differing views on the value 
of these kinds of undertakings. Some, like Hall, were more than happy to engage the laity in the 
process of data collection and, at times, interpretation as well. This was tied in very specific 
ways with Hall’s own professional aspirations, both as a recognized expert in the nation’s 
popular child study movement and as the President of a newly created university who was trying 
to establish the institution as a site of scientific excellence while also, out of necessity, courting 
the support of the local community (see Ross, 1972). In many respects, involving large swaths of 
the public in scientific research projects was simply expedient. This is not to say, however, that 
Hall’s vision of science was necessarily bankrupt. Rather, a different vision of the scientific 
enterprise was adopted in the face of the challenges of compiling great swathes of information.  
The appropriate relationship between psychology and pedagogy was a contentious point 
for the new scientific psychologists. Some, like Hall, saw psychological knowledge as the key to 
reforming educational practices upon firm scientific ground and educators as valuable 
contributors of information to psychological research projects. Others were less sanguine on one 
or both points. Objection was raised to the study of children, not so much on the basis of the 
inaccessibility of their minds, but rather on the grounds that doing so was antithetical to the 
proper role of parents and educators, the individuals best positioned to conduct this work. On the 
other hand, for some, investigations of children were best undertaken not with questionnaires 
that enlisted the aid of untrained individuals, but with experimentation done by psychologists. 
The cooperation of educators in the latter endeavours was appreciated, but not constitutive of 
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much in and of itself. Apart from studies that fell directly within the purview of child study, 
some psychologists engaged in research with children not so much because children were the 
object of interest, but simply because they served as a convenient population in which to study a 
particular issue. Though he was, by far, the biggest proponent of the questionnaire method in 
American psychology, Hall was certainly not alone in adopting the method. He and others 
employed questionnaires as a means of collecting large masses of data, while recognizing the 
inherent challenges of scientific practice as distributed among untrained individuals. For these 
psychologists, however, the benefits of enlisting a multitude of individuals in research 
outweighed any methodological deficiencies.  
As I argue in this chapter, those adopting a naturalistic orientation – which privileged 
collection, classification, and analysis of large quantities of information (see Crombie, 1994; 
Hacking, 1982, 2002; Pickstone, 2001) – did so in addition to, not exclusive of, a commitment to 
experimentation as central to psychological practice (see Young & Green, 2013). A commitment 
to multiple styles of scientific thinking is especially apparent in the context of projects involving 
both experimentation and questionnaire-based data gathering. A necessary corollary of the 
naturalistic orientation associated with the latter form of practice was the emergence of a moral 
economy of data wherein affect-laden norms and values sanctified particular data driven 
practices within the discipline. Within this moral economy the quantity of accounts collected was 
a key component of legitimizing a project’s scientific standing. While laboratory science relied 
on the use of standardized instrumentation wherever and whatever the endeavour (Benschop & 
Draaisma, 2000; Coon, 1993; Kroker, 2003), questionnaires and the practices of their 
employment were far less systematic. Here I draw on the work of Daston and Galison (2010), as 
well as Porter (1995), to argue that Hall and his associates, cognizant of the precarious scientific 
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status of this work, attempted to validate their endeavours by appealing to the discipline’s 
existing standards of objectivity. Attempts to standardize data collection along mechanically 
objective lines, in terms of the adoption of both literally and metaphorically mechanical modes 
of practice, as well as appeals to trained judgment, in the organization and analysis of material, 
aimed to position questionnaire projects as part of, rather than a departure from, the field’s 
accepted canon of practice. These efforts were never fully successful and, in the absence of any 
readily available means of demonstrating to others in the scientific community the quality of 
collected materials, the amount of material amassed served as a convenient stand-in for the value 
of these enterprises. This work occurred within the framework of the language of numbers that 
was increasingly dominating society, serving as an immediate, if superficial, marker of 
authoritative, scientific information (T. M. Porter, 1986, 1995). Efforts to transform collections 
of descriptive data into numerical form, of one kind or another, were attempts to capitalize on 
this development. Never fully successful in rendering this material into meaningful quantitative 
form, questionnaire research nonetheless sought to trade on the growing authority of numbers in 
its attempts to establish itself as a scientifically valid enterprise. 
Beyond Clark Syllabi 
 To be sure, child study inquiries were by no means confined to questionnaires. 
Investigators, psychologist and otherwise, employed a variety of methods in their efforts to 
understand child life (e.g., Chicago Public Schools, 1898). Outside of circular inquiries, some 
psychologists saw value in undertaking experimental studies of children. At Clark, Boas’s efforts 
to collect information on the physical characteristics of Worcester school children also spawned 
more psychologically-oriented projects including experimental work by Thaddeus Bolton (1892) 
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on memory and an inquiry by William Bryan (1892) on motor ability.225 These kinds of 
undertakings were also backed by Baldwin (1895a) who, although reluctant to endorse the work 
done by unskilled parents and educators, noted “children are experimented with so much and so 
unwisely, in any case, that it is possible that a little intentional experiment, guided by real insight 
and psychological information, would do them good” (p. 39). Elsewhere others also undertook 
investigations of children. At Wellesley College a number of investigations were undertaken 
with children, only some of which relied on questionnaires, including studies of the emotional 
lives of children, the stories and drawings of children, among others (Calkins, 1895b; Calkins, 
Buttrick, & Young, 1900; Learoyd, 1895). Similarly, at Columbia several projects employed 
children as subjects (Dexter, 1897, 1899; Franz & Houston, 1896). For his part, Edward 
Scripture (1892) of Yale University recommended  
every pedagogical seminary should have a laboratory in which, in the first place, the 
methods of experimental psychology are to be taught and then these methods are to be 
applied to educational problems. Every teacher should have been a psychologist and a 
physiologist before he becomes a pedagogue, and these two sciences cannot be acquired 
anywhere but in the laboratory. (p. 113) 
In his view pedagogy was to be subordinate to psychology, which could make valuable studies of 
children, such as the experimental work engaged in by his student J. Allen Gilbert (1892; 
1894).226 For Scripture, experimentation with children was a valuable undertaking but 
questionnaire-based work was far less revered, leading him to offer “his criticism and ridicule of 
                                                
225 See also “Second Annual Report of the President,” 1891, p. 45; “Third Annual Report 
of the President,” 1893, p. 117, B1-5-3, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. Hall (1900) also endorsed experimental work with children. 
226 For more on the research on children undertaken at Yale see (E. W. Scripture to G. 
Stanley Hall, April 14, 1893, B1-6-11, [no box or folder number], folder id: B1-D44-9, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
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the “unscientific” child study, which is being carried on by President G. Stanley Hall, Principal 
Russell,” and others (“The New England superintendents,” 1896, p. 348). 
Mixing Methods 
 While Hall and his associates distributed questionnaires to gather information on child-
life, and some opted to study children via experimentation, other psychologists occasionally 
combined both practices within the context of a single study. Though rarely done at Clark (Sears, 
1901), doing so allowed some investigators to both collect varied material on the subject at hand 
and enact more regimented laboratory practices. The challenge, however, was how to combine 
information gathered through these disparate efforts into some form of a coherent whole. As in 
questionnaire projects more generally, this was a difficulty never fully surmounted by 
investigators. What these kinds of investigations make clear, is that rather than the naturalistic 
orientation at the heart of questionnaire projects being antithetical to an experimental orientation, 
these epistemological and methodological boundaries were porous, if not non-existent. Even 
among the questionnaire investigators who did not undertake projects with multiple methods, 
their naturalistic orientation was not a de facto rejection of experimentation. Theirs was, instead, 
a broader conception of scientific psychology than those who dogmatically proclaimed the 
laboratory as the site, and experimentation the method, of the new discipline. 
William James and the Investigation of Dizziness 
 In the early 1880s, around the time of Hall’s inquiry into the contents of children’s 
minds, William James initiated a study of dizziness. This proved to be some of his only 
experimental work, in keeping with his later observation: “I am by nature no experimentalist – an 
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exclusively critical, logical, and literary mind.”227 James’s study was motivated, in part, by his 
own experience with seasickness.228 Previous work with friend and Harvard physiology 
professor Henry Pickering Bowditch as well as general interest in the work of Hegel, and his 
non-dualistic conception of mind, among American intellectuals at this time led James to 
dizziness as a topic that was both physiological and psychological in nature (see Richardson, 
2007).229 On the basis of the apparent lack of seasickness demonstrated by deaf-mutes he posited 
that the semi-circular canals, or the irritation thereof, was the physiological basis of the affliction 
(James, 1983b, 1983c). As he noted, the semi-circular canals were not involved in hearing, but 
were rather theorized to be the seat of “the sense, namely, of translation through space, which in 
its more extreme degrees becomes the feeling of dizziness or vertigo” (James, 1881a, p. 173, 
1881b, p. 412, see also 1882). At least some deaf-mutes, he speculated, lacked functional semi-
circular canals and were therefore insusceptible to seasickness. With this notion in mind, he set 
out to experimentally test his theory.230 
 Although experimentation was a key component of the inquiry, questionnaires were also 
employed (James, 1881a, 1881b, 1882). In effect James set out to gather information on the 
experience of dizziness, and the lack thereof, from as many sources as possible, however that 
might be achieved. This included accumulating information not only from deaf-mutes, but from 
                                                
227 W. James to H. Münsterberg, 15 May 1892, Box 10, Folder 1834B, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
228 For James’s views on seasickness see James (1983b, 1983c). His interest in the role of 
the semicircular canals first made its way into print in a review of experimental work on the 
semicircular canals (James, 1880). In a footnote in the review he described his own experiments 
with frogs, testing compensatory head movements following rotation, though he was unable to 
determine if such movements were a function of the semi-circular canals. 
229 Along similar lines, the doctoral dissertation Hall (1878) completed under James, 
based on work conducted in Bowditch’s laboratory, was an investigation of “The Muscular 
Perception of Space.” 
230 For a popular account of this research see Milar (2012). 
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“normal” subjects as well (James, 1882). Key to the project’s success was the cooperation of 
officials at a number of institutions for deaf children, including the Horace Mann School in 
Boston, the Hartford Asylum in Connecticut, the National College for Deaf-mutes in 
Washington, the Clarke Institution in Northampton, and the Indiana Institution (James, 1881a, 
1881b, 1882). James (1882) speculated “among their inmates must certainly be a considerable 
number in whom either the labyrinths or the auditory nerves in their totality have been destroyed 
by the same causes that produced the deafness” (p. 240). Not all deaf individuals were expected 
to be impervious to dizziness, but it was speculated that at least some proportion of them would 
be, with a further contingent affected to a lesser degree (James, 1882). That the subjects of his 
project were children was largely incidental, a result of the populations of deaf-mutes easily 
accessible within institutions charged with their care. 
 To test his hypothesis James attempted to induce dizziness in his subjects. Those at 
Massachusetts based institutions – the Horace Mann School, the Clarke Institution, and a number 
of individuals from Harvard College who were tested for comparison purposes (James, 1882) – 
were subjected to what James characterized as “by far the purest and most powerful means of 
inducing vertigo” (1881a, p. 173, 1881b, p. 412).231 This method involved whirling an individual 
about in a rotary swing. To do so, the apparatus was rotated so that the swing’s ropes were 
tightly twisted and 
the child is then seated on the board, with closed eyes, and head in any position desired, 
and the torsion of the ropes is left to work its effects freely. These consist in a rapid 
revolution of the whole apparatus, including its inmate. The moment the speed of rotation 
                                                
231 James’s brother Robertson (Bob) assisted with the examination of children from the 
Clarke Institute in Northampton (see James, 1882). Later investigations would also employ 
James’s family members (see Chapter 5). On the involvement of family members in nineteenth 
century science see Lindsay (1998). 
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slackens, the examiner stops the rotation, and sets the child, who has been instructed 
previously, to open his eyes and walk as straight as possible towards a distant point on 
the floor. (James, 1882, p. 243) 
Those unable to easily walk to the point on the floor were recorded as dizzy, while those who 
made the trip with ease were noted to be without the experience.232 
 The inducement of dizziness via the rotary swing was the preferred, but not the only 
method employed. All those tested outside Massachusetts were tested by another means. Rather 
than undergoing to the “passive rotation” of the rotary swing (James, 1882, p. 242), these 
children were examined with a method that required no special apparatus. This involved 
active spinning about on the feet with the head successively upright, bent forward, and 
inclined on one shoulder….the eyes must be closed to eliminate optical vertigo pure and 
simple, but opened when the spinning is over, so that the patient may have every 
advantage for walking straight. (James, 1882, p. 242)  
While simpler to conduct, this method came with the attendant difficulty of also inducing a state 
“muscular vertigo” as the result of whirling and the “involuntary continuance of muscular 
action” (James, 1882, p. 242). The passivity of the subject in the swing method avoided this 
potential confound to the dizziness that was of real interest.  
Across these investigations 519 deaf-mute children were tested, 186 of whom did not 
experience dizziness. A further 134 were only slightly dizzy, 199 were normally so, and a few 
individuals were excessively sensitive. James (1882) was also careful to note that congenital and 
                                                
232 In reporting the findings from his project James (1882) reprinted a letter from 
American neurologist George Beard, wherein Beard states: “First, by means of the swing which 
you have used in your experiments. I find that persons when put into trance sleep and placed in a 
swing which is twisted up tightly, so that it untwists rapidly, and for a considerable time, feel no 
dizziness or nausea, but when brought out of the trance, at once walk away without the least 
difficulty” (p. 253; see Chapter 5). 
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semi-mutes were not particular to any one category, but could be found experiencing all levels of 
dizziness.233 In comparison, of the nearly 200 students and instructors James tested at Harvard 
only one individual did not experience vertigo and very few individuals reported themselves to 
be only “slightly” or “somewhat” dizzy (James, 1882, p. 242). 
 In addition to rotation, whether by swing or manual spinning, dizziness was also induced 
in some by the application of a galvanic current. As with the rotary swing these experiments 
were limited to children in Massachusetts institutions. The current was first calibrated to be 
“strong enough to make four normal adults, on whom it was tried, bend body and head strongly 
over” (James, 1882, p. 244). Applied to forty-three students in Northampton, only five out of 
twenty-three who were not dizzy following the rotation experiment showed this reaction. Of 
twenty who were dizzy following rotation fourteen demonstrated some degree of response. 
Examinations at the Boston school were less successful. Fifteen not dizzy boys received the 
current and only one showed a response. A further three slight cases and one dizzy case were 
tested, with only one of the former group reacting. More problematic were attempts to examine 
female students at the school. As James (1882) noted, at the prospect of receiving the galvanic 
current “the girls became so nervous that the few results I obtained with them were valueless” (p. 
244). The current’s incitement of strong emotional reactions was hardly limited to female 
students as “subjective feelings … are so numerous and often so intense that a deaf-mute child 
experiencing them for the first time can hardly be expected to give a very lucid account of them” 
(James, 1882, p. 244). The child subjects in James’s experiments were far from passive 
                                                
233 Some cases were reported multiple times and James (1882) made an attempt to 
remove the duplicates. James also alerted the reader “Dr. Clarence J. Blake examined the 
condition of the ears of the Northampton children, but not being able to deduce any conclusions 
relevant to my own inquiry from his observations, I leave them unrecorded here” (James, 1882, 
p. 254). 
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recipients of his manipulations. 
 Outside of James’s various experimental attempts to stimulate dizziness he also collected 
information on the subject via questionnaire (James, 1881a, 1881b, 1882). Unlike his 
experiments, which deliberately included a large sample of non-deaf-mute individuals for 
comparison purposes, the printed circular was purposely distributed to mostly deaf-mute 
individuals (James, 1882). Among those who responded to James’s questionnaire were a number 
of those who also participated in his experimental efforts, though by no means did all of these 
individuals complete his circular as the total number of responses remained far below that of his 
experiments (James, 1882). The full set of questions posed is unknown, but included among the 
items were: “Do you ever experience dizziness under any other circumstances?” (James, 1882, p. 
243), “Are you dizzy on high places?”, and “Have you a good bump of locality?” (James, 1882, 
p. 252).234 The latter, James noted, was “a rather stupidly expressed phrase, but one which I 
supposed would be popularly intelligible” (James, 1882, p. 252). The popular, rather than 
scientific, comprehensibility of questions was a critical consideration, especially in 
circumstances where they were to be completed independently by individuals among the general 
public. 
Exactly how the results of his circular inquiry fit with the findings of James’s larger 
experimental undertaking was largely unclear. Perhaps the most important result of responses to 
his questionnaire was James’s (1882) realization of “the fact, notorious at deaf and dumb 
institutions but apparently not much known to the outer world, that large numbers of deaf-mutes 
stagger and walk zigzag, especially after dark, and are unable to stand steady with their eyes 
                                                
234 James also inquired into the experiences of deaf-mutes when diving, speculating that 
without gravity to guide them non-dizzy deaf-mutes would experience profound disorientation 
under water due to their nonfunctional semi-circular canals. This line of questionning produced 
little by way of definitive results (see James, 1882, pp. 246–9). 
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closed” (p. 250). Deducing dizziness was not as simple a matter as requesting subjects walk in a 
straight line following rotation, a fact that soon became apparent in his investigation. At the same 
time James observed that the absence of swaying was not itself a definite indication of the 
absence of dizziness. Some of the individuals who were steady on their feet after rotation “did 
have some sort of a vertiginous feeling, which they expressed by moving the hand wavingly [sic] 
across the forehead, by saying they were “dizzy” or felt like “falling”” (James, 1882, p. 244). In 
light of the difficulty of identifying both dizziness and the lack thereof, James (1882) regarded 
“the experiments… as almost inconclusive” (p. 244). In his usual self-effacing manor, he 
published his findings with prefatory remarks highlighting his inability to complete an 
investigation into the subject and his hope that in publishing the results thus far obtained “some 
one with better opportunities may carry on the work. The regular medical attendants of deaf-
mute institutions seem particularly well fitted for such a task” (James, 1882, p. 239). 
Josiah Royce and Inquiries into Imitation 
Like James more than a decade earlier Josiah Royce, his Harvard colleague, undertook a 
project that combined both experimentation and the circulation of a questionnaire. In the spring 
of 1894 Royce, an idealist philosopher with an interest in the new psychology, published a call 
for assistance with his latest research project within the pages of Century Illustrated Magazine. 
After reproducing his Schedule of Questions on Imitative Functions, a list of questions on 
various aspects of imitation he hoped readers would provide him information on, Royce (1894b) 
wrote: 
Such are some of the matters of natural history concerning which I just now ask for 
assistance from kindly disposed persons. Of the precise value of a collection of such 
reports it is impossible to give any fuller account without going into technical details 
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beyond my present limits. Suffice it to say that all serious efforts to answer any of the 
foregoing questions will be valuable. (p. 144) 
Like Hall and a number of other early psychologists, Royce explicitly conceived of his 
questionnaire-based inquiry as a form of natural historical research.235 His detailed, descriptive 
set of five questions asked for accounts of the place of imitation in child life, imitative games, 
naughtiness, and emotions, as well as children who failed to imitate.236 The significance of this 
kind of collection of material was not necessarily self-evident, but readers were reassured “the 
specific purposes of some of my questions will not at once be obvious to every reader. It is 
enough to say, in general, that all my questions bear upon some topic connected with the natural 
history of imitation” (Royce, 1894b, p. 143).237 
 As in child study projects, Royce’s ideal data collectors were parents and educators. It 
was “observant parents” as well as “teachers, other observers of children, and observant persons 
generally” (Royce, 1894b, p. 142) who were to supply the desired information on imitation. Even 
those not in the position to observe child-life could contribute to the project by offering their 
reminiscences of their own childhood experiences (Royce, 1894b, p. 142). As he noted, 
what is most needed is the coöperation of many independent observers; and owing to the 
                                                
235 Around the turn of the twentieth century Royce drafted another circular “for the sake 
of collecting material for a discussion of the relation of traditional Christmas festivities to the 
health, happiness, and general welfare” of children. He intended the inquiry to be circulated 
within a Mothers’ Club and beyond, but it is unclear if the circular was ever distributed and any 
responses collected (“The Influence of Christmas Festivities upon the Welfare of Children. A 
Circular of Inquiry,” [ca.1901], Box 92, Papers of Josiah Royce, HUG 1755, Harvard University 
Archives, Cambridge, MA).  
236 On Royce’s views on imitation and the development of the self see Royce (1892, 
1894a, 1894b, 1895a, 1895b, 1895c, 1895d, 1895e, 1897, 1898b). 
237 Those sending in responses were reassured that their information would be kept 
confidential, no personal details or names revealed and reports “shall keep confidential 
statements in a safe place, where they will surely be destroyed without further examination in 
case of my death” (Royce, 1894b, p. 145). None of this material remains today. 
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nature of the facts concerning which I shall here ask, such observers will be able to 
contribute many useful data for comparison, even where the observers themselves are no 
experts in psychology….could I get many psychological data of certain kinds from 
various independent observers, widely sundered in place, and widely differing in their 
opportunities, I should be aided in guiding certain of my intended investigations into the 
nature, the development, and the factors of these imitative functions of mankind. (Royce, 
1894b, p. 142)  
Parents and educators, though untrained in psychology, were in the best position to observe and 
record the imitative actions of children. In doing so, educators in particular “become a 
psychologist, not in the systematic, but in the scrutinizing sense; not as scientific generalizer, but 
as observing naturalist, as collector of mental facts” (Royce, 1891b, p. 127). This inclination 
toward observation would not only benefit his project, but also prove useful in the teacher’s 
relations with individual children.238 The participation of untrained individuals in scientific 
endeavours was by no means unique to psychology during this period, serving as a crucial to 
success in research projects across a number of domains (Kohler, 2006; Vetter, 2011). 
 Non-specialists were central to gathering material on childhood imitation via circular, but 
involvement in experimental work was more circumscribed. In the fall of 1894, following the 
circulation of his questionnaire, Royce (1895a) began a laboratory-based study of imitation. 
Under the direction of Münsterberg, head of Harvard’s psychology laboratory, he engaged four 
adult women and an equal number of men “all of a fair although decidedly varied amount of 
                                                
238 Royce gave a series of twelve public lectures, “Topics in Psychology of Interest to 
Teachers” in February through May of 1893 (see Royce, 1893a, 1893b, 1893c, 1893d). A further 
series of lecture was delivered in 1897-98 (“Lectures to teachers: Boston, 1897-1898,” Box 69-
70, Papers of Josiah Royce, HUG 1755, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA). On 
Royce’s views on education see also Royce (1883, 1891a, 1891b; see Rudy, 1952). 
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introspective preparation” (Royce, 1895a, p. 233) in his project. These at least somewhat skilled 
introspectors were asked “to listen to a rhythmic series of taps (made with an electric hammer), 
and then to reproduce this series by means of an electric key” (Royce, 1895a, p. 218). The 
original series of taps, as well as the attempted imitation was graphically recorded on the drum of 
a kymograph. Subjects were also instructed to record their subjective experiences of imitation 
immediately after the experiment (Royce, 1895a). The study was followed by another that sought 
to experimentally bring about inventiveness, held to be the counterpart of imitation (Royce, 
1898b). Once again taking place within the space of the laboratory, the project had subjects 
engage in a series of drawing exercises in which they were to avoid imitation and strive for 
originality as much as possible. 
Royce’s approach to his experimental work was much the same as that of his circular. In 
engaging subjects within the laboratory he aimed “to get a pretty careful series of records of the 
facts, and to wait for experience to indicate the best further procedure” (Royce, 1895a, p. 232). 
Collecting data, whether by circular or otherwise, was an exploratory process. Through trial and 
error Royce (1895a) refined his experimentation, altering the series of taps presented to subjects 
in his imitation study after concluding that some series were “too complex to promise any 
definite results” (p. 231). His persistency in this work was noted by James who observed “Royce 
comes almost daily, and covers sheets of paper with “imitations” and introspective notes by the 
imitators, showing an ultra-deutschen Ausdauer [ultra-German stamina], but so far no formulable 
results.”239 The final product of this dedication, like that of his questionnaire, is unclear. His 
records of imitation revealed “the most widely varying subjective processes, which do not seem 
to be constant, even for one subject” (Royce, 1895a, p. 234) rather than any definite pattern of 
                                                
239 W. James to H. Münsterberg, 23 April 1896, Box 9, Folder 1834A, Hugo Münsterberg 
Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
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imitative experience. These records like the results of his inquiry into invention offered only “a 
first glimpse into the labyrinth of the influence of social suggestion” on both imitation and 
invention (Royce, 1898b, p. 128). The collection of facts, inside and outside the laboratory, 
offered only the barest hint of a larger understanding of the social processes Royce was hoping to 
document. The synthesis of information gleaned solely by questionnaire was challenging – as we 
shall see – and the addition of findings from experimental undertakings, as Royce and James 
discovered, did not improve the situation. Definitive conclusions, whatever methods adopted, 
were hard to come by. 
Questioning the Questionnaire Method 
 By the end of the 1890s psychological work in child study and the proper relation 
between psychology and pedagogy were increasingly contentious issues. Particularly polemical 
were a series of articles published in 1898 by Hugo Münsterberg (1898a, 1898b, 1898c, 1898d), 
the director of Harvard’s psychological laboratory, and one of the chief advocates of 
experimentation as the discipline’s methodology. Within the pages of the Educational Review 
and The Atlantic Monthly Münsterberg made clear his antipathy for both Hall’s and Scripture’s 
brand of pedagogically-oriented psychology and the attempt to refashion pedagogy in the style of 
scientific psychology.240 Others in the field were soon drawn into the discussion. 
Münsterberg was not always disparaging of Hall’s efforts. Prior to his published 
criticisms at the end of the century he and Hall crossed paths in person at an April 1895 meeting 
                                                
240 Münsterberg’s (1898b) first The Atlantic Monthly article in this series began with 
harsh criticism of Scripture’s recent volume The New Psychology (1897), though he refused to 
name the author outright. In response, Scripture’s former student Charles Bliss (1898), now of 
New York University’s pedagogy department, published a defence of the value of psychological 
work in the training of teachers (see Benjamin, 2006). On Münsterberg’s denigration of applied 
psychology more generally, as well as his later involvement in applied work see Benjamin 
(2006). Following his change of mind regarding applied psychology Münsterberg published a 
volume on Psychology and the Teacher (1909).  
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of the Massachusetts Schoolmasters’ Club. Though others spoke at the meeting as well, the two 
psychologists largely confined their remarks to each other. Münsterberg (1895), still something 
of a newcomer to the American psychological scene, noted at the time 
the teacher who is a careful observer may furnish to the psychologist valuable material by 
the continual observation of children. The extremely interesting and important collections 
of such material, which my friend, President Stanley Hall has brought together, give the 
best and most encouraging illustration of such cooperative work. (p. 19-20) 
At this point, Münsterberg was at least nominally supportive of Hall’s efforts to collect enmasse 
accounts of child life. Doing so, he went on to comment, was something uniquely within the 
purview of educators: 
the teacher has so many chances to see events in the child’s mind which would escape the 
official psychologist if he could not rely on the teacher’s help, just as the biologist 
collects the reports of hunters, who have chances for observation which the biologist in 
his laboratory never can have. (Münsterberg, 1895, pp. 19–20)  
Offering an explicit articulation of the naturalistic orientation of these kinds of data collection 
projects he emphasized the important role of teachers as field workers. They, unlike the 
psychologist, were uniquely capable of enacting the kind of “unobserved observation” (Pettit, 
2013b, p. 203) of the children in their care privileged by psychologists.241 Privately, Hall wrote 
him  
I certainly supposed from your remarks … that you had little faith in Child Study. I think 
all who heard you got that impression, & its enemies received great aid & comfort from 
                                                
241 The persistent “appeal of the ideal of unobserved observation” (p. 203) among 
psychologists is discussed throughout Pettit (2013b). See also Morawski (1988a). 
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your words. I am still more surprised that you write to me that you believe teachers can 
do good work in this direction.242 
Surprising or not, apparently in the “natural” setting of the classroom, Münsterberg considered 
educators uniquely positioned to witness and record features of child-life for the benefit of 
psychologists. 
The value of teachers’ contributions to psychological knowledge notwithstanding, the 
latter was of little assistance to educational practices. So far as Münsterberg was concerned, 
modern psychological knowledge was of no help to teaching and, even more problematically, 
employing educators as data collectors was itself a hindrance to the teacher’s performance of 
their proper duties. Asserting that he does not, and would not, study his own children he 
implored teachers to “love their pupils instead of observing them” (Münsterberg, 1895, p. 25). In 
response, Hall (1895a) inquired: “does he regard child study as vivisection of the soul?” (p. 36). 
Accusing Münsterberg of considering child study “solely from this standpoint of laboratory and 
scientific apparatus” Hall (1895a) noted “I am sure his prejudices would be overcome if he 
would examine some of the thousands of returns, by non-psychologists, which I am now engaged 
in reporting on” (p. 36).  
Three years later Münsterberg continued to argue that disinterested scientific stance 
characteristic of the new psychology was directly at odds with the needs of the teacher. In his 
view, 
love and tact and patience and sympathy and interest are more important for the teacher 
than any psychological observations he can make on children, and that these observations 
                                                
242 G. Stanley Hall to H. Münsterberg, 4 May 1895, Folder 1766, Item 3, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
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are natural enemies of his instinctive emotional attitudes because they dissolve the 
personality into elements. (Münsterberg, 1898b, p. 165, see also 1898d)  
The incompatibility of the scientific attitude and the teacher’s proper role was something others 
similarly noted. In his volume Talks to Teachers on Psychology, and to Students on some of 
Life’s Ideals, based on a series of public lectures in the early 1890s, James (1899b) noted “I 
cannot too strongly agree with my colleague, Professor Münsterberg, when he says that the 
teacher’s attitude toward the child, being concrete and ethical, is positively opposed to the 
psychological observer’s, which is abstract and analytic” (p. 13).243 The United States 
Commissioner of Education, philosopher and educator William Torrey Harris informed 
Münsterberg 
the true interests of education have been very much strengthened by your timely articles. 
For those true interests of education demand that the large body of teachers shall not be 
turned aside from a belief in moral responsibility and the freedom of the soul, the 
permanent personality of the child, by any analytic theories or hypotheses, useful and 
necessary as these latter may be in taking a scientific inventory.244 
Similarly, Royce (1891b) contended “teaching is an art. Therefore there is indeed no science of 
education. But what there is, is the world of science furnishing material for the educator to 
                                                
243 James was less than enthusiastic regarding his course of public lectures to teachers, 
given at Harvard’s behest: “They are forcing me to give ten lectures here on “Topics of 
Psychology of interest to Teachers.” It is lamentable work!” (W. James to W. T. Harris, Nov. 14, 
1891 in James, 1999, p. 220). See also W. James to P. H. Hanus, April 6, 1891 in James (1999, 
pp. 148–9), as well as W. James to J. Royce, March 18, 1893 in James (1999, pp. 400–2). The 
lectures were delivered in Boston in 1892 and James continued to deliver the lectures for 
teachers across the country throughout the 1890s (see James, 1899b). See also W. James to H. 
Münsterberg, 2 September 1896, Folder 1834B, Item 15, Hugo Münsterberg Papers, Boston 
Public Library, Boston, MA.  
244 W. T. Harris to H. Münsterberg, 22 April 1898, Folder 2273b, Item 1, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
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study” (p. 132). Teaching, as a profession, demanded a very different skill set than science. 
Scientific psychology might provide useful information on children and pedagogy, but this 
information was to be the product of work by those other than educators.  
Münsterberg took his argument against educators engaging in psychological research as a 
means of improving their pedagogy one step further. Inasmuch as teachers were unable to 
contribute anything of value to the body of psychological knowledge, psychology was also 
unable to guide the teacher in their work. The impulse of educators to adopt the research 
practices of new psychology with the hope of improving their pedagogical efforts was simply ill 
conceived. So far as Münsterberg (1898b) was concerned 
this rush toward experimental psychology is an absurdity. Our laboratory work cannot 
teach you anything which is of direct use to you in your work as teachers; and if you are 
not good teachers it may even do you harm, as it may confuse you and inhibit your 
normal teacher’s instincts….You may collect thousands of experimental results with the 
chronoscope and the kymograph, but you will not find anything in our laboratories which 
you could translate directly into a pedagogical prescription. (p. 166)  
Experimental psychology, the proper mode of the new psychology, was a discipline distinct from 
pedagogy. Work in the former field had no direct bearing on the practices of latter. Rather than 
attempting to subordinate pedagogy to psychology, along the lines of Hall and Scripture, it 
would be best if the two went their separate “ways, with sympathy, but without blind adoration 
for each other” (Münsterberg, 1898b, p. 167). 
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The vitriolic style of Münsterberg’s critique attracted much attention. While Cattell was 
unimpressed with Münsterberg’s concurrent critique of psychological measurement,245 he agreed 
“that the usefulness of experimental psychology to the teacher has been exaggerated in certain 
quarters.”246 Nonetheless, he was unwilling to dismiss entirely the benefit of psychological 
knowledge to education: “if psychology is of value to the teacher and experiment has enriched 
psychology, then it is scarcely fair to say that experiment and laboratory work – whether as a 
training or as a professional help – are valueless.”247 If teachers were to receive training in any 
one science it should be the one in closest relation to their field and this, undoubtedly, was 
psychology (Cattell, 1898). James likewise  
rejoiced in any expression from an authority like him which might tend to destroy in the 
teacher’s eyes the prestige of all this industrious mystification to which they are exposed 
about the immense help to which is to come to them from psychological laboratories and 
measurements.248  
As far as James was concerned, the exaggerated claims of a fundamental connection between 
work in experimental psychology and teaching deserved to be struck down: “teaching and 
psychology have got to keep in connexion…. to flourish elementary measurements before the 
teacher’s eyes as his own ideal goal seems to me to be little short of criminal.”249 John Dewey 
                                                
245 See J. M. Cattell to H. Münsterberg, 26 May 1898, Folder 1614, Item 3, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. See also W. James to J. M. Cattell 
May 4, 1898 in James (2000, p. 363). Further comment on this aspect of Münsterberg’s article 
can be found in Thorndike (1898f) and Titchener (1898a). 
246 J. M. Cattell to H. Münsterberg, 26 May 1898, Folder 1614, Item 3, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
247 J. M. Cattell to H. Münsterberg, 26 May 1898, Folder 1614, Item 3, Hugo 
Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. 
248 W. James to J. M. Cattell, May 4, 1898 in James (2000, p. 363, see also W. James to J. 
M. Cattell, May, 1898 in James, 2000, p. 362). 
249 W. James to J. M. Cattell, May 4, 1898 in James (2000, p. 363). 
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(1900) expressed his agreement “with much of what Dr. Münsterberg says about the uselessness 
and the danger for the teacher of miscellaneous scraps of child study, of unorganized information 
regarding the nervous system, and of crude and uninterpreted results of laboratory experiment” 
(p. 106), his concern rooted in his view that the teacher “must not assume the psychological 
attitude. If he does he reduces persons to objects, and thereby distorts, or rather destroys, the 
ethical relationship which is the vital nerve of instruction” (Dewey, 1900, pp. 109–10). Royce 
(1898a) pointed out that the efforts of psychologists and educators were fundamentally as cross-
purposes since “the laboratory psychologist properly desires these experiments for theoretical 
purposes [and] the teacher desires them to be of immediate practical significance” (p. 89).  
As part of his rejection of the benefits of psychological work for educators Münsterberg 
also offered a far more negative view of educators as data collectors than that articulated three 
years earlier. In one of the most vehement and colourful critiques of the questionnaire method 
offered during this period he contended: 
the work must be done by trained specialists or not at all. That child study which has for 
its aim only the collection of curiosities about the child, as an end in itself, may be 
grateful to the nurse who writes down some of the baby’s naughty answers or to the 
teacher who sacrifices half an hour of her lesson to make experiments in the classroom to 
fill out the blanks that are mailed to her. The students of that scientific child psychology 
which stands in the service of the general mind study know how every step in the 
progress of our science was dependent upon the most laborious, patient work of our 
laboratories and the most subtle and refined methods, and that all this seductive but rude 
and untrained and untechnical gathering of cheap and vulgar material means a caricature 
and not an improvement of psychology. (Münsterberg, 1898a, p. 115) 
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The educator, untrained in psychology, lacked the proper attitude for engaging in research. The 
solution to this was not the inculcation of this attitude in educators, but rather an appreciation 
that teachers must adopt a style other than psychological in order for them to do their jobs well. 
Baldwin (1898) concurred: “it is an insult to the teaching profession to tell them that their 
humanity needs this sort of cultivation, and to hoodwink them into thinking that they are making 
contributions to science” (p. 219). Jastrow (1901) similarly endorsed this critique, but despite 
these kinds of assertions, neither he nor Münsterberg were singularly committed to the laboratory 
as the site of science. Both, for instance, engaged in trickery modeled on the craft of stage 
magicians, rather than the techniques of laboratory practice, in their efforts to debunk psychical 
phenomena (see Pettit, 2013b). Loyalty to the laboratory thus served more as a rhetorical strategy 
of disciplinary inclusion and exclusion, than an absolutely observed value. 
 Others also embraced the argument that educators were ill equipped to collect data and 
that this work detracted from their proper teaching duties. Titchener (1896a) cautioned the 
method “has grave dangers, and must be used with great caution” (p. 238), while Royce (1898a) 
observed 
the psychologist in the laboratory cannot well control the scientific use of the syllabus by 
persons outside of the laboratory. Lacking himself the time for an adequate personal 
study of children in school-rooms, the laboratory psychologist is consequently too often 
left dependent on the observations of unskilled persons for far too many of his data. 
Meanwhile the syllabus, often inexpertly used and filled out, through the busy teacher’s 
aid, may have led to much waste of time in the school-room. (p. 89) 
Despite, or perhaps because of, his earlier questionnaire inquiry that relied on the participations 
of educators Royce was not convinced that the efforts of teachers were worthwhile. Bemoaning 
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that “we are left at present to crude observation or to loose generalization by the practical 
teachers, on the one hand, and to laboratory investigations or to statistical collections of far too 
theoretical an interest, on the other” (Royce, 1898a, p. 93), he suggested the creation of school 
oriented “consulting psychologists” as an occupational category which might bridge the gap 
between the competing aims of psychological research and teaching.  
  James, Münsterberg and Royce’s Harvard colleague, was similarly disposed. Speaking to 
teachers, as part of his series of 1890s public lectures, he reassured those before him 
I fear that some of the enthusiasts for child-study have thrown a certain burden on you in 
this way... There are teachers who take a spontaneous delight in filling syllabuses, 
inscribing observations, compiling statistics, and computing the per cent. Child-study will 
certainly enrich their lives. And, if its results, as treated statistically, would seem on the 
whole to have but trifling value, yet the anecdotes and observations of which it in part 
consists do certainly acquaint us more intimately with our pupils….But, for Heaven’s 
sake, let the rank and file of teachers be passive readers if they so prefer, and feel free not 
to contribute to the accumulation. (James, 1899b, pp. 12–3) 
The directive that educators must collect material for child study in order to best serve their 
students was simply ridiculous to James’s mind. Accumulating information on pupils for 
psychologists like Hall was unnecessary and ultimately inconsequential to the actual work of 
teaching. Edward Thorndike (1898f) likewise encouraged educators to continue their 
psychological undertakings, if they so desired, noting “very poor psychology it may be, very 
inaccurate and inconsistent and misguided .… but they can do work as good for the purposes of 
mental science as much of the work of naturalists has been for biology” (p. 650). For teachers 
these kinds of undertaking were, at most, benign activities. Both James and Thorndike stopped 
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short, however, of completely dismissing the psychological value of amassed observations on 
child-life.  
Efforts at Objectivity 
 Even prior to the furor of criticism unleashed with Münsterberg’s articles, Hall explicitly 
sought to frame his topical syllabi as objective, scientific enterprises. For its psychological 
adherents, the adoption of a taxonomic or natural historical style of scientific thinking (Crombie, 
1994; Hacking, 1982, 2002; Pickstone, 2001), where the psychologist took on the role of mental 
naturalist, legitimized the pursuit of psychological knowledge through the construction, 
distribution, and collection of questionnaires. In Hall’s case, however, such a vision of the 
scientific enterprise was not totaling. Alongside his naturalistic questionnaire research, Hall 
privileged the laboratory as a space of scientific psychology – going so far at one point as to 
claim some part in founding psychology laboratories that he was in no way associated with, 
much to other psychologists’ chagrin (Hall, 1895b; James, Ladd, Baldwin, & Cattell, 1895). This 
kind of hubris recognized that work within laboratory spaces legitimized psychology as a 
science. Questionnaire work, which necessarily took place in more diverse spaces, was very 
much rooted in a different style of scientific practice. To reconcile this with his continuing 
espousal of the importance of psychology as a laboratory science and his persona of a modern 
scientist (see Bordogna, 2005), Hall strove to align his questionnaire work with the standards of 
objectivity at the heart of experimental laboratory investigations. 
Hall hoped invoking a blend of mechanical objectivity, during the process of data 
collection, and trained judgment, during the organization and analysis of material, would 
substantiate the scientific nature of his syllabi work.250 Reliance on untrained collectors, Hall 
                                                
250 On different standards of objectivity see Daston and Galison (2010) and Porter (1995). 
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was well aware, undermined the scientific standing of this work. In addition to the attempts to 
expertly analyze material after its inexpert collection, specific measures were taken to ensure the 
material amassed was of quality form. One means of tying questionnaire-based work to the 
exalted experimental mode of scientific psychology, was through the inclusion of items that 
inquired into associated physical states.251 Linking the physical and the mental, as Osborn earlier 
sought to do in his questionnaire efforts (see Chapter 1), provided a physiological grounding for 
at least some of the descriptive material gathered on mental life. Far more pervasive, however, 
was the provision of instructions on how to go about collecting objective material. 
 The lay collectors employing Hall’s syllabi were given directions on how to go about 
amassing mechanically objective data. Outside of the system of collecting Williams outlined (see 
Chapter 3), syllabi themselves included specific instructions on how individuals were to be 
observed and information recorded. If properly constructed, questionnaires  
suggest every main aspect, but no one answer rather than another, and must call for form 
enough so that the data can be fully treated statistically, yet must leave freedom enough 
to bring out details of all important cases which may be abridged and cited. (Hall, 1897a, 
p. 148) 
This did not mean, of course, that all responses were of value. As Hall (1897b) admitted “we get 
returns practically worthless. There are many tests no one but an expert psychologist can make, 
but the criticism that all tests are worthless unless so made is absurd” (p. 184). So long as syllabi 
                                                
251 See, for example, Hall’s inquiry into Anger which includes items such as “Describe 
every vaso-motor symptom, such as flushing, paling, about forehead, cheeks, nose, neck, or 
elsewhere…” and “Describe all changes of muscle tension…” (“Anger,” Oct. 1894, B1-7-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). See also Hall (1899, p. 529). 
This aspect of his investigation was later commented on favourably in a review provided by 
Arthur Allin (1899) of the University of Colorado, a former Fellow at Clark and Hall’s 
collaborator in a syllabus inquiry of “Tickling, Fun, Wit, Humor, Laughing” (Feb. 1896, B1-7-1, 
G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA; Hall & Allin, 1897). 
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were “suitably directed…almost any good teacher or parent” (Hall, 1893d, p. 430) could collect 
scientifically sound information. The instructions on syllabi, as well as Williams’s (1896) guide 
to collecting, were to fulfill this function. 
In constructing his questionnaires, Hall included specific instructions meant to ensure that 
precise, objective data were collected. Included on his syllabus on “Anger” was the edict to those 
collecting material: “In description be photographically objective, exact, minute and copious in 
detail.”252 The talk of photography in these directives was neither incidental, nor merely 
metaphorical. The syllabus on “Crying and Laughing” asked “if you are a photographer get snap 
shots at children crying and laughing, and if you have a phonograph record a few cries and 
laughs.”253 Those investigating early forms of vocal expression with his syllabi were instructed  
Be careful to record each sound or word with any spelling, accent, or other phonic 
method or sign that will show the exact pronounciation. The Bell method of notation, or 
better the phonograph, are suggested when practicable, but careful observation is the 
main thing.254  
In gathering data via questionnaire collectors were to be mechanically objective. This objectivity 
could be enacted metaphorically by being “exact, minute and copious in detail,” systematically 
through the employment of standardized notation schemes, or literally through the employment 
of mechanical devices like photographic or phonographic equipment in data gathering. The latter 
effort to collect recordings made “by the camera and phonograph,” while never the central aim of 
                                                
252 “Anger,” Oct. 1894, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. See also Hall (1899, p. 529).  
253 “Crying and Laughing,” Dec. 12, 1894, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. Photographic depictions of emotional states were, of 
course, earlier a central component of Darwin’s volume, The Expression of Emotions in Man and 
Animals (1872). 
254 “Early Forms of Vocal Expression,” Jan. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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questionnaire research, was characterized by one commentator as “most praiseworthy” 
(Thorndike, 1898e, p. 89). 
The invocation of mechanical objectivity did not, of course, mean that other forms of 
objectivity were inconsequential. While attempting to engage his collectors in mechanically 
objective practices, Hall also appealed to other forms of scientific authority. Discussion of bodies 
of data positioned collected material as valuable on the basis of trust (see Daston & Galison, 
2010; T. M. Porter, 1995). Reports 
by college or university students of psychology, by friends of the writer, in whose 
competence and reliability he has the greatest confidence, and particularly those from 
Miss Williams are made by a method calculated to eliminate very many at least of the 
possible defects and errors. (Hall, 1897a, p. 239) 
This trust in Williams, with her much praised method of accumulating information, as well as 
others was predicated on personal relationships. These individuals were positioned as producers 
of quality, objective material, as they could be trusted to follow the directives for collecting data 
provided on Hall’s syllabi. Invoking an intimate familiarity with at least some of these collectors, 
Hall asserted his own scientific authority as guarantee that the work of these individuals was 
trustworthy, and thus of scientific value.  
 The hope, at the end of all of this, was to produce something like a composite portrait of 
the phenomena under investigation. Doing so, even given the attempt to amass objective data, 
was by no means a straightforward affair. Writing in his autobiography, Hall (1924) observed 
vast bodies of data were accumulated and sent to us in response to some of the more 
popular questionnaires, and it was a very perplexing question how to make the net 
resultant of it all into anything like a composite photograph of the subject, point by point. 
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(p. 390)  
This aim was by no means merely an after the fact observation, as the goal of producing 
“composite portraits” was present from the earliest days of Hall’s questionnaire efforts (Hall, 
1883b, p. 252, see also 1893d).255 A statistical approach was the best hope of achieving this goal, 
but as Hall (1893d) noted 
the digesting and presentation of these returns, when very voluminous, is sometimes a 
difficult matter. Just what rubrics should be chosen, how the table and curves should be 
presented, especially the value and treatment of variations from the average, involve 
often the most complex methods of the statistician. (p. 430) 
Given the difficulties of analyzing masses of descriptive information accumulated with syllabi 
the statistical method was never particularly successful. Synthesis, of the form of composite 
portraiture, was elusive.  
Of course, not all material was of sufficient quality to include in a synthesis. Responses 
to syllabi came both from those Hall deemed trustworthy and a multitude of others. One 
rhetorical strategy adopted to deal with this complication was Hall’s (1897a) regular recognition 
of this feature of questionnaire-based research: “the imperfections of both the methods and 
results of all this work are very obvious, and everything depends on keeping them all in sight 
throughout. This cannot be said too distinctly, emphatically, or too often” (p. 239). Those 
undertaking this kind of research had constantly to keep in mind 
most returns are not made by experts, but by young people with little knowledge of 
psychology or of the dangers of loose and inaccurate statement, and who are peculiarly 
                                                
255 Elsewhere, Hall (1900) explicitly aligned this aim with his understanding of the 
Baconian grounding of his work (see Chapter 1): “The object here is to make what Bacon would 
call a silva silvarium, or a large collection of actual facts, and later … to present something a 
little like a composite photograph of the subject” (p. 697). 
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prone to exaggeration in describing their feelings. Some returns are seen to be of no 
value, and are rejected at the start. Many … are filmy and no doubt far less real than the 
language would indicate. Some, too, no doubt, are almost purely imagined. The data have 
all degrees of value from nothing up to very great. (Hall, 1897a, p. 239) 
This did not invalidate the method in toto, but meant that the investigator had to be ever aware 
that “returns are of all degrees of merit, from extremely good to worthless, and it requires great 
and constant critical acumen to sift the chaff from the wheat” (Hall, 1899, p. 530). Only a trained 
expert like Hall (1899) was capable of doing so “accurately and thoroughly” (p. 530, see also 
Hall, 1900, p. 692), thereby ensuring the scientific legitimacy a project. 
Dealing with Data 
 As responses to topical syllabi came in by the hundreds, sometimes thousands, efforts 
were made to organize these masses of material (see Hall, 1924; Wiltse, 1895). At various points 
in time Hall employed assistants exclusively for this work. This was in direct contrast to his 
earliest questionnaire endeavour, where his solution to the difficulty of managing a large body of 
information was significantly different. In his study of the contents of children’s minds, he 
simplified the process of analysis by opting to base his conclusions on the responses of two 
hundred “average” children selected from a larger body of responses more than twice this size 
(Hall, 1883b, 1893c). Even still he noted “the work is laborious, involving about fifty thousand 
items in all” (Hall, 1883b, p. 270). Later investigations, recognizing the sway of large quantities 
of data even given its associated difficulties, dealt with the whole of collected information. Of 
the process of making sense of the material collected via syllabi, Hall (1897b) observed 
when these returns come in, one at first feels helpless before them. We have now at least 
a hundred thousand returns, some of them comprising forty and fifty pages of manuscript. 
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Statistical methods have been used, and the very best trained statisticians have to be 
employed, and we have no money for these. We have kept four people at work off and on 
for nearly a year. (p. 184-5) 
This labour also fell along gendered lines as women were those tasked with analyzing data, 
including for a time a Miss Watson and a Miss Rawson, whose assistance was deemed “expert” 
(Hall, 1897a, p. 151). By the early twentieth century funds were explicitly secured for the 
purpose of employing “a competent and well trained research assistant” who was to devote their 
time “to working up data” (Hall, 1903, p. 96). The position was filled by psychologist Theodate 
Smith (Hall & Smith, 1903a, 1903b, 1903c; T. L. Smith, 1903), who like Williams positioned 
herself as an expert on the questionnaire method (see T. L. Smith, 1903).256 In many respects the 
explicitly statistical work associated with large masses of material proved as labour intensive as 
the process of collecting data.257 The difference was that in the former undertaking it was a select 
number of trained specialists who were employed rather than the multitude of laypersons 
engaged in the latter work. Even still, these female specialists were largely relegated to the 
mundane task of sorting and organizing data, rather than drawing conclusions on the basis of this 
material. Like the World War Two era women engaged in the clerical labour of computer 
programming, this feminized technical work was devalued and largely unrecognized (see Light, 
1999). 
Some attempts to organize data were almost appallingly elaborate. Hall lamented that his 
syllabi on fears lacked complete information, despite attracting information on the fears of more 
                                                
256 The position was funded through a gift of $1,000 from a Mr. Arthur S. Estabrook of 
Boston and a grant of $2,000 from the Carnegie Institution (see Hall, 1903, p. 96). On Smith’s 
role at Clark see Diehl (1991). 
257 For the explicit framing of questionnaire projects as statistical undertakings see Hall 
(1883b, 1897b) and Hall and Ellis (1896). 
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than 1,700 individuals and encompassing more than 4,000 manuscript pages.258 Of these some 
reports consisted of no more than a list of feared objects, while others included substantial detail 
of fears and fright. More problematic still, numerous accounts left out information regarding age 
or sex, or sometimes both. To synthesize this bulk of material an elaborate system was devised 
and implemented by Miss Watson and Miss Rawson: 
every individual was first represented in large tables by a line showing each of his or her 
fears, with age and sex, and with fullness of presentation marked on a scale of 10, with 
hieroglyphic signs for special features and a wide column for miscellanies. In these 
elaborate charts returns from each locality were kept by themselves, and running numbers 
referred to the original papers. (Hall, 1897a, p. 151) 
These extensive charts formed the basis for Hall’s published discussion on the topic, but were far 
too detailed and expansive to print themselves. A description of the effort to synthesize the 
material had to serve as sufficient guarantee of the exacting work behind the presented findings. 
This kind of manipulation of information further distanced the scientific community from the 
original material, but provided much needed organization to otherwise incoherent masses of 
material. While providing some kind of organizational framework to the material, the 
undertaking was exceedingly laborious and ultimately contributed little to synthesizing the data 
into a meaningful whole. 
Outside of the immediate milieu of Clark University, Joseph Jastrow (1891c, 1897b) 
spoke approvingly of the statistical possibilities of psychological work in child study. 
Emphasized, in particular, was the value of conducting large-scale studies of children, which 
might encompass the inherent variability of childhood and reveal the course of normal 
                                                
258 “Fears in Childhood and Youth,” Feb. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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development. This could only be achieved looking at individuals not singularly, but collectively, 
and applying to this material the technical logic of statistics, in much the same manner as was 
done with information from the national census (see Jastrow, 1897b).259 And, he noted, given a 
large body of collected data one could also 
sub-divide it. We study men and women separately, and then little men and little women. 
It is surprising to note how soon and how persistently differences in the development of 
the two sexes appear….We may divide our facts in many other ways, comparing children 
from town and children from the country, children from better-educated homes and those 
coming from ignorant homes. We can ask almost as many forms of questions as we have 
interests in the study of children. (Jastrow, 1897b, p. 106)260 
A singular picture of normal development could be ascertained from masses of data, but so too 
could information regarding regular and persistent differences between groups. To achieve this, 
however, “we need trained students – we may call them psychologists, educationalists, students 
of Child-Study – to properly interpret the facts which may be gathered in our school rooms” 
(Jastrow, 1897b, p. 101). Any educator might gather information on child-life, but only the 
statistically savvy expert could make use of the body of data. Hall (1900) too characterized the 
analysis of syllabi responses as “an expert problem, in which the opinions of experts only have 
value” (p. 693). In doing so, he immediately characterized as invalid all criticisms of this 
research from anyone but other questionnaire experts. With Clark as the centre of these kinds of 
undertakings, he in effect dismissed the views of all the method’s critics. 
                                                
259 Regarding the census see Jastrow (1885b; see Chapter 7). 
260 Jastrow is referencing Hall’s earliest questionnaire work in which knowledge and 
ignorance, and differences between town and country, were key components (see Hall, 1883b, 
1893c). 
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A key feature of questionnaire research was discussion of various forms of difference. As 
Hall (1900) saw it the aim of this work was “a large collection of actual facts, and later to group 
them according to sex, age, etc., so as to present something a little like a composite photograph 
of the subject” (p. 697). The published the results of questionnaire investigations presented 
information in various ways, including providing basic statistics on the collected material. Take, 
for instance, Hall’s study of the contents of children’s minds, which presented differences along 
several lines. In a table of the percentage of ignorance among children regarding various basic 
objects and concepts, he opted to divided his data into five columns: boys, girls, Irish children, 
American children, and kindergarten children (Hall, 1883b, p. 254). Providing this information 
in the form of a table allowed for easy comparison between groups regarding their knowledge of 
each item. This kind of simplified presentation was made possible by the very form of the data 
collected; individuals could only fall into one of two categories: those who were and were not 
ignorant of a particular item. This division along the lines of yes/no, or knowledge/ignorance, 
streamlined the presentation and interpretation of information in ways that were often impossible 
in later topical syllabi studies, which inquired much more broadly into a subject. Nonetheless, in 
subsequent studies efforts were made to transform masses of descriptive information into 
numerical form. 
Even when data was presented in simplified tabular form in these later endeavours, the 
nature of this information was such that tables were impossible to read with ease. In the case of 
A. Caswell Ellis and Hall’s (1896) inquiry into children’s relationships with dolls, data was 
transformed into numbers and presented within seventeen category rows (see p. 152-3).261 In 
                                                
261 This is the material collected with a supplementary syllabus on dolls issued following 
an earlier syllabus on the subject (“Dolls,” Nov. 1894, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA; Ellis & Hall, 1896, pp. 129–30). The former was issued 
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every case information from boys and girls was presented separately. Divided in this way were, 
among other categories, kindergarten practice schools in Boston, children below age 6 from 
Worcester, those between age 6 and 12 from Worcester, and foreign children. The sole group to 
feature a row of information from one sex, but not the other was feeblemindedness, for which 
only data from girls was included. Columns in the table were numbered to correspond to items 
on the syllabi, but possible responses to these were not always limited to simple yes or no 
answers.262 Consequently, reading the table required referencing a detailed description regarding 
what the numbers in each column represented. Further complicating the matter was the inclusion 
of two rows of numbers for each category row, the meaning of which varied from question to 
question. For instance, values for question 3 were the average “age of beginning and stopping 
doll play, placing the former over the latter” (Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 154), while for item 12 “the 
upper figure designates the preference for large and the lower small dolls” (Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 
155). In no case was information regarding what values in the body of the table referred to 
included within the table itself. Synthesis of masses information into tabular form was a means 
of reducing material into a form that could be easily shared, but with descriptive data that could 
not be easily and consistently reduced to simple binaries the legibility of such was by no means 
guaranteed. Even when material was transformed into tables and curves it was not immune from 
criticism. Syllabus data, Baldwin (1898) conceded “if worked out, might bring some order into 
the dreary mass of facts, reports and syllabus returns” but instead he noted, with great sarcasm, 
                                                                                                                                                       
“to get better statistical results” (Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 131; see “Dolls” (Supplementary 
Questionnaire), June 1896, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA). 
262 The syllabi comprised 29 questions, but not all these were represented in the table 
(Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 131; see “Dolls” (Supplementary Questionnaire), June 1896, B1-7-1, G. 
Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA). 
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they are arranged “in tables, and if a curve, a holy curve, can be drawn, that is rich, though it bar 
the way to thought. Let no man think beyond the confines of the curve” (p. 220). 
In many cases discussion of the results also included abundant extracts from collected 
responses, with the sex and age of the individual in question clearly indicated for each (e.g., Ellis 
& Hall, 1896; Hall, 1883b, 1897a, 1899). Occasionally, nationality was also provided. In 
reporting his study of anger Hall (1899) indicated twice that excerpts were from Irish individuals 
(see p. 535, 573), while also indicating two individuals were English (see p. 531, 538). In two 
further instances responses were identified as from “colored” individuals, including “a colored 
deaf mute” (see Hall, 1899, pp. 535, 542). At the same time, only two extracts were explicitly 
identified as from Americans (see Hall, 1899, pp. 533, 567). Outside of these explicit 
identifications the implication was that included responses were from Americans.263 In the 
absence of sharing the complete collection of responses, these extracts serviced as evidence both 
of the former’s existence and as an indication of their quality. At the same time, instances 
explicitly identified as from particular racial groups served as markers of necessary 
psychological differences between groups.  
Discussions of collected data, both that presented in tabular form and otherwise, further 
reinforced the existence of disparities between groups. In his initial study of children’s 
knowledge, Hall (1883b) highlighted gender differences, such as the proficiency of girls “in 
knowledge of parts of the body, home and family life, thunder, rainbows…” (p. 269) over their 
male counterparts. At the same time, children attending the Boston’s kindergartens were noted to 
be less ignorant than others (Hall, 1883b). Of the sole non-American nationality distinguished in 
                                                
263 In his study of fears a number of responses were similarly identified as from English 
individuals, likely the material collected in England by Miss Hughes, principal of a training 
school in Cambridge (Hall, 1897a). Colored individuals were also identified in this study (see 
Hall, 1897a, pp. 163, 190) and in a study of dolls (see Ellis & Hall, 1896, p. 147). 
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the study, in fitting with widespread prejudice toward the Irish at the time especially in the 
investigation’s Boston locale (Jacobson, 1999; Lee & Casey, 2006; Pick, 1993; Roediger, 1991), 
it was noted “the Irish children tested were behind others on nearly all topics” (Hall, 1883b, p. 
269). Suspecting differences between rural and urban children, Hall also quizzed thirty-six 
country children for comparison purposes. The country reared children were characterized as 
possessing an “average intelligence” higher than city children (Hall, 1883b, p. 255), dovetailing 
nicely with Hall’s contention that “city life is unnatural” (Hall, 1883b, p. 255). So unnatural was 
the urban experience 
that those who grow up without knowing the country are defrauded of that without which 
childhood can never be complete or normal….A few days in the country at this age has 
raised the level of many a city child’s intelligence more than a term or two of school 
training could do without it. (Hall, 1883b, p. 255)264  
Differences like these were regularly identified in questionnaire-based research, which, unlike 
laboratory studies of a restricted number of individuals, set out to document the wide variability 
between not just individuals, but groups. Requests for information regarding specific forms of 
difference, and efforts to collect information from particular groups, presupposed disparities 
between various classes of individuals, ones questionnaires were ideally positioned to reveal. As 
Hall (1899) noted, this was “the great advantage of this method” (p. 530). As “the range of 
individual differences is vast and the fecundity of human nature in so diversifying” it was 
                                                
264 Nature study, as a crucial component of educational practice, would later figure as part 
of pedagogical work at Clark (e.g., Hall, 1896b; Jewell, 1906a, 1906b). On nature study see 
Green (1995). In reprinting his study of the contents of children’s minds a decade later, Hall 
included data collected from 678 children, including 47 colored children, in 1883 in Kansas City 
by Superintendent I. M. Greenwood. This material was presented alongside his earlier Boston 
findings, with a division made in the Kansas results between “White” and “Colored” students 
(see Hall, 1893c, pp. 18–20). The latter group was characterized as more ignorant on a number of 
points. 
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“absolutely necessary as the basis for any valid psychology” to “first of all to gather a vast array 
of facts and cases” (Hall, 1899, p. 530). 
Conclusion 
 For a number of early American psychologists the naturalistic orientation that made 
questionnaire-based research possible was a complement to, rather than a replacement for, an 
experimental style of scientific thinking. Grounded in an emerging moral economy of data, 
questionnaire research positioned itself as scientific in large part as a function of its accumulation 
of masses of information. Münsterberg, adopting a very different and more restrictive 
understanding scientific practice in the discipline, highlighted the problem of relying on 
untrained observers to collect psychological information, an issue that attracted much discussion 
from others in the field. Hall was not blind to these difficulties, and in an effort to frame his 
questionnaire-based research as scientifically valid he invoked existing disciplinary standards of 
objectivity. Collection aimed to be mechanically objective, along the lines of the field’s idealized 
laboratory undertakings, while the analysis of material was restricted to trustworthy experts. 
Critiques of the method from those like James and Royce, who earlier employed questionnaires 
in their own research, reflect an ambivalence toward the method experienced by many of those 
who employed questionnaires, including Hall. Masses of easily obtained psychological data were 
appealing, but problematic.  
Collecting data was challenging, but so too was managing the resultant material. As one 
critic noted, “if the questionnaire method is worth working at all, it is only as a bare preliminary, 
simply as pointing out salient points for research” (Stanley, 1898, p. 240), as truly synthetic 
findings were nearly impossible to achieve with great volumes of descriptive material. As in 
efforts to accumulate information the labour of organizing hordes of responses fell largely to 
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female contributors. Attempts to distill masses of individual narratives into some coherent whole 
often produced difficult to decipher numerical data. This transformation of accrued descriptive 
accounts into numerical values, if only in the form of raw frequencies and percentages, was a 
never fully successful attempt to capitalize on the increasing scientific authority of numbers. 
Inherently intricate descriptive data, the kind central to most questionnaire investigations, did not 
cede well to these aspirations. This, however, for Hall (1901) was not a state unique to work with 
syllabi  
the literature of laboratory psychology abounds in studies based on simple enumeration, 
and that of child study is no better. In the one records or measurements, and in the other 
returns are made into tables or curves, which seem to be regarded as something holy and 
fetishistic. All this matter may be and often is extremely suggestive and valuable, but 
much of it consists of only the mud sills of possible superstructures …. The counters, 
photographers, and tabulators… seem to labor in the hope of a coming redeemer, who 
will gloriously fulfill and supplement their work, and by whom all its defects will be 
clothed upon. (p. 130) 
As Hall’s project progressed into the twentieth century, the larger psychological community 
increasingly ignored this kind of questionnaire-based research. Relegated ever more to pedagogy 
rather than psychology, questionnaires became something of an oddity particular to Clark 
investigators. 
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Chapter 5 
Researching the Limits of Experience: 
Data Collection and the Nature of Evidence 
The rejection of non-expert human testimony is, and has ever been, the first step in the 
development of a science; it is only by rejecting or ignoring all testimony save that of 
experts that any science is possible. Human testimony, indeed, handicaps mankind….Not 
out of the mouths of two or three witnesses nor of two or three millions, unless they be 
experts, can any great fact in science be established. (Beard, 1879, p. 70)265 
 
 American neurologist George Beard’s view on what constituted valid data when it came 
to investigations of spiritualism was a position the country’s psychologists increasingly came to 
adopt over the final decades of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. This, however, was 
not the position of many of the first scientific investigators into psychical matters. Many of these 
individuals were part of the first generation of American psychologists. Interested in mental 
phenomena, they set out to define the limits of such through their involvement in a formal 
organization, the American Society for Psychical Research (ASPR). The Society’s investigations 
capitalized on the American public’s interest in seemingly supernatural phenomena, enlisting 
their assistance in questionnaire-based endeavours rather than confining research to the “experts” 
Beard clearly privileged.266 As in child study investigations questionnaires were a prominent 
                                                
265 On Beard and spiritualism see Brown (1983). 
266 I focus here on some of the earliest of these investigations, those of the final decades 
of the nineteenth century, though questionnaire-based studies into psychical matters continued 
into the twentieth century (see Schiller, 1901; J. H. Hyslop to H. Münsterberg, 1 Jan. (n.y.), 
Folder 1825, Item 7, Hugo Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA). 
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means of collecting information in the realm of psychical research, which like the child was a 
subject of popular captivation. 
 Undertaking psychical investigations, much like studies of child-life, was often 
predicated on enlisting into the scientific enterprise a diverse body of practitioners. This, as 
Francesca Bordogna (2008) has argued, was a core tenet of William James’s vision of the 
scientific enterprise.267 For James, one of psychical research’s most ardent advocates, science 
was to involve – at least in theory – not just educated, elite gentlemen, but rather a larger range 
of individuals from across the social spectrum. Although the laboratory was emblematic of the 
new psychology’s status as a science, in practice, for James and others, science was to be a 
broader endeavour: 
Startling as the fact might be to professionalizing scientists and educated gentlemen, 
knowledge could be produced outside of gentlemanly, scientific, academic, and even 
educated circles by groups of people who inhabited different social worlds. (Bordogna, 
2008, p. 131)  
Collecting facts on a massive scale, if only for mere practical reasons, necessitated an expanded 
social community of participants in the scientific process. Enlisting the public in the collection of 
masses of data, via the circulation of questionnaires, was one means of practicing a more 
distributed form of science.  
 This is not to say, however, that science in the hands of James or other psychical 
investigators was a fully democratic endeavour. Although enlisting a greater number of more 
diverse individuals into the scientific enterprise, these participants were still limited in what their 
participation might entail. The accumulation of data might involve a diverse body of individuals, 
                                                
267 On James and psychology see Evans (1990) and Skrupskelis (1995). 
 185 
but interpretation of this material remained in the hands of a select few, much as was done in 
child study (see Chapter 4). This practice, I argue in this chapter, was one means of countering 
distrust in data amassed by the untrained public. Even for those occupying the position of 
researcher, psychical or otherwise, the information generated via individuals questioned with 
circulars was almost always suspect. The data generating public was never fully trusted to 
provide truthful responses to questions posed via circular. This distrust was furthered by 
concerns about not simply outright deceit, but also that respondents may not properly understand 
the questions at hand and that, even if the questions were properly understood, these individuals 
lacked the necessary introspective skills to generate scientifically valuable information. Together 
these concerns ensured persistent criticism of the method across a variety of subject areas, 
though these attacks were particularly pervasive in the already tense space of debate over 
psychical research. 
The American Society for Psychical Research 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, interest in the reality of so-called psychical 
phenomena was building in the United States. Popular public psychologies, including 
phrenology and mesmerism had attracted a significant following in the nation earlier in the 
century, while tales of the apparent supernatural powers of the Fox sisters of Upstate New York 
in the nation’s newspapers fuelled the public’s interest in extraordinary phenomena. The 
scientific community and the laypeople alike were well positioned for further work on the fringes 
of what would become scientific psychology (Coon, 1992a; Sokal, 2001). 
 In the face of such interest, in 1884, two years after the formation of a British Society for 
Psychical Research (SPR), an independent counterpart was established in the United States 
(“American Society for Psychical Research,” 1885, “Scientific intelligence,” 1885; James, 
 186 
1892).268 The Society was in some respects short-lived, as by the end of the 1880s personal and 
financial difficulties led the ASPR to be subsumed as a branch of the SPR, before once again 
regaining its independence in the early twentieth century. Among the ASPR’s founding members 
were not only James, but also a number of other early American psychologists and 
psychologically-inclined philosophers, including Hall, Jastrow, George Fullerton and James’s 
Harvard colleague Royce (“American Society for Psychical Research,” 1885, “Scientific 
intelligence,” 1885; Coon, 1992a). The association of these individuals with the ASPR was a 
reflection of the Society’s attempt to position itself as an organ of the new psychology. Speaking 
of scientific psychology’s potential as an agent of social improvement, the organization’s first 
report asserted, 
there is so much to be done for the theoretical and practical needs of psychology, so much 
experimental research necessary for the formation of a science that may yet have vast 
influence upon the art of education, upon the treatment of the insane, and upon the policy 
of society toward criminals, that all experimental beginnings of such a science in any 
direction much be greeted with satisfaction. (“The first report of the American Society for 
Psychical Research,” 1885, p. 156)  
Claims of the group’s scientific aims and its lofty expectations of psychology’s social benefit, 
along lines similar to child study, were not sufficient to ensure the continued participation of 
many of the Society’s first members. Outside of James, most of the Society’s psychologically-
inclined members severed ties with the organization shortly after its formation (Coon, 1992a). 
 Among the ASPR’s first initiatives was the issue of a series of circulars, both to its 
members and the public at large. While some of these circulars were mere announcements, a 
                                                
268 On the history of the British SPR see Oppenheim (1985). 
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number took the form of questionnaires (see Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical 
Research, 1885-1889), which requested that interested parties use the document as their guide to 
collecting data. Those interested in assisting with the Society’s research endeavours were often 
instructed to report not simply their own experiences, but to gather further information from as 
many individuals as possible.269 Animating this research were serious concerns about how to 
conduct scientific investigations of some of the most nebulous phenomena. As articulated by the 
ASPR’s first president, Johns Hopkins mathematician and astronomer – and sceptic – Simon 
Newcomb (see Moyer, 1992),  
the first and greatest obstacle we meet with in such investigations is the absence of clear 
ideas of what it is we are to look for, and how we are to distinguish between real relations 
of cause and effect and mere chance coincidences. (Newcomb, 1884, p. 372) 
Determining what constituted genuine psychical phenomena rather than “mere chance 
coincidence” would come to occupy much of the conversation between psychical researchers and 
their detractors. 
The Committee on Thought-Transference 
 Like its British counterpart, some of the ASPR’s earliest investigations were into matters of 
thought-transference. Several ASPR committees investigated thought-transference, or telepathy, 
in a number of ways.270 Taking the lead in these investigations was, unsurprisingly, the Society’s 
Committee on Thought-Transference, whose work was inspired by that of French physiologist 
and psychical researcher Charles Richet (Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885; see 
                                                
269 The British Society for Psychical Research similarly amassed huge quantities of 
material on various cases of psychical phenomena (Oppenheim, 1985). 
270 The term “telepathy” was coined by British psychical researcher Frederic W. H. 
Myers in 1882 (see Hacking, 1988; Oppenheim, 1985). 
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Hacking, 1988).271 Rather than collecting accounts of individuals’ past experiences with the 
phenomena through a simple list of circulated questions, the committee requested that the public 
undertake their own experimentation (“Notes and News,” 1885). Efforts to foster these kinds of 
engagements were an early form of citizen science, which sought to distribute the practice of 
science among members of the public (see Vetter, 2011). By distributing a series of circulars, 
they sought “to collect statistics as to experiments of uniform character, but made by a large 
number of observers” (Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885, p. 10). The first of these, 
Circular No. 4, included a strict set of instructions for making 3 types of experiments on thought-
transference, using coloured cards, dice, and numbers, respectively. In the case of experiments 
on number telepathy, participants were instructed to  
let one person, who may be designated as the agent, enter in the first column of one of the 
ruled squares the ten digits in any order taken at random. Let him then concentrate his 
attention on the first of these numbers; and let a second person, the percipient, who has 
been so placed that he could not see the figures, attempt to guess this number. The agent 
enters the figure guessed at the top of the second column, and then concentrates his 
attention on the second figure of the first column: this, in turn, is guessed and recorded. 
(Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885, p. 15)  
These kind of experiments were extended in Circular No. 5, which provided similar directions 
for making experiments with different sets of cards, as well as with free drawing (Thought-
transference committee, 1885). The latter involved “experiments in which a drawing thought of 
by one person, is reproduced by another, who has no visible means of obtaining information as to 
what the drawing may be” (“Thought-transference in Boston,” 1885, p. 9, see “Appendix D. 
                                                
271 Richet’s later physiological work on anaphylaxis is discussed in Kroker (1999). 
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Thought-transference by means of pictures,” 1885, p. 44). In all these experiments, a specific 
kind of experience was to be created de novo and recorded in the moment specifically for the 
Society’s research purposes. 
 Like many of the ASPR’s investigations emphasis was placed on obtaining information on 
both the occurrence and absence of phenomena. Instructions to participants specified, 
experiments giving either positive or negative results will be equally acceptable to the 
committee, because the object is to ascertain whether thought-transference occurs with 
many persons, and, if so, to what degree and in what proportion. To insure important 
results, it is desirable that from one to two thousand guesses be recorded for each agent and 
percipient. (Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885, p. 13)  
The collection of both instances of apparent thought transference and the absence of such was 
central to the probability-focused science practiced by the Society, as was the collection of large 
quantities of data.272 Asking for public participation this kind of labour intensive self-
experimentation was an ambitious enterprise that ultimately resulted in limited returns 
(Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885), and thus a largely unsuccessful effort at citizen 
science.  
The Committee on Experimental Psychology 
 The Committee on Experimental Psychology similarly issued circulars requesting 
information from the public on a variety of psychical fronts. Among the committee’s work was 
the circulation of a brief questionnaire on superstitions, intended to ascertain the prevalence of 
these kinds of beliefs in the American public. This questionnaire, Blank F (“Blank F,” 1887), 
consisted of just four questions: 
                                                
272 The results of the committee’s initial investigation failed to find any persuasive 
evidence of thought-transference (J. M. Peirce & Pickering, 1885). 
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Should you be influenced by any feeling (whether implying a belief or not is immaterial) 
in regard to: 
1. Sitting down thirteen at table? 
2. Beginning a voyage on Friday? 
3. Seeing the new moon over your left shoulder? 
4. Choosing, on your own account, between two otherwise equally desirable houses, one 
of which was reputed to be haunted? (“Blank F,” 1887, p. 269) 
Those responding to the questionnaire were simply asked to respond “yes” or “no” to each item 
and to also include with their responses their name, address, occupation, age, and nationality. 
The result of this inquiry was the finding that women were more prone to superstition than men: 
“about one man in ten and two women in ten, have a tendency to superstition, and that about four 
men in ten, and six women in ten, are inclined to pay some attention to a superstition actually 
encountered” (Minot, 1887, p. 223).  
 This relatively straightforward inquiry into the prevalence of superstitions was not the 
only such investigation undertaken by the committee. Toward the end of the decade, the 
committee distributed circulars in the form of post cards. Printed on these cards was the request, 
“please draw ten diagrams on this card, without receiving any suggestion from any other person, 
and add your name and address” (Minot, 1889, p. 302; see “Psychical research in America,” 
1887, p. 8). This brief directive spurred speculation in the press regarding the study’s aim, 
the purpose of the Society’s singular postal card request is not explained. We suppose the 
investigators desire to accumulate a mass of material in the way of data for generalization 
as to the commonest directions which human thought takes in graphic expression with 
pencil or pen. Or possibly there is a still deeper psychological intention. It may be that this 
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is a wholesale experiment in thought-transference. (“Psychical research in America,” 1887, 
p. 8)  
The committee received a total of 501 completed post cards in response to its inquiry. The cards 
were then sorted on the basis of those completed by men and those by women, and the diagrams 
analyzed according to the kinds of images drawn (e.g., circle, house, stars, trees, etc.), the kinds 
of lines used (e.g., straight vs. curved), and the kind of objects represented (i.e., natural vs. 
artificial; see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Reproduction of some of the most common types of drawings. Reprinted from Minot 
(1889, n.p.). 
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 In the end the collected diagrams provided little indication of difference between 
individuals. Committee chairman, Harvard anatomist Charles Sedgwick Minot (1889), 
interpreted these results as evidence of “the slightness of our real individual distinction and 
separation” (p. 314). Rather than each respondent producing random, or at least individual, 
diagrams Minot (1889) observed,  
it is evident that if two persons are requested to think of some one thing of a class, such as 
a letter of the alphabet, a playing-card, a baptismal name, there is by no means an equal 
chance of their selecting any one; on the contrary, there is not only the probability that they 
will think of a special one first, but there is a chance of their both thinking of the same one, 
for the relative frequency or preponderance of one idea or image out of a set has been 
shown to be similar for a number of people. In order to prove the reality of thought-
transference, it must be demonstrated that the observed coincidence of thoughts can not be 
explained by the law of relative frequency. (p. 314)  
The observation that individuals are likely drawing from a common pool of referents in studies 
like these had profound implications in Minot’s view.  
 If, in fact, individuals were more likely to respond to these kinds of requests in some ways 
rather than others, previous investigations into telepathy had been fatally flawed from the outset. 
The existence of these kinds of mental habits meant that these studies “having fundamentally 
misconceived the nature of the chances, of course fail to offer the necessary proof that the 
proportion of coincidences was greater than chance would account for” (Minot, 1889, p. 316). 
Given their failure to understand the true nature of chance, earlier studies of telepathy including 
as those undertaken by the Committee on Thought-Transference, as well as ones conducted by 
the Society’s British counterpart, were largely meaningless. For Minot (1889) “the general 
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conclusion is unavoidable that none of the experiments heretofore published afford conclusive 
evidence of thought-transference” (p. 317).  
 Minot’s dismissal of previous evidence that seemed to support the existence of thought-
transference was not the unanimous position of the Committee on Experimental Psychology. 
Although he understood the mental habits revealed in the committee’s study of diagram drawing 
to be pervasive and determinate in psychical research, James disagreed. As a member of the 
committee James took it upon himself to respond publically to Minot’s conclusions, which were 
offered in a report from the committee. Minot, James (1889) asserted “seems to me greatly to 
exaggerate the importance of this diagram-habit” (p. 317). 
The Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses 
Work undertaken by the ASPR’s Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses fueled 
further debate on the veracity of psychical phenomena. Headed by James’s Harvard colleague 
Josiah Royce, the committee distributed Circular No. 6, a questionnaire that inquired into 
individuals’ experiences with the committee’s titular interests (see Committee on Apparitions 
and Haunted Houses, 1886, pp. 130–1). The circulation of these circulars, in Royce’s (1887) 
view, provided an opportunity to explore as yet uncharted territory, 
but of the fantastic man, of the dreamer, of the man who lives a perfectly sane life in all but 
just some one or two realms of his mind, but who in those realms indulges in some sort of 
abnormal fancies, or is the helpless prey of some oppressive and diseased emotion or 
dream, of him we know in a scientific way far too little. Yet of such men the larger half of 
modern civilized humanity is probably made up. This wide and vast borderland region of 
human consciousness we need to study. (p. 229)  
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Declaring the committee free of any pre-existing beliefs with respect to psychical phenomena, he 
set out to gather a “mass of facts” (Royce, 1887, p. 228) on the basis of which hypotheses might 
then be formed.  
The committee’s circular inquired into experiences with apparitions and haunted houses, 
whether personally experienced or accounts provided by others. Alongside this information, 
respondents were asked to provide information on certain personal characteristics, 
to whom and when did the experience in question occur? What was his (or her) age, 
nationality, and occupation; and what was his (or her) state of health or of mind at the time 
of the apparition? At what hour of the day did it appear, and at what place? (Committee on 
Apparitions and Haunted Houses, 1886, p. 130)  
Other items on the circular specifically asked after apparent premonitory hallucinations. 
Question 5, in part, read, 
if the apparition seemed to give warning, or other knowledge, of any future or distant 
fact, did the narrator relate the incident to any one, or give notice of the warning 
conveyed, before he was able to verify the facts supposed to have been revealed? 
(Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses, 1886, pp. 130–1)  
It was inquiries into this subject matter that proved most fruitful for Royce and the committee. 
 Although much of the committee’s circular asked after experiences with ghosts and 
hauntings, the most engaging returns dealt only peripherally with these subjects. Information on 
haunted houses was particularly scarce. Rather “all our more interesting facts belong under quite 
another category…phantasms, visions, dreams, or presentiments” (Royce, 1887, p. 224).273 
                                                
273 In the early 1890s Millicent Shinn forwarded on to Royce an account of a premonitory 
dream provided by an acquaintance (F. H. Longhead to M. Shinn, Feb. 13, 1890, Box 124 Folder 
11, Papers of Josiah Royce, HUG 1755, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA). 
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Given the nature of the material, Royce recommended changing the committee’s name from the 
“Committee on Apparitions and Haunted Houses” to the “Committee on Apparitions and 
Presentiments” (Royce, 1887, p. 224).274 The change would also, Royce hoped, spare the 
committee the kind of public derision that the term “haunted houses” had attracted. Disdain was 
also demonstrated by scientific colleagues, including Newcomb (1884) who thought this kind of 
work  
can hardly be regarded by lookers-on as anything better than very scientific children’s 
ghost-stories. The extraordinary cases of events or accidents happening to one person 
being reproduced in the imaginations or visions of others at a distance, are nothing more 
than recitals of what we know, from the theory of probabilities, must be very frequent 
occurrences. (p. 373) 
Despite criticism, through his work with the committee Royce became convinced, at least for a 
time, of the scientific value of questionnaire-based research later taking up this form of 
investigation in his work on imitation (see Chapter 4).  
 Over the course of his involvement with the committee Royce became particularly 
interested in presentiments, that is some feeling or impression of an event prior to, or at some 
distance from, its actual occurrence. Although initially open to the possibility that these stories 
were evidence of authentic phenomena, he came increasingly to argue that they instead 
documented the existence of what he termed pseudo-presentiments. As Royce (1889b) described 
these were “more or less instantaneous and irresistible hallucinations of memory, which make it 
seem to one that something which now excites or astonishes him has been prefigured in a recent 
dream, or in the form of some other warning” (p. 366; see also Münsterberg, 1899, p. 76). So far 
                                                
274 In actuality the committee came to be renamed the Committee on Phantasms and 
Presentiments (Royce, 1889b). 
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as Royce (1888) was concerned these hallucinations of the sane, along with simple coincidence, 
were sufficient to explain much of the evidence in favour of telepathy: 
that our so well-known hallucination of the ordinary double memory-consciousness 
appears almost exclusively among the sane, encourages me to suppose that this new form 
of double memory, once verified as an existing fact among the insane, may be found to be 
an incident of normal life sufficiently frequent to explain a large number of ‘telepathic’ 
incidents. (p. 247-8)  
It was the successful documentation of the phenomena of pseudo-presentiments that Royce saw 
as the most promising result of the committee’s investigations. While refusing to rule out the 
existence of genuine telepathic phenomena completely he, like Minot, remained convinced that 
his studies revealed the contours of a phenomenon that provided an alternative, non-psychical, 
explanation for much of the previous evidence in favour of telepathy (Royce, 1889b). 
Conclusions like these, however, were not the only ones reached by officers of the ASPR.  
William James’s ASPR Investigations 
A number of psychologists were early members of the ASPR, but most severed ties with 
the organization soon after its formation. The most notable exception was James.275 A central 
figure in the development of the new psychology in the United States, James was also a devoted 
believer in otherworldly phenomena, maintaining ties with both the British and American 
Societies for Psychical Research throughout his lifetime. In the final decades of the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century James’s continuing advocacy of psychical matters as central to the 
new psychology attracted criticism from many of those within the former field. Tensions were 
especially high as psychologists sought to cultivate a distinct disciplinary identity, one in part 
                                                
275 There is an extensive literature on James and psychical research (see Blum, 2006; 
Bordogna, 2008; James, 1986a; Knapp, 2003; Sech Junior, 2013; Sommer, 2012; Taylor, 1999). 
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crafted around opposition to the work of psychical investigators (Coon, 1992a). One source of 
contention was the style of research practiced in the psychical field. While criticisms of James’s 
research methods, as well as his willingness to accept as valid the methods and conclusions of 
other researchers, may be understood as a not-so-veiled critique of the entire practice of 
psychical research, they may also be read as a split in allegiance to scientific method among 
psychologists. 
Consciousness of Lost Limbs 
James was himself both an early adopter, and a committed critic, of the questionnaire 
method (James, 1887b, 1890e). As such, in the 1880s James (1887b) constructed and circulated a 
questionnaire on the consciousness of lost limbs, in part motivated by his father’s loss of a leg 
fairly early in life (G. E. Myers, 2001).276 This was not his first venture into questionnaire-based 
research (see Chapter 4), but it was his first research under the auspices of the ASPR. With the 
assistance of “some of the leading makers of artificial limbs” (James, 1887b, p. 249) he gained 
access to a population of amputees for his research project. Although he conducted interviews 
with some of these individuals, most of his information was gathered via the circulation of 
questionnaires.277 He began his questionnaire by informing respondents 
I am engaged in scientifically studying the peculiarities of sensation experienced by 
amputated persons in their lost limbs. As the information I require can only be obtained by 
the statistical method of collecting and comparing a very large number of the facts in point, 
I trust you will not deem it too great a liberty if I beg you to communicate to me some 
details from your personal experience. (James, 1983a, p. 383)  
                                                
276 What today might be termed phantom limbs. 
277 The full questionnaire is reprinted in James (1983a). 
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In all he circulated eight hundred copies of his questionnaire on the consciousness of lost limbs 
and received responses from one hundred and eighty-five amputees. 
 It was James’s hope that his inquiry would provide insight into why the psychological 
experiences of amputees varied. Even before beginning his research he recognized that not all 
amputees are conscious of their lost limbs, and that even among those who have these 
experiences, the characteristics of these experiences vary. Some experience their amputated limb 
in a fixed position, while in others the limb’s position changes. For some, changes to the limb’s 
position are the result of conscious effort, while others, despite their attempts, are utterly unable 
to alter the position of their removed limb. Ultimately, James (1887b) concluded from his 
research: “The results are disappointing, in that they fail to explain the causes of the enumerated 
differences. But they tell certain things and suggest reflections which I here set down for the use 
of future inquirers” (p. 249). 
 As Woodward (1983) has noted, James’s work was a challenge to British associationism 
and German psychophysics. According to associationist theory, the amputee’s continued 
experience of their lost limb was the result of previously established associations between bodily 
movement and incoming sensations. Yet, as James observed, not all amputees continued to 
experience their lost limbs. Invoking Darwinian evolutionary theory, James (1887b) speculated,  
phantasms of lost legs and arms are to the mental organism just what rudimentary organs 
are to the bodily organism. They have no longer any real relations with the environment, 
being mere vestiges of something which formerly had real relations. (p. 257)  
Positioning phantom limbs as an evolutionarily neutral trait, James speculated that the tendency 
toward consciousness of lost limbs had simply failed to have been uniformly selected for or 
selected out by evolution. Consequently some individuals experienced their limbs after 
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amputation and others did not. In the process he positioned individual experiences of 
consciousness of lost limbs as normal and natural features of mental life. 
An American Census of Hallucinations 
 Shortly after completing his inquiry into consciousness of lost limbs, James was charged 
with a much more ambitious project: a census of hallucinations. Unlike his study of lost limbs, 
the census was not an original endeavour. Rather, this undertaking was an extension of an earlier 
British effort to enumerate individual experiences with premonitory hallucinations. This work 
focused particularly on hallucinations classified as veridical; that is, ones that corresponded to 
events actually taking place some distance away, often an individual’s death. Begun by psychical 
researcher Edmund Gurney (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886; see James, 1887a, 1895a; 
Sommer, 2012), the collection of cases sufficient to constitute a census was continued by the 
SPR following Gurney’s premature death in 1888 (Oppenheim, 1985). As part of this effort – 
during the meeting of the International Congress of Experimental Psychology in Paris in the 
summer of 1889 – the census was extended beyond Britain to include several international 
endeavours, including an American census for which James was made the ASPR’s designated 
agent.278  
 Although efforts at an official American census of hallucinations did not begin in earnest 
until the end of the 1880s, even prior to this the ASPR endeavoured to collect information on the 
subject. The investigations of Gurney and other SPR officers in this field, as documented in the 
                                                
278 During the meeting the proposal to undertake a census met with some objection. 
James notes it was “a somewhat stormy sitting of the Committee on the census of hallucinations, 
M. Pierre Janet disbelieving in the utility of a popular inquiry, and being supported by others” 
(W. James to A. H. G. James, Aug 7, 1889 in James, 1998, p. 522). In addition to the America 
census, Italian, Swiss, German, and Brazilian surveys were agreed to, though at the next 
congress results were presented from only the latter two countries, along with findings from 
France and Russia (Blum, 2006). 
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volume Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et al., 1886), served as a model for this work.279 In 
October 1887 the ASPR’s Committee on Experimental Psychology issued Blank G to collect  
accounts of cases where one person has had some remarkable experience, such as an 
exceptionally vivid and disturbing dream, or a strong waking impression amounting to a 
distinct hallucination, concerning another person at a distance, who was, at the time, 
passing through some crisis, such as death, or illness, or some other calamity. (“Blank 
G,” 1887, p. 270)  
Seeking to rule out “mere chance” (“Blank G,” 1887, p. 270) as an explanation for portentous 
hallucinatory experiences, individuals were asked to collect responses to a series of eight 
questions from as many individuals as possible. Framed as simple yes or no questions, the 
circular simply required collectors to indicate an individual’s response in one of the blank 
squares of the grid provided below each question. In this way the Committee hoped to ascertain 
(a) the number of persons in the community who have not had any such experiences at 
all; (b) the number of persons who have had such experiences coinciding with real 
events; (c) the number of persons who have had experiences which, though similar to the 
foregoing in other respects, did not coincide with real events. (“Blank G,” 1887, p. 270)  
Determining this required questioning a variety of individuals on the subject, not simply those 
likely to have experienced premonitory hallucinations. In this way, the Committee hoped to 
document not only the existence of these kind of psychical phenomena, but also the relative 
prevalence of such within the larger public. Given these aims, the necessity of obtaining a 
considerable number of responses was explicitly emphasized on the circular: “It is of the utmost 
importance to obtain answers from a very large number of persons, and it is hoped that many 
                                                
279 The place of dreams in accounts gathered as part of Phantasms of the Living is 
explored in Groth and Lusty (2013). 
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thousands of replies will be received” (“Blank G,” 1887, p. 271, see also “An investigation of 
dreams,” 1887) 
 Although James was a member of the Committee on Experimental Psychology it is unclear 
to what degree he was involved with the Committee’s aforementioned inquiry. Whatever his 
involvement in this work, James was clearly cognizant of larger efforts in this vein prior to 
undertaking the American census of hallucinations. Reviewing Phantasms of the Living in the 
pages of Science he commented on the authors’ “untiring zeal in collecting facts, and patience in 
seeking to make them accurate” (James, 1887a, pp. 18–9). Little did he realize at this time, he 
would soon be charged with the same painstaking work.  
 As superintendent of the census for the ASPR, James was charged with gathering 
information on individual experiences of hallucinations, or the lack thereof, from as many 
individuals as possible. His efforts at large-scale data gathering involved soliciting assistance 
with the project in various popular and scientific publications, including, among others, the New 
York Times (James, 1890i), Popular Science Monthly (James, 1890a), and the American Journal 
of Psychology (James, 1890g, see also 1890b, 1890c, 1890d, 1890f, 1891; “Untitled,” 1890, 
“Was it her ghost?,” 1890). In these advertisements, he described the project’s twofold 
purpose:    
1st, to get a mass of facts about hallucinations which may serve as a basis for a scientific 
study of these phenomena; and 2d, to ascertain approximately the proportion of persons 
who have had such experiences. Until the average frequency of hallucinations in the 
community is known, it can never be decided whether the so-called “veridical” 
hallucinations (visions or other “warnings” of the death, etc., of people at a distance) which 
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are so frequently reported, are accidental coincidences or something more. (James, 1890d, 
p. 304, 1890g, p. 292)  
Like many of the ASPR’s previous inquiries, mass circulation of questions on the occurrence of 
hallucinations was to generate information on the prevalence of premonitory visions, and visions 
of what should be unknowable present states, amongst sane members of the general public 
(James, 1986b). Given the project’s deliberate framing as a “census” of the phenomena, the 
necessity of amassing large – if not comprehensive – quantities of data was emphasized all the 
more. 
 To assess the frequency of hallucinations in the population, James’s census asked 
individuals to response yes or no to a single question: 
Have you ever, when completely awake, had a vivid impression of seeing or being touched 
by a living being or inanimate object, or of hearing a voice; which impression, so far as you 
could discover, was not due to any external physical cause? (James, 1890d, p. 304, 1890g, 
p. 292, 1986b, p. 58)  
Much like the earlier ASPR inquiry on the subject, those interested in aiding with the census 
were sent a formally printed sheet, labeled “Schedule A,” on which there was space to record the 
yes or no responses of twenty-five individuals.280 Demographic information for each individual, 
in the form of their name and address, sex, occupation, and age, was also requested (see James, 
1986b, p. 58).  
 In seeking self-reported hallucinatory experiences, both familiarity with these 
experiences and the lack of such were important. Consequently, in the printed preface that 
                                                
280 Given the project’s ambitions of being a “census” the use of the term “Schedule” for 
each of its component parts was appropriate, as the same was regularly employed in 
governmental census undertakings (see Levitan, 2011). 
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accompanied “Schedule A,” those collecting information for the census were reminded, “the 
answer “No” and the answer “Yes” are equally important” (James, 1986b, pp. 56–7). The 
recording of both instances and absences of hallucinatory experiences were crucial to obtaining 
an accurate estimate of the prevalence of these experiences within the general public. Thus, it 
was not just the self-reported details of these experiences that were important, but also the 
relative frequency with which these types of experiences occurred. Members of the public, 
charged with undertaking much of the data collection for the project, were reminded of the 
necessity of collecting representative data. 
 Individuals who reported having experienced hallucinations, and thus answered “yes” to 
the question on “Schedule A,” were then asked to complete a longer questionnaire on the nature 
of their experiences. This form, labeled “Schedule B,” consisted of six questions on the 
circumstances related to the hallucinatory experience. For example, 
1. Please state what you saw or heard or felt, and give the place, date and hour of the 
experience as nearly as you can.   
2. How were you occupied at the time, and were you out of health or in grief or anxiety?  
3. Was the impression that of some one whom you were in the habit of seeing, and do 
you know what he or she was doing at the time? (James, 1986b, p. 58)281  
As was generally the case with questionnaires during this period, all the questions on “Schedule 
B” were open-ended. Individuals were simply to report, in as much detail as possible, their 
personal experiences with hallucinations. Taken together, these collected accounts of 
                                                
281 A copy of the circular produced for the American census, including Schedules A and 
B, can be found in the Josiah Royce Papers (“International Congress of Psychology: Instructions 
to the Persons Undertaking to Collect Answers to the Questions on the Other Side,” Box 106, 
Folder 8, Papers of Josiah Royce, HUG 1755, Harvard University Archives, Cambridge, MA). 
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hallucinatory experiences were to provide a complete picture of the nature of hallucinations and 
the frequency of veridical, or premonitory, hallucinations in the general public. 
Collecting Data and Interrogating Evidence 
 The entire questionnaire enterprise was predicated on the apparent value of masses of 
collected material. In the context of psychical research, the accumulation of this kind of 
information was intended to reveal the true nature of extraordinary phenomena. Were these 
occurrences all simply the result of some confluence of superstition and chance? Or, were there 
among these accounts authentic psychical happenings? Surveying the public concerning their 
experiences with the seemingly inexplicable held the promise of resolving these kinds of 
questions once and for all, but only once the validity of each case was interrogated. With this 
method “by taking the experiences of these persons as they come and applying the ordinary 
methods of science” psychical investigators could produce an “empirical natural history worthy 
of all encouragement and respect” (James, 1892, p. 741). Like other questionnaire-based 
inquiries, these projects were of an explicitly natural historical orientation, seeking to collect, 
categorize, and analysis the amassed body of data. When these kinds of studies were still in 
progress, for psychical sympathizers like James, scepticism was “a very dangerous and 
unscientific attitude. Where observations are in process of accumulation, and one doubts them, 
the best thing is to wait…. if the observations multiply, all such objections fall to the ground.”282 
 Other psychical researchers outlined the advantages of large quantities of material in 
more specific terms. Royce (1889b) argued that “the collecting of stories is not idle play” (p. 
427), but rather that it produces “a collection of specimens of our material, — a little cabinet of 
                                                
282 W. James to G. Stanley Hall, Nov. 5, 1887 in James (1998, p. 283). 
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curiosities, if you will” (p. 352) suitable to the comparative method.283 In his view, the analysis 
of such a collection centred on classification and, unlike singular cases, was not dependent on the 
authorial intentions of individual correspondents. Instead, by focusing on the common 
characteristics across many accounts, researchers could analyze “the unconscious testimony, so 
to speak, of all the many persons” (Royce, 1889b, p. 351). Avoiding the particular limitations of 
the case study method, questionnaire research held the promise of “throw[ing] light on the dark 
things of mental life” (Royce, 1889b, p. 427). 
Enlisting the Public 
Across the various circular-based investigations undertaken by officers of the ASPR, 
public participation was vital.284 The success of each of these projects was predicated on the 
involvement of a large body of individuals in the data collection process. Consequently, 
researchers appealed “to the public for co-operation in the work of investigating that which is 
hidden, not in desert islands, or in glaciers, or in craters, or in crucibles, or in cuneiform 
inscriptions, but in human experience” (Phelps, 1885, pp. 254–5). Only through this participation 
could a significant enough mass of material be collected to warrant analysis and thus generate 
meaningful conclusions. This necessitated “flood[ing] the English-reading world with little 
circulars asking for authentic cases of mind-reading, or visions, as reported at first-hand by 
reporters willing to be personally investigated” (Phelps, 1885, p. 255). In the case of James’s 
census work this meant not only that the public would be required to provide first hand accounts 
of their experiences, but also that to accumulate this body of information “very many volunteer 
canvassers” were necessary “to secure success” (James, 1890b, p. 485). 
                                                
283 On the role of curiosities and wonders in science see Daston and Park (1998). 
284 For discussion of Francis Galton’s Anthropometric Laboratory at the International 
Health Exhibition in London 1884 as a “mechanically objective” form of public participation see 
Lundgren (2013). 
 206 
Attracting not only the public’s interest, but also their active involvement in these 
enterprises was a challenge. Early attempts to do so were not nearly as successful as the Society 
would have liked (“Request for cooperation,” 1887). Several years later, however, James’s active 
promotion of the census in the press was markedly successful, even it fell far short of the 
census’s goal of 50,000 replies (see James, 1890b). Requests for questionnaires were described 
as “pouring in at a great rate in consequence of my circular letter to the newspapers.”285 As the 
more than seven thousand responses James eventually accumulated for the census of 
hallucinations testifies, reluctance on the part of the public to engage in these projects was 
surmountable. This involvement, in James’s view, was crucial, for if the Society could become 
sufficiently well known to the public so as to attract reports of all phenomena related to the 
supernatural, its members could then thoroughly investigate these accounts and “we should end 
ere long by having a mass of facts concrete enough to found a decent theory upon” (James, 1892, 
p. 729).  
 In order to secure the participation of the public, the ASPR’s projects were regularly 
featured in both scientific periodicals and the nation’s newspapers. The presentation of the 
Society’s work, however, varied considerably (e.g., “Notes and News,” 1885, “Psychical 
research in America,” 1887). In some accounts the organization’s efforts were soundly 
dismissed, 
The Society for Psychical Research can spend a century and millions of dollars in 
attempting to determine a principle relating to the dreams and visions and hallucinations, 
and will then be as involved in doubt as now. The “research” to be attempted is useless, a 
waste of time, and can profit no one. (“A useless inquiry,” 1888, p. 5)  
                                                
285 W. James to A. H. G. James, May 17 [May 16, 1890] in James (1999, p. 32). 
 207 
On the other hand, some of the press on these projects was astoundingly positive, as in a report in 
New York City’s The Sun: 
They are exploring a field which men of science, as a rule, have been too reluctant to 
approach. The field is not the less interesting and important on that account, particularly 
to those who like their science with a dash of mystery in it. It is of great importance to 
settle definitely, one way or the other, the phenomena which gain so much by popular 
exaggeration and irresponsible narration; and to test the truth of those highly interesting 
superstitions which are the heirlooms of the centuries. (“Psychical research in America,” 
1887, p. 8)  
Even in largely favourable accounts, the press was not above poking fun at aspects of the 
Society’s work, 
The American Society for Psychical Research has sent out a circular requesting that any 
person having some unusual experience, such as an exceptionally vivid and disturbing 
dream, or a strong waking impression, amounting to a distinct hallucination, concerning 
another person at a distance, make a statement of that fact promptly to the society.... The 
society might as well employ four-score secretaries and readers of letters at once. If a 
tenth of the people who have had some such experiences comply with the request the 
office of the society will be inadequate to hold the letters, spacious as it is. (“A useless 
inquiry,” 1888, p. 5)  
This comment was particularly on point given the challenge of corralling masses of data into a 
meaningful whole and the difficulties James in particular would face compiling the census of 
hallucinations. 
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The press’s help and hindrance to the psychical cause was well recognized by the 
ASPR’s members. Royce (1889a) commented on the press’s positive role in the Society’s 
efforts, “the newspaper press of the country … at the cost of no small labor, has courteously 
helped us so much in our researches,” before going on to remark on their equally detrimental 
habit of “reporting from time to time all sorts of marvels as having been vouched for by this or 
that officer or committee of the Society” (p. 517). This latter observation was tempered 
somewhat by his characterization of these reports as the press’s “certain doubtless good-humored 
revenge” (Royce, 1889a, p. 517). 
 Although neither a uniformly positive nor negative force for the ASPR, the press was 
decidedly instrumental in ensuring the success of psychical research projects. In providing the 
organization with a venue to publicize their efforts, and interest readers in becoming involved in 
this work, the press was invaluable. The general request that the public provide the Society with 
information was a prominent feature of these accounts,  
The society, by means of circulars, is collecting accounts of cases where persons have 
had some remarkable experience in the realm of phantasms, such as hallucinations, 
premonitions, dreams that have been the forerunners of actual occurrences, visits from 
ghosts, etc. All who have had such experiences are requested to inform the psychical 
inquirers of Boston. (“Psychical research,” 1887, p. 4)  
Other reports of the Society’s work took care to underscore the scientific character of the 
research. Of the census of hallucinations Washington, DC’s Evening Star emphasized, “There is 
nothing weird or fantastic or sensational in this investigation. It is purely scientific...The 
volunteer canvass undertaken in each vicinity by persons of an inquiring mind will aid materially 
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a high scientific object” (“Untitled,” 1890, p. 4). Of the ASPR more generally the Pittsburgh 
Dispatch observed, 
A deeper scientific interest is manifest. The members generally realize that patience and 
time are required in this department of research as well as in other branches of science, in 
order to secure satisfactory results. We must mass together a great number of cases 
before being able to draw trustworthy deductions from them, but these deductions are 
sure to follow, I am confident, sooner or later. (“The ghost hunters,” 1890, p. 9)  
In these reports the authority of science was invoked in an attempt to attract the necessary 
volume of volunteer canvassers for projects. 
In some instances newspapers and other periodicals went so far as to reproduce the 
Society’s circular questions verbatim, especially – though not solely – in the case of the census 
of hallucinations (James, 1890a, 1890b, 1890c, 1890d, 1890f, 1890g, 1890i, 1891; “Psychical 
research in America,” 1887, “Was it her ghost?,” 1890). The ability to reproduce the substance 
of questionnaires in this way is a unique facet of these psychological instruments, one that served 
psychical researchers well. This ease of reproduction made questionnaires an incredibly mobile 
technology, ones able to traverse boundaries, geographic and otherwise, in ways largely 
impossible with other instruments. 
 The mobility of questionnaires allowed anyone to use them for data collection. Given the 
reliance on untrained collectors, providing specific instructions to those taking on this role was 
crucial. Short of training in what investigators considered proper research protocol, directives to 
volunteers served as a bulwark against poor quality information, much as they did in Hall’s child 
study efforts (see Chapter 3). Such instructions had to encompass both deferential and directive 
tones. Researchers at once sought to convince individuals to participate in the research 
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endeavour and to steer the shape of this involvement. In this vein, circular instructions included 
the entreaties such as “we therefore beg any reader of this circular [to collect data]” (“Blank G,” 
1887, p. 270) and “I most earnestly bespeak the co-operation of any among your readers” 
(James, 1890b, p. 485). These appeals were followed by strict directives; for instance, readers 
were told to “repeat the following questions, verbatim, to as many trustworthy persons as 
possible, from whom he does not know which answer to expect, and who have not already been 
interrogated by some one else, and communicate the results” (“Blank G,” 1887, p. 270). The 
census of hallucinations was particularly detailed in this respect. The census circular informed 
volunteer canvassers  
it is important that the question should be very widely asked and of all sorts of people – 
not only of those who are thought likely to have had such an experience or of those who 
are thought likely not to have had it. (James, 1986b, p. 56)  
Further, canvassers were instructed not to question anyone who was known to have previously 
experienced insanity, as the circular was “not intended to include the hallucinations experienced 
in delirium” (James, 1986b, p. 57). Also to be excluded from the material were any second-hand 
accounts of the presence or absence of hallucinatory experiences, as well as answers from 
individuals who had already participated in similar inquiries.286 Volunteers were only to question 
for the census those 21 years of age and over, but were to ensure that these individuals’ 
responses covered the entire span of their lives. Edicts to collectors were not limited to the 
printed page. Ending his instructions, James (1986b) informed interested collectors “I shall be 
happy to give any further information that may seem to you necessary” (p. 57). 
                                                
286 This is may have been an attempt to exclude not only those who were previously 
questioned as part of the census, but also those who participated in the previous inquiry into the 
subject undertaken by the Committee on Experimental Psychology (see “Blank G,” 1887). 
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The Will of Contributors 
 While James and other investigators took care to direct the activities of collectors and 
respondents, nothing could ensure their participation in the first place. Prior to undertaking the 
American census Gurney warned James of some the difficulties inherent in this work:  
the great difficulty the whole business has to contend against is not so much contempt as 
indifference. One’s material being human beings, with wills of their own, one is 
continally [sic] baffled by the fact that they have no vision of the subject as a whole, or as 
a subject at all, & therefore cannot be brought to tender their item of help.287  
Following the appearance of Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et al., 1886) James hoped this 
kind of resistance would diminish. Gurney was far less optimistic warning “I do not think it by 
any means certain, as you seem to expect, that evidence will now flow in more easily. I am not 
sure that the collection of facts will not be harder.”288 The prospect of collected accounts 
appearing in print was just as likely to deter individuals from participating in the project as 
encourage it. Acquiescence to researchers calls for contributors was no means guaranteed. 
Convincing masses of individuals to contribute to studies of psychical phenomena was 
only the first challenge with such participation. Although researchers hoped both those collecting 
data and individual respondents would follow the instructions provided with circulars, this was 
by no means assured. For instances, in Minot’s postcard circular, most participants produced 10 
diagrams as requested, but some disregarded this portion of the instructions to include more or 
fewer diagrams as they saw fit (Minot, 1889). James complained of his efforts to substantiate 
claims submitted as part of the census of hallucinations: “Our correspondents obstinately refused 
                                                
287 E. Gurney to W. James, Jan. 16, 1887 in James (1998, p. 190). 
288 E. Gurney to W. James, Jan. 16, 1887 in James (1998, p. 190). 
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to reply in a great many cases.”289 In these, as in other investigations, the participant-public was 
not a passive, compliant source to be mined, but rather asserted itself in ways often unsolicited – 
and undesired – by researchers.  
Requests for Forms & Clerical Assistance 
 With the census of hallucinations James faced an influx of requests for “census-blanks” 
from individuals willing to take up the work of data collection.290 In this kind of a project, as 
James noted “the labor is enormous.”291 Recognizing this fact in the midst of his census efforts, 
he sought to distribute the burden. This included not only the very necessary recruiting of 
members of the public into the collection process, but also delegating to some of his family 
members the tedious business of supplying this public with blank census forms. To deal with 
abundant requests for forms, he enlisted the assistance of both his wife Alice Howe Gibbens 
James and her sister Margaret Merrill Gibbens (later Margaret Gibbens Gregor).292 Female 
familial involvements of this kind were relatively common in nineteenth century science. While 
women were largely excluded from professional scientific spheres, many were involved in 
scientific practice as it took place within households, though this work went largely 
unrecognized (see Lindsay, 1998).  
                                                
289 W. James to H. Sidgwick, July 11, 1896 in James (1986b, p. 76). 
290 See W. James to A. H. G. James, May 17 [May 16, 1890] in James (1999, p. 32). 
291 W. James to E. M. Sidgwick, May 15, 1892 in James (1999, pp. 269–70). 
292 See W. James to A. H. G. James, May 17 [May 16, 1890] in James (1999, p. 32); W. 
James to A. H. G. James, July 7, 1890 in James (1999, p. 51); W. James to A. H. G. James,, July 
9, 1890 in James (1999, p. 55); W. James to A. H. G. James, July 21, 1890 in James (1999, p. 
66); W. James to A.H. G. James, Aug. 3, 1890 in James (1999, p. 83). Margaret Gibbens, her 
sister Mary Sherwin (later Salter) and her mother, the widowed Elizabeth Putnam Webb 
Gibbens, all lived with the James for a time. Mrs. Gibbens was the one to introduce James to his 
“white crow” medium Leonora Piper and Margaret Gibbens also visited the medium (see James, 
1986a, p. 400; see also Blum, 2006). 
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Over the course of the spring and summer of 1890, discussion of the labour associated 
with census work was a regular part of the correspondence between husband and wife. In these 
exchanges James regularly expressed his appreciation for the women’s assistance, especially his 
sister-in-law who seems to have taken on much of the work: “found here no proofs, but a lot of 
hallucination letters, most of which I enclose for Margaret’s noble treatment”;293 and in another 
instance noting, “I will forward to her [Margaret] the applications after this, thanking her 
wondrously in advance. She too is a white souled being!”294 Their aid spared James much of the 
drudgery that attended such an ambitious project: “Margaret is addressing my census-blanks…It 
is a great relief to me and she doesn’t seem to dislike it.”295 Much as the direct data collection 
portion of census work necessitated an expansion of the scientific sphere so as to include 
members of the public, the administrative portion of the project blurred domestic and 
professional boundaries.   
Despite the assistance James received with the census correspondence, he was still 
overwhelmed with the volume of requests. Simply keeping up with requests for forms, or as he 
termed them “hall.-blanks,” was a challenge: “I hope you have been at the work of sending hall.-
blanks to the applicants whose letters were in the big Epicure envelope in my valise. They’re 
getting fearfully into arrears. I send a few more with this.”296 To manage this influx, outside of 
the aid received from family members, James also relied on the ASPR’s only paid employee, the 
                                                
293 W. James to A. H. G. James, July 7, 1890 in James (1999, p. 51). 
294 W. James to A. H. G. James, July 9, 1890 in James (1999, p. 55). 
295 W. James to A. H. G. James, May 17 [May 16, 1890] in James (1999, p. 32). 
296 W. James to A. H. G. James, July 21, 1890 in James (1999, p. 66). 
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society’s Secretary Richard Hodgson.297 Hodgson’s assistance was also crucial in other circular-
based projects initiated by the society, as Royce (1889b) recognized, 
Nearly the whole work of collecting our facts, and of corresponding with our friends and 
with our other informants, has fallen upon the shoulders of the one paid officer of the 
society, our able and devoted secretary, Mr. Hodgson, and our committee alone has 
employed nearly all of his time, as well as the time of his clerical aid. (p. 426)  
Without the clerical services of Alice James, Gibbens, and Hodgson the extensive data gathering 
projects engaged in by the Society would have failed from the outset. Their work, though often 
unrecognized, especially in the case of the former two women, was instrumental to the success of 
projects predicated on securing a distributed network of contributors. 
Census Correspondence 
Of course, correspondence with data collectors was not limited to simple requests for 
blank census forms. Although published requests for assistance were perhaps the most 
productive means of ascertaining accounts of psychical phenomena, efforts to obtain information 
were also undertaken via more personal interactions. This includes both general word of mouth 
regarding research projects, but also personal communication between psychical investigators 
and potential data collectors, as well as individuals with relevant psychical experiences. James’s 
census related correspondence, in particular, took both forms. Communication with respondents 
allowed him to thank them for their contributions, and also further direct their work. Writing to 
incipient psychologist Mary Whiton Calkins, James thanked her for the three Schedule Bs she 
had sent, while also inquiring after the absent Schedule A. He expressed the “hope that the A-one 
                                                
297 See W. James to A. H. G. James, July 7, 1890 in James (1999, p. 51); W. James to A. 
H. G. James, May 22, 1890 in James (1999, p. 35). 
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will turn up in due time, filled.”298 Smith College Philosopher Harry Norman Gardiner, one of 
Calkins’s former instructors (Furumoto, 1979), also offered his assistance, inquiring as to a set of 
schedules for collecting information. James sent the schedules as requested, but also took the 
opportunity to provide Gardiner with further instruction on how best to go about collecting and 
recording information, including the directive: “the best rule is to send an account of all such 
doubtful experiences on Schedule B, but not to put them down on A as either yes or no.”299 
Seeking as much assistance with the project as possible, he closed his letter to Gardiner with the 
request: “if you know of anyone else who can help me, I should be thankful for his address.”  
 Correspondence with census respondents also provided James with the opportunity to 
enquire in more detail into the nature of recorded experiences. When Katharine Peabody Loring, 
companion of his sister Alice James, provided him with a story of an hallucination, he sent her 
the pro forma Schedule B but also questioned her further on her experience, guiding her 
completion of the document: “you say in your own case: “I was conscious of the presence.” Was 
this presence a distinctly exteriorized vision, or an ‘impression,’ or what? And was the voice an 
external voice? The distinction is rather important.”300 Distrust of individual, uncorroborated 
accounts of psychical events pervaded these kinds of investigations. Informed of an apparition 
experience in the years immediately preceding the census, James sought corroboration, or at least 
another opinion of the event in question, from the subject’s father, Shakespearean scholar Horace 
Howard Furness: “Is it too great a liberty for me to ask whether you have your self any distinct 
                                                
298 W. James to M. W. Calkins, July 30, 1890 in James (1999, p. 75). 
299 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Mch 26, 1890 in James (1999, p. 15). 
300 W. James to K. P. Loring, May 7, 1890 in James (1999, p. 23). 
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opinion about these facts.”301 Individual accounts in and of themselves were not to be trusted, but 
if further confirmation of their occurrence could be secured these stories were deemed more 
plausible.  
Census Labour: From James to Hodgson 
 Outside of engaging with individuals with whom he was personally acquainted, most 
submitted census-related material did not prompt a response. Instead, as he was inundated with 
census letters throughout the spring and summer of 1890, James simply allowed the census 
responses to accumulate. As this mass of material attests, the public, or at least some segment 
thereof, was more than willing to offer up their confessionals to the authoritative expert-
stranger.302 Although he made mention of efforts to tackle the growing expanse of material he 
received, “I have been trying to clear away my table of the enormous mass of unanswered letters 
(hallucinatory & other) which have accumulated on it, but have been able to make no headway 
whatever on acc! of the incessant interruptions,” little progress was made on the chore.303 James 
was simply unprepared for the realities of mass social investigation and the work attendant these 
kinds of inquiries.  
This lack of sustained engagement with the material as it appeared proved a poor 
strategy. James later recognized, as he sought to produce a report on the American census for the 
                                                
301 W. James to H. H. Furness, Mch. 21, 1886 in James (1998, pp. 120–1). The Furness 
family was a great help in James’s psychical work, as he “mesmerized” another son on two 
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303 W. James to A. H. G. James, May 25, 1890 in James (1999, p. 39). 
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International Congress of Psychology to be held in London in the summer of 1892, that his lack 
of dedicated work on the project was a grave error. In advance of the meeting, as census 
submissions continued to pour in, James informed one of the coordinators of the international 
effort, British psychical researcher, Eleanor Sidgwick  
My mistake was in not “keeping up” daily, or at least weekly, with the correspondence 
involved in all the schedules I received. In the midst of my other occupations, I was 
irregular, and let them go, keeping no systematic account of the correspondence, until 
now I fear the matter is irreparable.304  
About to leave for a yearlong sabbatical in Europe, James abandoned his efforts to produce a 
report and instead handed the material over to Hodgson.  
James did undertake the daunting challenge of organizing the bulk of the material, but he 
left the final analysis of such in Hodgson’s hands. Prior to transferring the material from his 
home to the Society’s office, and thus into Hodgson’s care, he ensured most of “the cases are 
analytically indexed, so that the work of classification will be easy.” 305 Hodgson was informed, 
however, that along with these organized accounts there were “two boxes of unana[l]yzed 
cases—at least I think most of them are—and an index book of old American S.P.R. cases with 
analysis (mostly dreams), plus an envelope with some other cases.” 306 There was also, among 
this material, “some uninteligable [sic] schedules A., which you will understand.” 307 With these 
James included his “hallucination-book,” which served as an analytical index to the material. 
This was not solely the product of his work, but rather, as James explained, “the first couple of 
hundred cases of the analytic index were prepared by my student - - - Wood – the rest by myself, 
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mostly dictated to Mr. J. W Alger by me, as I read. He did a few alone.”308 Just as James could 
not conceivably have undertaken the work of collecting information for the census alone, the 
project of sorting this data was not feasible for only one individual. In addition to Hodgson, 
James found it necessary to enlist others in the effort. 
Boxes of raw material and James’s analytical index were to guide Hodgson’s completion 
of the report on the American census. To further aid this effort, James sent along a “skeleton-
paper” from Eleanor Sidgwick, which outlined her method of analyzing the British census 
results.309 Using this as a template, James informed Hodgson that if he could analyze the census 
material “so as to fill in the blanks in time to send her the paper by the July congress – ‘twould 
be well!” though he warned “Heaven help you anyhow: You’ll be troubled with duplicates and 
ambiguities enough.”310 In the end, James was dissatisfied with the entire endeavour, concluding 
our census has been a terrible slouchy piece of work…I didn’t clearly foresee the exact 
line of argument at first; mistrusted the value of the whole thing and let the 
correspondence get into arrears, in spite of the weeks and weeks of time I gave to it. The 
result is a mass of uncorroborated stuff…I don’t advise any other country to try to take up 
the job. Irreproachable results would require too enormous an amount of labor.311  
Perhaps unsurprisingly this was James’s final foray into questionnaire-based research. 
Seeking Confirmation 
As James recognized, the fact that circulars produced “a mass of uncorroborated stuff” 
was problematic. To address this, in the census and other similar projects, investigators 
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deliberately set out to corroborate individual accounts of psychical phenomena. Doing so, 
however, was difficult. Not only did some respondents refuse to respond to further questioning, 
but accruing other forms of documentary evidence was an arduous undertaking.312 Simply 
organizing and classifying the many accounts the public provided overwhelmed James. Further 
inquiries were beyond him, especially considering the example set by Gurney, who informed 
James 
it must be remembered also that the witnesses did not know—I doubt if more than a 
fraction of them even for a moment guessed—that registers & libraries &c &c were going 
to be or had been searched; & in correspondence I have used a great many little 
precautions & dodges with a view to detecting weak spots, & of avoiding leading 
questions.313  
In this vein, James (1895a) later praised the British census workers for “the energy and skill with 
which …[they] executed their burdensome task” recognizing that their census responders were 
“corresponded with or interviewed or in other ways subjected to as critical a scrutiny as 
circumstances allowed” (p. 69). This kind of investigative work – required to verify every 
account of a positive hallucinatory experience – was laborious to say the least and an already 
overwhelmed James proved ill prepared for the task. 
 While the census provided the biggest challenge with respect to verifying accounts, 
simply as a function of its sheer scope, other projects faced similar difficulties. Across the 
ASPR’s circular research endeavours efforts were made to secure confirmation, of one form or 
another, of psychical phenomena. In some instances, assurances of the plausibility of an account 
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 220 
were sought from those acquainted with an individual.314 The Society’s pre-census hallucination 
inquiry requested of those reporting hallucinatory experiences: “if the experience has been 
coincident with a real event, we specially request the percipient to send us an account of it” 
(“Blank G,” 1887, p. 271). Ensuring the reality of the event in question then fell to the 
Committee. The attendant request “we desire to receive also (not for publication) the name and 
address of any person who answers yes” (“Blank G,” 1887, p. 271), was a necessary part of the 
process of verification, providing investigators within enough information so that they might 
seek substantiation of an account from other sources.  
Underlying these attempts at ascertaining confirmatory evidence was a basic distrust of 
individual stories. It was not so much outright fraud that concerned investigators, as simple 
errors of memory. As Royce (1887) recognized, 
it is a very natural result of our public request for facts that the most of the cases which 
have been submitted to us by our correspondents are narratives dependent for their 
verification not so much upon documents as upon the memory of certain persons. (p. 224-
5) 
Because memory was such a fallible source of information, documents were often sought to 
substantiate accounts: “an authentic letter or diary in the hand is worth not only two but twenty 
remembered facts in the bush” (Royce, 1887, p. 225). Thus, an individual recalling a veridical 
hallucination would be well served to include with their proffered account some form of 
documentation from that same period of time confirming the hallucinatory experience.  
 
 
                                                
314 See, for example, W. James to H. H. Furness, Mch. 21, 1886 in James (1998, pp. 120–
1). 
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The Sway of First Hand Testimony and the Distrust of Data  
The distrust of disembodied accounts was pervasive. At the same time, first hand 
testimony held a powerful sway. James was informed of the appeal of personal accounts by 
Gurney, “I cannot describe to you the effect on my own mind which my hundreds of personal 
interviews have had.”315 After he conducted his own census he admitted 
I find however that narratives are a weariness, and I must confess that the reading of 
narratives for which I have no personal responsibility is almost intolerable to me. Those 
that come to me at first hand, incidentally to the Census, I get interested in. Others much 
less so; and I imagine my case is a very common case.316  
Individual narratives, told in person, were both far more interesting and convincing than masses 
of anonymous information. Better still were reports given by friends, or one’s own first hand 
experience with a phenomenon, 
a single veridical hallucination experienced by one’s self or by some friend who tells one 
all the circumstances has more influence over the mind than the largest calculated 
numerical probability either for or against. I can testify to this from direct observation. 
(James, 1895a, p. 74) 
James and others found testimony persuasive, but these kind of first hand accounts were 
inaccessible to most. In terms of practicality, it was impossible for stories of psychical 
experiences to be communicated, in person, to everyone with an interest in such matters.  
Distrust of the information gathered via circular extended beyond individual cases, to 
encompass the full expanse of collected data. The copious accounts collected on behalf of the 
ASPR were stored with Hodgson, and the press complained at points that the Society 
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guards its gathered materials with great secrecy. Its rich fund of facts is not published 
until they have been passed upon and thoroughly examined by the various committees; 
even then the names of those who contribute their experiences are in no case furnished to 
the public. (“Our weird visitors,” 1888, p. 16)  
Though it was certainly true that most stories of psychical experiences were divorced of 
identifiers, the material itself was not necessarily as inaccessible as claimed. The Committee on 
Thought-Transference explicitly specified “the original papers sent in to us are preserved, and 
can be seen by any member or associate of the society, on application to the Secretary” (J. M. 
Peirce & Pickering, 1885, p. 17). For some at least, rendering the entirety of collected 
information accessible was a mark of its legitimacy.  
In the absence of presenting the totality of accumulated accounts as evidence, readers of 
psychical research reports had to rely on the interpretations provided by investigators. Though 
inexpert volunteers collected information, expertise was a central component of the evaluation. 
For James (1887a), the determination of the veracity of an account “comes back essentially to the 
investigator’s instinct, or nose, as one might call it, for good and bad evidence” (p. 19). While 
those reading the reports of psychical research might seek to make their own judgment of the 
material “it must be remembered, that, so far as expertness in judging of truth comes from 
training, no reader can possibly be as expert as the authors” (James, 1887a, p. 19). As in Hall’s 
child study investigations, only the trained expert was capable of uncovering the truth within a 
mass of material.  
Much of psychical research was predicated on the accumulation of great masses of 
material, but sheer volume was insufficient to produce valuable results. Knowing this, James 
(1892) argued that in this research 
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quality, and not mere quantity, is what has been mainly kept in mind. The most that could 
be done with every reported case has been done. The witnesses, where possible, have 
been cross-examined personally, the collateral facts have been looked up, and the 
narrative appears with its precise coefficient of evidential worth stamped on it, so that all 
may know just what its weight as proof may be. (p. 729)  
It was simply infeasible to present all collected facts as evidence. Instead, psychical researchers 
sought to convince readers of their conclusions, by making transparent at least a portion of their 
process of assessing these facts. This, together with their expertise in the field and their self-
styling as men of science, was hoped to be sufficient to persuade others to adopt their way of 
thinking. 
Conclusion 
 Unlike Beard’s characterization of the scientific process as one governed by the word of 
experts, psychical researchers embraced a somewhat more distributed model of science. 
Adopting questionnaires as a means of surveying the experiences of a wide spectrum of the 
public, these investigators took untrained testimony as the foundation of their scientific work. 
This is not to say, however, that the narratives provided by the public were uncritically accepted. 
As described in this chapter, expertise remained a critical component of the analysis of the 
masses of information accumulated via questionnaire. In at once democratizing the scientific 
process and further reifying the privileged position of the few, psychical research adopted a style 
of scientific thinking at odds with what many understood as objective science. The naturalistic 
orientation of their investigations, predicated on the collection of masses of data on individual 
experiences, necessitated placing portions of scientific practice into the untutored hands of the 
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public. This, together with their already suspect status as a function of their subject matter, made 
psychical work an easy target for criticism (see Chapter 6). 
With respect to undertaking research on matters that fell within the sphere of psychical 
phenomena the value of personal observations as scientific evidence came into dispute. While 
accounts of personal experience, were satisfactory forms of evidence in the sphere of research on 
children, in the contested space of psychical research the personal was problematic. On this point 
William James informed sceptic G. Stanley Hall,  
I should express the difference between our two positions in the matter, by calling mine a 
baldly empirical one, and yours, one due to a general theoretic creed.... I don’t think it 
exactly fair to make the issue what you make it—one between science and superstition.317  
For James, the ASPR and the British Society’s efforts to collect information on experiences 
outside of the norm was a more valid enterprise than Hall’s prima facie dismissal of all such 
phenomena as mere wishful thinking or, more damningly, fraud. 
 Although psychical researchers readily adopted questionnaires as a means of undertaking 
a particular kind of science, they were themselves aware of the challenges associated with the 
method. The labour involved with these inquiries was enormous, both that of the participant-
public and that necessary from researchers themselves. Publicizing the inquiry, sending out blank 
forms, collecting returns, corresponding with volunteers, and collating responses all required the 
devotion of much time and energy. Were these efforts worth the end result? Perhaps. In 1887, 
having completed his inquiry into the consciousness of lost limbs, James observed 
in a delicate inquiry like this, little is to be gained by distributing circulars. A single 
patient with the right sort of lesion and a scientific mind, carefully cross-examined, is 
                                                
317 W. James to G. Stanley Hall, Nov. 5, 1887 in James (1998, p. 284). 
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more likely to deepen our knowledge than a thousand circulars answered as the average 
patient answers them, even though the answers be never so thoroughly collated by the 
investigator. This is becoming apparent in many lines of psychological inquiry; and we 
shall probably, ere long, learn the limits within which the method of circulars is likely to 
be used with fruit. (James, 1887b, p. 249 fn.) 
Despite these reservations, he went on to conduct an even larger questionnaire-based inquiry: the 
American census of hallucinations.  
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Chapter 6 
Psychical Research, Probability, and Scientific Styles 
Studies of telepathic phenomena were not limited to the kind of questionnaire-based 
investigations discussed in the previous chapter. Experimental work conducted in the laboratory 
also aimed to determine the parameters of mental life. Unlike questionnaire-based studies, 
experimental investigations were conducted with a limited pool of subjects,318 yet still involved 
the collection of a mass of facts across numerous trials with those same subjects. A reliance on 
accumulating large quantities of data was necessary given the aim of detecting not self-evident 
regularities of mental functioning, but rather the occurrence of extraordinary ability. What to do 
with this mass of material was the looming question. Both kinds of studies, though rooted in 
fundamentally different methodologies, adopted similar styles of scientific thinking at the point 
of analysis and interpretation: the calculation of relevant probabilities.319 These calculations, and 
their attendant interpretations, were fraught with difficulty and played a central role in 
discussions between believers and skeptics. These debates over the value and interpretation of 
particular forms of evidence offer insight into the methodological and scientific commitments of 
some of psychology’s earliest practitioners. 
Psychical investigations held as paramount the belief that statistics, as applied to a 
collected mass of facts, was what characterized their work as scientific. By this measure, the 
undertaking of a census, and the employment of questionnaires more generally, was of great 
benefit because it provided “… the means of collecting an enormous amount of material for 
study” (James, 1892, p. 733). Collected with relative ease from a wide segment of the public, this 
                                                
318 For an exception see Chapter 5. 
319 On psychical research and probabilistic thinking see Hacking (1988) and Porter 
(1986). 
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mass of material was not meaningful in and of itself, but required analysis and interpretation. 
This was similarly the case with experimental studies of psychical phenomena. Like Darwin 
“collected, collated, colligated his enormous array of facts” psychical researchers set out to 
“collect, collate, and colligate the disarray of their facts” (Phelps, 1885, p. 256). 
While James was willing to involve members of the public in his scientific practice, other 
early psychologists were not. The particular American interpretation of Wundtian introspection, 
promoted most ardently by Edward Titchener provided one alternative. Remaining within the 
laboratory environment, Titchenerian introspectionism often abandoned the measurement of the 
speed of mental processes in favour of an introspective examination of the units of consciousness 
by those trained in the method. Training, in this case, was to ensure the attainment of the best 
results if only from a specialized few (C. D. Green, 2010). On the other hand, questionnaires 
forewent training and instead enlisted the untrained masses in the introspective process. Valuable 
results would be obtained in looking at the results of this kind of introspection as a whole, rather 
than relying on findings from a few intensely interrogated minds. Each system was predicated on 
a different understanding of where psychological facts could be best achieved, whether through 
the efforts of the expert or through the aggregation of the experiences of a portion of larger 
society. In each case mental phenomena otherwise outside the scope of study were rendered part 
of the purview of scientific psychology by an extension of the discipline’s methods.  
In this chapter I focus on two specific debates over psychical phenomena: attempts to 
interpret the findings of the census of hallucinations described in the previous chapter and a 
debate over experimental work on telepathy that arose at the close of the nineteenth century. 
James was – unsurprisingly – a central figure in both discussions, joined in the latter instance by 
Titchener. The census of hallucinations was very clearly a questionnaire-based inquiry. The 
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studies of telepathy were not. Nonetheless, statistics were as crucial objects for debate in each 
enterprise as, irrespective of method, calculations of probability were central to competing 
interpretations. Unlike questionnaire endeavours that relied on the accumulations of masses of 
descriptive material, the debates discussed in this chapter often-involved precise numerical 
values. Though numbers were easier to synthesis than hordes of descriptive data, they remained 
open to interpretation and debate. As a counterpart to the census, the related debate over 
experimental inquiries into telepathy provides insight into the different methodological 
commitments of early American psychologists and their vision of what constituted psychological 
science and the proper route to truth. At the same time, I argue, the non-psychical understanding 
of mental life put forward in this debate itself rendered information gleaned from untrained 
members of the public – precisely the form of data collected in questionnaire projects – as 
inherently untrustworthy. This threatened to undermine the entire project of questionnaire 
research. 
Interpreting the Census of Hallucinations 
Amassing material for a census of hallucinations was, at least superficially, 
straightforward, but interpreting the results of this endeavour was more involved. James’s public 
pleas for aid in conducting the census in the United States were successful, though his efforts 
resulted in only a fraction of the 50,000 responses it had been hoped would be produced as part 
of the larger international endeavour (James, 1890b). In the end the American census attracted 
7,123 responses and even though this was far below the number of responses desired at the 
project’s outset James was overwhelmed (see Chapter 5). Of these, 1,051 were reports of 
hallucinatory experiences (James, 1986b). After eliminating those whose experiences occurred 
when under the age of 10 and reports of vaguely similar experiences from a single individual, 
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James was left with “62 subjects with 71 cases of visual hallucination of some recognized living 
person.”320 In order to obtain a more accurate estimate of the number of visual hallucinations 
experienced by these individuals James then – as a correction for hallucinatory experiences that 
had been lost to memory, following the example of the treatment of figures for the British census 
– multiplied this number by 6 ½. This left him with the figure of 462, meant to represent the 
probable number of veridical hallucinations actually experienced by these individuals since the 
age of 10.321 Further calculations using the death rate in the United States led James to conclude, 
“apparitions on the day of death are, according to our statistics, 487 more numerous than pure 
chance ought to make them.”322 With these figures, James thought, one could argue “against the 
probability of chance coincidence” as an explanation for veridical hallucinations.323  
Even prior to completing his analysis of the American census, James was convinced that 
veridical hallucinations occurred at levels above chance. He praised the British census for “an 
unusually careful handling of the raw material offered” which produced “a great accession of 
new facts” (James, 1895b, p. 69). Its more than 17,000 collected responses, James (1895b) 
determined, “affords a most formidable presumption that veridical hallucinations are due to 
something more than chance” (p. 75). The still to come final results of the American census, 
James (1895b) hoped, would only lend further credence to this conclusion.  
In these census undertakings, investigators sought to define the probability, on the basis 
of chance alone, of an individual reporting a hallucinatory experience that corresponded an event 
                                                
320 W. James to H. Sidgwick, July 11, 1896 in James (1986b, p. 74). Due to the smallness 
of this number, James opted not to correct the number for “suspicious” cases as was done with 
the results of the British census (see James, 1986b, p. 74). 
321 See W. James to H. Sidgwick, July 11, 1896 in James (1986b, p. 74). 
322 W. James to H. Sidgwick, July 11, 1896 in James (1986b, p. 74). 
323 W. James to H. Sidgwick, July 11, 1896 in James (1986b, p. 74). 
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that in fact took place and to compare this to the frequency of these kinds of reports in the census 
data. As James (1892) described, 
The result seems to be, roughly speaking, that about one adult in ten has had such an 
[hallucinatory] experience at least once in his life, and of the experiences themselves 14 
per cent coincide with some real distinct event. In other words, one person out of every 
one hundred and forty in the community has had a veridical hallucination of some sort or 
other, vague or precise. The question is, Is this degree of frequency too great to be 
deemed fortuitous, and must we suppose an occult connection between the two events? 
(p. 733) 
The presumption was that if such cases occurred with sufficient frequency psychical phenomena 
were substantiated. How accurate psychical researchers’ calculations were was a matter of some 
debate.  
Statistical Arguments 
 Disagreements over statistical interpretations of psychical findings were not, of course, 
limited to the census of hallucinations. The invocation of probabilities was a mainstay of 
psychical investigations. Like the census, other studies sought to prove that seemingly 
otherworldly phenomena were more than mere chance coincidence and, in fact, represented 
genuine wonders. Yet the sheer scope of the census, relative to other investigations, rendered the 
potential ramifications of its conclusions that much larger.  
 Immediately prior to the formal founding of the ASPR problems of data collection and 
interpretation were highlighted by the Society’s soon-to-be first president. Writing in the pages 
of Science, Newcomb derided a recent call for accounts of experiences with thought-
transference, apparitions, and related phenomena that had appeared in the newspaper the New-
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York Nation: “it would be difficult for the society to put forth any thing better fitted than this 
advertisement to lower the estimation in which their work is held by common-sense people” 
(Newcomb, 1884, p. 372). In his estimation, a full percent of the population was susceptible to 
vivid dreams, visions, and illusions. On this basis he calculated a set of expected probabilities, 
which he used to argue that there occurred nearly everyday, purely as a result of coincidence, 
some correspondence between a death and “the dream or vision by a friend of the dying person” 
(Newcomb, 1884, p. 372). Just these kinds of calculations were central to psychical researchers’ 
projects, though it was often hoped that the “the application of the doctrine of chances” (Gurney, 
1884, p. 509) would substantiate rather than explain away certain phenomena. 
Studies undertaken in the years prior to the census were explicit about the evidentiary 
value of statistical analyses. The ASPR’s Committee on Thought-Transference, calculated 
probabilities associated with their collected evidence, but also highlighted the importance of 
allowing individuals to evaluate evidence for themselves. Given the latter commitment, they 
sought to provide as full an account of this evidence as possible in order “to enable persons who 
are unfamiliar with the principles of mathematical probability to form their own independent 
judgment of the soundness and the just application of our methods, and of the fairness of our 
conclusions” (J. M. Peirce & Pickering, 1885, p. 17).324 To what extent their readers were 
equipped to do so is an open question. 
 Problems of data collection further complicated attempts at statistical analysis. Toward 
the end of his work on the American census, James was disheartened by the quality of responses 
                                                
324 Other psychical investigators similarly sought to leave conclusions to readers, 
presenting them with unadulterated evidence, rather than their own interpretation, through the 
reproduction of graphic recordings (see Bordogna, 2008, p. 113). James similarly explicitly 
strove to report only the facts, rather than his conclusions, in his investigation into the purported 
contacts made by medium Leonora Piper with Hodgson following the latter’s death (see 
Bordogna, 2008, p. 129). 
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and his own lacklustre efforts to organize the material. Particularly problematic was the first 
phase of the census, which sought to ascertain simply the proportion of individuals who had 
experienced veridical hallucinations during their lifetime, relative to those who had not: “My 
impression is that beyond the crude appearances, no accurate analytic statistics can be based on 
the [Schedule] A’s, from the imperfection of the record.”325 More still, much of the material was 
in disarray, due to his admitted failure to note – until the very end of the analysis – from which 
Schedule A individual accounts of hallucinatory experiences had originated. Of the more 
detailed Schedule Bs, which provided the specifics of hallucinatory experiences from those who 
answered yes on the first part of the inquiry, James was more optimistic. These, James 
contended, as he handed the material over to Hodgson for analysis, seemed “sufficient for 
statistics.”326 This pronouncement was rooted in James’s observation that he and Eleanor 
Sedgwick, the head of the British census in charge of statistical analyses, had arrived at “the 
same percentages.”327 The correspondence of numbers across the two endeavours was sufficient, 
in James’s view, to affirm the worth of the data collected as part of the American census.  
The underlying rationale for the census, as well as other data collection projects into 
psychical phenomena, was known as the “cumulative evidence” or “faggot” argument. This 
argument held that it was more probable that a witness otherwise known to be truthful was being 
dishonest than it was that an improbable phenomena had taken place, but, and this is the crucial 
point, that with the an increase in the number of witnesses the probability of testimony being true 
would be surpass the improbability of a phenomena (see Bordogna, 2008, p. 105). To be sure, 
this chain of reasoning was not universally accepted, yet for his part James (1909) asserted, 
                                                
325 W. James to R. Hodgson, May 25, 1892 in James (1999, p. 271). 
326 W. James to R. Hodgson, May 25, 1892 in James (1999, p. 271). 
327 W. James to R. Hodgson, May 25, 1892 in James (1999, p. 271). 
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I am … constantly baffled as to what to think of this or that particular story, for the 
sources of error in anyone observation are seldom fully knowable. But weak sticks make 
strong faggots; and when the stories fall into consistent sorts that point each in a definite 
direction, one gets a sense of being in presence of genuinely natural types of phenomena. 
As to there being such real natural types of phenomena ignored by orthodox science, I am 
not baffled at all, for I am fully convinced of it. (p. 587) 
The faggot argument was convincing for James, but he was under no illusions about the 
persuasiveness of the argument for more sceptical individuals. Writing about his work on the 
American census he informed Eleanor Sidgwick that he thought the calculation of statistics 
regarding veridical hallucinations was unlikely to sway opinion on the matter.328 Even the larger 
international effort was deemed insufficient on this front as it was “still too small for knock 
down proof of occult cause” (James, 1895b, p. 74).  
For those like James, who regarded telepathy as likely on the basis of other forms of 
evidence, including firsthand personal experience, census statistics simply reinforced this belief. 
On the other hand, James (1895b) noted 
they will not convert the disbeliever, who will pooh-pooh the statistical method in toto 
when it takes 17,000 answers to get 30 good cases to cipher with, saying that the field is 
too vast and lean for profitable reaping, that figures got by applying so many hypothetical 
corrections to inaccurate crude data, savor too much of guess-work to inspire confidence, 
and that cooked returns are cooked returns, even though, like these, they be cooked for 
the safe side, the side adverse to the conclusion reached by their means. (p. 74) 
                                                
328 W. James to E. M. Sidgwick, May 15, 1892 in James (1999, p. 269). 
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Doubt of the form James described was pervasive within scientific circles. Cattell (1896) 
vehemently expressed his view of the census: “when we have an enormous number of cases, and 
cannot find among them all a single one that is quite conclusive, the very number of cases may 
be interpreted as an index of the weakness of the evidence” (p. 582).  
Hall, James’s former student, was similarly derisive of the evidence accumulated in 
psychical research. In reviewing the work of English psychical researchers, including the 
recently released Phantasms of the Living (Gurney et al., 1886), Hall (1887a) noted  
we must hasten on to note the fallacious conception of evidence in such a field. Much is 
said about “spreading responsibility,” the “cumulative” nature of the proof for telepathy, 
increasing the number of people who are knaves or idiots if it is not true, and the 
multiplication of instances is compared to increasing the size of a bundle of faggots, each 
one of which is easily broken, till together their evidential value is irresistible. (p. 143) 
Psychical researchers were striving for quantitative proof in their investigations; that is, the 
accrual of a great quantity of cases. This, however, from Hall’s view was a fundamentally flawed 
approach. It was not quantity, but quality that was to take precedence through “more systematic 
and prolonged study of such cases as have been already found” (Hall, 1887a, p. 144).329 These 
kinds of concerns were just as relative to questionnaire-based child study investigations, but in 
that realm the stakes were not nearly so high. Though psychical researchers recognized the 
necessity of quality material (see Chapter 5) their emphasis on quantity often overshadowed 
other considerations.  
The ability of psychical researchers to invoke probabilities that located the chance 
occurrence of an extraordinary event at astronomical levels was also singled out as problematic 
                                                
329 The study of Mrs. Piper by Amy Tanner (1910), conducted under Hall’s tutelage, 
certainly fit this description. 
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(see Jastrow, 1900, pp. 97–8; Münsterberg, 1899, p. 76). As one observer commented, psychical 
researchers’ “use of the so-called doctrine of chances is so ludicrous as to be practically a 
burlesque of science” (Buckley, 1888, p. 454). Jastrow (1900), for instance, attributed faulty 
estimations of this sort not simply to a misunderstanding of probability theory, but also to the 
persuasiveness of personal experience for those making such calculations: 
We find a misconception of the nature of the application of the doctrine of chance to 
mental coincidences, which brings about an apparent recognition but an intrinsic 
belittling of the rôle which chance really plays in the evidence advanced for telepathy; we 
find that this error is probably due to an unfortunate, intensely individual view of the 
problem, which insists upon an explanation of personal experiences, and disregards the 
essentially impersonal and statistical nature of the inquiry. (p. 94) 
More still, investigators were cautioned to take greater precautions against error. Paralleling the 
overblown probabilities propounded as evidence in favour psychical events, Hall (1887a) 
advised that in this line of research the likelihood of error “would be shown so incalculably great 
could the calculus be intelligently applied to their estimation” (p. 144).  
Some of the most pointed criticism of psychical researchers’ attempts to marshal 
probabilities for their ends came from more statistically literate individuals. Philosopher and 
logician Charles Sanders Pierce and his student Christine Ladd Franklin, both of whom 
undertook work that fell within the new psychology, were especially critical of the calculations 
of psychical researchers.330 At Johns Hopkins Pierce established a Metaphysical Club, many of 
the members of which were avowed skeptics of psychical phenomena, some undertaking work 
                                                
 330 On Peirce and psychology see Leary (2009) and Cadwallader (1974). On Ladd Franklin 
see Cadwallader and Cadwallader (1990) and Furumoto (1992). 
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explicitly to disprove these kinds of occurrences (e.g., Jastrow, 1886a).331 Ladd Franklin was one 
member of the club (Behrens, 2005), and also a founding member of the ASPR (Coon, 1992b). 
Her criticisms of the work of others, however, seem to have been her only significant 
contribution to the psychical field.  
In the mid-1880s, just after completing work for a doctorate at Johns Hopkins University, 
Ladd Franklin took French psychical research Charles Richet to task for what she characterized 
as his misuse of the theory of probabilities. Richet, a physiologist and psychical researcher, 
published results of a study into thought-transference within the pages of Revue Philosophique at 
the end of 1884 in which he purported to prove, through his invocation of the theory of 
probabilities, the phenomenon’s existence. The application of probability theory to psychical 
phenomena was Richet’s particular innovation, one soon taken up by other researchers (Hacking, 
1988).  
Although Richet undertook four different experiments on mental suggestion, including 
“guessing a photograph drawn at hazard from a set of six, finding a watch hidden under one of 
several orange-trees by means of the vibrations of a stick, and spelling out names by means of 
table-rappings” (Ladd Franklin, 1885, p. 133), for the purposes of her statistical critique Ladd 
Franklin focused on an experiment involving guessing cards drawn randomly from a deck. On 
the basis of his experiments Richet calculated the probability of mental suggestion to be 2/3, the 
ratio of the number of correct trials to the total number of trials. This, however, as Ladd Franklin 
(1885) points out, is not the probability that the findings were the result of chance: “a 
                                                
331 Among the Johns Hopkins Metaphysical Club members with connections to the new 
psychology were Cattell, Hall, Dewey, Jastrow, Ladd Franklin, Benjamin Ives Gilman, William 
Noyes, and Royce, a corresponding member of the group (Behrens, 2005). The club was founded 
in the wake of the more famous Cambridge Metaphysical Club of the 1870s, of which Pierce was 
also a member (Menand, 2001). 
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comparison of this sort affords no measure of the improbability of the observed facts being the 
result of chance” (p. 133). What is needed is not a calculation of the deviation from the average, 
but rather the probability that such a deviation should occur. Richet, Ladd Franklin (1885) notes, 
“does not seem to know that there is a mathematical formula by which this probability is 
determined” (p. 133). Applying her own mathematical knowledge to his numbers, she arrived at 
1/70 as the probability of the deviation from the average found in his card guessing experiment, 
far from his original 2/3 value. Though taking no particular position with respect to the reality of 
psychical phenomena herself, Ladd Franklin (1885) thoroughly refuted Richet’s conclusions: 
“his unfamiliarity with the theory of probabilities renders his numerical deductions, except the 
most obvious ones, misleading and useless” (p. 133). 
The same year Ladd Franklin’s commentary of Richet appeared, so too did a study by 
Peirce and Jastrow (1885) often regarded as the first experiment in scientific psychology in the 
United States. In their work Peirce and Jastrow offered a probabilistic criticism of the existence 
of the sensory discrimination threshold identified by German psychophysicist Gustav Fechner. In 
doing so, they linked their findings to psychical matters, arguing that purported instances of 
“telepathic” phenomena could be explained with reference to faint sensations outside of 
awareness (C. S. Peirce & Jastrow, 1885, p. 83; see also Cadwallader, 1974; Dehue, 1997; 
Hacking, 1988). A decade later Jastrow (1895) continued to assert, in response to claims of 
psychical phenomena,  
the possibility of the transference of thought, apart from the recognized channels of 
sensation, has been too frequently discussed with the suppressed or unconscious 
assumption that our knowledge of the means by which we ordinarily and normally 
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convey to others some notion of what is passing in our own minds, is comprehensive and 
exhaustive. Nothing could be farther from the truth. (p. 571)   
Studies like the one conducted with Pierce provided concrete evidence by which to support the 
idea that faint sensations, outside of conscious awareness, were viable causes of purported 
psychical experiences. 
Peirce was highly sceptical of psychical phenomena, even given his friendship with the 
great believer James. Though James was much impressed with the SPR’s Phantasms of the 
Living (Gurney et al., 1886), Peirce found much to fault in the volume, offering up an extensive 
critique of the study’s methods and conclusions (see Hacking, 1988). He criticized the author’s 
for their misapplication of statistical reasoning, particularly in the case of calculations related to 
“spontaneous telepathy” or veridical hallucinations: 
they cipher out some very enormous odds in favor of the hypothesis of ghosts. I shall not 
cite these numbers, which captivate the ignorant, but which repel thinking men, who 
know that no human certitude reaches such figures as trillions, or even billions to one. (C. 
S. Peirce, 1887a, p. 150)  
Outside of the extravagant probabilities presented, it was the character of the data on which these 
were based that most troubled Peirce. His outline of 18 specific points of contention with the 
study focused largely on the quality, or lack thereof, of the cases included in the analysis. In his 
opinion, given “the utter uncertainty of all the data, it would be very rash to draw any conclusion 
at all. But the evidence so far as it goes, seems to be rather unfavorable to the telepathic character 
of the phenomena” (C. S. Peirce, 1887a, p. 156). 
Peirce’s commentary did not go uncontested as Gurney (1887), the driving force behind 
the volume, provided his own point-by-point rebuttal. Unwilling to concede ground, Peirce 
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responded at length. Admitting a number of errors in his original commentary, notably in his 
identification of the numbers assigned to specific cases he considered suspect, he characterized 
Gurney’s decision to focus on his errors rather address the real issues at hand as a “line of 
argumentation [that] seems more appropriate to a school disputation than to a scientific inquiry” 
(C. S. Peirce, 1887b, p. 181). Once again attacking the logic of the undertaking and the form of 
the statistical analyses Peirce (1887b) concluded “until the telepathic theory of ghost-stories has 
been rendered far more antecedently probable than it now is, it is useless to try to establish it as a 
scientific truth by any accumulation of unscientific observations” (p. 215). Perhaps predictably, 
Gurney (1889) offered a further lengthy refutation only to have their ongoing debate cut short by 
his untimely death. In his absence Myers (1889), one of Gurney’s co-authors on Phantasms of 
the Living, waded into the debate, arguing that Gurney   
always intended to take a further census before long. It is to be hoped that his example, in 
thus substituting the laborious but fruitful methods of statistics for the vague generalities 
current on this subject before him, may be followed in England and elsewhere. (p. 301) 
Though Peirce (1887b) was far from enthusiastic about this prospect, he did contend that if 
investigators were determined to continue with this kind of work, they would be better off 
undertaking “a new census … upon a larger scale and with the sufficient means to carry it out in 
a thoroughly scientific manner” (p. 84). Its doubtful that Peirce considered the larger 
international census to have been carried “out in a thoroughly scientific manner” as it no more 
escaped criticism than did its problematic forerunner. 
The James-Titchener Telepathy Debate 
James involved himself with American census of hallucinations, but was also interested 
in other methods of inquiry in the field. In the final years of the nineteenth century, his 
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investment in the outcome of psychical research led to a dispute with Titchener over a set of 
experiments that seemed to refute previous findings in support of telepathic phenomena.332 As 
revealed time and again over the course of this debate, the two men were by no means of one 
mind with respect to either the existence of psychical phenomena or, perhaps more importantly, 
the proper means of evaluating the reality of these kinds of experiences. The disagreement 
served as a site in which two of psychology’s most distinguished contributors voiced very 
different opinions on what constituted proper investigatory practices and scientific reasoning. For 
Titchener, these investigations were to be laboratory-based (C. D. Green, 2010). James, on the 
other hand, was far less committed to the laboratory as the site of science. For him, scientific 
inquiry required the accumulation of as much information as possible on the subject under 
consideration. With this data at hand, relevant probabilities could be calculated to determine both 
a phenomenon’s existence and prevalence. While one may argue that James’s view of the 
scientific enterprise was coloured by his psychical commitments, he nonetheless articulated a 
very different view of how science was to be carried out.   
The Sidgwicks’ Thought-Transference Experiment 
Strictly speaking the debate between James and Titchener over telepathy was confined to 
a series of seven articles published in Science from late-1898 through the spring of 1899 – as 
well as a series of personal correspondence on the matter during this time – but the issues under 
dispute dated much earlier.333 The discussion centred around experimental results on telepathy 
published by Danish researchers F. C. C. Hansen and Alfred Georg Ludwig Lehmann several 
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including Titchener (1898b, 1899a, 1899b, 1899c) and James (1898b, 1899a, 1899c). See also 
the reprint of the debate, with additional commentary, published by the ASPR (“Messrs. Hansen 
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years earlier (Hansen & Lehmann, 1895). This study was itself a response to still earlier work 
undertaken by the SPR on the topic.334 I focus here less on these original studies, both of which 
took place in Europe, than on how this work was presented in the pages of American scientific 
periodicals and taken up in discussion and debate by two of the most prominent new 
psychologists in the country. In the course of this dispute, James and Titchener each made 
explicit their differing scientific commitments. These scientific allegiances, in part, provide 
context for James’s willingness to engage in, and entertain more generally, work with the 
questionnaire method, as well as the larger – often dismissive – disciplinary response to these 
undertakings. 
In 1890 Henry and Eleanor Sidgwick, with the assistance of entertainer George Albert 
Smith,335 published findings from a series of experiments on thought-transference in the SPR’s 
Proceedings (Sidgwick, Sidgwick, & Smith, 1890). Smith served as the telepathic agent in the 
experiment while 4 hypnotized subjects served in the role of percipient. After Smith randomly 
selected and looked at a 2-digit number (between 10 and 90) the percipient guessed what number 
had been drawn. Correctly guessed digits, irrespective of their order, were scored as successes. 
Over the course of 644 trials in which the agent and percipient were in the same room, 131 
successes were recorded, while over 228 trials in which the agent and percipient were in separate 
rooms, only 9 successes were recorded. In the former setup 14 of the 131 recorded successes 
                                                
334 Also see James’s (1897) earlier review of Henry Sidgwick’s response to the work of 
Lehmann and Hansen. 
335 As an entertainer Smith employed mesmerism and telepathy in his performances, and 
attracted the attention of prominent British psychical researcher Edmund Gurney, who employed 
Smith as his private secretary. Gurney, it is rumoured, committed suicide in 1888 when Smith 
and another’s deliberate deceit in a thought-transference experiment was revealed (Oppenheim, 
1985). 
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were guesses in which the order of the digits were reversed; in the latter, this number was 1 of 9 
(Sidgwick et al., 1890).  
Anticipating some of the criticism to come, the Sidgwicks noted the possibility that 
hyperaesthetic whispering, that below the level of general awareness, had influenced their 
findings. Acknowledging that telepathy operated with far more success when agent and 
percipient were in the same room, the experimenters noted also “any whispering or faint 
pronouncing of the number would lead, one would think, to numbers whose names have 
common characteristic letters being mistaken for each other” (Sidgwick et al., 1890, p. 165). 
This kind of correspondence between errors and the selected number was, however, not found 
and instead the experimental results were taken as evidence in favour of telepathic phenomena 
(see also “Review of Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern,” 1896, p. 98). 
The Hansen & Lehmann Experiment 
The Sidgwick experiments were presented as evidence in favour of telepathy, but their 
findings were soon challenged. Hansen and Lehmann repeated this experiment on telepathy with 
particular attention to the previously ruled out whispering explanation (see Hacking, 1988). As 
an unnamed reviewer for the Psychological Review described, 
Repeating the experiment with two hemispherical mirrors, 90 cm. wide, opposite each 
other, the head of the agent being in the focus of one, and that of the percipient in the 
focus of the other, they found that the numbers could be heard by the percipient, and 
consequently named rightly; when the agent inwardly articulated them, even [though] the 
bystanders could hear nothing and the agent’s lips were tightly closed. (see also “Review 
of Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern,” 1896, p. 98)
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The finding that whispering was the source of results that could otherwise be interpreted as 
telepathy was further supported, in the reviewer’s opinion, by Hansen and Lehmann’s discovery 
that the mistakes made by the subjects in the Sidgwicks’s experiments mirrored those made by 
subjects in their study. These mistakes they argued, despite the Sidgwick’s earlier dismissal of 
the idea, were the result of imperfect hearing and thus the confusion of phonetically similar 
numbers (“Review of Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern,” 1896). Presenting a highly favourable 
account of the Danish studies, the reviewer noted that Hansen and Lehmann’s work constituted 
“a genuinely scientific contribution to the elucidation of so-called thought-transference 
phenomena, and contrasts most agreeably with the random abuse to which their recorders are 
accustomed” (“Review of Ueber unwillkürliches Flüstern,” 1896, p. 99). 
The Explanatory Power of Faint Sensations 
The idea that some or all purported telepathic phenomena could be explained with 
reference to imperceptible sensations, as Hansen and Lehmann’s study intimated, was not new. 
Just prior to assuming the presidency of the newly formed ASPR, Newcomb (1884) speculated 
that accounts of “feeling at a distance without the intervention of any physical agent” (p. 373) 
were simply experiences that had been mischaracterized: 
We must remember that the physical connection through which one mind affects another 
may be of the most delicate kind; may, in fact, nearly evade all investigation. The 
slightest look, an unappreciable motion of the muscles of the mouth or eyes, made 
perceptible through the light which is reflected to the eye of the second person, constitute 
a physical connection. (Newcomb, 1884, p. 373) 
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An individual might perceive, below the level of general awareness, the subtlest of physical 
changes in another and this might be sufficient to account for occurrences so readily classified as 
telepathic.  
Identifying whether individuals were capable of detecting these kinds of faint changes 
was a project for the new scientific psychology. Peirce and Jastrow’s work on the sensory 
discrimination threshold, discussed earlier, and their finding that there was in fact no absolute 
minimum perceptible difference was a project targeted at just these issues: 
The general fact [of no minimum perceptible difference] has highly important practical 
bearings, since it gives new reason for believing that we gather what is passing in one 
another’s minds in large measure from sensations so faint that we are not fairly aware of 
having them, and can give no account of how we reach our conclusions about such 
matters. The insight of females as well as certain “telepathic” phenomena may be 
explained in this way. Such faint sensations ought to be fully studied by the psychologist 
and assiduously cultivated by every man. (C. S. Peirce & Jastrow, 1885, p. 83) 
Though Peirce and Jastrow’s experiment offered an alternative basis for ostensibly telepathic 
experiences, this work was not enough to discredit all future findings in this direction. Psychical 
researchers, rather than attributing evidence of telepathy to an agent’s detection of subtle sensory 
information from the outset, sought to assess whether these kind of sensory processes were in 
fact operative.  
The debate between James and Titchener over telepathy began in earnest with Titchener’s 
publication of a brief research report in Science on the ability of individuals to detect when they 
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are being stared at.336 Referencing some laboratory experiments he and his students had 
conducted on the matter, he rejected the idea that the feeling of being stared at was the result of 
some ubiquitous telepathic ability. Rather, the phenomenon was described as no more than the 
result of an awareness that others are in a room and our tendency to direct attention to, what are 
otherwise normal and unremarkable, sensations like those at the back of one’s neck. For 
Titchener (1898b) undertaking investigations with his students on what might be regarded as a 
trivial matter was justified as a project that allowed for the “breaking-down of a superstition 
which has deep and widespread roots in the popular consciousness” (p. 897). In doing so, this 
kind of project provided students of psychology with a useful introduction to the scientific 
mindset. His further remark that “no scientifically-minded psychologist believes in telepathy” 
(Titchener, 1898b, p. 897) was likely targeted at the field’s staunchest supporter of spiritualistic 
phenomena: James. This, together with the final words of Titchener’s article, which 
characterized Hansen and Lehmann’s recent research on telepathy – or the lack thereof – as 
“brilliant work” (Titchener, 1898b, p. 897) moved James to respond.  
Central to the resulting dispute was disagreement over the validity of Hansen and 
Lehmann’s conclusions given their investigatory practices. In evaluating this work James and 
Titchener took markedly different approaches. Relying on a statistical analysis, much like in his 
earlier census work, James contended that Hansen and Lehmann had failed to provide sufficient 
proof that results of thought-transference studies were explicable on the basis of hyperaesthetic 
whispering. The less psychically sympathetic Titchener, held the experiment up as conclusive 
                                                
336 The investigation of this subject had previously been suggested by Hiriam Stanley of 
Lake Forrest College, in Illinois, who specifically suggested there was need to investigate 
phenomena such as the ability of some individuals to detect when they are being stared at from 
behind (Stanley, 1891). 
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evidence against telepathy, very much in line with his own laboratory-based work on 
individuals’ ability to detect being stared at. 
James’s Mathematical Refutation  
Prior to Titchener’s incendiary dismissal of telepathic phenomena and its believers, James 
published a critique of Hansen and Lehmann’s experiment. The anonymous review of the study 
which appeared in the Psychological Review was followed shortly thereafter by a piece by James 
in which he reviewed the formal response issued by Henry Sidgwick to the work. In this review 
James, perhaps unsurprisingly, sided with Sidgwick’s analysis of the research. He criticized 
Hansen and Lehmann for the paucity of their data, which consisted of only 500 observations, a 
number James deemed “obviously too small a number for safe conclusions” (James, 1897, p. 654 
fn.). Convinced that more observations were required to reach definitive conclusions, he went so 
far as to collect data for “a series of upwards of 1,000 guesses at bi-digital numbers whispered 
with closed lips by the agent” (James, 1897, pp. 654–5 fn.). With his own set of data in hand 
James, following the method of Hansen and Lehmann, compared the four most frequent errors in 
both his results with those of the British researchers and found twenty commonalities between 
the two sets of data. He then compared the four most frequent errors in his series with the four 
least frequent errors in the Sidgwick experiment, finding that fifteen digits were the same across 
the studies. Given the similar levels of correspondence, James concluded there was no real 
difference between correctly and incorrectly guessed digits irrespective of the occurrence of 
whispering. In his view “both the agreements and the disagreements are thus probably 
accidental” (James, 1897, p. 655 fn.) and attributable to the limited data collected by the Danish 
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researchers.337 Like Sidgwick, James declared they had failed to prove the “hypothesis of 
whispering as the cause of the ‘thought-transference’ results” (James, 1897, p. 655 fn.).    
In this undertaking, as in other endeavours, James privileged the accumulation of 
substantial quantities of data. He noted, “after analyzing my own 1000 cases that at least 5000, 
(not 500 as in L. & H.) would be required, if one wished any valuable conclusions – and possibly 
10,000 or more.”338 Though recognizing the need for additional data James was uninterested in 
pursuing this work himself, which he attributed to both his “laziness” and the fact that this 
particular line of work would have no bearing on studies of thought-transference conducted with 
agent and percipient in separate rooms.339 
 James considered both his and Sidgwick’s criticisms of Hansen and Lehmann as 
constitutive of a mathematical refutation of their conclusions. He repeatedly informed 
correspondents of this fact, writing to Gardiner: “Sidgwicks criticism and mine are absolutely 
and as it were mathematically conclusive against Hansen’s—&L’s theory that the sidgwick [sic] 
phenomena were due to whispering.”340 He similarly informed Cattell of Hansen and Lehmann’s 
work: “the failure of their proof is as it were mathematical and absolute.”341 This, of course, did 
not mean that their hypothesis regarding the true cause of some cases of thought-transference 
was invalidated, as James admitted the refutation was “not of the hypothesis of L. & H., but of 
                                                
337 See W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 484). 
338 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 484). 
339 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 484). Also a 
consideration was his desire to devote himself to the investigation of his “white crow,” medium 
Leonora Piper (see W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James, 2000, p. 484). 
340 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 8, 1899 in James (2000, pp. 480–1). 
341 W. James to J. M. Cattell, Jan. 10, 1898 [1899] in James (2000, p. 483). 
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their proof of the hypothesis.”342 His earlier critique of this work constituted, in his view, an 
irrefutable argument against the evidence contra telepathy presented by Hansen and Lehmann. 
Wishing further support for his conclusions, James wrote directly to Lehmann. 
Referencing both his critique and that of Sidgwick he inquired, 
Do you think, after these criticisms, that your 500 experiments are still demonstrative of 
your hypothesis that the Sidgwick results were due to whispering? Or do you agree with 
Sidgwick and myself, that both the series were too short, and that the coincidence of 
errors was probably an accidence?343  
Faced with this critique Lehmann admitted that his series was too short to serve as definitive 
evidence in favour of the whispering hypothesis as initially argued. This concession was readily 
seized upon by James who, in his continuing dispute with Titchener, reprinted a portion of 
Lehmann’s response: “Your own as well as Professor Sidgwick’s experiments and computations 
prove, beyond a doubt, that the play of chance had thrown into my hands a result distinctly too 
favorable to my theory” (as quoted in James, 1899a, p. 655).344 
 Irrespective of Lehmann’s judgment of the matter, Titchener remained unconvinced of 
James’s position. Describing his argument against the results of Hansen and Lehmann as “quasi-
mathematical,” in the face of what he saw as Titchener’s continuing obstinacy, James (1899a) 
offered that he “was astounded at this hardness of hearing in my colleague” (p. 655). Though in 
James’s mind his, at least quasi-mathematical, refutation served as powerful evidence against the 
proof offered in favour of the whispering hypothesis Titchener strenuously disagreed. So far as 
he was concerned this line of argument did not amount to much: “I do not know that quasi-
                                                
342 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 484). See also W. James 
to J. M. Cattell, Jan. 10, 1898 [1899] in James (2000, p. 483). 
343 W. James to A. G. L. Lehmann, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 485). 
344 See W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 21, 1899 James (2000, pp. 531–2). 
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mathematics has contributed much to psychology in any field of research” (Titchener, 1899b, p. 
687).  
Number-Habits 
 Probabilities were not the only thing invoked to challenge the evidence purporting to 
explain telepathic results to be a function of whispering. Both James and Titchener raised the 
possibility of number habits as a further complicating factor in the interpretation of the results 
(see Chapter 2).345 Indeed, the observation that individuals sometimes exhibited distinct 
preferences for certain numbers was not new. In the Sidgwick thought-transference study, after 
ruling out whispering as a determining factor in the results, a number of other characteristics of 
percipients’ telepathic capacities were also remarked upon. It was noted that in detecting the 
number selected by the agent, the percipient’s impression of the number tended to be of a visual 
nature (Sidgwick et al., 1890). More specifically, in the case of one percipient, identified only as 
“T.,” a distinct number-habit was exhibited; that is, he tended to guess higher digits (7, 8, 9) far 
less often than other digits (see Sidgwick et al., 1890, p. 170).  
 Number habits were even more problematic in studies where agents selected their own 
numbers, rather than choosing at random from a deck of cards. The ASPR’s Committee on 
Thought-Transference, through their Circular No. 4, provided individuals with instructions for 
making various experiments on telepathy including number telepathy (see Chapter 5). Directions 
for one experiment involved an individual assuming the role of agent and entering the digits 0 to 
9 in any order in the first column of a supplied grid. They then focused on each digit in turn. The 
percipient, unable to see the digits listed by the agent, then guessed which digit was being 
attended to and their response was recorded (Committee on Thought-Transference, 1885). From 
                                                
345 On Hansen and Lehmann’s experiment and number habits see Hacking (1988). 
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the records amassed the committee was able to identify one percipient in particular who 
possessed “a very decided system of guessing, or an unconscious number-habit, which he was 
following all the while, and which was different from the habit of numbers of the agent” (Minot, 
1886, p. 86; see “The First Report of the American Society for Psychical Research,” 1885). In 
following “certain systems of association in giving his numbers” (“The First Report of the 
American Society for Psychical Research,” 1885, p. 156) the percipient served as a decided 
confound. More problematic still were instances where both agent and percipient possessed 
number habits in the same direction as “some successful guesses may be made which are due not 
to thought-transference, but to similarity in the number-habits of the two experimenters” 
(“Messrs. Hansen and Lehmann on the telepathic problem,” 1899, p. 119). 
Although to James’s mind his statistical analysis refuted the conclusions of Hansen and 
Lehmann, the similarity between the errors reported in the Sidgwicks’ experiments and those in 
the Danish study remained to be explained. To do so, James (1897) favoured Sidgwick’s 
speculation that such could be best accounted for by the tendency of subjects in both studies to 
favour certain numbers, observing that “in my own series, the tendency to run on favorite 
numbers in guessing was a well marked phenomenon, to eliminate the effects of which many 
thousands of guesses would be required” (James, 1897, p. 655 fn.). Hansen and Lehmann’s 
limited number of observations undermined their conclusion that whispering was the true cause 
of ostensibly telepathic phenomena, as the difficulties associated with established number habits 
in thought-transference research could only be surmounted through a much more extensive series 
of experiments into the matter. Informing Titchener of the results of his correspondence with 
Lehmann, James wrote 
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he absolutely succumbs to Sidgwick’s and my contention as to the undemonstrative 
character of his own experiments, and that he adopts S.’S hypothesis that the coincidence 
between his error and Sidgwick’s was probably in large part due to the accidental 
coincidence of similar number-habits in the experiments.346  
Although James was in other instances dismissive of mental habits as alternatives to apparent 
instances of thought-transference (see Chapter 5), he was not above invoking these kinds of 
associations as evidence against the evidence against telepathy.  
Like James, Titchener thought number habits were an important consideration. He was 
not, however, inclined to adopt James’s number-habit explanation for the similarity in errors 
across the studies. For Titchener, even given Lehmann’s change of mind, this correspondence 
remained evidence of the whispering hypothesis. Still, he held that in studies of thought-
transference “the next stage of advance must be an exhaustive study of the ‘number habits’” 
(Titchener, 1899b, p. 687, see also 1899c), as mental habits were a plausible explanation for 
instances of apparent thought-transference where whispering was not a sufficient or possible 
factor. Titchener was not alone in this kind of speculation. Both earlier American psychical 
investigators (Minot, 1886, 1889) and psychologists also saw mental habits as central to 
naturalized accounts of some extraordinary phenomena. In a critical account of work on thought-
transference, Jastrow (1887) observed   
the human mind is not calculated to act like a die-box or a raffling-wheel, and to have 
numbers chosen is a different thing from having them drawn. In fact, it is possible to 
suggest a certain kind of number-preference by the framing of the question. (p. 116) 
                                                
346 W. James to E. B. Tichener, May 6, 1899 in James (2000, p. 524). 
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Similarly, Münsterberg (1899) characterized “the surprising coincidences illustrated by recent 
experiments” as no more than the product of “the concordance of associations and other 
similarities of mental dispositions” (p. 76). 
Styles of Scientific Thinking 
Different scientific styles fuelled the debate between James and Titchener and over its 
course they explicitly articulated divergent understandings of what constituted proper science. 
While James offered the opinion “that the experimental evidence for ‘thought-transference’ is 
lamentably poor in amount, and for the most part in quality, to serve as basis for admitting a 
phenomenon so subversive of our scientific beliefs,” he held as an exception to this state of 
affairs the experimental work of the Sidgwicks.347 He characterized their thought-transference 
study, which had precipitated the debate, as “an excellent model of research.”348 That their 
findings could not be explained with recourse to known natural laws was a state of affairs the 
scientifically-minded simply had to accept: “That seems to me the attitude of the truly ‘scientific 
psychologist’ — ‘ ,’ however anomalous, are worth more than all our theories, however many 
other facts the latter may explain.”349 For James, in word if not in deed, the role of the scientific 
psychologist was to accept the facts of mental life as they came, not to interrogate them in light 
of their own theoretical commitments. Facts, once established, held a privileged position. They 
were incontestable, while theories were open for revision and rejection as necessary (see also 
Royce, 1887, p. 228). Of course, in this instance, the facts seemed to affirm James’s own beliefs 
in psychical phenomena. 
                                                
347 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 21, 1899 in James (2000, p. 532). 
348 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 21, 1899 in James (2000, p. 532). 
349 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 21, 1899 in James (2000, p. 532). See also James 
(1896, p. 885). 
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Unlike James who regarded the facts procured in psychical research as indisputable, and 
his simple mathematical calculations as the best manner in which to evaluate the work of 
Lehmann and Hansen, Titchener privileged other aspects of scientific practice in his analysis. As 
a committed proponent of the laboratory as the place of scientific psychology, and 
experimentation as its mode, it was Hansen and Lehmann’s methodology that was paramount. 
Their work was exceptional not simply because its findings refuted telepathy, but because it took 
place in a psychological, not psychical, laboratory. In conforming to this laboratory ideal, the 
study was characterized as “both ingeniously devised and rigidly controlled” (Titchener, 1899b, 
p. 687). As Titchener informed James toward the end of their dispute, 
What I like in Lehmann, and what I believe he deserves great credit for, is that he has 
brought the question into the laboratory. We have left the medium, and the medium’s 
apartments, and the hypnotisings, and the ‘good subjects’ who have been hypnotised so 
often before…and we have the bare laboratory walls, and the waking state of scientific 
scepticism, that we have in all other inquiries.350  
In aligning with his adopted style of scientific reasoning, and providing evidence discrediting 
psychical phenomena, this study served as a prime example of good science for Titchener.351 
James offered his own experimental results on the matter, but these were decidedly less oriented 
toward data collection within the authoritative space of the laboratory, than to the collection of 
                                                
350 E. B. Titchener to W. James, May 28, 1899 in James (2000, p. 536). 
351 Titchener continued to hold the Hansen and Lehmann study in high esteem well into 
the twentieth century. When asked by Münsterberg for advice concerning a possible monetary 
donation to Harvard for psychical studies, he responded that in terms of psychical research: 
“There are two things that are worth doing: (1) the explanation of mediums – like this new 
Beulah Miller, and (2) the laboratory experiment of the Lehmann-Hansen type…. if you could 
make prolonged and exact studies of telepathy, telekinesis, etc., under standard conditions, you 
would remove a great reproach that is now urged against laboratory men in general” (E. B. 
Titchener to H. Münsterberg, 2 February 1913, Folder 2191, Item 42, Hugo Münsterberg Papers, 
Boston Public Library, Boston, MA). 
 254 
large quantities of material that might be used as a mathematical refutation. While James leaned 
more toward a taxonomical, or natural historical, style of scientific thinking in the realm of his 
own psychical research, Titchener was more dogmatically committed to experimentalism across 
the entirety of scientific endeavours (see Crombie, 1994; Hacking, 1982, 2002; Pickstone, 2001). 
 Like Titchener, other psychologists similarly upheld experimentation as a privileged 
methodology. In Jastrow’s case, experimentation was valuable not simply because of its habitual 
location in the controlled space of the laboratory, but also because of what these kinds of studies 
afforded calculations of probability.352 Thought-transference experiments, in particular, were 
advantageous since they presented the possibility of “accurately allowing for the effect of 
chance” (Jastrow, 1900, p. 97). The command of chance afforded by experimentation was 
presumably unattainable in undertakings like the census of hallucinations and questionnaire 
research more generally. 
 Method was paramount in Titchener’s evaluation of psychical findings. At the same time, 
proper method could not be wielded by just anyone, as the qualifications of investigators were 
also determinative. In December 1898 Titchener gave a talk at Mount Holyoke College in which 
he refuted the existence of telepathy.353 Having attended the talk, Gardiner reported that 
Titchener described believers in telepathy as “either men who knew everything about one 
subject, but were without scientific training in departments outside their special field…or they 
were men who knew a great deal about a good many things, but had no thoroughly scientific 
training in anything” with James falling in the latter category.354 James’s lack of sustained 
                                                
352 Despite the idealization of the laboratory Jastrow, like a number of other early 
psychologists, undertook work outside this space, particularly in his efforts to debunk psychical 
phenomena (see Pettit, 2013b). 
353 See H. N. Gardiner to W. James, Jan. 9, 1899 in James (2000, p. 481). 
354 H. N. Gardiner to W. James, Jan. 9, 1899 in James (2000, p. 482). 
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training in the new psychology both explained his credulity and rendered him unqualified to 
evaluate research. This was similarly the case with Sidgwick, whose commentary on the issue 
Titchener reportedly observed “wasn’t worth noticing.”355 As Gardiner reported “it would 
seem…that the only persons who really are competent to form a judgment in the matter are the 
laboratory psychologists, Lehmann, Hansen, Titchener & Co.”356 In privileging training as what 
qualified an individual to undertake research and to make definitive assertions regarding the 
value of findings, Titchener rendered himself – and not James – the arbitrator of truth in these 
matters. 
Titchener’s definitive boundary between those qualified and not to undertake an 
evaluation of psychical research was reflected in his more general attitude toward the field. Like 
a number of other new psychologists at the end of the nineteenth century, Titchener was 
dismissive of the value of psychical research and the reality of spiritualistic phenomena. James’s 
support for both led Titchener to inform Cattell “his credulity and his appeals to emotion are 
surely the reverse of scientific.”357 This kind of condescension, also apparent in their more public 
printed interactions, antagonised James: 
I suspect our beloved Tit. to be lying in this matter in his rejoinder to me [re. having read 
James’s and Sidgwick’s criticisms of Hansen and Lehmann], – such being the mode of 
warfare required probably by his idea of the ‘straight scientific path.’ Your ‘scientist,’ 
outside a few painfully acquired habits in a limited field, is a big a moral savage as any 
                                                
355 H. N. Gardiner to W. James, Jan. 9, 1899 in James (2000, p. 481). 
356 H. N. Gardiner to W. James, Jan. 9, 1899 in James (2000, p. 482). 
357 E. B. Titchener to J. M. Cattell, Nov. (?), 1898, as quoted in Bjork (1983, p. 88). 
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one else, & no faith need be kept, he thinks, with mere outlaws from the tribe, like 
psychical researchers.358  
Attempts by Titchener and others to depict scientists as constituting a morally superior class 
were in clear opposition to James’s vision of knowledge production as a social activity best 
engaged in by many kinds of people. This kind of high regard for the work scientists in the realm 
of psychical investigations was pervasive in the final decades of the nineteenth century, but 
shifted to include more a more diverse cast of characters, including stage magicians, in the early 
twentieth century (see Pettit, 2013b). Titchener did not necessarily see James’s criticism of the 
narrow-mindedness of scientists as negative characterizations. Granting “scientific people are 
one-sided,” he responded that psychical researchers were similarly one-sided in their approach 
and that: “together, with many others, I rather resent the airs of martyrdom that psychical 
research puts on.”359 The practices of psychical researchers and their form of argumentation fell 
outside his conceptualization of science. In doing so, they were readily dismissed and the forms 
of knowledge they produced invalidated in the eyes of Titchener and other likeminded scientists.    
 The scorn directed at psychical researchers irritated James to no end. In the face of his 
own beliefs regarding knowledge production, the dismissive tone of Titchener and others 
chaffed: “no part of the unclassed residuum has usually been treated with a more contemptuous 
scientific disregard than the mass of phenomena generally called mystical” (James, 1890h, p. 
361). Cattell’s vocal scepticism led James to respond, “your state of prejudice is so absolute, that 
quite naively and unconsciously you perpetrate acts of insolence quite as remarkable as your 
lapses of logic, as if I were some minor or child making a nuisance in the psychological 
                                                
 358 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 8, 1899 in James (2000, p. 480). 
359 E. B. Titchener to W. James, May 28, 1899 in James (2000, p. 480). 
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neighbourhood.”360 Categorizing the psychical field as one concerned with “empirical details,” 
he bemoaned that so many insisted on adopting “the attitude of “authoritative aloofness.””361 
Deviating from this aloofness was an Atlantic Monthly article by Münsterberg (1899) excoriating 
psychical endeavours, which appeared in the midst of James’s debate with Titchener. Of the 
piece James remarked, “How clever! but how essentially childish. The insolence of these 
fellows, sure of the applause of Scientism, whatever they may say, is amusing.”362  
Scientism was clearly problematic, but the term “scientist” also held negative 
connotations for James. The word, to his mind, suggested a “priggish sectarian view of science, 
as something against religion, against sentiment, etc.”363 This was not James’s vision of the 
proper form of knowledge production. Recognizing the “mechanical rationalism” (James, 1896, 
p. 886) at the heart of modern science he rejected its dismissal of “the personal and romantic 
view of life” (James, 1896, p. 887), which included “religious thinking, ethical thinking, poetical 
thinking, teleological, emotional, sentimental thinking” (James, 1896, p. 886). Knowledge was, 
or at least could be, deeply personal and “perenially [sic] fed by facts of experience” (James, 
1896, p. 887). Consequently, the kinds of collection enterprises engaged in by the ASPR were 
valuable because they related “to real experiences of persons. These experiences have three 
characters in common: They are capricious, discontinuous and not easily controlled; they require 
peculiar persons for their production; their significance seems to be wholly for personal life” 
(James, 1896, p. 887). There was pragmatic, personal value to knowledge produced outside the 
bounds of the developing strictures of “science.” One means of corralling this kind of 
information, while still engaging in the privileged domain of science, was through the adoption 
                                                
360 W. James to J. M. Cattell, May 8, 1898 in James (2000, pp. 363–4). 
361 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 31, 1899 in James (2000, p. 541). 
362 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, Jan. 10, 1899 in James (2000, p. 484). 
363 W. James to J. M. Cattell, May 4, 1898 in James (2000, p. 364). 
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of a style of scientific reasoning other than the experimental. Naturalistically oriented science, 
such as the circulation of questionnaires, allowed for the collection of the diverse, often personal 
accounts of experience that James so valued.  
 Psychical endeavours, and by association their supporters, were disparaged by many but 
despite this derision James insisted on maintaining friendly relations with those on the opposing 
side. Ending his dispute with Titchener over the reality of telepathy, he wrote: “after this 
correspondence, dear Titchenor [sic], we shall meet somewhat as old friends.”364 Similarly, after 
excoriating Cattell for his dismissal of psychical research, James noted “I don’t care personally a 
rap for the treatment, or think the less well as human beings of the treaters – yourself 
included.”365 In the case of Münsterberg’s Atlantic Monthly article, James simply declined to 
discuss the matter with him insisting, “I have served my time with a priori arguments, and 
henceforward will only listen to those who bring definite talk about particular facts.”366 The 
refusal to engage directly in prolonged personal confrontation did not, of course, stop James 
from expressing his distain to others. Of Münsterberg’s criticisms he insisted he would “leave 
M’s rot lying in the gutter to decay with other similar garbage, awfully cleverly put as it is.”367 
This strategy of maintaining personal relationships even in the face of sustained, and often bitter 
censure, was yet another aspect of James’s inclusivity. Though he regarded the rigidity of 
science as problematic, he did not wholly dismiss its results and rather contended “our debt to 
Science is literally boundless, and our gratitude for what is positive in her teachings must be 
                                                
364 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 31, 1899 in James (2000, pp. 541–2). 
365 W. James to J. M. Cattell, May 8, 1898 in James (2000, p. 364). 
366 W. James to E. B. Titchener, May 31, 1899 in James (2000, p. 541). See also W. 
James to H. N. Gardiner, June 21, 1899 in James (2000, p. 556). 
367 W. James to H. N. Gardiner, June 21, 1899 in James (2000, p. 556). 
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correspondingly immense” (James, 1896, p. 886). The knowledge produced by science was 
valuable, but was not to supplant other forms of knowledge. 
Conclusion 
 Whether involving questionnaires or experimentation research into psychical phenomena 
was a contested matter. Particularly problematic was the interpretation of data produced in these 
undertakings. Some opted to engage directly with the probabilistic thinking that was central to 
psychical investigations and framed their critiques within these lines. Others, Titchener included, 
refused to participate in disputes over the probabilitist particulars of research findings and 
instead upheld as axiomatic all evidence presented contra psychical phenomena. Though he 
continued to assert the validity of Hansen and Lehmann’s initial conclusions, Titchener never 
undertook the kind of fact-based analysis James insisted upon. For him and other early American 
psychologists, including Cattell and Münsterberg, extraordinary experiences of the kind 
investigated by the ASPR were self-evidently within the bounds of natural law. 
The conflicting interpretations offered by James and Titchener in their dispute over 
telepathy is reflective of their conflicting styles of scientific thinking more generally. James 
explicitly aimed to include a wider array of individuals in research projects than Titchener’s style 
of science would allow. In his view knowledge was highly personal and necessarily socially 
inclusive (see Bordogna, 2008). While not opposed to the kind of experimentation Titchener 
privileged, James was unwilling to limit the scientific enterprise to just this form of practice or to 
restrict its practitioners to only those with specific training. This kind of public involvement in 
research was anathema to psychologists who saw the untrained masses as a source of 
fundamentally untrustworthy information.  
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Although Titchener opted to engage with psychical research through experimentation on 
issues at the periphery of the field and advocacy of others’ experimental findings other 
psychologists, especially come the twentieth century, opted for a more direct approach. For these 
researchers, controlled experiments undertaken by experts, often in concert with those skilled in 
deception, were to be the final, and only, arbitrators of truth when it came to spiritualism (see 
Pettit, 2013b; Sommer, 2012). These kinds of efforts at debunking required rejecting earlier 
assumptions regarding the unsuitableness of psychologists for this work, including 
Münsterberg’s (1899) contention that 
daily work in scientific laboratories was a continuous training of an instinctive 
confidence in the honesty of their cooperators. I do not know another profession in which 
the suspicion of constant fraud becomes so systematically inhibited as it does in that of 
the scientist. (p. 78) 
Research into the reality of psychical phenomena was circumscribed to efforts by psychical 
researchers, a group increasingly seen as distinct from psychologists. 
 In an effort to clearly delineate the boundary between the psychical and the psychological, 
and assert their professional authority, psychologists insisted that the investigation of psychical 
phenomena was best pursued “by the same methods and in the same spirit as are other 
psychological problems” (Jastrow, 1900, p. 55). Making themselves the authority on the 
genuineness of phenomena, they crafted “an interesting chapter to the natural history of error, 
showing how readily the emotions carry away the reason, and what a child the layman is before 
the professional expert in sense-deception” (Jastrow, 1889, p. 81). In doing so, the public’s 
capacity to cultivate knowledge was eroded and, at the same time, phenomena previously 
understood to be supernatural were naturalized.  
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Chapter 7 
Naturalizing Unconscious Mental Functioning 
Normal human consciousness is only a narrow extract from a great sea of possible human 
consciousness, of whose limits we know nothing. (James, 1898a, p. 194) 
 
 In the final decades of the nineteenth century, questionnaires were popular instruments 
for the investigation of phenomena that straddled the boundaries of “normal” mental life. Taking 
place alongside studies of explicitly psychical phenomena were inquiries into seemingly more 
mundane matters. Psychological investigations of dreams and unconscious cerebration, though 
often presented divorced from psychical concerns, sought to map the full range of the mind’s 
abilities.368 In doing so, investigators sought to normalize mental functions, and patterns of 
mental association, that produced experiences often characterized as psychical. Rather than 
understand extraordinary occurrences as evidence of a genuine supernatural realm, one 
accessible only through otherworldly channels, psychologists charted the terrain of the mind so 
as to account for these kinds of experiences in terms of normal mental functioning, whether 
conscious or otherwise.369 The discipline’s interest in dreams was part of larger cultural interest 
in the subject during the nineteenth century, and research in this field allowed psychology to 
craft itself as the authority on the true nature of dream-life. Questionnaires proved a useful, if not 
sufficient, tool for collecting large bodies of data that encompassed the full range of human 
mental functioning. Alongside other methodological approaches to psychological science, many 
                                                
368 For a review of psychological work on dreams in late-nineteenth and early twentieth 
century periodicals see Vande Kemp (1981); more generally, see Ellenberger (1970), Groth and 
Lusty (2013), Kroker (2007), and Pick and Roper (2004).  
369 For contemporary discussion of the various meanings ascribed to the term 
subconscious see Münsterberg, Ribot, and Jastrow (1907) and Janet and Prince (1907). 
 262 
of them also statistically oriented, this kind of research served as a site for differing articulations 
of what constituted acceptable evidence in the field. 
Studies on dreaming, and unconscious mental life more generally, employed a number of 
methods in a variety of configurations, but were often oriented toward amassing large quantities 
of data. Although the term “statistics” was a moniker often associated with questionnaire 
investigations, it was not restricted to these kinds projects. Rather, statistics referred not so much 
to the collection of information from a great number of individuals, but to large data sets more 
generally, particularly ones amenable to analysis and classification along various lines. Among 
the most successful of these endeavours were those involving a restricted range of information, 
rather than the accumulation of great expanses of diverse descriptive material. These kinds of 
psychological projects were, I argue, part of an emerging moral economy of data within the new 
scientific psychology (see Daston, 1995). Large quantities of information served as means of 
refuting otherwise persuasive personal experiences with, and individual narrative accounts of, 
dreams and unconscious cerebration that interpreted these facets of mental life as psychical in 
nature. Research like this served as a form of boundary-work (see Gieryn, 1983), which 
demarcated psychological science from non-science. Natural, materially grounded mental 
phenomena, and not superstition-ridden psychical experience, were declared the discipline’s 
appropriate subject matter, and the latter’s reality was rejected. 
In focusing on the plurality of methods at play in dream research, before turning to 
related efforts to document the occurrence of unconscious cerebration, this chapter locates 
questionnaire-based investigations within the larger methodological landscape of psychological 
science in its earliest years. The various research endeavors discussed in this chapter reveal the 
fuzzy boundary between what are often discussed as distinct forms of practice; those 
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characterized as introspective, questionnaire-based, or experimental studies. Among 
investigators, there was no firm agreement on what constituted work within a given 
methodology. Questionnaire-based projects were rarely isolated endeavours. This style of 
inquiry, rather than taking place completely divorced from other forms of practice, was but one 
of many methods applied to various subjects of interest within the new psychology. Within 
experimental inquiries undertaken by trained professionals small bodies of information were 
sufficient to form conclusions. In contrast, non-experimental projects, especially those involving 
the efforts of numerous untrained individuals, necessitated the accumulation of larger quantities 
of material to carry anything approaching the same weight. Depending on the mode of practice 
different standards of evidence applied.  
Within the context of statistically oriented projects, information generated from only a 
few individuals served as counterpart to discussions of data amassed from much larger expanses 
of individuals. While the former served as a means of describing the minutiae of individual 
experiences in depth, the latter allowed for meaningful discussions of difference between 
individuals to take place, much as was done in Galton and Osborn’s imagery investigations (see 
Chapter 1). These kinds of statistics were, in part, a means of revealing innate variation in mental 
life even during periods in which conscious awareness largely lapsed. As such they were part of 
efforts to produce a “natural history of the normal mind” (Jastrow, 1906, p. 222), one that 
encompassed both the conscious and unconscious realms.370 This kind of a natural history of the 
mind naturalized mental functioning, often by rooting it in directly material processes. Dream 
                                                
370 More general discussion of the psychology of dreams, and the relation between 
dream-life and consciousness, were also undertaken during this period. This work was part of a 
broader discourse on dreams, one that involved neither statistical nor experimental studies 
(Gould, 1889a, 1889b, 1889c; Gulliver, 1880; Oswald, 1889; Redway, 1889; L. Robinson, 1893; 
Sully, 1889; “Untitled [Review of ‘Dreams, sleep, and consciousness’ by Geo. M. Gould],” 
1889). 
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research, in particular, offered a site in which to study sensory and perceptual processes and to 
distinguish between mental life as directly influenced by physical stimuli and the functioning of 
the, at least theoretically, isolated mind. Employing diverse methodologies, these endeavours 
offered a counterpoint to more restrictive laboratory-based psychophysical projects on the 
relation between the physical world and sensation and perception and allowed for direct 
discussion of the experiential element of unconscious life.  
Psychology’s interest in dreams was in large part a function of its cultural circumstance. 
For more than a century prior the appearance of Freud’s Die Traumdeutung (The Interpretation 
of Dreams) (1900), dreams were a popular cultural preoccupation, interest in which by no means 
abated into the twentieth century (Carroy, 2006; Groth & Lusty, 2013).371 As Helen Groth and 
Natalya Lusty (2013) note in their recent cultural history of dreams and modernity, “new modes 
of writing about dreams emerge from the early decades of the nineteenth century that promised a 
more systematic approach to the epistemological and ontological conundrums that the 
multiplicity of dream phenomena generated” (p. 5). During this period dreams became the 
subject of popular and scientific inquiry. Among the public, dreams were a means to self-
understanding as part of the increasing psychologization of the self that took place in the 
nineteenth and into the twentieth century (see Groth & Lusty, 2013).372 American psychology’s 
interest in dream-life capitalized on existent cultural practices related to the dream, particularly 
dream interpretation, the recording of dreams in dreams books, and the publication of these 
volumes. French psychology’s similar co-option of cultural practices, with respect to automatic 
writing, has recently been documented by Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau (2013). Much like child 
                                                
371 Carroy (2006) positions Freud as very much embedded in the nineteenth century 
cultural practices associated with dreams, and as a reader of the period’s dream literature. 
372 The development of modern selfhood, in the French context, is also discussed in 
Goldstein (2005). 
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study and spiritualism, dreams – prophetic and otherwise – were of popular interest among the 
American populace. As a function of this popularity, dreams served as a venue in which 
psychology could attempt to enlist the assistance of members of the public in their data 
collection efforts, while asserting its authority over the nature of dream-life at a broad social 
level. 
The Hidden Self 
 That conscious existence was only a portion of mental life was increasingly recognized in 
the nineteenth century (see Ellenberger, 1970). Within American psychology one of the most 
prominent proponents of the subliminal self was James for whom consciousness was not 
singular, but plural. This plurality made itself known in dreams, emotions, and various psychical 
phenomena (see Taylor, 1995, 1996). James’s conviction that there was a subliminal dimension 
to the mind (James, 1890h) was reinforced through his work on the American census of 
hallucinations,  
I have my self, during the past two years as American agent for the census, collected 
some five hundred cases of “hallucination” in healthy people. The result is to make me 
feel that we all have potentially a “subliminal” self, which may make at any time 
irruption into our ordinary lives. (James, 1892, p. 739)373 
More generally, James’s views on the subliminal were influenced by the work of English 
psychical researcher Frederic Myers, one of the co-authors of Phantasms of the Living (Gurney 
et al., 1886). According to this accounting, consciousness was but a small part of the total 
psyche. At the subliminal level there existed a whole host of other functions, most notably ones 
                                                
373 Some criticisms of Phantasms of the Living (Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886), the 
volume that inspired the international census effort, explicitly tied hallucinatory experiences with 
dream-consciousness (e.g., Parish, 1897). 
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responsible for the supernatural phenomena subject to study by psychical researchers. More so, 
the subliminal in Myers’s view, and as taken up by James, was a source of spontaneous 
variations and thus played a vital role in the evolution of consciousness. Dissociative states, such 
as those of hysterics, while possibly degenerative also offered a valuable opportunity for new 
aggregations of personality (see Sech Junior, 2013; Taves, 1999). In this scheme mental 
variation, at both the conscious and unconscious levels, was a crucial element to be explored. 
 Although James was drawn in by Myers’s description of the subliminal as an 
evolutionarily advantageous realm responsible for psychical phenomena, other psychologists 
were less enthusiastic. Jastrow, though he noted Myers’s work in his own account of the 
subconscious, rejected this view of the mind’s depths. Unsurprisingly, this dismissal was largely 
based on Myers’s endowment of the subliminal with extraordinary powers (Jastrow, 1906, 1930; 
see Taves, 1999). Psychical researchers like James and Myers saw psychical phenomena as 
genuine products of a subliminal mind, which possessed supernatural knowledge inaccessible to 
normal consciousness. For instance, James (1890h) reported that he knew 
a non-hysterical woman who, in her trances, knows facts which altogether transcend her 
possible normal consciousness, facts about the lives of people who she never saw or 
heard before. I am well aware of all the liabilities to which this statement exposes me, 
and I make it deliberately, having practically no doubt whatever of its truth. (p. 373) 
As James intimated, new scientific psychologists increasingly rejected the reality of psychical 
phenomena. Jastrow contended that these kinds of experiences were better accounted for by 
operations of the subconscious mind and, critically, that mental functioning at this level was a 
normal, natural state and not the result of a subconscious conduit to the supernatural. 
Documenting Dream-life 
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In his “systematic exposition of subconscious functioning,” presented in The 
Subconscious (Jastrow, 1906, p. viii), Jastrow repeatedly turned to the subject of dreams. This 
interest in dreams can be traced at least as far back to his questionnaire-based work on “The 
Dreams of the Blind” undertaken in the mid-1880s.374 First presented to the Biological section of 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1886 (“Dreams of the blind,” 1886, 
“Notes in science and industry,” 1887, “The dreams of the blind,” 1886), the research appeared 
in print two years later.375 Given the pervasive interest in dreams on the part of the American 
public, the topic of dreams in the blind in general and Jastrow’s particular study of the subject 
attracted discussion in popular periodicals (Buckley, 1888; “Curious facts about dreams,” 1888, 
“Dreams of the blind,” 1886, “Notes in science and industry,” 1887, “Review 4,” 1888, “The 
dreams of the blind,” 1886). Jastrow’s work, which was published in The New Princeton Review, 
was one of the only endeavors by the new psychology to reference Osborn’s mental imagery 
investigations (see Chapter 1).376 For Jastrow, Osborn’s inquiry into imagery was especially 
relevant. It was not simply dream-life writ large that Jastrow (1888d, 1900) sought to interrogate 
                                                
374 Jastrow’s interest in the blind persisted through the 1890s (Jastrow, 1894b) and into 
the twentieth century (Jastrow, 1900, 1906). He later initiated another questionnaire-based study, 
on logical reasoning, by reprinting within the pages of Science a logical statement along with a 
series of questions (Jastrow, 1897a). Readers were asked regarding the logical statement: 
Is this reasoning correct or is it not? If regarded as correct, my request is to have the 
reasons for its correctness given as explicitly as possible. If it is regarded as incorrect, I 
wish in the same way a very explicit statement of the nature of the error. Answers are 
requested from all who are interested in the matter. I am particularly desirous of receiving 
replies from those whose interest in thought is a philosophical one, as well as from those 
who are more specially devoted to scientific pursuits. (Jastrow, 1897a, p. 26)  
What came of this inquiry is unclear. 
375 Interest in the dreams of the blind was not confined to inquiries undertaken by 
psychologists (e.g., “Blind men’s dreams,” 1886). 
376 Reviews of Jastrow’s “The Dreams of the Blind” include Ribot (1888) and an 
anonymous review in the American Journal of Psychology (“Untitled [Review of ‘The dreams of 
the blind’ by Joseph Jastrow],” 1888). A circular based inquiry into sleep and dreams was also 
undertaken in Russia near this time (see “Statistics of Sleep and Dreams,” 1889). 
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but rather the visual character of dreams. Beyond his knowledge of the questionnaire-based 
inquiries of Osborn, and the work of Galton they were based upon (see Jastrow, 1888d), Jastrow 
was certainly aware of, and influenced by, Galton’s larger body of work (Jastrow, 1885a, 1898; 
see Pettit, 2013b). This, together with his earlier work with Peirce (see Chapter 6), oriented him 
toward the probabilistic nature of the universe and the import of individual variation. His 
decision to attend to the visual element in dreaming was in line with the view expressed by 
Galton (1883) that the “faculty of visualising… supplies the material out of which dreams and 
the well-known hallucinations of sick people are built” (p. 84-5). Untangling dream-life from its 
association with meaningful hallucinatory experiences and the superstition of premonitory 
dreams was one of the recurrent features of larger body of dream research undertaken outside of 
directly psychical realms. 
 In Jastrow’s case, the blind were an ideal population in which to study the visual 
character of dreams.377 Seeking to ascertain the developmental period of visual stimulation 
necessary for an individual to continue to possess the power of visualization, even after the loss 
of vision, he turned to individuals in institutions for the blind in Philadelphia and Baltimore.378 
As he saw it, 
if we accept as the test of the independent existence of the sight-centre its automatic 
excitation in dreams, the question can be answered by determining the age of the onset of 
                                                
377 The blind were also a group investigated by a number of others, notably in the study 
of deaf-mute Laura Bridgman, which continued even after her death with anatomical studies of 
her brain (H. H. Donaldson, 1890; Hall, 1879; Sanford, 1886a, 1886b; “The brain of Laura 
Bridgman,” 1891).  
378 These were convenient locales for Jastrow. He spent most of his childhood in 
Philadelphia, after immigrating to the United States from Poland as a young child, and earned his 
undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1882. After obtaining his doctorate 
from Johns Hopkins in 1886, he was at least nominally a fellow at Johns Hopkins from 1886 to 
the spring of 1888. During this period he conducted some research, including this work on 
dreams, and wrote for pieces for Science, as well as popular magazines (see Jastrow, 1930).  
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blindness which divides those who still retain in their dreams the images derived from the 
world of sight, from those who do not. (Jastrow, 1888d, p. 21)  
This project was one of many late-nineteenth and early twentieth century studies that sought 
information on dreams, including a number that focused particularly on the role of sensory and 
perceptual factors in dream-life. The importance of investigating the visual element of dreams, 
over other sensory dreams, was predicated, in part, on Jastrow’s (1888a) conviction that “man is 
a visual animal; as a race we are eye-minded” (p. 598).379 
 To determine the degree of visualization in dreams of the blind required securing not only 
the cooperation of the blind themselves, but also that of “the authorities and teachers” (Jastrow, 
1888d, p. 21) at the institutions within which they resided. Success on this front gave Jastrow 
access to a group of 183 blind individuals of both sexes. These individuals were personally 
examined, their sight tested, and the age and date at which their sight was lost recorded. Most 
importantly, each individual was asked “quite a long series of questions” (Jastrow, 1888d, p. 21) 
on their dreaming habits, beginning with the simply query “Do you dream?” (Jastrow, 1888d, p. 
27). The exact procedure for administering these questions is unclear, but given the visual 
impairment of his subjects Jastrow undoubtedly posed the questions in his lengthy series to 
subjects orally, rather than providing them with a written list of questions to answer, as was, at 
least sometimes, the case in other questionnaire investigations. 
Taking place contemporaneously with Jastrow’s initial inquiry into dreams was a long-
term project at dream collection by another Johns Hopkins graduate, Julius Nelson. After 
receiving his doctorate in biology from Johns Hopkins University in 1888 Nelson was appointed 
Professor of Biology of Rutgers College, later Rutgers University (Hanes, 2008). The same year 
                                                
379 An allusion to Artistotle’s Metaphysics. 
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as he completed his graduate studies, Nelson (1888) published a piece in Hall’s newly founded 
American Journal of Psychology on his efforts to record his dreams and relate them to other 
facets of his life.380 Since beginning his project in November 1884 he had “accumulated the 
records of over one thousand dreams per year” (Nelson, 1888, p. 374). The intent of this 
endeavour, as he described it, was “the study of dreams as a convenient portal to the general 
subject of hallucinations, and with the hope of adding to our knowlege [sic] of this most 
fascinating field of psychology” (Nelson, 1888, p. 374). Despite this expressed aim Nelson had 
little interest in the content of dreams. So far as he was concerned,  
the fact that a person dreams much or little is of more significance than what one dreams. 
A curve representing the variations from day to day in the amount of dreaming has 
scientific interest, while the hobgoblins that we saw are of interest to children. (Nelson, 
1888, p. 375)  
Rather than attending to the content of dreams, Nelson used his extensive dream records to chart 
the relation between amount of dreaming and sexual life. Focusing particularly on nocturnal 
emissions, which he referred to as gonekbole, he found a direct correspondence between these 
and quantity of dreaming. In opting to focus on sexual rhythms and dreaming, Nelson explicitly 
pursued a line of inquiry that connected psychological and physiological functions, one he hoped 
might “stimulate others to study their own dreams” (Nelson, 1888, p. 374).  
Efforts to understand dream-life through the collection of masses of information on one’s 
own dreams were by no means confined to attempts to link dreams and sexual habits.381 While 
                                                
380 Nelson’s decision to publish in the American Journal of Psychology was likely a result 
of, at the very least, an awareness of Hall as a consequence of their overlapping tenure at Johns 
Hopkins (see Hanes, 2008). 
381 Some later experimental studies in psychology inquired more into sleep states than 
dream-life per se (e.g., Sidis, 1908a, 1908b, 1908c). 
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studying the new laboratory psychology with Edmund Sanford at Clark University in the 1890s, 
Mary Whiton Calkins undertook a project on dream-life in which both she and Sanford recorded 
their dreams over the course of a number of weeks. Calkins (1893b) explicitly identified her 
dream project as an experimental endeavour, one that, given the collection of large quantities of 
dreaming data, was also described as a project on the “Statistics of Dreams.” The latter 
characterization was perhaps more apt as it was the collection of a bulk of information on dream-
life that was the central feature of this work. In all Sanford recorded 170 dreams over 46 nights 
and Calkins 205 dreams over 55 nights, an average of roughly four dreams per night.  
Collecting dreams proved a challenge. Calkins and Sanford recorded their dreams by 
making notes “during the night…supplemented by careful study and recollection on the 
following day” (Calkins, 1893b, p. 311).382 This was hardly a foolproof process, as Calkins 
herself noted. Memory was especially fallible with respect to dreams, which were often quickly 
forgotten the next day. If not recorded in detail during the night, dreams were easily lost as was 
illustrated when 
the account of one dream, apparently of peculiar significance, was written out in the dark 
by the experimenter, who then sank off to deep with the peaceful consciousness of a 
scientific duty well done. In the morning the discovery was made that an un-sharpened 
pencil had been used, and the experimenter was left with a blank sheet of paper and no 
remotest memory of the dream. (Calkins, 1893b, p. 312) 
                                                
382 Several years later seven of Calkins’s students at Wellesley conducted “A Study of the 
Dream-Consciousness,” following the same method, in which they recorded their dreams over 
the course of 5 to 6 weeks (Weed & Hallam, 1896). 
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Reliance on memory meant what was produced from these efforts was not a record of the 
entirety of dream-life, but rather of recollected dream-life. The accounts produced by Calkins 
and Sanford were merely a partial record of the activity of this level of the mind. 
The aim of collecting accounts of dreams was, in part, to document what associations 
existed between the content of dreams and life events. Doing so was part of Calkins’s interest in 
association more generally (see Calkins, 1896a, 1896b, 1898; Münsterberg et al., 1894).383 That 
dreams could regularly be traced back to the events of waking life was seen as evidence of “the 
essential congruity and continuity of the dream life with the waking life” (Calkins, 1893b, p. 
323). Nonetheless, Calkins (1893b) was able to identify three distinguishing features of dream-
life: “the comparative feebleness of the attention and the will, the want of discrimination, and the 
relative lack of perception” (p. 334). 
Calkins’s analysis of dreams, like Jastrow’s endeavour, also paid particular attention to 
the role of sense-perceptions in dreaming.384 This involved documenting to what extent dreams 
included, for instance, visual, auditory, tactile, and gustatory sensations. The analysis led Calkins 
(1893b) to contend 
dreams may be most conveniently classified according as they are connected through 
sense excitation with the immediate present, or through the fact of association with the 
waking life of the past, according, that is, as they contain presentations, or merely 
representations. Or, in physiological terms, dreams are occasioned or accompanied by 
peripheral or by merely cerebral excitation. (p. 319) 
                                                
383 Others were similarly interested in associations in dream-life, including Robert 
Woodworth (1897) who conducted a study of the rapidity of associations in dreams. 
384 On visual and other sensory elements in dream-life see also Ladd (1892) and Stanley 
(1899). 
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This is to say, sensory experiences during dreaming were categorized as the result of one of two 
circumstances; either the direct excitation of a sensory organ, just as in waking life, or the mere 
mental representation of previous sensory experiences. These were termed presentative and 
representative dreams, respectively. In pointing to differences in the physiological processes 
underlying dreams Calkins, much like Nelson, deliberately linked psychological experience with 
physiological states, though in a much different manner. While Nelson focused on sexual 
functioning Calkins, who was clearly much more firmly rooted in the new psychology, tied her 
work to sensation and perception, the key subjects of experimental projects in the developing 
science. 
The role of sense-perception in dreaming was also investigated by others at this time. 
Titchener (1895b) expressed an interest in the subject in the mid-1890s, publishing a brief report 
of five cases of taste dreams. Of these, only two were documented in detail, including one 
specifically collected following printed notice, within the pages of the Philosophical Review, of 
J. Clark Murray’s “Do We Ever Dream of Tasting?,” a paper presented at the 1893 meeting of 
the American Psychological Association (see “Notes,” 1894). Murray, a philosopher at McGill 
University, asserted in his presentation that “it remains doubtful whether, when there is no real 
‘taste in the mouth’ at the time, the dreamer ever revives a past taste in mere idea” contending 
instead that “when one dreams of tasting, the taste is not a dream-image, but a dream-sensation” 
(“III. Second annual meeting,” 1894, p. 20); that is, taste dreams were always the result of 
“peripheral excitement in the organ” (“III. Second annual meeting,” 1894, p. 20) which produced 
taste sensations just like any other and thus presentative dreams. For Titchener (1895b) this was 
an overly rash conclusion: “it does not seem justifiable to single out the taste center as not 
centrally excitable, because it is so very easily excitable peripherally” (p. 507).  
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Following in the footsteps of Calkins’s work on dreams, Titchener set out to test the idea 
that true taste dreams, ones purely the result of cerebral activation, were possible. To do so he 
not only gathered information from several individuals on their experiences of taste dreams, but 
also performed a short series of experiments on his own dream-life (Titchener, 1895b). This 
small set of collected material served to refute Murray’s contention that representative taste 
dreams never took place. Over the course of three evenings in late January 1895 he sought to 
bring about his own taste dreams through auto-suggestion prior to sleep, finally succeeding on 
the third night. For these experiments “every precaution was taken to avoid the occurrence of a 
presentation dream; the mouth thoroughly washed out, etc.” (Titchener, 1895b, p. 507). Having 
ruled out immediate sensory information as the root of his taste dream Titchener was free to 
contend that at least some taste dreams were the result of solely cerebral excitation. Beyond this, 
like Calkins, he was able to trace “the associative connections between the dream and events of 
the waking life … with rather exceptional completeness” (Titchener, 1895b, p. 508).  
 Experimentation of this kind on dream-life was also taken up with larger groups of 
individuals. At the State Normal School at Westfield Massachusetts Professor of Psychology 
Will Monroe, inspired by the recently reported work of Norwegian philosopher John Mourly 
Vold (see Warren, 1897), initiated a study of visual stimuli on dreams. Over the course of ten 
successive nights 14 female students in his senior psychology course recorded their dreams after 
looking at coloured stimuli in a variety of shapes (e.g., a red square, violet heart, light blue cat, 
etc.) for between two and ten minutes immediately prior to sleep (Monroe, 1898). An analysis of 
the 221 dreams collected showed little correspondence between stimuli and dreams, with only 18 
dreams featuring the colour and 11 the form of a stimulus. A subsequent study of taste dreams 
was also undertaken with twenty female students at the school (Monroe, 1899). For ten 
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successive nights, just prior to bed, students were required to wash their mouths out and place a 
crushed clove upon their tongue. In comparing dreams across the two endeavours Monroe 
focused particularly on differences in dreams reported of each sensory modality, noting the 
somewhat larger proportion of gustatory and olfactory dreams in the taste study.385 Other efforts 
at experimentation on dream consciousness were also undertaken, including work by Barnard 
College mathematician Grace Andrews, a former Wellesley student. Andrews, in 1900, 
published a study of dreams undertaken at her alma mater. Six Wellesley students, including 
Andrews, recorded their dreams for four nights. Prior to sleep the participants looked at squares 
of coloured glass and paper for five minutes and then at two lithographs for a further ten minutes. 
The experiment failed to produce results as it was cut short after only four nights because of 
Andrews’s (1900) dissatisfaction with the quality of the data collected and her distrust of the 
value of the experimental set up as whole.  
Clark Questionnaires 
Far simpler than attempting to experimentally induce dream content, was the survey of 
the subject via questionnaire. At Clark University, as was the case with so many other topics (see 
Chapter 3), a number of dream related questionnaires were produced in the 1890s and into the 
early twentieth century. These include: “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie” by E. H. Lindley, 
December 1895;386 “Reveries and Allied Phenomena” by G. E. Partridge, April 1897;387 
                                                
385 Monroe (1899), like most investigators, found dream content was often best attributed 
to associations with life experiences. 
386 “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie” Dec. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. See also Lindley and Partridge (1897) and Hall (1924). 
Lindley and Partridge’s (1897) report on mental automatisms, based on some of the responses to 
the syllabus on “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” was briefly reviewed by Thorndike (1898d) as 
part of a series of reviews of the results of Clark questionnaires (Thorndike, 1898a, 1898b, 
1898c, 1898e). 
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“Dreams” by James Ralph Jewell, October 1903;388 “Special Defects” by Augusta Wiggam, 
November 1908;389 “Study in Dreams” by Raymond Bellamy, November 1912;390 and “Dreams” 
by Vance Randolph, November 1914.391 Much broader in scope than other investigations of 
dreams, these inquiries also focused less on the relation between the physical stimuli and 
sensation and perception and more on various forms of difference between groups, as was so 
often the case in questionnaire research where these kinds of comparisons were possible. Like 
much of the questionnaire work at Clark, these studies largely focused on pedagogical or 
developmental issues, with children, or at least childhood, the frequent locus of the inquiry.392  
 Even though these questionnaire-based projects largely eschewed experimentation there 
was an attempt by some to use the two methods in tandem. Jewell’s study into dreams, which 
began in 1903, was such a broad inquiry into the subject that one individual who took up data 
collection for the project felt free to pursue a related, but not explicitly specified, line of inquiry. 
In much the same vein as earlier dream experimentation this teacher “before giving her pupils 
this questionnaire … asked them to look intently at a bright object, red preferably, for some 
minutes before retiring, to see if it would influence their dreams” (Jewell, 1905, p. 2). In line 
with the previous findings of Monroe and Andrews, the visual stimuli had little influence on 
                                                                                                                                                       
387 “Reveries and Allied Phenomena,” April 1897, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. See also Partridge (1897) and Hall (1924).  
388 “Dreams,” Oct. 1903, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. Although Jewell (1905) published on the results of this questionnaire 
investigation, and claimed the project as his own in print, his name is not listed on the circular 
(see Hall, 1924). For a review of Jewell (1905) see Manchester (1906). Jewell (1906a) later 
completed his doctorate at Clark on nature study (see also Jewell, 1906b, 1907). 
389 See Wiggam (1909) and Hall (1924). 
390 See Bellamy (1915a, 1915b), Hall (1924), and Allen (1970). 
391 See Randolph (1915) and Hall (1924). See also Randolph (1925) and Halpert (1981).  
392 Later investigations, notably ones undertaken following Sigmund Freud’s visit to 
Clark in 1909 (Evans & Koelsch, 1985), often approached the discussion of dreams from a 
psychoanalytic perspective (e.g., Bellamy, 1915a, 1915b; Randolph, 1915). 
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dream-life. Lindley’s 1895 questionnaire on “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” which was by no 
means solely focused on dreams, also blurred the boundaries between the circular method and 
experimentation requesting:  
Will you (a) kindly sit in a perfectly dark room, or else bandage, shut or cover the eyes in 
some way to exclude all light, but not to press the eye, and sit for five minutes in quiet, 
attending to the field of vision, and then write down consciously and in order the visual 
impressions you had, describing them fully; (b) stop the ears very firmly and constantly 
also for five minutes, and write what you seem to hear?393  
These experiments, like those undertaken by others, focused on isolating the influence of 
physical stimuli on sensation and perception.  
Although experimental investigations of dreams often made note of the large quantity of 
dreams recorded by a small number of individuals, questionnaire-based studies emphasized that 
these accounts of dreams were provided by a great many individuals. Of his discussion of 2,000 
dreams collected from roughly 800 people, through both the circulation of a questionnaire on 
dreams and the dream diaries kept by himself and some friends, Jewell (1905) contended “no 
study of dreams from such a mass of data has ever been made before” (p. 2). Other Clark studies 
were similarly reliant on large quantities of data (e.g., Lindley & Partridge, 1897; Partridge, 
1897; Wiggam, 1909), though Jewell collected by far the most extensive set of dream data. 
Unlike experimental investigations of dreaming, which tended to rely on large quantities of 
dream records from only a few individuals, questionnaires had the unique advantage of 
surveying a multitude of individuals and thus recording the diversity not only of dreams, but also 
of dreamers. Here, unlike in more experimentally oriented endeavours, it was the variation made 
                                                
393 “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” Dec. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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visible in the mass of material that was of central import, rather than the isolation of pure dream-
life. 
Trust and Training 
 Across inquiries into dream-life trust in, and the training of, participants were of central 
concern. Investigations that relied on the report of only one or two individuals, as well as those 
that gathered information from large numbers of individuals were often the ones least likely to 
comment on the difficulties of data collection. In the case of Calkins’s project she and her data-
collecting counterpart, Sanford, were positioned as trained practitioners ideally suited to the task 
of reporting the details of their dream-life. As such they fit well within the Wundtian model of 
the trained psychologist as psychological subject (Danziger, 1985, 1990), even if their 
undertakings occurred outside of laboratory spaces. On the other hand, the questionnaire-based 
inquiries produced at Clark relied in large part not on trained investigators, but rather on masses 
of untrained individuals who were asked to report on their dream-life. Their work thus adhered 
not to the Wundtian program, but rather to a Galtonian style of research, which emphasized 
populations over individuals (Danziger, 1985, 1990). In both types of endeavours the lack of 
commentary on the qualifications of those reporting their dreams is a reflection of their self-
evident status as trained and untrained, respectively. It need not be said that Calkins and Sanford 
were psychological experts.394 And in much the same way it need not be stated – a decade or 
more into Hall’s program of questionnaire-based research – that those supplying the material in 
these endeavors were psychological lay persons. These individuals remained largely anonymous, 
but some of the more productive intermediary data collectors were singled out for recognition. 
                                                
394 Calkins was at this point still in the early stages of her training in the new psychology, 
though may still be understood as possessing a degree of expertise lacking in lay respondents 
(see Chapter 2). 
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For instance, as was standard practice for those publishing questionnaire-based investigations, 
especially those doing so out of Clark, Jewell explicitly thanked all those who aided with data 
collection.395  
 The combination of the involvement of only a handful of individuals and a limited body 
of collected material, however, often merited explicit commentary on the qualifications of 
respondents. In the case of Titchener’s (1895b) report on taste dreams, he explicitly 
characterized the five individuals providing him with accounts of representative taste dreams as 
“trustworthy” (p. 508). Titchener’s assertion aligns him with the well-documented ideal of 
cultivating trustworthy selves as a component of scientific practice during this period (Daston & 
Galison, 2010; T. M. Porter, 1995). That those providing him with information could be trusted 
was particularly important given his small body of collected data and the untrained status of 
those individuals providing information. The undertaking’s aim of countering claims that all 
taste dreams were presentative, that is simply the result of sense-perception, further necessitated 
such assurances. Emphasis on the trustworthiness of the individuals from whom he collected 
instances of representative taste dreams was further reinforced in the sole description of another 
individual’s dream-life actually provided in his report. It is left unclear who the other individuals 
reporting experiences of representative taste dreams are, with the exception of one Reverend A. 
Beele of Alfred, Maine (see Titchener, 1895b, p. 508). Although presumably not trained in the 
new psychology, it is difficult to think of any other class of individual who would fit Titchener’s 
category of “trustworthy” better. If the account of a man of god could not be trusted, just whose 
word might one trust? At the same time, accompanying the description of Beele’s taste dream 
                                                
395 Those who lent their assistance to the investigation included a number of individuals 
with longstanding ties to the institution, among them Lillie Williams, Margaret Smith, Norman 
Triplett, Frederick Tracy, and G. E. Partridge, the latter of whom had earlier conducted his own 
work on dreams at Clark (see Jewell, 1905, p. 2 fn.; Lindley & Partridge, 1897; Partridge, 1897). 
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was a description of Titchener’s experiments on his own dreams. Beele’s status as a man of god 
ensured the trustworthiness of his report, but it was Titchener’s status as a trained psychologist 
that served as a mark of his credibility. This scientific standing and its attendant trustworthy 
status, allowed Titchener to certify that his other amassed taste dreams, even though left 
undescribed, were “trustworthy” accounts. These kinds of assurances were essential to the 
statement of definitive conclusions on the topic.  
Other attempts to amass accounts of dream-life from a handful of individuals faced 
similar challenges regarding the trustworthiness of collected data. Andrews’s effort to gather 
information on dream-life at Wellesley relied on reports from just six students at the College, 
including Andrews herself. The project was cut short after only four nights due to the poor 
quality of the data, a result of what Andrews (1900) identified as a lack of training on the part of 
the other participants, as she was the only one, as she put it, “trained in dream introspection” (p. 
131). The study’s participants, herself excluded, failed to live up to the ideal of the trained 
psychological subject at the heart of the discipline’s idealized Wundtian paradigm (Danziger, 
1985, 1990). Involving untrained students in the project of recording dream-life was an easy 
means of undertaking research, but it was also problematic from a scientific standpoint. The 
problems of untrained data collection, however, only became apparent once the study was 
underway: “the inexperienced observers obviously required training in the observation and 
record of their normal dreams before the attempt to vary experimentally the conditions of their 
dreaming” (Andrews, 1900, p. 131). One solution to this difficulty would be to embed the 
participants in the Wundtian model through further training. More generally, she found the entire 
experimental set up for the investigation of dreams problematic. What was really needed, 
Andrews (1900) contended, was “the excitation of the dreamer through auditory, olfactory or 
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dermal stimuli, applied by the experimenter at different periods during the night” (p. 132).396 
These aspirations were in line with the laboratory projects of psychophysics, whereby physical 
stimuli were directly tied to their sensory and perceptual counterparts. Applying these conditions 
in the context of dream research was extremely difficult, however, and not something Andrews 
pursued.  
Even if the model experimental situation could be achieved in dream investigations, 
Andrews remain skeptical of the value of this kind of research. In her estimation,  
there is the disadvantage attendant upon all investigation in which a person experiments 
upon himself; there is the further objection that stimulation and supposed result are 
separated by a considerable interval of time; and, finally, there is the lack of any observer 
of the attendant conditions. (Andrews, 1900, p. 132) 
Whether these difficulties could ever be overcome in the context of dream investigations was 
doubtful. Before one could even think of experimentally manipulating the conditions of 
dreaming in the way Andrews sought to do, those charged with recording their dreams needed 
more basic training in the method of dream introspection. In the absence of this kind of training, 
collected data was not simply deficient, but useless. Training might solve some difficulties 
associated with the project, but the nature of dreams was such that it was doubtful that research 
into the subject could ever meet Andrews’ understanding of the technical standards of the field.   
Physical States and Dream-Life 
Given the challenges associated with investigations of dreams as a function of their very 
nature – and thus the improbability of ever achieving the rigorous standardization associated 
with experimental laboratory practice – a different research ideal was needed. One means of 
                                                
396 For a personal account of the influence of external stimulation on dream-life see 
Baldwin (1888). 
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avoiding the some of the difficulties identified by Andrews was to look at existing populations as 
a form of natural experiment. Jastrow’s effort to link visual dreams of the blind with specific 
brain functioning was just this kind of an endeavour. Outside of this special population, he was 
cognizant of the pervasiveness of presentative dreams contending: “the feel of our body and the 
fluctuations of its condition surge up more distinctly as we dismiss the outer world; and their 
presentative dominance furnishes an ingredient in the stuff that dreams are made of” (Jastrow, 
1906, p. 473). Examples of presentative dreams were pervasive, but irrefutably documenting the 
existence of representative dreams was much more difficult. Studying the dreams of the blind 
was a means of recording truly representative dreams, while also emphasizing “many points of 
interest in the nature and development of the cortical centres of the human brain” (Jastrow, 
1888d, p. 33). Charting the continuing existence of visual dreams also offered compelling 
evidence of the developmental trajectory of the brain. Those who continued to experience visual 
dreams after their loss of sight were assumed to have the cortical centres functionally necessary 
for vision even though their perceptual apparatus was impaired. Moreover, continuing 
experiences of visual dreams following the onset of blindness was evidence of the occurrence of 
truly representative dreams. Though external visual stimulation could no longer have an 
influencing effect on dreams for the blind, this was not the case for dreamers more generally. It 
was only in the context of studies with this population that this factor could be controlled for and 
these kinds of assertions made with definiteness. Here, ostensibly, was perception fully divorced 
from physical stimulation.  
Easier to accumulate than the precise determinants of physical stimulation on dream-life 
that Jastrow pursued were accounts of connections between the particulars of dream-life and 
specific physical states at the time of dreaming. Among questionnaire-based projects these kinds 
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of associations were sought by Jewell, whose circular on dreams specifically asked after the 
physical state of dreamers. For instance, respondents were asked “Can you discriminate between 
psychological and physical causes?” and “Give temperament and physical condition” (Jewell, 
1905, p. 1).397 In discussing his findings several commonly associated dreams and physical states 
were singled out. These included the tendency for children to experience nightmares when over-
tired (see Jewell, 1905, p. 8), as well as the conclusion that dreams of smothering could be 
attributed to the “inability to get sufficient air to breathe” (Jewell, 1905, p. 9) at the time of 
dreaming. These findings aligned well with Calkins’s scheme of presentative (those that result 
from physical stimuli) and representative dreams (those that result from cerebral excitation due 
to memory association), which Jewell (1905) like other researchers adopted. Collecting accounts 
of correspondences between dream-life and physical states via questionnaire avoided the 
inherent difficulties of experimentation on dream-life.398 
Altered States of Consciousness 
Both discussion of dreaming also provided an avenue for discussion of altered states of 
consciousness. That dream-life could be influenced by suggestion was an open topic of 
discussion, both in questionnaire investigations and in more experimental work. In the case of 
daydreams, this conversation moved beyond efforts to document suggestion’s effect on the 
                                                
397 “Dreams,” Oct. 1903, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. 
398 On the psychic front he similarly identified two causes of dreams: “(1) memory and 
association, and (2) suggestion” (Jewell, 1905, p. 9). The questionnaires produced by Lindley, 
Partridge, and Jewell all also took up, in addition to dreaming proper, the subject of daydreams. 
So far as Partridge (1897) was concerned daydreaming is “a habit common to normal minds” (p. 
460). It was, in fact, an evolutionarily advantageous feature of mental life that provided a means 
of “adapting to new conditions of life…. In its dreams the mind tries all things, enters all walks 
of life, forms new associations, and, as in the race, these ideals represent the hopes and longings 
upward of the soul” (Partridge, 1897, p. 460). Like dreaming more generally, he linked 
daydreaming with specific physical states, particularly muscular relaxation. 
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content or quality of dreams (visual, auditory, etc.) to discussion of hypnotic states. Lindley’s 
circular on “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie” asked 
Describe any cases, whether in yourself or others, of reverie or day-dreaming, when the 
mind was vacant, far away, wool gathering, castle building, etc. Just what was the mind 
doing; how did you or the person observed, look, act, feel; what condition favors this 
state and how came the awakening? Do you think it is like hypnagogic phenomena, or 
those images experienced just as we are falling asleep? Do you deem them hypnotic?399  
Jewell likewise saw parallels between dreaming and hypnotic states, but deemed the influence of 
suggestion as severely limited. In dreaming as in hypnosis “only the beginning of any certain 
mental content can be brought about by suggestion, – once induced, association takes its natural 
course, and repeated suggestions are necessary to direct it along desired lines” (Jewell, 1905, p. 
2). This, in part, explained the difficulties of experimental efforts to induce dream content with 
exposure to various sensory stimuli. It was association rather than suggestion that ruled the 
dreaming mind. 
Inquiries also positioned dreaming as a state comparable, if not identical, to altered states 
of consciousness induced by various chemical compounds. As a follow-up to Lindley’s earlier 
effort, Partridge’s questionnaire “Reveries and Allied Phenomena” asked individuals to report on 
the “effect of any kind of drug or narcotic upon reverie or any spontaneous actions of sense or 
mind. Describe any experiences you may have had with ether, gas, belladonna, laudanum, 
paregoric, mescal, opium, etc.; effects of food and drinks.”400 Along similar lines, nearly two 
                                                
399 “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” Dec. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
400 “Reveries and Allied Phenomena,” April 1897, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. Like research into dream states, interest in consciousness 
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decades after his investigation of dreams of the blind, Jastrow proposed a new inquiry. Rather 
than the blind, this investigation targeted to those under the influence of mild forms of 
anaesthesia. It was hoped that in collecting information of this kind insight would be gained into 
a “range of subconscious mental states, including simple states of distraction, absentmindedness, 
reverie, trance, hypnosis, dreams, the actions of drugs, alterations of personality, lapses of 
memory, states of confusion, and the reactions to anaesthetics” (Jastrow, 1905, p. 327). Since 
psychologists did not have ready access to those under anaesthesia he appealed “to those who are 
professionally engaged in their production, to step aside from their main interests to supply in a 
spirit of coöperation the data so valuable to students of a different and yet not unrelated science” 
(Jastrow, 1905, p. 327). With the cooperation of surgeons and anaesthetizers he hoped especially 
to explore congruencies between anaesthetic and hypnotic states, as demonstrated through 
suggestibility and automatic activities, as well as similarities between such states and dream-life. 
To ascertain this information he requested that “a patient be questioned as to what occupied his 
mind up to the moment of losing consciousness and again during the regaining of full 
consciousness” so that “a valuable collection of data regarding the waning and waxing states of 
consciousness” (Jastrow, 1905, p. 326) could be obtained. The relationship between anaesthetic 
phenomena and the “normal, waking, mental traits of the subject” was to be determined through 
“skillful questioning controlled, where possible, by ingenious tests”; these it was thought, “will 
be the most effective instrument of inquiry” (Jastrow, 1905, p. 325). This questionning was to be 
guided by Jastrow’s expressed interests in the subject, but no formal set of questions was 
provided. Though he later wrote of the experiences of those under anaesthesia it is unclear 
whether this discussion was informed by this effort at data collection and, indeed, if his request 
                                                                                                                                                       
while under the influence of various chemical compounds was also pursued through auto-
experimentation (e.g., Cattell, 1980; James, 1898a; see Schmied, Steinberg, & Sykes, 2006). 
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for information met with any degree of success (see Jastrow, 1906). Across these kinds of 
inquiries, it seems, just what took place during various altered states of conscious proved easier 
asked than answered. 
Differences in Dreamers 
In the case of statistically motivated experimental work, like that of Calkins (1893b), 
variety in dreams could be documented but differences between classes of dreamers were 
impossible to enumerate because of the limited pool of participants. On the other hand, those 
who opted to investigate dream-life via questionnaire deliberately set out to survey a large, and 
hopefully diverse, body of individuals. These statistically oriented investigations, unlike their 
experimental counterparts, provided a means of ascertaining various forms of difference between 
dreamers. The overall aim of dream research, in its various guises, was made explicit by Jastrow 
(1906): “the natural history of dreaming requires equally that its distinctive traits, the differentia 
of its species as well as its community with the genus, shall be discerningly noted” (p. 211). The 
totality of the nature of dream-life could only be ascertained through broad inquiries of the kind 
most often undertaken with questionnaires. In rendering dreaming an object of scientific inquiry 
dreams were naturalized so that psychical and folk interpretations, often rooted in intimate 
personal experience, were invalidated as evidence of the nature of dreams. Psychological 
investigations of dreams, often reliant on the collection of masses of material, were instead 
positioned as authoritative. Through these inquiries dreams were rooted in material processes, 
rather than a supernatural realm. 
In the case of Jastrow’s inquiry into dreams of the blind, a very particular form of 
difference was positioned as central. However, the study was decidedly not a comparative 
investigation of differences between the dreams of those with and without sight. What was at 
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issue was the nature of dreams in this already very particular group as a function of differences 
in age of onset of blindness. Although he noted “… it would be valuable to see corroborated by a 
similar study upon the dreams of normal individuals” (Jastrow, 1888d, p. 27) this was not 
something that Jastrow himself pursued. Rather, in questionning the blind about their dreams he 
was able to identify the “critical period” after which the loss of sight did not necessarily mean 
the loss of visual dreams, and thus loss of the power of visualization more generally. As Jastrow 
(1888d) put it this was the “point in the growth of the higher sense-centres, at which a divorce 
from sense-impression is no longer followed by a loss of their psychical meaning” (p. 34). 
Through his questionning of the blind in conjunction with records listing the date at which sight 
was lost, Jastrow identified the critical period as that between five and seven years of age. Within 
the 185 individuals he investigated, those who lost sight prior to the age of five did not 
experience visual dreams, while those who lost their vision after the age of seven all continued to 
experience visual dreams. This identification of developmental differences served as the 
comparative element of his investigation (Jastrow, 1888d).401  
                                                
401 Jastrow’s interests in visualization and difference were not limited to his study of the 
blind. Appearing in print the same year as his study of dreams of the blind was a Popular 
Science Monthly article, “Eye-mindedness and Ear-mindedness” (Jastrow, 1888a). Here Jastrow 
expressed his view that individuals were either eye-minded (“visionaire”) or ear-minded 
(“auditaire”). Several means of testing which category individuals fell into were proposed, 
including tests of the limit of the capacity and the degree of error of each sense, as well 
concurrent tests of the senses to determine which was central to attention and later recollection. 
Knowledge of whether individuals were eye- or ear-minded, Jastrow (1888a) contended, would 
be valuable not only as a contribution to psychological knowledge but also in terms of its 
practical value to education: “the importance of recognizing and studying these distinctions, [is] 
alike for their educational utilization and as a contribution to a scientific psychology” (p. 608). 
Those in his study of the blind necessarily comprised a restricted range of these types.  
Baldwin later proposed a similar scheme of educationally-oriented classifications (see 
Baldwin, 1895d, 1896c, 1896d). This was part of a much larger debate over the type theory of 
reaction, which proposed that the results of reaction time experiments were necessarily 
influenced by the type of individual (i.e., sensory or motor oriented) participating in the study 
(Baldwin, 1895d, 1896f; Lange, 1888; Titchener, 1895a, 1895c, 1896b). The theory was central 
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Attention to differences between individuals was a recurrent feature of inquiries into 
dream-life using questionnaires given their Galtonian orientation (Danziger, 1985, 1990). The 
particular form of statistical inquiry questionnaires allowed for made the collection of 
information regarding various forms of difference a central feature. Among the categories of 
difference regularly inquired into were “age, sex, [and] nationality,”402 with others added as 
researchers saw fit, including “temperament,”403 and “state of health.”404 Jastrow’s (1905) 
inquiry into anaesthesia, while not involving a formal list of questions to be answered by 
respondents, did specify that those providing him with material also append information 
regarding not only “age, sex, occupation, condition in life, physical state, temperament,” but also 
the “purpose for which the anaesthetic was administered, length of period under its influence, 
degree of nervous shock accompanying the same, and so on” (p. 326-7). Information like this 
allowed researchers to divide individual respondents according to particular lines of interest and 
to make determinations regarding the essential nature of various groups. 
Most prevalent, by far, were distinctions made along the lines of age, sex, and 
nationality.405 Regularities in the content of dreams with respect to age could be identified, such 
                                                                                                                                                       
in the development of American functionalism (see C. D. Green, 2009). Jastrow himself – along 
with Baldwin, Cattell, Lightner Witmer, and Sanford – was later part of the American 
Psychological Associations Committee on Physical and Mental Tests (“Physical and mental 
tests,” 1898). 
402 e.g., “Reverie and Allied Phenomena,” April 1897, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, 
Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
403 “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” Dec. 1895; “Dreams,” Oct. 1903, B1-7-1, G. Stanley 
Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA.  
404 “Fancy, Imagination, Reverie,” Dec. 1895, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
405 This is not to say that the absence of any pronounced difference between some 
investigated categories in the collected material went unnoticed. For instance, Jewell (1905) 
concluded from his inquiry, “so far as can be inferred from the returns to this questionnaire 
neither the season, day of the week, nor the month have any marked effect on dreams” (p. 4). 
Nonetheless, assertions regarding differences took centre stage. 
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as the propensity for children to dream about animals and places and for adolescents to dream 
about people and events. At the same time emotionally tinged dreams were categorized as 
occurring most often in early childhood, puberty, and between the age 18 and 21 (Jewell, 1905). 
More generally, this work located the “age of dreams about the time of puberty and dawning 
adolescence” (Jewell, 1905, p. 34), with day dreams similarly characterized as prominent during 
this period (Partridge, 1897). These were, of course, not absolute statements about all members 
of a group, but rather general observations of a larger trend in the differences between dreams at 
various stages of development. Making such distinctions, both for the researchers undertaking 
their work at Clark and for Jastrow, was a means of suggesting, if only in the vaguest of terms, 
pedagogical uses for this kind of knowledge. Thus, while Jastrow (1888a), at the same time as 
his dream research, advocated for the classification of children according to their status as eye- 
or ear-minded, others emphasized the important role of the imagination in educational practices 
(Partridge, 1897).406  
Adolescence was the time of dreams for Clark researchers, but the findings of Jastrow’s 
investigation into dream-life aligned more with earlier inquiries into mental imagery. Like 
Osborn and Galton he found both women and children to be the most prolific dreamers. His 
work with the blind led him to conclude 
it is the vividness of the emotional background elaborated by the imagination that 
furnishes the predominant characteristic and tendency to dreams; for it is in the 
development of just these qualities that women excel men; the same view is favored by 
the relation of the prevalence of dreams to age….Childhood, the period of the lively 
                                                
406 “Reverie and Allied Phenomena,” April 1897, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark 
University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
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imagination and highly tinged emotional life, brings the richest harvest of dreams. 
(Jastrow, 1888d, p. 28)  
The imagination, as revealed in dream-life, was the territory of women and children. Others 
emphasized the crucial role of race in dreaming. Jewell’s (1905) work allowed him to assert 
“two-thirds of those who do not dream are clearly of Scandinavian or German parentage” and 
more generally that “what little data there is suggests strongly that the more stolid, phlegmatic 
races tend to less dreaming (remembered dreaming) than do the more active, nervous ones” (p. 
6). As in earlier inquiries imagining, this time in the context of dream-life, was positioned – at 
least by some – as particularly pronounced in women, children, and “lower” races (see Chapter 
1).407  
Disputing Telepathic Dreams 
Questionnaire-based studies of dreams were oriented toward determining differences 
between various groups, but dream research more generally was also concerned with disputing 
connections between dream-life and premonitory hallucinations. These two aims were not, 
however, mutually exclusive. In situating her dream research Calkins directly addressed the issue 
of prophetic dreams and dismissed accounts of such, including those provided in Phantasms of 
the Living (Gurney et al., 1886), as without any good evidence in their favour (see Calkins, 
1893b). So far as she was concerned, “the number and the significance of these have inevitably 
been exaggerated. Such dreams are seldom accurately recorded, and the after experience (the so-
called fulfillment) supplies details which one then believes that one has dreamed” (Calkins, 
                                                
407 As in Hall’s (1883a, 1893b) earliest questionnaire-based inquiry into the contents of 
children’s minds, the Clark investigations also singled out differences between rural and urban 
(or city and country) children for discussion (see Chapter 4). In particular, burglar dreams were 
reported as a distinctive feature of the dreams of those in cities and towns, but as a type of dream 
completely foreign to those who resided in the country (Jewell, 1905). 
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1893b, p. 341).408 Cases presented as prophetic dreams were, for Calkins, no more than after-the-
fact illusions of memory. Jewell’s attempt to understand the nature of dreams included an 
explicit inquiry as to “Whether any dream comes true.”409 In discussing the results of this 
investigation, undertaken in the years after work on dreams by those like Calkins, he contended 
“dreams have lost much of their significance to us now-a-days because we have learned that they 
are caused by some special stimulus or memory-association, that they are not prophetic – and so 
we have ceased to regard them with superstition” (Jewell, 1905, p. 29). This discussion of 
prophetic dreams also provided an opportunity to distinguish between the dream-life of modern, 
“civilized” individuals and that of “savages.” So far as Jewell (1905) was concerned, civilized 
individuals “work harder, sleep more soundly and consequently dream less” and thus pay less 
attention to their dreams (p. 29). Together with a growing recognition of rational alternative 
explanations, there came about a general renunciation of the idea of prophetic dreams. The 
“savage,” in contrast, “can well afford to pay more attention to his dreams, and, by the very act 
of paying attention, he gets to remember more and more of his dreams, and so magnifies them 
more and more” (Jewell, 1905, p. 29). With a larger body of dream-life to draw upon “savages” 
were seemingly inescapably oriented toward the irrational interpretation of dreams as 
premonitory.  
The illusionary nature of dream-life was potentially problematic beyond the 
mischaracterization of dreams as prophetic. Jastrow (1906) made clear the necessity of 
distinguishing the products of the imagination from reality: 
                                                
408 More general commentary on dreaming in relation to hypnotism, spiritualism, and 
premonitory hallucinations was also offered during this period (Buckley, 1888; C., 1890; Norton, 
1888). 
409 “Dreams,” Oct. 1903, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, 
Worcester, MA. 
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Unless I hold apart the world of fancy from the world of reality, I jeopardize my practical 
sanity. I must ever distinguish between my inventions and my experiences, my memories 
and my fancies, my hopes and my observations, my intentions and my deeds, and most 
decidedly between my dreams and the waking reality. Illusion, hallucination, error, 
fallacy, are common enough; and a considerable range of deception is the common lot. 
(p. 489; see also Jastrow, 1889)  
The mind’s propensity to be deceived, by dream-life or otherwise, was of central concern, 
especially for Jastrow who took up deception as one of his abiding psychological interests (see 
Pettit, 2013b). 
Statistics of Unconscious Life 
 Interest in the nature of dream-life connected with psychical matters beyond the issue of 
prophetic dreams. Most particularly, discussion of dreams often intersected with the notion of 
unconscious cerebration. Proposed in the mid-nineteenth century by British physiologist William 
Benjamin Carpenter, unconscious cerebration consists of “automatic activity of the highest level 
of the brain, without volition and without subjective awareness of the operative connections” 
(Danziger, 1982, p. 129).410 As Danziger (1982) has described, within this category of mental 
activity fell not only ideomotor action, whereby specific ideas necessarily produced movement, 
but also 
the association of ideas (especially when there were unconscious mediating associations), 
the phenomenon of involuntary attention, unconscious problem solving (as when the 
solution appeared suddenly after the problem had been put aside), the artistic productions 
                                                
410 On George Beard’s development of the notion of “involuntary life” in response to 
Carpenter’s work see Brown (1983, pp. 573–4). 
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of genius (where poems or sonatas might appear to be composing themselves), and also 
dreams and hallucinations. (p. 129-130) 
These were not mutually exclusive as, for instance, dreams might themselves involve the 
association of ideas and unconscious problem solving.411  
Beyond the circulation of the notion of unconscious cerebration within the developing 
scientific realm it also gained a certain amount of popular traction. Thus, in the mid-1870s Mark 
Twain could comment, of the writing of The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,  
when the tank runs dry you’ve only to leave it alone and it will fill up again in time, while 
you are asleep – also while you are at work at other things and are quite unaware that this 
unconscious and profitable cerebration is going on. (as quoted in F. G. Robinson, 1995, p. 
379; see also Gillman, 1989)  
Twain also wrote of his belief in and experience with telepathy, or what he termed “mental 
telegraphy” (see Twain, 1891, 1895). Jastrow (1905) responded directly to these claims, 
asserting “it is necessary to emphasize the great limitations as yet surrounding our knowledge of 
the normal modes of sensation and the corresponding hesitancy with which we should regard any 
series of facts, no matter how apparently inexplicable” (p. 572). As in other instances, Jastrow 
invoked imperceptible sensory information as a plausible alternative account of presumed 
psychical experiences. Only by documenting the mind’s full range of ability, and explaining its 
functioning in natural rather than supernatural terms, could accounts like Twain’s be countered 
with scientific force.  
                                                
411 Carpenter’s text, Mental Physiology, was assigned by Jastrow in his initial years 
teaching at the University of Wisconsin (see Jastrow, 1930; Jastrow et al., 1890). Jastrow (1906) 
at times intimates the occurrence of something like unconscious cerebration, but avoids the use 
of the term with its implied physiological mechanism, as he developed his own understanding of 
subconscious mental life. 
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The notion of unconscious cerebration also resonated with those seeking alternate 
explanations for purportedly psychical experiences. Rather than, like Twain, positioning 
unconscious cerebration as a psychical phenomena psychological investigators adopted the 
process as a feature of the normal mind.412 Royce invoked “unconscious cerebration” as an 
alternate, non-psychical explanation for the reportedly telepathic phenomena he collected in his 
psychical research via questionnaire. Cases of “double memory-consciousness” (see Royce, 
1888), that is déjà vu, were explained in this way, both by Royce and by Osborn several years 
earlier in his work on illusions of memory (see Osborn, 1884a, p. 484). Royce (1889b) also 
characterized instances “where people by the aid of dreams have recalled forgotten facts, have 
found lost articles, or have solved problems that they had vainly attempted in their waking life” 
(p. 356) as instances of unconscious cerebration rather than psychical phenomena. To explain the 
“exceedingly small residue” (Jewell, 1905, p. 34) of seemingly prophetic dreams for which there 
was no readily available rational explanation, Jewell (1905) argued “there may be 
subconsciously injected into one’s dreams an element of truth which he does not recognize as 
subjective, hence they may take on a supernatural cast” (p. 34). As an example of this kind of 
process, he offered the case of an individual who dreams of acquaintances betraying his trust and 
the later occurrence of a betrayal then leading the dream to be interpreted as premonitory. In 
reality, Jewell contends, the dream was not prophetic but instead an avenue by which 
subconscious distrust made itself known.  
The apparent telepathic quality of dreams was addressed in similar terms in Jewell’s 
dream research. As he explained, 
                                                
412 On unconscious cerebration see also Burnham (1889), Donaldson (1893), and 
Robinson (1893).  
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when one has misplaced anything, he may not be able to tell where it is, but the missing 
association is made during sleep, which explains quite a number of dreams usually called 
premonitory. It is but a short step from this to dreams of finding something one has lost 
rather than mislaid. Somewhere down in the realm of sub-conscious activity is a 
recognition of the losing of the article, which is not sufficiently vivid to reach the higher 
levels of conscious memory. (Jewell, 1905, p. 12)413 
Imperceptible sensations, discussed as alternative explanations for various psychical findings 
(see Chapter 6), were similarly invoked as crucial features of unconscious cerebration. This kind 
of sensory information – together with unconscious mental processes that often occurred during 
dreaming – held the potential of producing revelatory information that appeared, at first glance, 
to be telepathically derived.414  
Collecting Accounts of the Unconscious 
 In March 1889 the findings of a questionnaire-based inquiry into unconscious cerebration 
appeared within the pages of The Popular Science Monthly (Speir, Jr., 1889).415 The piece, “The 
Antechamber of Consciousness” was the work of Francis Speir Jr. (1856-1925), a peer of 
Osborn’s during their time as students at the College of New Jersey (see Chapter 1). The two, 
along with William Berryman Scott, were lifelong friends and conducted a groundbreaking 1877 
paleontological expedition on behalf of the college (see Gregory, 1937; Osborn, Scott, & Speir 
                                                
413 For a criticism of the characterization of dream-life as unconscious cerebration see 
Pierce (1906). Jewell’s work on dreams also explicitly references Child’s (1892) work on 
unconscious cerebration, discussed below.  
414 More generally, it was suggested that the study of reverie would lead to similar insight 
as it “would seem to be the natural approach to the whole subject of association of ideas and new 
light might be expected from such a treatment, upon obscure facts of association, which the 
present doctrine seems inadequate to explain” (Partridge, 1897, p. 445).  
415 Discussion of this research also occurred elsewhere (“[Editorial notes],” 1888, 
“Mental science,” 1888).  
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Jr., 1878; Simpson, 1948). Speir continued his scientific work in the 1880s,416 but although both 
Osborn and Scott made scientific endeavors their life’s work, Speir eventually went on to a 
career as a lawyer (see “Student killed in motor,” 1915). Before doing so he, like Osborn, 
undertook a research project within the new psychology. 
 In 1884 Speir began collecting information on the unconscious cerebration, broadly 
conceived. A report in Science that year described the project as an attempt “to cover the field of 
conscious mental activity in its relations with a possible unconscious cerebral activity” (“Notes 
and news,” 1884, p. 426).417 Speir’s (1889) chosen method of amassing information was, as he 
characterized it, “the well-known one of the distribution of printed questions to be answered 
from personal experience” (p. 657). This material, it was reported, would then be used “for the 
purposes of a classification and co-ordination of the phenomena” (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 
426). Discussion of Speir’s project provided the Science commentator with the opportunity to 
address the issue of questionnaire-based research more generally. So far as he was concerned, 
“this work of collecting facts by means of psychological circulars is yet in its infancy, and its 
very life is threatened by any injudicious use of it” (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 426). Holding 
the work of Galton in this vein as a model of what successful questionnaire research was to look 
like, the reviewer contended 
the necessary safeguards are, to ask only perfectly definite questions, to ask questions in 
whose answer our subject has no disturbing personal interest, and to be careful not to ask 
                                                
416 Speir replaced Scott as head of another Princeton scientific expedition in 1886 (see B., 
1886). 
417 This was markedly similar to Speir’s (1889) later description of the project: “It was 
with a desire to throw the light of further-collected facts upon the relation of a conscious activity 
to a possible unconscious cerebral activity that I undertook the task of collecting the necessary 
data” (p. 657). The report in Science (“Notes and news,” 1884) on Speir’s project did not list an 
author, but it was likely written by Jastrow in advance of his own questionnaire-based research. 
 297 
questions that popular tradition has already answered by some poetical or otherwise 
interesting myth. Best of all are the questions whose answer our subject will never before 
have thought of at all, so that he will have no theory of his own. Unless we take some 
such care as this, our latest effort at the collection of psychological facts will degenerate 
into the most tedious of disastrous wanderings. (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 426)  
In this context, the criticism offered of Speir’s circular was as much a means of safeguarding the 
method more generally for use in future projects, as it was about addressing the inadequacies in 
that project. 
Speir’s questionnaire, beyond any material procured by the attention generated through 
its discussion within the pages of Science, obtained responses through its distribution to a 
number of university presidents and professors. Those who assisted Speir with his project 
included not only Osborn and McCosh at Princeton, but also James and Hall, the latter then at 
Johns Hopkins. Additional assistance was provided by Professor of Ecclesiastical History 
George P. Fisher of Yale College, President Ezekiel Robinson of Brown University, 
educationalist Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia, and Professor of Philosophy Henry A. 
P. Torrey of the University of Vermont (see Speir, Jr., 1889, p. 658).418 Much as in Osborn’s 
earlier imagery investigation, the study relied on the assistance of these men for the collection of 
data within the university system. Perhaps distrusting the ability of the public to provide non-
psychically tainted information on the phenomena, Speir opted not to advertise his project more 
broadly as was common in explicitly psychical investigations (see Chapter 5). More than 600 
copies of the questionnaire were distributed and 102 responses ultimately obtained. Like most 
questionnaires of the period the name and age of respondents, as well as their address, was to be 
                                                
418 Torrey was John Dewey’s undergraduate philosophy professor and was instrumental 
in his admission to Johns Hopkins for graduate study (see Dalton, 2002). 
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included with each submission. The request for information regarding sex was absent, though the 
directive that names be included was sufficient to ensure that the title of “Mr.” and “Mrs.” 
distinguished responses from the sexes (see Speir, Jr., 1889). Information on nationality or race 
was seemingly entirely absent, likely a consequence of the homogenous population surveyed at 
educational institutions. 
 Although Speir (1889) solicited information on a set of 11 questions, his published 
findings only addressed the results of 5 of these items.419 Notably missing among the items 
discussed were ones singled out for specific criticism earlier in the decade within the discussion 
of the project in Science. As part of this critique the questions Speir listed on his circular were 
characterized, as a whole, as “of very unequal value and definiteness” (“Notes and news,” 1884, 
p. 426). Particularly problematic was the item: “What is the greatest number of distinct ideas you 
can consciously have before your mind at one time?” which the author described as “hopelessly 
vague” (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 426). Other items were of limited value for other reasons. 
The query “Have you ever dreamed a dream precisely like one your parents or ancestors have 
dreamed?,” it was said, would produce “mere idle gossip” (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 426). 
More damagingly, answers to this question 
if negative, interest nobody: if they are affirmative, they might interest a collector of folk-
lore; for, in telling his dream-experiences, who is very accurate at the best? In 
remembering and repeating them over and over, who is free from the manifold errors of 
memory? But in comparing one’s own dreams with the traditions of the dreams of one’s 
grandmother, who will be able to give answers that can be called scientific? The more 
                                                
419 These were items 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 (Speir, Jr., 1889). 
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confident the reply, the less useful, in such a case, the supposed fact. (“Notes and news,” 
1884, p. 426)  
To this reviewer’s mind, keeping science and not superstition at the centre of the inquiry was of 
paramount importance. Only by doing so could unconscious cerebration be brought within the 
realm of natural mental functioning and the boundary between scientific psychology and 
unscientific psychical work be erected. It is unclear to what extent Speir concurred with the 
criticism, but he nonetheless opted to focus his analysis on responses to other questions on his 
circular. These other questions were of sufficient interest for the same commentator to note, if 
only lukewarmly, that he was looking forward to Speir’s findings as “most of his circular is 
promising enough” (“Notes and news,” 1884, p. 426).  
 The most substantive conclusion of Speir’s inquiry into unconscious cerebration was the 
observation that most individuals had some familiarity with the kinds of experiences that fell 
within the category. Questioned about whether they had ever worked “for a lost idea, fact or 
fancy, while consciously devoting one’s whole attention to something else” (Speir, Jr., 1889, p. 
659), 91% of individuals responded in the affirmative. The results of other questions in Speir’s 
report were discussed in much the same manner. Discussion of various facets of unconscious 
cerebration – such as the unconscious measurement of time – were addressed within the context 
of a representative question on the circular. For each of the five questions Speir took up, the 
results were presented as a series of excerpts from various respondents as well as a report of the 
various divisions among respondents, in the form of the percentage of individuals who did and 
did not experience different forms of the phenomenon. Much as in other questionnaire-based 
inquiries, simple dichotomous data, in this case yes and no responses, were easiest to synthesize. 
As a whole, the focus of the inquiry was normal, rather than pathological, mental functioning as 
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what was of interest to Speir (1889) was the “broad belt of border-land between consciousness 
and unconsciousness, whose limits are uncertain, yet where the manifestations of intellectual 
activity are recognized, which prove the kinship of the life of those two great regions” (p. 666). 
Surveying individuals about their experiences with various forms of unconscious cerebration was 
a means of scientifically documenting this relationship between conscious and unconscious 
mental life. 
 Beyond this project Speir did not pursue work on unconscious cerebration, but several 
years later incipient zoologist Charles Manning Child (1892) took up the project again. Most 
recently of Wesleyan University, where he earned a masters degree in zoology in 1892, Child 
became interested in the new psychology through his undergraduate work on the nervous system. 
Near the time of his project on unconscious cerebration, he traveled to the University of Leipzig 
where he briefly studied in Wundt’s laboratory. The experience proved disappointing and he 
quickly moved on to the study of zoology at the University, earning his doctorate in 1894. Upon 
his return to the United States he obtained a position at the University of Chicago, where he 
remained for the rest of his career (Hyman, 1957). In advance of this, however, the notion of 
unconscious cerebration drew his interest. 
 Child’s investigation of unconscious cerebration was not simply a replication of Speir’s 
work. Instead, he explicitly set out to extend the earlier investigation by adding to the material 
already collected. So as to ensure “the continuity of the inquiry it seemed best to re-issue the 
same set of questions, and these Mr. Speir very kindly furnished” (Child, 1892, p. 249). In 
addition to furnishing Child with his circular, Speir also provided Child with the full set of 
answers previously collected with the instrument. Despite assertions regarding the necessity of 
distributing “the same set of questions,” the questionnaire Child issued was not identical to that 
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previously circulated by Speir. The order of questions was changed and some questions were 
abandoned entirely as they were deemed, based on the results of the previous inquiry, to be “of 
no essential value to the subject” (Child, 1892, p. 250). The questions omitted from Child’s 
inquiry were three that Speir himself opted not to discuss in his earlier published findings.420  
To Speir’s original set of 102 answers Child added nearly 100 further responses, bringing 
the overall total to 200. These were gathered with the assistance of Andrew Campbell 
Armstrong, Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan who had earlier conducted his own 
questionnaire work extending Osborn’s mental imagery investigation (see Chapter 1). In much 
the same manner as Speir, Child discussed the results of each question in turn, providing both 
examples of answers and the percentages associated with various kinds of responses, but unlike 
Speir Child also divided the responses according to sex (having obtained responses from 49 
women) and age. Since most of the responses received were from those under 30, and of these 
most from those under 25, he opted to divide the data into three groups: “Under 25 years,” 
“Between 25 and 30 years,” and “Above 30 years” (Child, 1892, p. 250). To display the 
differences between his sex and age groups, Child also included a number of tables depicting 
frequency of responses in each. Overall, he concluded that women were less familiar with 
unconscious cerebration than men and that there was a decrease in conscious awareness of 
unconscious activity with age. Of the latter finding he speculated: “It is possible that the decrease 
with increasing age is due to the decreasing plasticity of the brain molecules or brain cells under 
normal conditions” (Child, 1892, p. 259). In doing so he, much like so many other investigators 
of the period, attempted to link descriptive accounts of mental life with associated physical 
states. 
                                                
420 Items 1, 5, and 11 (see Child, 1892). 
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 Across their investigations, both Speir (1890) and Child (1892) framed their undertakings 
as “statistical” projects. At the same time, Child (1892) saw his work as comprising “an 
experimental verification of the psychological principles which others have maintained” (p. 258). 
In what respect the investigation constituted an experimental project was not specified, but this 
characterization fits with the larger trend at the time to see questionnaire investigations as 
experiments. Although Speir’s project encountered direct criticism on the methodological front 
(“Notes and news,” 1884), it was not he but Child who addressed these concerns. In Child’s 
(1892) view, “the general sources of error in statistics of this nature are well known” and 
included cases in which “some who answer evidently do not understand the questions and some 
are in doubt as to their answers” (p. 258). Even removing the items identified as deficient, as was 
done when he reissued Speir’s circular, was no guarantee that individuals would respond to 
questions as the researcher intended. 
An even more substantial issue in these kinds of statistical inquiries, so far as Child 
(1892) was concerned, was “that of selecting a body of persons who will give average results” 
(p. 259). In the context of his investigation this was a concern as “the answers are from persons 
more or less accustomed to mental work and self-observation” (Child, 1892, p. 259) something 
that therefore was unlikely to produce “average” responses. This, however, Child contended was 
a difficulty largely overcome through the means by which individuals came to answer his 
circular. Information was collected from “largely college students and, moreover, not special 
individuals among the students, but entire classes, thus giving a body of persons selected 
perfectly at random, and likely to yield average results” (Child, 1892, p. 259). Having entire 
classes of students complete his circular might ensure a more representative body of data than 
simply selecting individual students, but it doubtful that this approach achieved his goal of 
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obtaining “average” results. Concern with producing an understanding of the average individual 
would later emerge as a overarching goal in twentieth century survey and polling work (Igo, 
2007), while at the same time, student populations came to serve as convenient representatives of 
the normal human mind in much psychological research (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). 
Just what “average” results, in the contest of Child’s inquiry, were to look like and how one was 
to ensure their attainment was left unspecified.  
Conclusion 
Research into unconscious mental functions was one means of contesting the 
characterization of certain phenomena as psychical. In documenting mental life outside the 
bounds of conscious awareness, a host of psychical phenomena that at first glance appeared 
inexplicable was now accounted for by an expanded conception of normal mental activity. The 
mind’s actions beyond the level of conscious awareness were in no substantive way different 
than its workings more generally. The subconscious James sought to associate with the 
supernatural realm was re-categorized by numerous psychologists as purely natural. Crucial to 
this repositioning was the new scientific psychology’s moral economy of data within which 
statistical investigations, in various forms, flourished. This bounty of material offered a means of 
countering personal experience of coincident events all too easily interpretable as psychical in 
nature. More experimentally oriented work followed the prototypical style of laboratory 
psychology, seeking to document the connection between the physical world and sensory 
experiences. Rather than detailing the particularities of experiences, these projects limited 
themselves to substantiating the very existence of certain features of mental life. Questionnaire-
based projects, on the other hand, provided an avenue for discussing various differences between 
particular groups. Expansive bodies of data, whatever their methodological origins, offered 
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persuasive evidence of the mind’s many, up to that point undocumented, unconscious processes.  
Although psychical research of the kind described in previous chapters continued in the 
twentieth century, including that with questionnaires, it was increasingly circumscribed as 
outside the realm of psychology proper.421 As psychologists came increasingly to repudiate the 
value of psychical research outside of debunking efforts (see Pettit, 2013b), and to deny the 
veracity of these phenomena more generally, questionnaire research spread into other realms. 
Psychologically oriented investigations of extraordinary mental states expanded to encompass 
more conventional religious experiences. In this vein a number of questionnaire-based inquiries 
into the varieties of religious experience were undertaken. Newer religious or quasi-religious 
practices that leaned more toward spiritualism, including mind cure and Christian Science, were 
investigated in this manner (Goddard, 1899; see Zenderland, 1998).422 At the same time studies 
of largely Protestant religious experience, especially of conversion, were positioned as a normal 
part of the maturation process and thus as neither simple superstition nor pathology (Leuba, 
1896; Starbuck, 1899).423 Here again was “the age for statistics” (Orr, 1903, p. 406) in yet 
another form.  
                                                
421 For instance, see J. H. Hyslop to H. Münsterberg, 1 January (n.y.), Folder 1825, Item 
7, Hugo Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA. See also Schiller (1901). 
422 “The Psychology of Health and Disease,” May 18, 1897, B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall 
Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. 
423 “Moral and Religious Experiences,” May 1895; “Religious Experience,” Feb. 1896, 
B1-7-1, G. Stanley Hall Papers, Clark University Archives, Worcester, MA. The various 
scientific investigations into religious experiences in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, much of which was associated with Hall’s program of questionnaire research at Clark 
University, have been explored by a number of scholars (Hay, 1999; Hood, 2000; Taves, 1999; 
C. G. White, 2008, 2009). This kind of work eventually coalesced into a distinct field of research 
on the psychology of religion. 
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Chapter 8 
Numbering the Mind:  
Thurstone, Likert, and the Re-Design of Questionnaires 
 In the mid-1890s, as Calkins was completing her research on mental associations, another 
Wellesley psychologist was employing the questionnaire method for a distinctly different 
purpose.424 Caroline Miles (1895), an Instructor in Psychology at the College, undertook work 
with the questionnaire less with the intent of revealing facts of individual psychology, the 
nominal subject of her inquiry, than with the aim of revealing the possibilities and limitations of 
method itself. Having traversed the space between the Wellesley, Clark, and Harvard psychology 
laboratories, much like Calkins, Miles came to articulate a position on the relationship between 
questionnaire-based investigations and other disciplinary practices, one that Calkins and others 
never clearly voiced.425 Arguing that questionnaire data could serve as a check to unverified 
introspection, as the psychologist who set about blindly examining his or her own mind might 
use accounts gathered via questionnaire as a means of corroborating their introspective findings, 
Miles (1895) also noted some of the method’s distinct challenges: 
                                                
424 Calkins is often remembered as the psychologist at Wellesley during the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but she was not the only psychologist employed at the 
institution during this period. In later years, Eleanor Gamble, a student of Edward Titchener, 
took over running the institution’s psychology laboratory from the ever more philosophically-
oriented Calkins (Creese, 1998). Prior this, in the mid-1890s, she was joined by Miles (later 
Miles Hill; 1866-1951). Educated at the University of Michigan, where she studied with John 
Dewey and earned a doctorate in philosophy in 1892, Miles taught first at Mount Holyoke 
College before moving to Wellesley (Attaway & Barritt, 2000; Creese, 1998). 
425 While serving as Instructor in Psychology at Wellesley Miles, like Calkins, also 
undertook private instruction in the new field with Edmund Sanford at Clark (see Miles, 1895) 
and conducted work in the Harvard laboratory (Creese, 1998; Hill, 1898). Following her 1895 
marriage, Miles moved to Chicago where her psychological work continued, with the assistance 
of Helen Thompson (Woolley), in the University of Chicago psychology laboratory (see Hill, 
1898). In Chicago Miles also became actively involved in the social settlement movement, living 
for a time at Hull House (Attaway & Barritt, 2000; Creese, 1998). 
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to ask questions is easy, but to make the questionnaire an instrument of precision is very 
far from easy….to say nothing of the general difficulty of selecting truly cardinal points 
for questioning about, and the special rhetorical difficulty of framing questions that shall 
be perfectly clear as to the information required without at the same time prejudicing the 
answers to be received, there yet remains the difficulty of assigning their proper weight to 
the answers received. (p. 534) 
Situated on the periphery of the discipline, and relatively disinterested in the fate of the 
questionnaire as method, Miles was uniquely positioned to comment on the potential benefits 
and intrinsic challenges of this mode of inquiry. Unlike other critics, the focus of her discussion 
was not the use of untrained individuals as data collectors, but rather the problems inherent in the 
construction of these instruments, as well as those that arose at the point of making sense of 
collected information. Her final conclusion that “in general, the questionnaire seems to the writer 
more valuable for the suggestions it gives the questioner than for its strictly scientific results” 
(Miles, 1895, p. 558), offered no solution to the method’s problems.426 These observations 
notwithstanding, it would be decades longer before the discipline arrived at a solution to the 
difficulties of constructing questionnaires and interpreting their findings. 
                                                
426 Her investigation, as she chose to characterize it, was of “individual psychology” 
(Miles, 1895), an allusion to the work underway by Alfred Binet in France. Conducted under the 
direction of Edmund Sanford, head of Clark laboratory of psychology, the study was nonetheless 
undertaken at Wellesley where the questionnaire was given to 100 individuals (71 students, 29 
faculty members) “taken at random” at from the College community in the winter of 1893-94 
(see Miles, 1895, pp. 535–6). Miles first questioned these individuals verbally and recorded their 
responses. Based on these results new items were added to the initial series of questions and this 
new set of 15 questions, some of which consisted of multiple parts, was then printed and sent to 
the previous 100 individuals, 97 of whom responded. Among the items on the questionnaire 
were: “how do you recall a forgotten name?,” “How do you go to sleep when sleepless?,” and 
“Mention some story that has made you weep - the most pathetic you can think of” (Miles, 1895, 
p. 535). Discussion of the collected information often made use of various individual 
associations as explanatory, much as in Calkins’s contemporaneous work on mental associations 
(see Chapter 2). 
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In this chapter I discuss the evolution of the questionnaire over the first three decades of 
the twentieth century. Although Hall’s program of questionnaire-based research continued 
unabated until 1915, it was increasingly relegated to the periphery of psychology proper. Many 
questionnaire-based investigations, especially those at Clark, fell within other fields – most 
notably education, religious studies, and psychical investigations427 – which were themselves 
evermore-distinct disciplinary entities. At the same time, mass data collection in psychology 
became increasingly a project of psychological testing. It was only in the 1920s, with an 
increased interest in tracking individual attitudes on social issues of various kinds, that 
psychologists returned to questionnaires with force. These psychological projects were not 
rooted in the accumulation of descriptive accounts of human experience, but rather sought to 
transform this method of data collection in significant ways by restricting the range of answers 
available to respondents to a set few. In doing so, the method adopted the scientific ideal of 
numerical values. This move from descriptive to numerical data, I argue, involved a shift from 
thick to thin description (T. M. Porter, 2012) and a distinct change in the public’s relation to this 
work. Thin, numerical descriptions of psychological phenomena offered the promise of solving 
the issues of data analysis that had plagued earlier investigations. At the same time, concrete 
                                                
427 Psychologists continued to be involved in psychical investigations in the twentieth 
century, but the tone of much of this involvement changed markedly. Rather than approaching 
psychical occurrences as potentially genuine phenomena, psychologists took on the role of 
debunkers out to expose not just the normal mental processes that might account for apparently 
psychical phenomena, but the outright fraud of mediums and their compatriots (Coon, 1992b; 
Pettit, 2008, 2013b; Sommer, 2012). Among the religious questionnaires circulated in the 
twentieth century was one by James Pratt, a former student of William James (W. James. 
[Answers to J. B. Pratt's questionnaire on religion]. Printed sheet with autograph annotations; 
[n.p., 1904 ]. William James Papers, 1803-1941, b MS Am 1092.9 (4474), Houghton Library, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA). James Hyslop also discusses a questionnaire investigation 
into psychical matters near the same time (J. H. Hyslop to Hugo Münsterberg, 1 January (n.y.), 
Folder 1825, Item 7, Hugo Münsterberg Papers, Boston Public Library, Boston, MA). Hall 
outlines the full tenure of his multi-decade program of questionnaire-based research in his 
autobiography (Hall, 1924). 
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numerical findings held the advantage of operating as immutable mobiles (Latour, 1986), a form 
of information able to circulate with ease not only within science, but also among government 
and corporate entities (T. M. Porter, 1995). The construction, application, and analysis involved 
in questionnaire research now had a set of strictures to follow, ones that both simplified 
interpretation and, at least superficially, certified such work as scientific. Though the reworking 
of questionnaires secured their place in the science’s methodological repertoire, the space in 
which the method was revived was in some ways similar to the earliest projects in which the 
method was employed in the field. Once again, questionnaires were applied to issues of great 
social relevance. Decades into the twentieth century, however, the public was no longer invited 
to participate in this research process, but was instead the target of psychologists 
pronouncements on the state of the social world. 
Testing and Mass Data Collection 
 The re-working of questionnaires was influenced by other psychological practices that 
similarly sought the accumulation of masses of material, most notably intelligence testing. 
American psychology’s interest in mental testing long pre-dated the advent of intelligence testing 
proper.428 Most famously, James McKeen Cattell instituted a program of mental testing, 
beginning in 1890 at the University of Pennsylvania and continuing later at Columbia College, in 
New York City. The initiative at the latter institution, where all incoming students to the College 
as well as those at the Columbia School of Mines were tested, consisted of a battery of motor 
tasks and physical measurements. Cattell’s efforts were the most enduring and systematic, but 
others in the field were also interested in developing mental tests. In 1896 the American 
Psychological Association appointed a Committee on Physical and Mental Tests. In addition to 
                                                
428 On this history see Carson (2007), Sokal (1987b), and Zenderland (1998). 
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Cattell, the committee comprised James Mark Baldwin, Joseph Jastrow, Edmund Sanford, and 
Lightner Witmer, all prominent members of the discipline in their own right. The committee 
failed to reach consensus regarding a battery of tests, instead listing alongside various tests those 
committee members in favour of the item’s inclusion. The series of physical and mental tests was 
“regarded as especially appropriate for college students tested in a psychological laboratory” but 
“would also be suitable for the general public and, with some omissions and slight modifications, 
for school children” (Farrand, 1897a, p. 132, 1897b, p. 211).429 The tests were intended to be 
administered over less than an hour and were selected on the basis of “those which seemed likely 
to reveal individual differences and development, but also took into account ease and quickness 
in making tests and in interpreting and collating the results” (Farrand, 1897a, p. 132, 1897b, p. 
211; see also “Physical and mental tests,” 1898). Outside of Cattell’s undertaking little sustained 
effort was made to test large bodies of individuals.430 This project ran into the twentieth century 
only to falter in the face of his student Clark Wissler’s discovery that the tests failed to correlate 
with academic achievement to any appreciable degree (Sokal, 1982, 1987a). Notably, it was only 
with the development of statistical methods able to analyse collected masses of data that efforts 
to produce these kinds of tests came to an end. 
                                                
429 This is a reflection, especially, of the position Cattell articulated the previous year: 
“The psychological laboratory can also be brought into mutually helpful relations with the 
community by extending the tests to any who wish to have them made. Children in the schools 
might be tested with special advantage. For this purpose tests are especially useful which can be 
made simultaneously on a large number of observers… In any case the making of the tests is 
good practice for advanced students preliminary to, or in addition to, special research. By 
bringing the laboratory into relations with the community we add to its influence and at the same 
time secure the material needed for research” (Cattell & Farrand, 1896, p. 647). 
430 Early in the twentieth century a variety of tests were employed by Helen Thompson 
Woolley (1903) in her study of the sexes. For a review of the content of many of the mental tests 
used in the United States prior to 1910 see Whitley (1911). 
 310 
 Cattell’s mental testing endeavours had little sustained influence on the discipline. It was 
instead in the realm of work with children that intelligence testing took hold in the United States. 
In the early twentieth century, psychologist Henry Goddard imported Alfred Binet’s intelligence 
test for children from France in an effort to resolve the practical problem of evaluating those 
institutionalized at the Training School for Feeble-minded Boys and Girls in Vineland, New 
Jersey.431 One of those who took up the newly translated Binet test was Lewis Terman, who 
produced the most popular American version of test, the Stanford-Binet revision (Terman, 
1916). Both Goddard and Terman were former Hall students, though neither was directly 
involved in questionnaire-based child study research during their time at Clark.432 Nonetheless, 
their subsequent employment capitalized on the Clark program’s connections within educational 
circles, as each obtained work within normal schools for a time before moving on to other 
positions.433 What each took with him from their time at Clark was an openness to work with 
children, as well as an orientation toward the collection of masses of data. Rather than continuing 
to employ the Galtonian ideal championed by Hall as their vision of normalization, these 
investigators adopted a Queteletian notion aggregate as a central feature of their work (see 
Hacking, 1990; Hegarty, 2013).434 No longer was an idealized picture of childhood the goal of 
research on children. Rather an understanding of the distribution of children across a clear range 
                                                
431 On the development of intelligence testing in France see Carson (2007) and Nicholas, 
Andrieu, Croizet, Sanitioso, and Burman (2013). 
432 That said, Terman’s doctoral dissertation sought to distinguish of “bright” and 
“stupid” children via the administration of mental tests (Terman, 1906).  
433 Goddard was employed at the State Normal School in West Chester, Pennsylvania 
prior to his time at the Vineyard Training School (Zenderland, 1998). Terman worked for a time 
at the Los Angeles State Normal School, where he was joined by Arnold Gesell another former 
student of Hall’s, before moving to the Department of Education at Stanford University (Carson, 
2007; Chapman, 1988; Minton, 1988).  
434 That said, there remains an element of the Galtonian ideal in later work, notably 
Terman’s interest in the gifted (Hegarty, 2013). 
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of defined ability was used as a means of locating particular children along this dimension. In the 
context of intelligence testing, this information offered a means of sorting children on the basis 
of their mental abilities. In the hands of Hall’s former students, mass investigations of children 
were now employed explicitly so as to locate individual children within a larger distribution of 
the population. This was a distinct departure from earlier questionnaire-based investigations 
where the aim was descriptive rather than diagnostic.  
 The scope of testing in the United States expanded considerably during World War 
One.435 Psychologists seeking to contribute to the war effort promoted various forms of testing as 
a means of sorting scores of new military recruits. In addition to a program of intelligence testing 
organized by Robert Yerkes (Carson, 2007), Walter Dill Scott developed aptitude tests for 
personnel selection (von Mayrhauser, 1989), and Robert Woodworth devised the Woodworth 
Personal Data Sheet to assess neurotic symptoms (Gibby & Zickar, 2008; Winston, 2006). The 
latter was completed too late for use during the war, but its lack of copyright facilitated its wide 
use with civilians (Gibby & Zickar, 2008). The statistically literate Woodworth, who taught 
mathematics for several years prior to pursuing work in psychology, was educated at Harvard 
under both James and Royce. He was also influenced by a year of study at Columbia University 
where he came into contact with both Cattell and the more statistically savvy Boas 
(Poffenberger, 1962; Woodworth, 1932), both of who had previously undertaken data collection 
projects.436  
                                                
435 There is an extensive literature on mental testing during World War One, including 
Carson (2007), Chapman (1988), Fass (1980), Kevles (1968), Minton (1988), Samelson (1977), 
and von Mayrhauser (1991, 1992). 
436 In 1904 Woodworth headed the Anthropological Department for the St. Louis World’s 
Fair where 1,100 individuals received anthropometric and psychometric measurements and the 
results were compared to those of various “primitive” people on exhibit at the Fair (Winston, 
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The Woodworth Personal Data Sheet, identified by Winston (2006) as a “forerunner of 
modern personality tests” (p. 56), was constructed as a test of emotional stability at the behest of 
the American Psychological Association (Winston, 2006; Woodworth, 1932).437 By inquiring as 
to symptoms rarely seen in normal individuals the inventory was intended to be used as an 
alternative to time consuming psychiatric interviews in order to assess the emotional stability of 
army recruits. As Woodworth later recalled, he collected hundreds of neurotic “symptoms from 
reported case histories, I threw them into the form of a questionnaire which could be applied to a 
group of subjects at a time, the single questions to be answered Yes or No” (Woodworth, 1932, 
p. 374). The questionnaire was then tested on groups of normal subjects, and symptoms 
frequently reported by non-neurotic individuals were removed from the test. In limiting his 
questionnaire to questions that could only be answered Yes or No, Woodworth ensured that his 
collected information would be easily interpretable and set a precedent for future data collection 
schemes. 
Like Woodworth’s Personal Data Sheet, the form taken by intelligence tests developed to 
meet the needs of the war effort proved influential to later developments in questionnaire 
construction. Though the military never fully embraced the use of intelligence testing’s findings 
as a basis for personnel decisions, more than 1.75 million individuals were tested with the 
instruments psychologists devised. Intelligence test results from nearly two million men 
produced massive quantities of information that could only be analyzed statistically. Efforts to 
construct a picture of American intelligence writ large from this collected material were far from 
                                                                                                                                                       
2006). Woodworth’s statistical work includes Woodworth (1912). On his life and work see 
Murphy (1963), Poffenberger (1962), and Winston (2006).  
437 The history of personality tests is addressed in a number of works (Buchanan, 2002; 
Gibby & Zickar, 2008; Koppes, 1997; von Mayrhauser, 1989). 
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simple and not without controversy.438 That said, statistical approaches had developed 
significantly since the late nineteenth century making analyses possible, resulting in large tomes 
dedicated to explicating this amassed material (Brigham, 1923; Yerkes, 1921; Yoakum & 
Yerkes, 1920). Given the necessities of mass testing in the military context, psychologists 
devised multiple-choice tests suitable for administration in group settings; this included versions 
for both literate and illiterate individuals, the Army Alpha and Army Beta, respectively. For 
pragmatic reasons, possible responses to questions in these tests were restricted. Scoring 
hundreds of thousands of tests, and millions of individual questions, was far simpler in the case 
of multiple-choice items where there was a clearly defined correct answer, a scheme that 
rendered expertise an unnecessary part of the scoring process. Following the scoring of tests, the 
organization of data was also streamlined through the assignment of letter grades on a scale 
ranging from A to E, with grades nearer the beginning of the alphabet corresponding to higher 
intelligence (Carson, 2007). By the end of the war intelligence had been rendered “quantifiable 
on a unidimensional scale” (Carson, 2007, p. 197), setting the stage for the conceptualization of 
other attributes along similar terms.439 
 
 
 
 
                                                
438 Particularly controversial was the contention that the average American soldier had a 
mental age below that of a thirteen year old (see Carson, 2007). 
439 These developments were not, of course, limited to the United States. In addition to 
intelligence testing in France (Carson, 2007), work on testing was also undertaken in England 
where factor analysis proved a central component in this work, especially in the twentieth 
century. Among the most notable figures in this field are Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt, 
Raymond Cattell, and Hans Eysenck (see Buchanan, 2010; Levy, 1995; Lovie & Lovie, 1993; 
Tucker, 2009; Wooldridge, 2006).  
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Questionnaires Get an Attitude 
 One of the many psychologists involved in the World War One intelligence testing effort, 
though in a relatively minor role, was Louis Leon Thurstone (Carson, 2007).440 Like Woodworth 
and an emerging generation of social scientists in the early twentieth century, Thurstone was 
mathematically skilled. This was in direct contrast to an earlier generation of psychologists who 
were decidedly less capable in this arena, most notably Cattell who Sokal (1982) has 
characterized as “mathematically illiterate” (p. 337). Thurstone’s mathematical talents can be 
traced back to his undergraduate studies of electrical engineering at Cornell University. He then 
pursued graduate study in psychology at the University of Chicago with James Rowland Angell 
in the 1910s.441 Following periods working with Walter Bingham at the Carnegie Institute of 
Technology, including work on intelligence testing for the war effort, and at the Institute for 
Government Research in Washington, DC, developing methods of improving civil service 
examinations, Thurstone returned to the University of Chicago in 1924. Three years later he was 
appointed to a research professorship in social science. The position was underwritten through 
the more that $3.4 million in funding from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial the 
university received between 1923 and 1929, which was administered by the university’s Local 
Community Research Committee (later the Social Science Research Committee). Although 
funds were largely for work in political science, sociology, anthropology, and political economy, 
Thurstone secured support for his statistically oriented research, work which was broadly 
                                                
440 Thurstone’s published prolifically on mental tests and scaling (Thurstone, 1919, 
1921a, 1921b, 1925, 1926, 1927b, 1927c, 1927f, 1928c, 1928d, 1931b; Thurstone & Ackerson, 
1929; Thurstone & Jenkins, 1929; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1930). 
441 Thurstone’s life and work is discussed in Bulmer (1984), Jones (1998), Guilford 
(1957), and Thurstone (1952). 
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influential on social scientists at the university (Bulmer, 1984).442 It was from this position that 
his redesign of questionnaires took place. 
In producing scaled questionnaires Thurstone took attitudes as his object of measurement. 
The precise meaning of the psychological term attitude, and research on such, was only just 
solidifying in the 1920s. Danziger (1997), in his discussion of the emergence of attitudes as a 
subject of psychological research, identifies early twentieth century psychologists, and brothers, 
Floyd and Gordon Allport as instrumental in formulating social attitudes as a component of 
mental life. Conceived of as learned individual attributes amenable to change, attitudes were not 
simply internal dispositions divorced from the world, but rather a “state of readiness” (Danziger, 
1997, p. 145) that produced real effects in society. The positing of social attitudes allowed 
psychologists to investigate facets of the social world, more often the terrain of sociologists, via 
the study of individual attitudes toward something in the social world. Psychologists were able to 
comment on the state of society through their research on attitudes toward popular social issues 
of various kinds and, in doing so, the discipline’s larger visibility and social value was bolstered. 
Through the measurement of attitudes, psychologists could comment on the roots of social ills, 
which were positioned as at least partly the effect of underlying attitudes within individual 
members of the populace. The production of measurement techniques, including Thurstone’s 
scaled attitude measures, was crucial to this process, reifying the previously loose concept of 
                                                
442 Thurstone was also affiliated with the University of Chicago’s Institute for Juvenile 
Research, previously the Juvenile Psychopathic Institute (see K. W. Jones, 1999), at the time he 
developed his scaling method (Bulmer, 1984; Thurstone, 1952). 
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attitude and allowing the field to argue that state decision making should be informed by its 
findings (Danziger, 1997).443 
Thurstone’s work on scaled attitude measures grew out of his earlier development of 
mental tests and work on the scaling of intelligence measures.444 A prolific producer of research 
in the 1920s and early 1930s, especially following his appointment as research professor, he was 
well-versed in the scaling techniques at use in intelligence testing having developed some of 
these himself (e.g., Thurstone, 1925). In applying his scaling knowledge to the measurement of 
attitudes Thurstone was also inspired by difficulties he encountered teaching psychophysics. 
Finding differences in weights dull, he opted instead to give his students “a list of offenses 
presented in pairs with the instruction that they should be judged as to their relative seriousness” 
(Thurstone, 1952, p. 307). This classroom exercise eventually led to the formulation the law of 
comparative judgement (Thurstone, 1927a, 1927d), which outlined how a psychological scale 
could be constructed, independent of physical measurement, on the basis of a series of 
comparisons of stimuli. As he later noted, “the law of comparative judgment is entirely 
independent of the physical stimulus magnitudes. This circumstance enables one to use the law 
in the measurement of social and aesthetic values where physical stimulus measurement is 
entirely irrelevant” (Thurstone, 1952, p. 310). In this way Thurstone was able to “illustrate the 
connection between the study of social values and some methodological studies in psychophysics 
                                                
443 Further discussion of the growth of work on attitudes in the 1920s can be found in 
Converse (1987), and another exploration of the term’s history is offered by Fleming (1967). For 
discussion of the discourse on “scientific attitude” during this time see Jewett (2012). 
444 Thurstone published extensively on attitude measurement (Thurstone, 1928a, 1928b, 
1928e, 1929, 1930, 1931a, 1931c, 1931d; Thurstone & Chave, 1929). Outside of these works he 
also published a number of statistically oriented pieces during this time (Thurstone, 1922a, 
1922b, 1926, 1927c, 1927e). 
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which, as such, seem to be rather remote from social science.”445 Like the recently solidified 
conception of intelligence, this scaling method consisted of unidimensional continuum along 
which variables could be straightforwardly measured in terms of more or less. In undertaking 
this work Thurstone’s particular interest was not the social per se, but rather the methodological 
challenges attendant the measurement of social values. 
So far as Thurstone (1928b) was concerned “attitude” denoted “the sum total of a man’s 
inclinations and feelings, prejudice or bias, pre-conceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and 
convictions about any specified topic” (p. 531). Given attitude’s existence as internal 
dispositions toward action, it was not attitudes themselves that were measured, but rather stated 
opinions which were used as proxies for such on the assumption that these were revelatory of 
underlying attitudes (Thurstone, 1928b). In taking up attitude research, Thurstone explicitly 
sought to improve upon earlier efforts at measurement, particularly those of Floyd Allport (e.g., 
Allport & Hartman, 1925). Allport’s assessment of attitudes had subjects select from a list of 
opinion statements a single statement most representative of their own views. Noting that Allport 
was “virtually dealing with rank order” (Thurstone, 1928b, p. 542), Thurstone offered his scaling 
method as a mere refinement of these earlier attempts. Rather than arriving at idiosyncratic rank 
orders of statements of opinion Thurstone (1928b) sought to produce a “rational unit of 
measurement” (p. 542) for attitudes, selecting as his initial topics attitudes toward pacifism-
militarism, prohibition, and the church, all prominent social issues of the day.446 
                                                
445 L. L. Thurstone to L. D. White, December 23, 1927, Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. 
446 See also “Experimental Study of Attitude Toward the Church,” Box 14, Folder 9, 
University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. 
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In Thurstone’s (1928b) work attitudes were conceptualized in terms of more or less and 
scales were constructed so that 
the shift in opinion represented by a unit distance on the base line seems to most people 
the same as the shift in opinion represented by a unit distance at any other part of the 
scale. Two individuals who are separated by any given distance on the scale seem to 
differ in their attitudes as much as any other two individuals with the same scale 
separation. (p. 542) 
The decision to compress attitudes into a single dimension along a linear scale allowed for their 
precise measurement, but also attracted criticism from those who considered attitudes 
immeasurable and nonlinear (see Bulmer, 1984).  
As Thurstone (1928b) outlined, the process of constructing an attitude scale involved a 
set series of steps. To begin with one identifies the attitude variable to be measured. From here a 
wide range of opinion statements related to the attitude are collected, both by way of written 
opinions on the issue obtained from individuals and through a search of literature “for suitable 
brief statements that may serve the purposes of the scale” (Thurstone, 1928b, p. 544).447 This list 
of statements is then narrowed to approximately one hundred statements that encompass the full 
range of attitudes toward the issue. These statements are then printed, individually, on small 
cards and several hundred judges are given the task of rank ordering the statements into eleven 
piles, ranging from those most strongly in agreement to those most strongly opposed to the issue 
                                                
447 These statements, in addition to relating to the variable being measured, were to meet 
the following criteria: they must be brief, avoid double-barreled statements, be able to be 
endorsed or rejected based on the subject’s attitude, and acceptance or rejection of a statement 
should indicate something about the subject’s attitude toward a topic (Thurstone, 1928b). More 
recent work in psychology has critiqued the notion that attitudes are underlying predispositions 
of individuals, arguing instead that attitudes are created as a result of deliberative processes (e.g., 
Puchta & Potter, 2002). 
 319 
at hand with a neutral pile in the middle. A attitude scale is then constructed on the basis of “the 
proportion of readers or judges who agree about the rank order of any two statements” 
(Thurstone, 1928b, p. 541). That is, for example, “the scale value assigned to the statement is so 
chosen that one half of the readers consider it more militaristic and one half of them consider it 
less militaristic than the scale value assigned” (Thurstone, 1928b, p. 546). After a scale value is 
calculated for each statement, ambiguous and irrelevant items are eliminated on the basis of 
various calculations, as outlined by Thurstone (1928b). Finally, a shorter series of between 
twenty and thirty items, which “constitute as nearly as possible an evenly graduated series of 
scale values” (Thurstone, 1928b, p. 552), are selected to comprise the final scale.448  
 Before being put to use the scale was then, ideally, subjected to an experimental test of its 
validity. Thurstone (1928b) contended that the scale could only be considered valid so long as it 
remained unaffected by the particular opinions held by the judges whose rankings informed its 
construction. One means of ensuring this was by constructing two scales from the same set of 
statements, one using the rankings provided by a group with attitudes that fell at the positive end 
of the spectrum and one with rankings from those with attitudes at the negative end. If the scale 
values produced by the groups aligned, the scale, and this method of scale construction more 
generally, was proved valid. This means of validating the method, he noted, “may turn out to be 
a severe test in practice, but the scaling method must stand such a test before it can be accepted 
as being more than a description of the people who construct the scale” (Thurstone, 1928b, p. 
                                                
448 For a brief review of Thurstone’s system of attitude scaling see Jones (1998, pp. 90–
1). 
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547). Only through these tests could it be ensured that the scale was applicable beyond the initial 
group whose rankings informed its construction.449 
 Thurstone deemed his new method of scale construction “satisfactory” and termed it “the 
method of similar reactions.”450 Those completing the attitude scales were instructed to endorse 
any and all listed statements with which they were in agreement (1928b) and their individual 
score on the scale was computed as the average scale value of all the endorsed items.451 These 
scores could then be plotted in a frequency distribution to reveal the attitudes of a given group 
toward a particular social issue.452 At the same time, for comparison purposes, Thurstone’s 
                                                
449 This was the approach to assessing validity of scales discussed by Thurstone (1928b) 
in his initial presentation of the method and referenced in other work at this time (Thurstone, 
1928e). It is also discussed in Thurstone and Chave (1929), alongside other means of assessing 
validity. In neither instance are the results of this kind of analysis presented, though the latter 
publication notes that this work is underway. The results of this test are unknown. 
450 L. L. Thurstone to T. V. Smith, October 2, 1928, Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. See also Thurstone (1929, p. 240). 
451 See also “Experimental Study of Attitude Toward the Church,” Box 14, Folder 9, 
University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. 
452 Thurstone also experimented with other scheme for amassing information. In 1928, he 
produced a personality schedule that was given to University of Chicago freshmen. He noted “I 
hope that this test will enable us to identify the nervous students and I hope that we will be able 
to prevent several nervous breakdowns by obtaining psychiatric assistance for those students 
who need it” (L. L. Thurstone to T. V. Smith, October 2, 1928, Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL). The personality schedule instructed students to 
“draw a ring around” either “Yes,” “No,” or “?” for each question on the test, which consisted of 
dozens of items and spanned four pages (“Personality Schedule,” Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL). Among items from other sources, the content of 
Woodworth’s earlier inventory was used as part of the test (see Thurstone & Thurstone, 1930). 
Additionally, a questionnaire titled “An Experimental Study of Racial Attitudes” presented 
respondents with lists of paired races or nationalities and asked them to “underline the one 
nationality, or race, of each pair you would rather associate with” (“An Experimental Study of 
Racial Attitudes,” Box 14, Folder 9, University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee 
Records, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL). 
Although undated, the scale was produce around 1929. 
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questionnaires explicitly asked individuals to directly indicate their attitude toward the issue at 
hand; for instance, by marking an X, where they fell along a line ranging from “strongly 
favorable to the church” at one end to “strongly against the church” at the other with “neutral” as 
a mid-point.453 
Though Thurstone’s systematized use of ranking to construct scaled questionnaires was 
novel, the employment of ranking as a means of organizing information was far from 
revolutionary. Earlier psychological questionnaires also employed ordered rankings, but to a 
different end. Galton’s (1883) mental imagery questionnaire, adopted by Osborn, employed 
descriptive rankings (i.e., very faint, faint, good, or vivid) in one of its items (see Chapter 1), 
while in Jastrow’s dream inquiry the occurrence of dreaming was recorded as either Yes, 
Seldom, Frequently, Every night, or No (see Jastrow, 1888d, p. 27). Perhaps most notably, 
Cattell’s American Men of Science project, which was precipitated by the newly founded 
Carnegie Institution’s desire to identify exceptional scientists to whom to funnel money (Godin, 
2007), used rankings as a means of ordering scientists in various fields (Cattell, 1903a, 1903b, 
1906a, 1906b, 1906c, 1910a, 1910b).454 The undertaking sought “to make a somewhat elaborate 
study of the natural history of American men of science” (Cattell, 1903b, p. 323), via the 
circulation of a memorandum to “ten leading representatives” (Cattell, 1903b, p. 311) from each 
                                                
453 “Experimental Study of Attitude Toward the Church,” Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. 
454 Cattell’s project not only occupied much of the remainder of his life, but continues to 
this day (American men & women of science, 2013). For contemporaneous comment on Cattell’s 
undertaking see Bentley (1904). Cattell’s student Wells (1907) also undertook similar work. 
Earlier still a statistical study of belief, which asked individuals to order a set of questions on the 
basis of certainty of beliefs, was undertaken in the Psychological Laboratory at Columbia 
University, with suggestions from Cattell. On Cattell’s American Men of Science work see 
Godin (2007) and Sokal (1995). For an account of the rise of statistical work at Columbia, 
including Cattell’s efforts, see Camic and Xie (1994).  
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of twelve sciences who were to provide rankings on the basis of merit.455 From their ratings a 
picture of the ideal scientist was to emerge. 
The process of constructing a scale by employing judges to sort statements was 
labourious, as Thurstone well recognized. In something of a reversal of the logic of the scaling 
method used thus far, he speculated that if one were to administer a set of statements to a large 
enough group, consisting of those in possession of a full range of attitudes, the endorsements 
provided by these individuals could themselves be used to construct the attitude scale. It was the 
frequency with which individuals endorsed pairs of items, in relation to those who endorsed each 
individual item, that could serve as the basis for a scale (see Thurstone & Chave, 1929, pp. 90–
1).456 This simplified method of scale construction, although mathematically more complex, was 
soon rendered unnecessary by a still simpler method. 
A “Simpler Method” of Scale Construction457 
 Near the time Thurstone published his new approach to attitude scaling, Rensis Likert 
was undertaking his own research on the subject.458 A graduate student at Columbia in the late 
                                                
455 The study of great men was previously undertaken by Galton in his English Men of 
Science (1874) and more broadly by Pierce and a group of students at Johns Hopkins University 
in the mid-1880s. This work was characterized by Jastrow as a “natural history of great men” 
(Jastrow, 1886b, p. 10 fn., 1886c, p. 295 fn.) and intended to show how statistical analyses might 
be applied to impressionistic data (see C. S. Peirce, 1989, p. lxii). Though the work was never 
completed, but Jastrow later published several short pieces on the project, including discussions 
of the longevity (Jastrow, 1886b, 1886c) and precocity (Jastrow, 1888b, 1888c) of great men (see 
Jastrow, 1916). Peirce later took up this work again (C. S. Peirce, 1901a, 1901b). 
456 See also “Report on Current Research Projects, Autumn Quarter, 1929,” Box 14, 
Folder 9, University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special 
Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL. The process of 
deriving a scale from a body of data in this way was later reimagined in Thurstone’s work on 
factor analysis (e.g., Thurstone, 1935, 1947). 
457 See Likert (1932, p. 25). 
458 On Rensis Likert see “The Career of Rensis Likert,” Institute for Social Research 
Newsletter, Winter 1971, Box 1, Folder 2, Rensis Likert Papers, Bentley Historical Library, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. See also Kish (1982) and Seasore and Katz (1982). 
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1920s, Likert was working with socially engaged psychologist, and psychical researcher, 
Gardner Murphy who had initiated a small project on social attitudes and enlisted Likert’s 
assistance.459 Work on this project expanded to form the basis of Likert’s 1932 dissertation, 
which described what came to be known as the Likert method of scaling (Likert, 1932; see S. E. 
Seashore & Katz, 1982). 
 Prior to his studies at Columbia Likert had never taken a psychology course. Like 
Thurstone, he initially pursued engineering as an undergraduate student. This shared background 
informed both men’s view of psychology as a form of social engineering, which first 
necessitated that relevant information was collected. At the University of Michigan Likert’s 
study of chemical engineering, particularly metallurgy, led him to wonder  
if you can analyze steel that way, perhaps the same kind of rigorous scientific approach 
could be applied to the problems of human behavior in industry or internationally, etc. 
that first errors of measurement would be large and graphical approximations rather than 
precise mathematical equations, but nonetheless you could use rigorous quantitative 
research to solve these problems.460 
Likert attributed his growing interest in human behaviour and social issues to various factors, 
including his reading of historian James H. Robinson’s Mind in the Making, recent domestic 
turmoil in the form of the Union Pacific Rail strike, which he witnessed firsthand, and his active 
involvement in a student Christian association dealing with the “costs and consequences of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Likert’s other work, including survey research, has been discussed by a number of scholars 
(Converse, 1987; Crowther-Heyck, 2006; Jewett, 2013; Johnson & Nichols, 1998; Mahoney & 
Baker, 2007; Sewell, 1989). 
459 Danziger (1997), in passing, erroneously identifies Likert as Thustone’s student. On 
Murphy see Pandora (1997). 
460 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 
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war.”461 Given that “little has been accomplished by WWI” the group was “beginning to wonder 
if, perhaps, there weren’t better ways of dealing with international differences than warfare.”462 
For his part, “the more I thought about it the less sense to me it seemed to make.”463 This rising 
social consciousness led Likert to change course and earn a bachelors degree in economics and 
sociology.464 
 Following a year at Union Theological Seminary, Likert began graduate studies in the 
Department of Psychology at Columbia where his social engagement took on a decidedly social 
scientific bent (Kish, 1982). Murphy secured funds from the Columbia University Council for 
Research in the Social Sciences, part of a larger Rockefeller Foundation grant, to undertake a 
study of “attitudes of college students toward international and economic matters, race questions, 
political issues, [and] religious problems.”465 To do so, Likert and Murphy prepared a 
questionnaire. Like other efforts in this vein the instrument was constructed of items used by 
other researchers to measure attitude, as well as statements of opinion taken from recent 
magazines and newspapers, and “from books, addresses and pamphlets, and a number were made 
up by the experimenters” (Likert, 1932, p. 12). Initially taking an hour and forty-five minutes to 
complete, the questionnaire was later altered to include only half as many items, as well as 
“some additional items which were largely descriptive where you describe a situation and ask for 
                                                
461 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
462 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
463 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
464 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
465 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. See also Likert (1932, p. 
11). For Likert (1932) attitudes were “dispositions toward overt action” (p. 9). 
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reactions to it,” and “a number of items having to do with [the] personal history of the 
individual.”466 All items were to adhere to the criteria of “simplicity, clarity, and brevity” (Likert, 
1932, p. 12).  
The questionnaire items were all to be answered from a set series of responses. These 
were themselves various, involving questions of four types. Some items were to be answered 
“Yes,” “No,” or “?,” such as the question “Do you favor the early entrance of the United States 
into the League of Nations?” (Likert, 1932, p. 15). Others items were multiple-choice questions 
each with their own set of possible answers. Two other kinds of questions were completed by 
selecting from a graduated series of “(a) strongly approve, (b) approve, (c) undecided, (d) 
disapprove, (e) strongly disapprove” (Likert, 1932, p. 14). The simplest of these items had 
individuals respond to a statement by selecting from this range of responses. For instance, “we 
should be willing to fight for our country whether it is in the right or in the wrong” (Likert, 1932, 
p. 17). In more complex items, individuals were presented with condensed newspaper stories on 
relevant social issues, the final portion of which described the outcome of a conflict: “In a 
community of 1,000 whites and 50 negroes, a drunken negro shoots and kills an officer who is 
trying to arrest him. THE WHITE POPULATION IMMEDIATELY DRIVE ALL THE 
NEGROES OUT OF TOWN” (Likert, 1932, p. 19).  
Influenced by previous research documenting the contextual specificity of honesty and 
dishonesty, Murphy and Likert speculated that attitudes would be of a similarly specific 
nature.467 The aim of the overall project was  
                                                
466 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
467 The work on deceit referred to is that of Hartshorne and May (1928); this research is 
discussed in Pettit (2013b). In publishing the results of his attitude study Likert (1932) offered a 
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to cut through the statistical confusion which has resulted from the whole specificity-
generality argument, to bring out the actual points of disagreement which separate these 
rival groups of psychologists, to make clear the statistical assumptions involved in all 
such methods of reasoning, and above all to test empirically in an extensive way the 
actual coherence or clustering of attitudes on a variety of public issues. (Likert, 1932, p. 
10) 
It was thought, for instance, “that attitudes toward segregation, toward eating with the Negro and 
toward lynching would be independent, and that in general any one specific attitude toward the 
Negro would bear no clear relation to the attitudes on other issue” (Likert, 1932, p. 11). To 
assess this relationship the attitude questionnaire was administered to students at Columbia, as 
well as an additional eight schools including Yale, the University of Michigan, the City College 
of New York, and New York University. From these institutions more than 2000 individuals 
completed questionnaires (Likert, 1932). 
 Numerous responses to the questionnaire were accumulated, but this success soon proved 
problematic. Likert was well aware of the inherent challenges of efforts to quantify social 
phenomena. In previous attempts to measure attitudes, he noted, “the difficulty has lain in the 
statistical difficulties which are encountered when everyday aspects of social behavior, ordinarily 
handled as qualitative affairs, are treated from the mathematical point of view” (Likert, 1932, p. 
5). This was not a dismissal of the latter approach, but rather a recognition of the complications 
so much a part of these endeavours. As Likert recalled, “we built the questionnaire and decided 
to collect all the data without really thinking through how we were going to analyze the data,” 
but it soon became apparent that “it wasn’t going to be feasible to do what we originally thought 
                                                                                                                                                       
critique of these earlier character inquiries and their conclusion that honesty and deceit were 
context dependent. 
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we might do” with the collected material.468 Working on the assumption that there would be little 
relationship between the attitudes expressed in answers to different items, Likert sought to 
compare each individual’s answers to every other answer on the questionnaire. This, however, 
proved impossible, 
we had something over 400 items and if you did 400 X 399 by 2 you would have the 
number of tables that we would have. I checked with the tabulating services at Columbia 
University and it became clear that the magnitude of the job was such that we didn’t have 
the money for it. If we had had the money for it, I would have had so many tables I would 
never have gotten out from under the [work].469 
While attractive in principle, the abundant material collected for the project, even though now 
restricted to a set range of possible responses, proved difficult to manage just as in questionnaire 
investigations decades earlier. The development of equipment meant to aid in the tabulation of 
large amounts of information, proved both inadequate and out of reach given the costs associated 
with an inquiry of this scale. 
Faced with what seemed to be an insurmountable amount of material to analyse, Likert 
attempted to simplify his task as much as possible. To this end, he opted to focus just on the data 
collected from students at the University of Michigan through the assistance of one of Murphy’s 
former students. He recalls, 
I studied their responses on large tabulation sheets that my wife and I plotted item by 
item by individuals across large sheets about a yard square. It became clear that there 
were consistent patterns. A person that had a hostile attitude toward Negros on one item 
                                                
468 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
469 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
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had a hostile attitude on other items. I became impressed with this pattern and I began to 
compare them. I would cut strips of a row or column out and slide it across and compare 
it with others and make that kind of analysis.470 
Like Hall and his research associates in the late-nineteenth century Likert, out of necessity, 
employed paper systems as a means of managing and making sense out of his collected material 
(see Chapter 4). In doing so, Likert initially eschewed any attempt to synthesize the whole of his 
data in favour of detecting patterns among individual response sets. He also enlisted in this work 
his wife, and regular collaborator, Jane Gibson Likert (Kish, 1982; Likert & Likert, 1976) 
continuing the tradition of engaging women, in restricted capacities, in the labour associated with 
questionnaire research.  
 This initial piecemeal analysis facilitated the development of a new approach to scaling: 
the sigma method of scoring. As Likert (1932) made note of the relative stability of attitudes 
across contexts he also observed that attitudes measured with multiple choice and scaled 
approval items were normally distributed, as attitudes were in Thurstone’s earlier research. In 
this system of analyzing the questionnaire results he was able to “compute the sigma scores for 
each item based on the distribution for that item, and then I could assign each person a sigma 
score depending on which item he checked.”471 The conversion of item responses into sigma 
values, that is, standard deviation units, allowed for the location of individuals across a spectrum 
of attitude positions without the use of judges to construct a scale. At the same time, a reliable 
attitude scale could be constructed with fewer items than was necessary in other endeavours. 
                                                
470 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
471 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. See also Likert (1932, p. 
22). 
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This method of scoring was, therefore, a far easier approach of measuring attitude and analyzing 
the resulting mass of material (Likert, 1932). 
 At the suggestion of Albert Poffenberger, head of the Department of Psychology at 
Columbia, Likert set out to test the effectiveness of a still simpler method of scoring. 
Poffenberger pointed out that directly numerical rating scales were regularly used in industry for 
evaluating items, employees, and the like. Believing this form of measurement to be ineffective, 
Poffenberger informed Likert: “what you ought to do is show that this kind of a simple 1-2-3-4-5 
scoring that is commonly used is not very good and show that they ought to use the sigma 
method of scoring.”472 Likert readily took up the challenged. Each of the possible responses on 
the scale from ranging from strongly disapprove through strongly approve was assigned a 
numerical value from 1 to 5, with 5 always corresponding to positive end of the scale.473 To his 
surprise, “when I compared the 1-2-3-4-5 scoring I got the same level of reliability that I got with 
the sigma scores.”474 Moreover, comparisons of individuals’ scores on the questionnaire, as 
calculated with both methods, produced “correlations for total scores of .998, .997. So it was 
virtually identical as far as the distribution was concerned.”475 Not only was it “much simpler to 
build an attitude scale” with this new method, but scoring was easier than with the sigma 
                                                
472 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
473 In this initial work it appears that these values were not labeled directly on the 
questionnaire itself, but were rather used simply for scoring purposes (see Likert, 1932, pp. 25–
6). 
474 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.  
475 Oral History Interview Transcript, 1970, Box 1, Folder 1, Rensis Likert Papers, 
Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. Likert (1932) also 
experimented with other numerical scale values, including a scale with heavier weighted 
extremes that ranged from 1 to 7, with no 2 or 6 values, and found little difference between the 
scales as they produced similar results. 
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method, as all that was necessary to produce an individual’s final score was the summation of the 
numerical values associated with each response.476  
Like Poffenberger, Likert had been sceptical of numerical rating scales as viable 
alternative means of measurement. As he noted in his dissertation, he “began this inquiry with a 
suspicious attitude toward the simple computations used in rating-scales, and adopted these 
simple procedures only in the light of evidence showing that the simpler methods gave the same 
results as the elaborate” (Likert, 1932, p. 27 fn.). The end results, however, constituted “a radical 
departure” (Likert, 1932, p. 6) from the scaling methods so recently developed by Thurstone. 
Simple numerical scales were superior to earlier measurement efforts, including Likert’s own 
sigma method, “since they yield almost identical results with the sigma method and similarly do 
not involve any of the errors likely to be present in any technique in which experts, judges, or 
raters are used” (Likert, 1932, p. 26). The ease of this form of scaling was in direct contrast to 
Thurstone’s “exceedingly laborious” (Likert, 1932, p. 6) procedure and this “Likert” method of 
scaling soon took hold in the discipline and beyond. 
Participants and the Public 
The move to the collection of more circumscribed material was accompanied by a shift in 
the role of the public in questionnaire-based endeavours. Unlike earlier investigations that sought 
to collect information via questionnaire, the work of collecting in attitude research in the 1920s 
and 30s was limited to those in professional spheres. While still seeking to amass large quantities 
of data, these endeavours did so not by engaging members of the public in the research process, 
but rather through networks of association largely internal to the university system. This work 
was to speak to broad social issues and, to some degree at least, the state of the public mind at 
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large, hence its use of popular literature as source material. The public, however, was not 
actively involved in the process of arriving at these conclusions. 
 At the same time, the public at large was not among those targeted to provide 
questionnaire responses. It was instead readily accessible populations of university students who 
comprised the bulk of respondents in these investigations. Converse (1987), in her history of 
survey research in the United States, contends that the development and use of scaled attitude 
measures required several supporting factors, including: educated individuals capable of 
articulating “their intellectual, political, and moral positions; people, in sum, who were trained in 
having attitudes” (Converse, 1987, p. 58). University students were uniquely capable of meeting 
these requirements given their presence in intellectually stimulating educational environments 
where discussion of social issues was a regular occurrence. At the same time students possessed 
the time and tolerance necessary for participation in this kind of research. Students were a group 
whose subordinate position in relation to the researcher-academic meant they could be imposed 
upon to cooperate in research. Finally, students were inexpensive and accessible participants, 
which meant time and effort did not have to be spent looking elsewhere for respondents 
(Converse, 1987).477 In Thurstone’s case participants were predominantly University of Chicago 
instructors and students, including those at the undergraduate and graduate level, as well as 
divinity students. An additional group of participants was obtained from the local Chicago 
Forum Council, a goodwill group in which individuals gathered together to discuss social issues 
                                                
477 Many similar points are identified by Rice (1930) in his criticism of the use of 
particular kinds of individuals as the judges in Thurstone’s scaling method. Likert highlights 
Rice’s criticisms in his own work and frames his new approach to scaling as avoiding these 
difficulties (see Likert, 1932, p. 24). 
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(Thurstone & Chave, 1929).478 Likert’s participants were more diverse only in the sense of 
originating from multiple universities across geographic locales. The tendency to employ 
students as research participants, while an aspect of the earliest questionnaire-based 
investigations in the discipline, was a convenience that would soon come to dominate 
psychology as a whole. As in these earlier endeavours, the use of students as sources of 
generalizable knowledge is increasingly recognized as problematic today, though for largely 
different reasons (Henrich et al., 2010).  
 The use of students in Thurstone’s work, while convenient, was ultimately problematic. 
In presenting his “simpler method” (Likert, 1932, p. 25) of scale construction and scoring, Likert 
positioned his work as superior to Thurstone’s for reasons beyond its ease. To do so, he 
referenced criticism of the method by sociologist Stuart Rice who noted the construction of 
Thurstone type scales was dependent on the cooperation of individuals who were able to 
articulate their attitudes, a skill uniquely found in students and members of discussion groups. 
Given the power differential between students and investigators cooperation risked veering into 
(over)-compliance, a danger psychologists were cognizant of and concerned about during this 
period (see Pettit, 2013b ch. 6). Beyond this challenge, it was not these but “the more numerous 
work-a-day groupings of society … about whose attitudes the social scientist is in the most need 
of information” (Rice [1930] as quoted in Likert, 1932, p. 24).479 This was impossible, however, 
if scales were constructed with the judgments of only certain kinds of members of society. The 
determination of equal appearing intervals was directly tied to those engaged as judges. There 
                                                
478 Thurstone’s monograph length collaboration with Chave is a rare instance in which he 
addresses who the participants in his work are, as his focus in publications is more often on scale 
construction and its intricacies (see Thurstone & Chave, 1929). 
479 Sociologist and statistician Stuart Rice discussed methodological issues related to 
quantitative approaches to social measurement in Rice (1928, 1930). 
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was no reason to believe that the scale they produced would also serve as a scale of equal 
appearing intervals for other kinds of people. More problematically still, it was “difficult to 
imagine securing comparable judgments, or satisfactory measurements in the final application, 
from bricklayers, business men, Italian-Americans, nuns, stevedores, or seamstresses” (Rice 
[1930] as quoted in Likert, 1932, p. 24). This meant that, at least so far as some were concerned, 
the attitudes of a great many segments of society were necessarily off limits to investigators 
whose interest lay in these particularly psychological facets of individuals. This did not preclude, 
of course, more expedient commercial undertakings like opinion polling (see Igo, 2007; D. J. 
Robinson, 1999). Likert’s alternative approach to scaling avoided this difficulty by foregoing the 
use of judges altogether. The result was scales that could, conceivably, be applied to any and 
every type of member of society. 
The use of students as the source of information did not, necessarily, limit conclusions to 
just this group. In Likert’s investigation the obtainment of responses from students at universities 
in both Northern and Southern states facilitated discussion of difference in attitudes along 
regional lines. The results of his scale indicated “there exists a clear-cut pro- or anti-Negro 
sentiment, an emotional and conative disposition….this, then, is a psychological fact 
transcending the mere statistical aspects of the scaling method involved” (Likert, 1932, p. 38). In 
concrete terms this difference in attitude manifested, for instance, in “Never” serving as a far 
more popular response to a question on the appropriateness of lynching from those in Northern 
schools, than from those in the South. Differences like this were evidence of group factors rooted 
in shared cultural patterns among those in various locales. Comparing results from one university 
to those of another in a similar region of the country offered “an empirical method of 
establishing the degree of uniformity of the cultural pattern in which these various groups of 
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students participate” (Likert, 1932, p. 38). The result was evidence of a difference in “general” 
attitude between those in the North versus the South attributable, in Likert’s view, to a host of 
environmental factors – social, educational, economic, and otherwise. Likert framed his scaling 
method as a valuable “way of revealing general differences in the friendliness or antagonism 
shown by different social groups toward some nationality or class with which they have 
dealings” (Likert, 1932, p. 39). While couching his findings as revelatory of the attitudes of 
college students, he edged toward broader generalizations of the attitudes he found characteristic 
of those in the North and South, respectively. The aim of this kind of research was fundamentally 
broader than merely determining the attitudes of college students toward various social groups or 
issues. 
Rather than enlisting members of the public in their work, early twentieth century 
psychologists were more likely to collaborate with those in other academic disciplines. More 
generally, questionnaire research felt the influence of, and itself made an impression on, other 
fields, particularly sociology. It is no coincidence that Columbia and Chicago were the sites at 
which questionnaire scaling was developed as sociologists from both universities dominated the 
field in the interwar years (M. C. Smith, 1994). Connections with sociology at Columbia most 
notably include the close friendship between Robert and Helen Lynd, the sociologists 
responsible for the 1920s Middletown survey study, and Murphy, Likert’s doctoral supervisor 
(Pandora, 1997).480 In his scaling work, Thurstone collaborated with pastor Ernest John Chave, 
of the University of Chicago’s Divinity School (Thurstone & Chave, 1929). Beyond this, 
Thurstone was part of a much larger social science community and his influence on those around 
him, especially sociologists and political scientists, was considerable (Bulmer, 1984). The 
                                                
480 The work of the Lynds is ably addressed in Igo (2007). 
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clearest evidence of this impact is in the work of sociologist Samuel Stouffer who would go on 
to a career as a survey researcher and methodologist (Bulmer, 1984; Converse, 1987; Platt, 
1996). Thurstone was not Stouffer’s official advisor, but served as mentor to the young 
sociologist whose dissertation project was clearly influenced by Thurstone’s work and 
departmental debates over the appropriate methodology for sociological research. Although 
taking prohibition as its nominal topic, the project was in reality a comparison of the efficacy of 
scaling versus case study methods, with the department’s best coders enlisted to assist with the 
latter approach (Stouffer, 1930). Stouffer found high agreement between the two methods, but 
scaling’s easier, more efficient process made this mode of evaluation the clear winner. This 
finding by no means resolved disputes over the appropriate methods of sociological research, but 
contributed to the larger trend toward greater quantification within the field in the interwar 
years.481 Thurstone, more generally, was also a contributor to this shift through his statistical 
projects, advocacy of quantification, and lobbying for the purchase of equipment necessary for 
the analysis of large sums of material, all within the context of social science at the University of 
Chicago (Bulmer, 1981, 1984).482 
The social role of the social sciences also changed considerably during the interwar years. 
Rather than confining social scientific work to empirical studies in academic spheres the social 
sciences increasingly took on what sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld termed “administrative research;” 
that is, new forms empirical research that aimed to solve the immediate practical problems of 
government and corporation interests (Converse, 1987; Dehue, 1997; House, Juster, Kahn, 
Schuman, & Singer, 2004; Igo, 2007). Research centres like Survey Research Centre (later the 
                                                
481 For a broader discussion of twentieth century developments in American sociology 
see Haney (2008). 
482 Discussion of the social sciences, especially sociology, during the interwar years can 
be found in Bannister (1987) and Smith (1994). 
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Institute for Social Research) at the University of Michigan, which Likert headed from the mid-
1940s until his retirement in 1970,483 were part of the increasing commodification of social 
science research. Instead of simply putting into practice existing psychological findings these 
kinds of enterprises created their own psychological knowledge de novo in order to meet very 
specific ends. Newly redesigned questionnaires were one method put to use in these new kinds of 
research endeavours. 
 Both Thurstone and Likert revolutionized questionnaire research with their development 
of scaling techniques, but neither dogmatically adopted this mode of investigation. Thurstone 
and his students created numerous attitude scales before he opted to end his pursuit of these 
kinds of inquiries in the early 1930s. Deeming the mass creation of seemingly endless quantities 
of attitude questionnaires unproductive, “incomplete material for a dozen more attitude scales 
was thrown in the wastebasket and I discouraged any further work of that kind in my laboratory” 
(Thurstone, 1952, p. 312).484 Instead, Thurstone turned his attention to more quantitatively 
focused work on factor analysis, as was hinted at in his earlier speculation that scales might be 
derived mathematically through the identification of patterns of responses to attitude questions 
                                                
483 “The Career of Rensis Likert,” Institute for Social Research Newsletter, Winter 1971, 
Box 1, Folder 2, Rensis Likert Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI. 
484 Attitude scales produced by Thurstone in the late 1920s and early 1930s include those 
on Attitudes toward: Patriotism, the Treatment of Criminals, Censorship, Sunday Observance, 
War, Evolution (“Report for the Autumn Quarter, 1931,” Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL), the Church, the Negro, Birth Control, God, the 
United States Constitution, Communism, the Chinese, the Germans, Law, Capital Punishment, 
Patriotism, Public Office (“Report for the Winter Quarter, 1931,” Box 14, Folder 9, University 
of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections Research Center, 
University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL), Prohibition, Capital Punishment, the Chinese, and 
the Constitution of the United States (“Report for the Spring Quarter, 1931,” Box 14, Folder 9, 
University of Chicago Social Science Research Committee Records, Special Collections 
Research Center, University of Chicago Library, Chicago, IL). 
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within large, diverse groups (e.g., Thurstone, 1935, 1947). Likert similarly adopted a variety of 
methodological approaches to social research. In his later work for the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) surveying farmers he came to advocate the use of structured open-ended 
interviewing, rather than questionnaires. He also played a pivotal role in the development of 
modern techniques of sample surveying (Converse, 1987; Platt, 1996).485 Methodological 
diversity was also apparent during his tenure heading the University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Centre. The discipline, in contrast, embraced Likert scales very nearly wholeheartedly.   
Conclusion 
What began in the final decades of the nineteenth century as a means of collecting large 
quantities of descriptive accounts of mental life had, by the 1930s, become a numerically 
oriented practice. This, I argue, constituted a profound shift from thick to thin description (T. M. 
Porter, 2012) in the discipline’s mass data collection endeavours and was accompanied by a 
change in the public’s relationship to this kind of research. The discipline’s moral economy of 
data continued unabated, but took on a more decidedly numerical form. Tests, as tools for 
collecting information on various characteristics of a multitude of individuals, were pervasive by 
the time Thurstone and Likert turned their attention to questionnaires. Developments in this 
realm, notably the use of restricted sets of answers and the emergence of statistical techniques, 
were powerful influences on the reimagining of questionnaires. Although similarly oriented to 
issues of social relevance, these instruments were restricted to the sphere of experts including 
those engaged in more commercially oriented enterprises (Igo, 2007; D. J. Robinson, 1999), 
rather than involving a diverse body of practitioners in the collection process, as had been the 
case in many late nineteenth century projects. At the same time, easily accessibly bodies of 
                                                
485 Further discussion of the USDA’s employment of academic experts in the 1930s can 
be found in Jewett (2013). 
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students were increasingly rendered the default subjects for this research. Despite these 
restrictions on participation, questionnaire research aimed to comment on the broad state of the 
public, particularly its position on prominent social concerns of the day. To do so, it was 
necessary to derive specific findings, something far easier to achieve with the reductive power of 
numbers, than the richly nuanced accounts of personal experience so much a part of earlier 
questionnaire investigations. 
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Conclusion 
At the 1926 gathering of the Experimentalists, held just a year prior to founder Edward 
Titchener’s death, the society unanimously “resolved, that this meeting deplores the increasing 
practice of collecting administrative or supposedly scientific data by way of questionaries; and 
that the meeting deplores especially the practice under which graduate students undertake 
research by sending questionaries to professional psychologists” (D., 1926, p. 468).486 This was 
followed by a note from E. G. Boring (1926) in the next issue of the American Journal of 
Psychology in which he urged psychologists to unburden themselves from their default practice 
of responding to “the promiscuous questionary” (p. 633). Characterizing regular requests for 
information via circulation of these instruments a “nuisance” (Boring, 1926, p. 633), he outlined 
a set of seven criteria for determining when and how to respond when faced with the request to 
complete a questionnaire. More than three decades after James’s (1890e) observation that 
questionnaires “ranked among the common pests of life” (p. 194), the instruments remained as 
bothersome as ever. By the 1920s even psychologists had adopted the practice of using 
questionnaires as a means of collecting information for administrative, rather than research 
purposes. 
Questionnaires are deceptively simple psychological tools. They are, at base, no more than 
a printed list of questions circulated to amass multiple responses. Despite, or perhaps because of, 
this simplicity the questionnaire has become one of psychology’s most used instruments. 
Seemingly any study can benefit from the quick, concise, and easy data collection that a 
questionnaire allows, whether this is of basic demographic details or more pointed information 
                                                
486 The term questionary was often employed by Titchener in reference to questionnaires 
(see Titchener, 1901, pp. 387–8). On the history of the Experimentalists, later the Society of 
Experimental Psychologists, see Boring (1938), and Goodwin (1985, 2005). 
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about some aspect of the participant’s subjectivity.487 Although questionnaires did not originate 
within psychology, the discipline has had a profound influence on the form these tools have 
taken. Likert scales, developed in the 1930s, are now the dominant, if not default, style of 
questionnaire. Used in explicitly psychological research enterprises and in society more broadly, 
these instruments continue to enact a moral economy of data much like the one that governed 
psychology at its very inception as a discipline.  
At the same time, psychology fetishizes experiments as much today as it did in its earliest 
years. Despite this proclivity, much of the research undertaken in the discipline employs other 
kinds of methods. Experiments can reveal causes and, given the right conditions, may produce 
highly generalizable findings. Questionnaires, surveys, and the like provide of means of 
generating very different kinds of knowledge. These instruments tell us not about causes, but 
instead allow us to describe populations and highly particular kinds of problems. Numerical 
Likert scales are one way of accessing this kind of information but, as qualitative researchers can 
attest, their popularity has by no means ridden the field of nuanced description. Thick description 
continues to exist alongside thin.  
Likert scales, while dominant today, were not immediately heralded as the solution to the 
discipline’s difficulties with mass data collection (e.g., Barclay & Weaver, 1962; Butcher, 1956; 
Edwards & Kenney, 1946; Edwards & Kilpatrick, 1948; Ferguson, 1941; Kriedt & Clark, 1949). 
Just how these kinds of questionnaires assumed their current ubiquity remains to be explored. 
Undoubtedly part of this success is rooted in practical considerations. By flattening experience to 
no more than a number on a scale, Likert scales generated information that was far easier to 
                                                
487 Theoretical and critical discussion of the use of rating scales, and self-report data more 
generally, in psychology can be found in Haeffel and Howard (2010), as well as Rosenbaum and 
Valsiner (2011). 
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refine, combine, and plot. Mental life was rendered unidimensional and richly detailed accounts 
were replaced with the simple accounting of more or less on a linear scale. No longer was 
experience in all its diversity the hallmark of questionnaire research. This kind of depiction of 
mental life surely served to create particular kinds of selves and social groupings. The particular 
looping effects at work here (see Pettit, 2013a), are ripe for investigation as means of further 
historicizing the place of questionnaires in twentieth century psychology and society more 
broadly.  
The shape of the public’s engagement in psychological research has changed considerably 
over the discipline’s history. Questionnaires, in particular, have adopted new mediums of 
existence and methods of dissemination. Rather than print requests for information in scientific 
and popular periodicals, as was done in the final decades of the nineteenth century, 
questionnaires are increasingly digital born, able to be accessed and completed on the Internet by 
individuals in many locales. This both simplifies and complicates efforts to amass significant 
quantities of data with questionnaires. At the same time, the move from paper to digital form 
once again altered the relationship of the public to questionnaires, while an attendant interest in 
big data has also influenced the broader collection practices of the discipline.  
In the present moment Big Data is bigger than ever.488 As questionnaire-based endeavours 
in early American psychology attest, big data in this field is not new. Practices of mass data 
collection have been a part of psychology from its very inception and continue in the discipline 
today. Yet, the challenges faced in work with Big Data today are necessarily different from those 
encountered by psychologists in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Engaging directly 
                                                
488 The literature on Big Data is itself massive. A small sampling of recent discussions of 
the subject, both within the history of science and more broadly, includes Boyd and Crawford 
(2012), Crawford, Gray, and Miltner (2014), Jurgenson (2014), Michel and colleagues (2011), 
Stevens (2013), and Weinberger (2011). 
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with big data, especially when experimental manipulations come into play, can be controversial 
as recent response to a psychological experiment involving nearly three-quarter of a million 
unaware Facebook users attests (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014; Verma, 2014). Even in 
circumstances that do not involve these kinds of manipulations, Big Data comes with distinct 
challenges even with advances in techniques of data collection and analysis. New means of 
synthesizing great masses of material have, in some respects, taken us further than ever from 
meaningful findings. Just as in questionnaire researchers’ earliest efforts to produce coherence 
from great masses of descriptive material, the meaning in the mass often remains elusive today. 
Important questions regarding the continuing collection practices of psychology, especially in the 
realm of Big Data, remain: What does collecting masses of material entail in our increasingly 
digital age? How does the public figure into this kind of collection? And how do individuals 
understand themselves in relation to work rooted in forms of Big Data that purport to include 
them? 
This dissertation has spanned more than fifty years of disciplinary history to elucidate the 
changing character of the questionnaire in American psychology. In doing so, I have argued that 
a natural historical orientation has figured into psychological practice from the field’s inception. 
This orientation facilitated a moral economy of data, wherein the objects and practices valued in 
the discipline are ones related to mass data collection. The privileging of data eventually fostered 
a move from the collection masses of descriptive material, of the kind central to early 
questionnaire endeavours, to the numerical forms of data produced by Likert scales. This was a 
shift from thick to thin description. In the process, questionnaire research’s relationship with the 
public also changed. In the discipline’s earliest questionnaire investigations members of the 
public were often integral to, though never full participants in, the research process. By the 
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1920s, the public was no longer invited to engage with questionnaire research in this way. 
Instead, these instruments increasingly served as means by which to make pronouncements about 
the state of the public across various domains.  
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